ML20205K788
| ML20205K788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1986 |
| From: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hood D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8603050519 | |
| Download: ML20205K788 (3) | |
Text
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j mew 0RANDUM FOR:
Darl Hood, Senior Pro, ject Manager PWD Project Directorate *4 p
Division of PWR Licensing-A g8 a g 's UQ FROM:
Charles E. Rossi Assistant Director Division of PWR Licensing-A
SUBJECT:
CODDFCTIONS TO THE MCGUIRE SAFETY PAPAMETER risplAY SYSTEM SER Plant Name:
McGuire. Units 1 and ?
Utility:
Duke Power Company Docket No.:
50-369/370 Licansino Status:
OR Desconsible Directorate:
PO #4/0PL A Proinct Manager:
Darl Hood Deview Branch:
EICSR/DPL-A Review Status:
Open items in SER in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the McGuira l' nits 1 and 2 Safety Parameter Otsplay System (SPOS) that was transmitted to vou in.lanuary, the staff inadvertently amitted scene information about the results of our review of the licenset's mst r'
't submittal (November 27,1985). The omissions are described in thr s low e.
They should be transmitted to the licensee as senn as possible. Ple e rote that these addenda do not change the staff's conclu-sinns regarding the McGuire 1&2 SPDS. i.e.
that the McGuire SPOS daes not fully satisfy the provisions of Supplement I to NUREG-0737
'C/
/s/
C. E. Rossi. Assistant Director Division of PWR Licansing-A Ecclosure:
As stated cc (with enclosuras):
Distribution:
D. Crutchfield rJecument Control 016 G. Lainas ETCSB Rdo.
B. 1 Yr.unablood G. Lapinsky (PFlf M T. Spets F. Orr V. Benaroya S. Weiss D.
Eckenende F. Rosa J. Joyce C. E. Onssi R. Liner. SAIC McGuire S/F
Contact:
G. Lapinsky. F06/DPA Ip X78166 /f
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O ENCLOSURE 1 CORRECTIONS TO THE MCGUIRE 1A2 SER CONCERNING THE 5AFETY PADAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM The following text was inadvertently v.itted from the SER for the McGuire 1&?
SPDS:
o Page 2, line 13; after the sentence ending "... August 13,19P5 (Ref.11)"
insert the followino sentence:
'l A final request (Ref. I?1 was responded to by DPC on November 27, 1985 (Ref. 6),
o Page 5, line 5; after the sentence ending "...but does not specify hot leg temperature" insert the following paragraph:
in its most recent submittal (Ref.' 6) the licensee states that wide range hot leg RTDs are utilized as inputs to monitor subcooling.
The staff-finds this position unacceptable because specific, actual values are not displayed.
It is the staff's opinion that the current value of hot leg temperature must be displayed in order for an operator to accuratelv' assess whether natural circulation can be initiated and maintained as a mode of heat removal, o Pace 5, line 16; after the sentence ending "...and/or their steamlines are isolated" insert the following paragraph:
1 1
In Reference 6 the licensee states that loss of RHR flow will result in a loss of RCS inventory and a reduction in core cooling.
Although 1
this may be true, it does not address the staff's concern, i.e., the viability of the heat transfer orncess (rather than the effects of that process). Nor did the licensee's response address the staff's concern about monitoring radiation release paths, in particular the status of the steam lines and steam generators.
DPC has limited its thinking about SPDS to actions in p' ant emergency procedures.
Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 calls for the SPDS to be available for continuous assessment of plant safety status during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions.
It also calls for information to be provided relevant to Radioactivity Control.
Since the McGuire SPDS does not provide some measure of Steam Generator Radiation, the staff concludes that these provisions of Supplement I have not been fully satisfied.
For example, if after a steam oenerator tube rupture incident, it was deemed necessary to 4
f unisolate the faulted steam generator, how could the operator assess the SG radiation status to ascertain the advisability of such action and determine the appropriate disposition of SG fluid?
O 2
o Page 5, line 22; after the sentence ending "... assurance of centainment -
integrity' insert the following paracraph:
In its response to the staff's questions on this subject (Ref. 6), the licensee stated that the status of containment isniation can be varified at any time by checking the monitor light panels in the control roon.
The staff finds this reasoning unacceptable. Assumedly, most important variables that are displayed on the SPDS are also displayed and verift-able on existing control panels.
This should be true if the design basis of the control room was comprehensive and correct.
The SPOS is not in-tended to replace control room indications, it is. intended to gather together important indications so that thel, can be observed concurrently in a concise display.
The monitor light panels referred to in the licensee's response do not provide this capability.
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