ML20205J155
| ML20205J155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/22/1976 |
| From: | Karen Chapman NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | National Resources Defense Council |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205J149 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904090200 | |
| Download: ML20205J155 (10) | |
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Dear Sirs:
1976, This is in response to your petition of February 2, captioned " Petition for Adoption of Emergency Safeguard Measures or, Alternatively, for Revocation of Licenses."
Your petition concerns the sixteen commercial licensees who strategic are presently authorized to possess and transport quantities of special nuclear material, two exempt freight forwarders, and one common carrier with approved transpor-tation plans. The licensees work with special nuclear materials -- subject to NRC regulations -- for a variety of purposes, but primarily for the production of reactor fuel for U. S. naval vessels and for energy research and develop-ment projects. Based upon your assessment of what you have termed the " maximum credible threat of theft," your petition asks, among other things, for immediate implementation of l You ask, in the alter-
" emergency safeguards measures."
native, that these outstanding licenses be summarily re-voked, and that federal authorities take immediate posses-
-sion of the special nuclear material.
Your petition was addressed to the Commission and, as appropriate, to me as Director of the Office of NuclearYour petition was p Material Safety and Safeguards.
published in the Federal Register with an invitation for submission of public comment. 41 Fed. Reg. 5357.
Recog-nizing your petition to be, in substance, a request for the enforcement action pursuant to 10 CPR 2.206 and 2.202, 1976, with Commission referred it to me on February 4,
- instructions to consider it and all conments provided thereon.
In the interim, the Commission instructed my Office to continue our comprehensive review of safeguards a review measures at the licensee facilities in question, tiy office already underway when your petition was filed.
was also instructed to continue to take any actions within our delegated authority deemed necessary to meet regulatory responsibilities, and to promptly inform the Commission 9904090200 760324 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR ,.
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l Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 2 whether any special regulatory action by it is warranted The prior to a determination of the merits of the petition.
Commission directed me to make that determination as soon as feasible following receipt of public comments.
1 My office immediately reviewed your petition and determined that it contained no information that was not already known to us. On that basis and on the basis of the information then'available to us from our on-going review of the facili-ties in question and other sources, I advised the Commission by memorandum dated February 11, 1976, that there was no basis for immediate imposition of the kinds of " emergency safeguards measures" contemplated by your petition. A copy of that memorandum was placed in the Commission's Public Document Room and another copy is enclosed for your refer-ence. Since that time, we have reviewed and evaluated comments from other interested persons and organizations and from the potentially affected licensees of special nuclear materials; these comments have been placed in the Public Document Room. We have also evaluated additional infor-mation now available to us from our on-going review of I am now in a position to potentially affected facilities.
make my determination with respect to your requests for enforcement actions, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206(b).
Your specific requests for actionYou areask, set first, forth infor paragraph an 7, pp. 10-12 of your petition.
immediate review of the adequacy of safeguard programs to '
protect against theft at facilities licensed to possess strategic quantities of special nuclear material. Such a review was underway before your petition was filed and is continuing.
N N The crux of your request, as I understand it, is for im-mediate implementation of " emergency safeguard measures" at licensee facilities, which you suggest might include dis-patchment of U.S. Marshals to protect such f acilitics, elimination of transportation of special nuclear material, other than that essential to national defense, and use of U.S. Marshals to accompany necessary national defense ship-ments. In' the alternative, if the emergency measures you
-suggest cannot be quickly implemented or can be implemented only with undue difficulty or expense, you ask that the outstanding licenses authorizing possession of strategic quantities of special nuclear materials be summarily re-voked, and that the material be recaptured by federal
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 3 authorities. For the reasons that follow, and on the basis of relevant information presently available to me, I have determined that there is no factual or Icgal basis for granting these requests for summary action.
As I am sure you are aware, I do not possess unfettered discretion to impose additional requirements on outstanding licenses or to modify or revoke such licenses solely on the basis of your organization's perception of where the public interest lies. On the contrary, my authority to proceed under 10 CFR 2.202 is circumscribed by the terms of that regulation and by established principles of law. I note that your principal emergency measure suggestion -- dis-patchment of U.S. Marshals to licensed facilities - is clearly beyond my authority and that of the Nuclear Regu-latory Commission. The U.S. Marshals are supervised and directed by the Attorney General and it does not appear that the authority of the Marshals would extend to protection of privately owned businesses under existing law. In this ,
connection, I refer you to the provisions of section 569 of l Title 28 of the United States Code. More importantly, your petition does not allege, and information presently available to us does not disclose, any substantial violations ofINRC regulations. Apart from such violation situations, am authorized to proceed summarily under 10 CFR 2.202 in excep-tional situations, including those involving immediate hazards to public health or safety, but only whereInthere is a sub-my judgment, stantial factual basis for such action.
that necessary factual basis is lacking in this case. Pur-suant to 2.206 (b), it is my decision not to insitute any L proceedings with respect to your requests for emergency
\ measures or summary revocation actions. For the reasons given hereafter, I believe that the present safeguards pro-grams of the licensees in question are adequate to provide a reasonable assurance of public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense and security.
In rejecting your requests for emergency measures and summary revocation actions, I do not mean to imply that there is no legitimate basis for concern about the adequacy of present safeguards. I am concerned about their adequacy, I know that more can be done particularly in this area,for the future.and I believe that my office will be proposing I
significant new regulatory requirements in the near future, l
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both with reference to specific sites and c;enerally appli-cable requirements. The development of more refined safe-guards criteria and standards is the principal purpose of our on-going reviews and studies. In my judgment, however, the precipitous actions you request are unnecessary and fail to take into account the competing interests of the. licensees and the broader public interests involved. I will summarize the basis for my judgment with reference to the present factual situation, current regulatory requirements, and the actions we are taking pursuant to our Congressional safe-j guards mandate.
l Today's licensed nuclear power industry is one which depends upon low-enriched uranium; that is, uranium enriched to approximately three percent in the fissile uranium 235 isotope. The current industry consists of fifty-seven licensed power reactors (one operating on high-enriched uranium) and nine low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facilities. A nuclear explosive cannot be nade of such low-enriched uranium, although it is classified for regulatory l I
purposes as "special nuclear material. '
There are sixteen licensees in the private sector who are authorized to possess strategic quantities of p]utonium and high-enriched uranium. These kinds of special nuclear material, if stolen in sufficient quantities, ould be fashioned into a crude nuclear explosive, if ti.e thieves had .
the requisite technical skill and equipment.
The greatest percentage of this high-enriched uranium is ;
government-owned and is being processed in licensed facili- I ties for national security programs. High-enriched uranium for commercial purposes (about sin percent of the total ,
l quantity in the private sector) is mostly in storage vaults and is likely to stay there unless additional high tempera-A small ture gas-cooled reactors are built and operated.
amount of high-enriched uranium is being used to fabricate research reactor fuel.
About half of the plutonium in commercial plants is govern-ment-owned. Certain licensed facilities process plutonium for development programs related to the liquid metal fast breeder reactor.
Otherwise, the material is being used in small quantities for R&D purposes or is in vault storage.
Thus, the amount of special nuclear material, plutonium and high-enriched uranium, being used outside national security
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 5 programs is very small and at this time is largely in vault storage.
Each firm licensed to possess specified quantities of high-enriched uraniun or plutonium (substantially less than the amount necessary to make an explosive device) must comply with published safeguards requirements. A copy of One these of regulations (10 CFR Part 73) is attached hereto.
these requires that a physical protection plan be submitted to the NRC for approval. The plan must demonstrate how the licensee will protect his plant against sabotage and the strategic materials in his possession against theft. The NRC promulgates regulations and imposes license conditions to make it clear to the licensee what he Sunnarizing is expectedthese to do in order to obtain and keep a license.
requirements briefly, the URC safeguards program requires f that the licensee employ safeguards measures in depth, l including on-site armed guards with access to law enforce-ment agencies; intrusion alarms backed un by structural exit l
j barriers; access controls over limited access areas; searches; and material control and accounting. l Theft of' plutonium by an employee would be extremely diffi- f cult to accomplish. As I mentioned earlier, most of the j
material now present in the private sector is in vault The l I
storage and essentially inaccessible to a lone insider.
material not in storage is handled or processed in enclosed, Individuals i sealed containment or glove box process lines. '
are not allowed to work unobserved in areas housing these process lines, nor can a single individual make an authorized If, under the scrutiny removal of material from such lines.
of his fellow employees, an individual is able to circumvent these measures, remove material, and conceal it on his person, he would still be subject to an exit search. As a check on the performance of safeguards, bi-monthly inventories are conducted to assure material has not been stolen.
An outside intruder must either force an entry at an access point which is manned by an armed guard or attempt covert entry. To gain entrance covertly, the intruder must surmount located and the the fence line'where intrusion alarms are walls of the building housing the nuclear materials. Such buildings present significant delay times to anyone attempting !
to breach them since they are of substantial construction. ;
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Natpral Resources Defense Council, Inc. 6 Any time strategic quantities of special nuclear material are shipped, plans are made before the shipment takes place.
Routes are chosen to bypass areas of natural disaster or where civil disorder might occur. The shipment is picked up at the shipper's plant at a pre-arranged time by the convoy personnel, including armed guards, responsible for carrying and protecting the shipment. The material itself has already been assayed and placed into a safe container with tamper-indicating seals attached. During the shipment no intermediate stops are made to pick up or drop off other cargo. Periodic radio-telephone calls are made to report progress of the shipment. After arrival at the receiver's plant, the seals are checked, the nuclear material is unloaded and NRC and the shipper are notified. Within a short time of receipt, the receiver assays the material to verify the quantity of nuclear material shipped.
The NRC is continuously upgrading its safeguards requirements and has under consideration several changes to its present regulations to further protect against theft. One of these changes, relating to in-transit security, has been issued for It would require greater public comment. 39 Fed. Reg. 40036.
numbers of armed guards to accompany certain shipments of strategic material. A regulation change to require an NRC I security clearance for employees in certain job functions involving access to strategic material is now being developed by the NRC staff.
NRC has a program of inspection and enforcement to ensure that licensees comply with its safeguards requirements. If items of noncompliance are found, the licensee is expected to take prompt corrective action. If the situation warrants it, the NRC can assess a civil penalty and/orFormodify, suspend example, or revoke a license for failure to comply.
civil penalties were imposed on two licensees for failures !
to make timely implementation of upgraded safeguards re- j quirements made effective in 1974. l In attempting to assess the present level of the threat some posed by posrible theft of special nuclear Priormaterial, to 1970, threat l historical perspective is necessary. '
of public harm as related to licensed nuclear facilities was considered primarily in terms of industrial sabotage which could endanger the public health and safety through dispersal of radioactive material. A panel of experts reviewing
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safeguards for the AEC in 1967 also expressed some concern that a black market might develop for low-enriched uranium.
But the Atomic Energy Commission rejected the contention that licensed facilities should be required to maintain safeguards capable of withstanding a military attack, and that determination was upheld in court in [iegel,v. AEC, 400 P.2d 778 (C . A . D. C . 1968).
In the 1970-74 period, greater emphasis began to be given to the possibility that a terrorist group might attempt to to steal an amount of special nuclear material sufficient fashion a crude nuclear explosive in order to achieve its ends, be they political, social, or financial. Two factors which directed increased attention to this consideration were the increase in terrorist violence and the possibility that plutonium might play a larger part in the fuel cycle for power reactors. Reacting to this concern, the AEC significantly strengthened its safeguards regulations. in Additional requirementu were published for public comment i February 1973 and issued in effective form in November 1973, with industry being required to meet them by the spring of 1974. Imprcvements have been made in safeguards on a con-tinuous basis since that time.
In the past year, my office and other elements in the Commission have conducted and have on-going extensive studies dealing with the problem of threat. Me have utilized expert contractors and consultants, and our people have worked extensively with others in Federal, state, and local law enforcement communi ties. Keeping in mind that in over 20 years of industry ucilization of nuclear materials, not one member of the public has been injured by the theft and subsequent misuse of such materials, I believe the threat of nuclear material theft or sabotage can be characterized today as follows:
There is no information available to us which indicates '
that any group is planning an act of thef tthis or sabotage time.
against the licensed nuclear industry at Nevertheless, there is a continuing potential for t
insiders to execute malevolent acts or to provide l
! assistance to outsiders in the execution of acts which could harm the public.
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Furthermore, there are organizations with malevolent intent which could develop the capability to carry out operations against the licensed nuclear power industry.
Our studies have concluded that there is evidence to support the possibility that present threat groups may be highly i motivated and diciplined, well equipped and financed, well {
j trained, and well prepared to execute the tasks they have selected.
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llistorical data on the size of terrorists groups indicates 1 that terrorists assault groups larger than six persons are not likely to be formed. We have examined over 4000 in-cidents of terrorism and other antisocial behavior and were able to find 1271 cases where the number of perpetrators could be identified. The number of incidents involving groups of more than six persons account for only about 2.5 percent of the cases. Groups with as many as twelve persons have been very rare. By far the largest percentage (86t) involved groups of three persons or fewer.
There have been no instances of armed attack on United States nuclear facilities in the 20-plus years they have been operating. We have records of the types of violence and threats of violence which the licensed nuclear industry has experienced. These records show that during the three-year period after 1969, there were increasing numbers of bomb threats, hoaxes against power reactor sites and associated industry and education facilities, along with'other acts of harassment. Since 1972, there has been a fairly constant number of hoaxes. In concert with other government agencies we are continuing to record and examine such incidents, in order to track the data, observe whether trends are develop-ing, and analyze such trends to determine their relevance, if any.
The exact threat then, to summarize, cannot be predicted with confidence, since it is an inherently uncertain problem By its very and history is an unsure guide to the future.is much more judgmental nature, the assessment of this threat that the kinds of risk assessments the NRC is able to make with respect to reactor safety questions. In this regard, I
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believe that your " maximum credible threat" concept, which is you would analogize to quantifiable safety assessments, unsound.
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l l My assessment of the threat, based on currently available l
evidence, expert opinion and our collective judgment is that an attack on nuclear facilities would likely stem from a relatively small number of persons, possibly aided by an insider. Present nuclear industry security measures are expected to deter most attacks and to prevent the success of such attacks as are attempted. It should be noted that the nuclear industry has customarily taken the approach of going beyond the normal precautions taken elsewhere in society in facing uncertain contingencies. The same conservative i approach is being taken in nuclear safeguards, to the extent that we believe the total safeguards system for the indus-try, including on-site and off-site security forces, can protect against theft or sabotage attempts by groups larger than those thought to constitute the most likely threat.
Concerns about the adequacy of safeguards properly tend to focus more on possible future wide-scale use of plutonium than upon its present limited use. The question of whether low-enriched uranium fuel for commercial reactors might be supplemented in the future with recycled plutonium is under consideration. The Commission's procedures for resolving this complex issue were announced recently. 40 Fed. Reg. 53056. If, after the careful review now in progress, this is allowed to occur, plutonium will be recovered from spent reactor fuel and processed into mixed uranium / plutonium reactor fuel. The advent of wide-scale plutonium recycle would increase the quantities of this material handled in the private sector. For planning purposes, design threat l levels and safeguards measures to protect against them are j being evaluated in a safeguards supplement to an environ-mental impact statement on plutonium recycle. This safe-guards supplement is scheduled for release by the Commission Public hearings will be !
for comment some time this spring. '
held on the supplement before any final decision is reached.
Your organization will have the opportunity to participate in those proceedings.
Use of Federal guard forces to perform safeguards functions has been considered in an intensive NRC study specifically required under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. While the study report, which is to be submitted to Congress in the near future, is not yet in final form, the NRC does not envision recommending at this time any major change in the ,
allocation of guard responsibilities between the Federal and l l
private sectors, contrary to your suggested deployment of
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t Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 10 You attached to your petition an internal memorandum dated January 19, 1976, f rom Carl II. Builder, Director of the Division of Safeguards of this office, to Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Safeguards, entitled " Adequacy of Current Safeguards." That memorandum expresses Mr. Builder's concern that safeguards at currently licensed facilities may not be adequate against design threats now being considered for future safeguards programs. Mr. Builder has read your petition and my response to it. lie concurs in my determination that your requests for emergency and summary action are not warranted by the evidence presently availabic.
The Commissioners have not participated in the making of this determination under 10 CFR 2.206(b), which is based solely on the investigation and recommendations of the staff, and my judgment.
Sincerely, j
) l Kenneth R. Chapman, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
- 1. Cy memo, 2/11/76, Chapman to Commission
- 2. 10 CFR Part 73 l
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