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Forwards Petition for Adoption of Emergency Safeguards Measures Or,Alternatively,For Revocation of Licenses
	ML20205H962
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse, Erwin, 07000754, BWX Technologies, 07000734, 07000008, 07000364, 07000925, 07000371, Framatome ANP Richland, 05000135, 07000135, 07000033, Wood River Junction, 07001319, 07001143
Issue date:	02/02/1976
From:	Speth J; National Resources Defense Council
To:	Chilk S; NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
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ML20205H965	List: ML20205H962; ML20205J022;
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	NUDOCS 9904090129
	Download: ML20205H962 (6)
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4 Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc.

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Samuel J. Chilk 9;

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not=ri nserord Secretary to the Commission Dr.7mEum U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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.e 8"u.'u'". aspr "m' D*88Dear Mr. Chilks I

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Enclosed are six copies of the Natural Resources Defense Council's Petition for Adoption of Emergency Safeguard Measures or, Alternatively, for Revocation of Licenses.

I would appreciate it if you would file copies of this document with the Commission and with the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

In light of the urgent nature of the requests in the petition, we respectfully request that action on the petition be taken 4 M iately.

Sincerely, 9904090129 760202 PDR ADOCK 07000008 i

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J.G. Speth Attorney for Petitioner Enclosures i-2.-7L m y- % em u n-a A.ftw p.. q e f--

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BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA b

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A co In the matter of NRC Dkt. Nos.:

LICENSEES AUTI!ORIZED TO

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70-8 70-754 HOLD OR TRANSPORT

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70-27 70-820 STRATEGIC QUANTITIES OF

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70-33 70-925 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS i

70-135 70-1143 70-143 70-1151 70-364 70-1257 70-371 70-1319 70-734 et al.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL PETrtION FOR ADOPTION OF EMERGENCY SAFEGUARD MEASURES OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR REVOCATION OF LICENSES Petitioner Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., hereby requests the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, as appropriate, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards to act immediately to implement emergency safeguard measures which can assure that strategie quantities of special nuclear material (SNM) currently held

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or transported by licensees are protected, with an ample margin of

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safety, against the maximum credible threat of theft.

AlternativeI.y, if such emergency safeguards cannot be devised or implemented effec-tively and immediately, either generally or with regard to particular

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The scope of this petition is limited to those facilities and

,activities covered by 10 CFR S 73.~1 and not exempt under 10 CFR S 73.6.

St rat cgi c on n Mtic" of rpecial nuc1 car material as used herein is anrinna in a ++,,- k m.*

^ +o this petition.

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' facilities, petitioner requests, except in those instances where considerations of national defense require otherwise, that licenses or portions of licenses authorizing the possession or transportation of strategic quantities of special nuclear material be revoked

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forthwith and that federal authorities take immediate possession of such special nuclear material.

In support of this request, petitioner states as follows:

1.

Numerous private corporations currently hold materials licenses and other licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which authorize the possession and transportation of strategic quantities of unirradiated special nuclear materials within the United States.

Certain of these licenses are identified in Attach-ment A to this petition.

Pursuant to these licenses, thousands of kilograms of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are now held, processed and transported within the United States by private cor-porations.

2.

Under the Atomic Energy Act and the rules and decisions thereunder, the Commission can issue a license authorizing the possession of special nuclear material only upon making a "defini-tive finding" that safeguards to prevent the theft of such materials l

l are adequate to protect against the maximum cradible threat of theft.

In Power Reactor Development Co. v. Electrical Union, 367 U.S.

396, 398, 407 (1961), the Supreme Court noted that the Commission's i

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l obligation to protect the health and safety of the public requires l

l that the agency make a " definitive finding of safety" at the time it authorizes operation of nuclear power reactors.

An analogous obligation is imposed in the context of licenses to possess special nucicar materials by 42 U.S.C.

S 2077, which requires that the Commission "shall not"* issue a SNM license which "would be inimical to the common defense and security or would constitute an unreason-able risk to the health and safety of the public."

See also 10 CFR 5 70. 61(b).

3.

Numerous studies have been recently conducted assessing the nature and size of the threat that might confront a licensee holding special nuclea'r materials.

One such study is the Security Agency Study required by Section 204 (b) (2) (C) of the Energy Reorgani-zation Act of 1974, the draft Executive Summary of which states as follows:

" Congressional concern for adequate safeguards was heightened as a result of a special safeguards study done for the Atomic Energy Commission in 1974.

That study, by David Rosenbaum and others,

. described a variety of potential problems and short comings in the area of nuclear safeguards and made recommendations for their solution.

i "The Rosenbaum report expressed concern about the l

adequacy of protection afforded SNM by the private industrial security systems of licensees.

One aspect l

of concern was the level of threat to facilities and SNM.

The authors postulated a maximum credible threat consisting of 15 highly trained men, three of whom might be " insiders", employed by the licensee target firm."

" Threats to nuclear facilities and material can come from external or internal sources.

External threats would include overt acts of theft and sabotage.

They span a scale ranging from mischief and minor nuisance through coordinated attacks, which at some point would take on the character of civil war.

Internal threats are most often postulated as being covert and might involve diversion of material, the perpetration of hoaxes and, perhaps, sabotage.

They span a scale from minor pilferage by individuals, through collusion, all the way through revolutionary conspiracies, in which entire plants might be covert]y controlled.

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, "To estimate the credible threat, the office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards researched 19 relevant studies and conducted 9 interviews with indisiduals and groups of professional analysts from the FBI, the intelligence community, the Department of Defense and State and local law enforcement agen-cies.

"What emerged from this was a consensus estimate that an external threat group will probably number about 6-8 persons and very likely not exceed 12 persons.

" Interviews and studies yielded less upon which to base estimates of threats internal to the industry.

In general, the internal threat was characterized as follows:

o one person operating alone will probably remain undetected.

o Instances of collusion involving 2-3 persons have been encountered in industry.

o Most hijackings involve internal collusion.

o Key internal persons can be influenced by threats against their families or other forms of blackmail.

As a result, a credible internal threat, for safeguards purposes, is estimated to consist of 2-3 persons in col-lusion. "

Similarly, the January 19, 1976, memorandum of Carl H.

Builder, Director, Division of Safeguards, to Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Safeguards, states:

"The design threats in the safeguards supplement to GESMO are divided into an internal (diversion) and an external (assault) threat.

Many parameters or considerations must be taken into account in describ-ing or specifying such threats.

To simplify these

. descriptions, we have assumed that all of these para-meters (e. g., motivation, training, arms, equipment, employment position, etc.) are fixed at worst-case values with respect to safeguards, and that the only remaining variable is the number of people involved in the threat.

For a nominal or baseline threat, as a point of departure, we have assumed that the internal and external threats are two and six persons, respective-ly.

The range of numbers sugg'ested by threat researchers, expert opinion, and partisan comments generally lie within a factor'of two, up and down, from this baseline specification."

In sum, these studies indicate that an attempt to steal plu-tonium or highly enriched uranium from licensed facilities or while in transit by a group of 12-15 armed outsiders or 3-4 industry employees in collusion should be considered a credible possibility.

Review and assessment of these studies and other studies may indi-cate that the maximum credible threat is in fact significantly larger or otherwise more serious.

4.

The January 19, 1976, memorandum of Carl H. Builder, referenced in paragraph 3 supra and attached hereto as Attachment B, assesses the adequacy of the safeguards now applied at currently licensed facilities as follows:

"over the past six months, I have been questioned several times as to the adequacy of current safe-guards.

I have replied that I was not in a position to judge current safeguards as adequate or inadequate until we had logically structured both the safeguards problem and our approach to solutions.

Only then, I argued, would we understand the measures by which we could judge the adequacy of safeguards.

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"If safeguards are not adequate againct the lowest levels of design threat that have been suggested, then we must logically conclude that such safeguards are inadequate, quite apart from the uncertainty we may accept about what constitutes adequate safeguards.

I am concerned that some or even many of our currently licensed facilities may not have safeguards which are adequate against the lowest levels of design threat we are considering in GESMO.

"The lowest levels of design threat being considered in GESMO are, for an internal threat, one person and, for an external threat, three persons.

I don't know of any serious suggestion that these levels are too high and that we should consider even lower levels as design threats for adequate safeguards."

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the principal source of Commission expertise on the question of safeguards has indicated that he is "not in a position" to make

, a definitive finding that currently licensed facilities are adequate-ly safeguarded and, indeed, that he is " concerned that some or even many currently licensed facilities" are not protected against even very small threats -- threats far less serious than the maximum credible threat.

5.

The concerns expressed in the Builder Memorandum regarding the inadequacy of current safeguard practices confirm the conclusions

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of numerous independent experts.

Thus, Dr. Theodore B.

Taylor, a l

i safeguards authority and consultant to the NRC, testified in his December 10, 1975 statement before the Committee on Energy and I

Diminishing Materials of the California State Assembly as follows:

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"Present U.S'.

safeguarda applied to commercial plutonium and highly enriched uranium are not ade-quate to provent theft by heavily armed groups with resources and motivation comparable to the Brinks

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gang and other groups of professional criminals

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l that have carried out successful major robberies in the past.

Though not routinely recycled in power plants, plutonium for commercial R&D purposes is now stored and transported in. substantial quantities, annual shipments amounting to at least several hun-dred kilograms.per year."

Similarly, the Special Safeguards Study ("Rosenbat$m Report") pre-pared by Atomic Energy Commission consultants and released April 29, l

1974, concluded:

j "In recent years the factors which make safeguards a real, imminent and vital issue have changed rapidly for the worse, Terrorists groups have increased their professional skills, intelligence networks, finances and level of armaments throughout the world."

"The factors involved in preventing the illegal ac-quisition of special nuclear material and the subsequent manufacture of nuclear weapons have received a great deal less attention than those associated with power plant accidents.

The relevant regulations are far less strin-gent and we feel they are entirely inadequate to meet the threat.

The seriousness of the problem demands a clear commitment by the AEC to bring the risk to the public from safeguards problems down to the level of public risk associated with the operation of nuclear power plants."

(Emphasis supplied.)

6.

The possibility that nuclear weapons materials now held by U.S. corporations under NRC licenses might be stolen and i

used is real and substantial.

Terrorist activity and other forms 1

i of anti-social violence are an almost daily occurrence.

In the

r pAqsent age of sophisticated criminal organizations, bombs and bomb threats, of aircraft hijacking, of the ransom of diplomats and the murder of Olympic athletes, the risks of nuclear theft, blackmail l

I and terrorism should not be minimized.

A criminal or terrorist l

group, using information and equipment that are widely available, l

could design and build a crude nuclear bomb which could be carried in,an' automobile and could explode with a yield equal to at least i

100 tons of high explosive.

A recent report to the NRC by the Mitre Corporation, The Threat To Licensed Nuclear Facilities (MTR-7022, September 1975), reached the fcilowing conclusions:

l "The only prudent prediction is that there will continue to be international operations by most of the presently active terrorist organizations through-out-the world; that new ones will spring into exis-tence, sometimes without any warning before their first dramatic strike; and that some of these groups, driven by ideology, need for political leverage on

'the United States, or desperation, may choose the United States, and perhaps licensed nuclear facilities, l

as a target."

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" Organized crime in the United States has demon-l strated the capacity to execute complicated actions l

with planning, coordination, secrecy, patience, and i

whatever level of force and armament is necessary to accomplish the job.

They are interested solely in acquiring more money and power for themselves and there is no evidence that they have or ever had any motivation such as patriotism.

They are involved in almost all the hijacking that goes on in the United States, and have been able to exert considerable control over substantial parts o'f industry, labor, and government.

Their business is often international and they have longstanding and secure links in Europe, the Middle East,. Latin America, and the Far East.

There is little question that, for a sdfficient amount of money, t

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members of organized crime would take a contract to l

acquiro special nuclear material for another party.

[A] large proportion of their operations involve l

l cooperation from people inside their target 7.

In light of the foregoing, the Commission should conclude that an adequate basis does not now exist for finding that currently l

applied safeguards are adequate to protect against the theft of strate-gic quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium now in the possession of licensees.

Both the Director of the NRC's Safeguards Division and the agency's consultants are unable to make a definitive

' finding that current safcguards are adequate.

Yet, unless the Commission can make such a definitive finding of safety regarding these licenses, the Commission's obligation to the public requires that such licenses be revoked forthwith.

Accordingly, petitioner urges the Commission and, as appropriate, the Director of Nuclear Material Safeguards and Safety (a) to review immediately the safeguard programs of all facilities licensed to possess strategic x

N; quantities of special nuclear material in order to identify all such facilities for which existing safeguards are inadequate to protect, with an ample margin of safety, against the maximum credible threat of theft.. The determination of an ample margin of safety is essential in light of existing uncertainties regarding the upper limit of the maximum credibic thrcat.

This review might reveal 4

that all such facilities are inadequately safe-guarded.

(b) to develop and impicmont on an expedited basis emergency safeguards which can assure with an ample margin of safety that strategic quantities of speciai nuclear material held by licensees i

are protected against the maximum credible theft threat.

Such emergency safeguards might include, among others, the following:

(1) immediate dispatchment of forces from the U.S. Marshals Service to appropriate fixed sites; (2) curtailment of relevant licensee activities at fixed sites where consistent with national defense considerations; (3) elimination of all transportation of strategic quantities of special nuclear material other than that essential to national de.fense; and (4) where transportation of such special nucipar material is essential to l

national defense, use of forces from the U.S. Marshals Service to accompany shipments.

l (c) to revoke outstanding licenses which authorize the possession of strategic quantities of special l

nuclear material, and to recover such material immediately, if safeguards meeting the standard set out in subparagraph (b) supra are not now in place and (1-) cannot be devised or implemented quickly and effectively or (2) can be implemented only with undue difficulty or expense.

8.

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York.

It is a national environmental protection organization with more than 20,000 members in 50 states.

One of NRDC's major objec-tives is to protect its members and the public from the risks and other consequences of nuclear power development, including the risks associated with the theft or diversion of special material from licensed facilities or with attacks directed against such facilities.

NRDC's interests and those it its members and the public are adversely affected by the activities of private corporations carried out pur-suant to the licenses referred to herein.

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully urges that the requests made herein be granted without delay.

, Respectfully submitted:

Of Counsel:

J.G.

Speth Anthony Z.

Roisman Natural Resources Defense Counc;1 1712 N Street, N.W.

917 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 Washington, D.C.

20005 (202) 737-5000 Attorney for Petitioner February 2, 1976 a

l ATTACHMENT A Companies Having Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licenses To Possess Strategic Quantities Of Spccial Nucicar Material */ (SNM) (Covered Undcr 10 CFR Part 73) At Fixcd Sites **/

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Sites Operations 1.

Babcock and Wilcox Fabricates mixed oxide i

Nuclear Materials Division (plutonium) fuel for light 609 North Warren Avenue water reactors and for the Apollo, Penn.

15613 breeder reactor R&D program.

Parks. Township facility Docket No.70-364 License No. SNM-414 2.

Babcock and Wilcox Fabricates uranium fuel for Nuclear Materials Division commercial reactors (may be 609 North Warren Avenue low enriched uranium only).

Apollo, Penn.

15613 Apollo facility ~

Docket No.70-135 License No. SNM-145 3.

Babcock and Wilcox Fabricates naval reactor Naval Nuclear Fuel Division fuel.

P.O. Box 785 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 Docket No. 70-27 License No. SNM-42

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Strategic quantities of special nuclear material (SNM) are either uranium-235 (containing uranium enriched to 20% or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium, or any combination of these materials which is 5 kilograms or more computed by the formula, kilograms = (kilograms containing U-235) plus 2.5 times (grams U-233 plus grams plutonium).

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Status as of January, 1976.

Not all facilities holding such licenses are listed.

Information on nature of operations is in-complete.

Licenses sometimes authorize activities not now being carried out.

. Sites

. Operations 4.

Battelle Memorial Institute Research and development.

Columbus Laboratories Only small quantities of 505 King Avenue SNM are permitted on site Columbus, Ohio 43201 at any one time.

Docket No. 70-8 License No. SNM-7 5.

Exxon Nuclear Company Manufactures fuel rods for 2101 Horn Rapids Road power reactors and advanced Richland, Washington 99352 fuel R&D.

Docket No. 70-1257 License No. SNM-1227 6.

General Atomic Company Primarily HTGR fuel cycle P.O. Box 81608 R&D.

San Diego, Calif.

92138 Docket No.70-734 License No. SNM-696 7.

General Electric Company Plutonium fuel R&D facility.

Vallecitos Nuclear Center P.O. Drawer B Pleasanton, Calif.

94566 Docket No.70-754 License No. SNM-960 8.

Kerr-McGee Corporation Produced mixed oxide (plu-Crescent, Oklahoma tonium) fuel pellets and Docket No.70-925 fabricated fuel pins for the License No. SNM-ll74 FFTF (LMFBR R&D) programs.

Operations have been terminated.

The facility probably does not have significant quantities of SNM on site at this time.

9.

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.

Fabricates naval reactor Erwin, Tennessee 37650 fuel.

Docket No.70-143 License No. SNM-124

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l Sites Operations l

10.

Rockwell International Corp.

Conducts broad R&D programs Atomics International Division and nuclear fuel manufacturing P.O. Box 309 activities utilizing SNM of Canoga Park, California 91304 various forms.

Docke t No. 70-2 5 l

License No. SNM-21 l

11.

Texas Instruments, IEc.

Processes and fabricates Materials and Electrical high enriched uranium "for Products Group Administration programs."

34 Forest Street Attleboro, Mass.

02703 Docket No. 70-23 License No SNM-23 l

12.

United Nuclear Corporation Scrap reprocessing facility l

Fuel Recovery Operation (unirradiated scrap).

I Wood River Junction, R.I.

02894 Docket No.70-820 License No. SNM-777 l

13.

United Nuclear Corporation Produces nuclear fuel elements Naval Products Division and components and complete 67 Sandy Desert Road reactor cores for naval l

Uncasville, Conn.

06382 reactors.

Docket No.70-371 License No. SNM-368 14.

U.S. Nuclear, Inc.

Produces uranium-aluminum fuel P.O. Box 680 elements for test and research Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 reactors.

Docket No. 70-1319 License No. SNM-1315 f

15.

Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Produces mixed oxide (plutonium)

Water Reactor Division fuel pellets and fabricates Box 355 fuel pins for light water Pittsburgh, Penn.

15230 reactors.

Choswick, Penn Site Docket No. 70-1143 License No. SNM-1120 O

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4 Sites

. Operations l

16.

Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Capability to assemble mixed i

Nuclear Fuel Division oxide (plutonium) fuel pins Drawer R into fuel assemblies.

l Columbia, S.C.

29205 Prchably does not have Columbia Nuclear Fuel Plant significant quantities of i

Docket No. 70-1151 SNM on site at this time.

License No.-SNM-1107*.

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Companies Having Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licenses To Transport Strategic Quantities Of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)

(Covered Under 10 CFR Part 73) 1 1.

Edlow International do.

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1100 17th Street, N.W.

Suite 404 Washington, D.C.

20036 2.

Transnuclear, Inc.

One N. Broadway White Plains, N.Y.

10601 In addition to these, several companies having fixed site SNM licenses covered under 10 CFR 73 also have licenses to f

transport strategic quantities of SNM.

These include, but are not necessarily limited to, Westinghouse Electric Corp.,

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U.S. Nuclear, and Exxon Nuclear Co.

l Common Carrier With An Approved NRC Safeguard Plan Per 10 CFR 73 Tri-State Motor Transit Co.

Nuclear Division P.O. Box 113 Joplin, Mo.

64801

ML20205H962

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