ML20205H606
| ML20205H606 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/15/1979 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205H602 | List: |
| References | |
| RULE-PR-150-MISC, RULE-PR-70-MISC, RULE-PR-73-MISC NUDOCS 9904080331 | |
| Download: ML20205H606 (70) | |
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i, h D. " L.TM d NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ITMM !! [6'/ 7 10 CFR PARTS 70, 73. AND 150 ' '
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Physical Protection Upgrade Rule h@ % . A AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
ACTION: Final Rule
SUMMARY
- In July 1977, the Commission published for public comment pro-l posed amendments to its regulations for strengthened physical protection for strategic special nuclear material, certain fuel cycle facilities, I
transportation and other activities involving significant quantities of strategic special nuclear material. Extensive comments were received and a revision of the proposed amendments was published in August 1978 requesting public comment on the changes made.
i In response to public comments, some additional changes have been l
made to the proposed amendments. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission now is publishing these revised amendments in final form.
The NRC has issued for public com.aent guidance documentation to l
assist the licensee in the development of safeguards physical protecti'an and transportation protection plans and the implementation of such plans required by the amendments. The effective date of the revised require-ments has been set to permit public comment on the guidance and its issuance in final form at the time the requirements become effective.
EFFECTIVE DATE: 120 days after publication in FR.
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NOTE: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has submitted this rule to the Corratroller General for review of its reporting requirement under the j 9904090331 791115
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Federal Reports Act, as amended, 44 U.S.C. 3512. The date on which the reporting requirement of the rule becomes effective, unless advised to the contrary, includes a 45-day period which that statute allows for l
Comptroller General review (44 U.S.C. 3512(c(2)).
l l FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief, Regulatory Improvements Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material l
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, 301-427-4181, or Dr. W. B. Brown, Acting Chief, Safeguards l
Standards Branch, Division of Siting, Health and Safeguards Standards, Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ';ommission, ,
Washingttn, D.C. 20555, 301-443-5907.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 5, 1977, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (42 FR 34310) proposed amendments l
to 10 CFR Part 73 of its regulations. Interested persons were invited to submit written comments and suggestions in connection with the pro-l posed amendments within 45 days after publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.
I i The comment period was subsequently extended thirty days. Upon considera-tion of the comments received on the proposed amendments published on July 5, 1977 and upon consideration of other factors involved, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published revised proposed amendments on August 9, 1978 in the FEDERAL REGISTER (43 FR 35321) to obtain further public com-ment on the changes that had been made to the proposed amendments.
Significant differences from the original proposed amendments pub-lished for comment on July 5, 1977 were: (1) the definition of the conspiracy threat was changed to a conspiracy between individuals in any position who may have access to and detailed knowledge of the facilities {
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[7590-01) s and activities referred to in 73.20(a) or items that could facilitate theft of special nuclear material or both; (2) export / import requirements were revised to reflect the jurisdictional aspects of the regulation; (3) the phrase "...but not necessarily limited to..." was deleted from l the general performance requirements and capability requirements; (4) the package search requirements were changed so that packages carried into a protected area by persons having access authorization need only ;
be searched when that person is chosen for random search. The package search requirement also was changed to require only random search of pack-l ages delivered into a' protected area; (5) the Contingency and Response plan requirements for in-transit protection were' revised to add more detailed response requirements consistent with the fixed site require-ments; (6) the requirement for three armed escorts on cargo aircraft and for sea shipments was changed to two, (7) the requirement for Pu and U-233 l
containers resistant to small arms fire was deleted; (8) the export / import security plan approval requirement was changed to apply to all shipments and was clarified as to timing; (9) the requirement for alarm stations to be considered vital areas was changed; (10) the use of vault type rooms for storage of strategic special nuclear material directly useable in a nuclear explosive device was prohibited and the definition of vault changed to better reflect the purpose of vaults; (11) the word "immediately"
, was deleted from the requirement that armed response personnel be imme-diately available; (12) definitions were added for deceit, stealth, and force, and other changes in wording and language were made throughout the rule to clarify the intent and be more specific in the meaning of the requirements; (13) obsolete sections to be deleted when the effective rule 3
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is published were noted; and (14) planning and implementation times were changed.
After review of the latest round of comments, the following substan-tive changes have bran made: (1) non power reactors are not required to meet the provisions of the upgrade rule. As an interim measure, non-power reactors must meet the provisions of 9 73.67(a), (b), (c), (d),
(requirements for protection of material of low and moderate strategic significance), and in some cases of the provisions of a revised S 73.60 (for those non power reactor facilities possessing formul~a quantities of special nuclear material not meeting the 100 rem self protection exempt' >n);
(2) the definition of vault has been further revised and required vault attributer have been added to S 73.46(c)(5)(i); (3) the number of armed escorts required for transfer, rail and road transportation of domestic shipments of SSNM has been reduced from nine to seven individuals; (4) the requirement for " penetration resi: tant" tamper-indicating con-tainers for storage of certain SSNM has been changed to tamper-indicating containers; (5) the requirement for a third closed circuit television moni-tor of vaults has been changed; (6) a definition has been added for "under-going processing;" (7) planning and implementation times have been changed; (8) the design basis threat relating to theft of strategic special nuclear material has been modified and moved to 6 73.1(a); (9) the design basis threat statement relating to radiological sabotage (present S 73.55) has been modified and moved to 6 73.1(a); and (10) the "high assurance phrase" -
contained in S 73.20(a) of the proposed rule and in present 6 73.55(a) has been modified to state that the physical protection system will have as its 1
objective to provide high assurance. In addition, changes in wording and j l
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. , , [7590-01) e language have been made throJghout the rule for clarification, and conform-ing changes in references to and by existing sections have been made.
The following discussion pertains to items (1) through (9) above. ;
I (1) Application of the requirements of these amendments to non-1 power reactors possessing formula quantities of special nuclear material which cannot meet the 100 rem self protection exemption has been deferred pending completion of a separate on going review of total safeguards requirements adequacy at such facilities. In the interim, such licensees will be subject to the provisions of 6 73.67(a), (b), (c), and (d), and revised S 73.60. This is an interim solution only, and it is the intent of the Commission to bring non power reactors under an improved safeguards system in the near future.
(2) Commenters noted that the definition of vault, while attempting to specify a delay capability tied to the response time of LLEA, failed to account for the significance of other aspects of the security system, such as intrusion detection and communication, in determining that response time. Additionally, the use of LLEA response time as the criterion for measuring vault delay time was criticized as being impracti-cal and ignoring the protection afforded by response of the armed onsite security force. Accordingly, the definition has been changed and an addi-tional discussion of required vault attributes has been added to S 73.46.
(3) In determining a specific number of armed escorts for domestic transfers, rail, and road shipments, the basic principles were that force -
size be lacge enough to engage a small group of attackers and delay theft i
and that t!.is force would always be composed of two distinct separated groups, so that no single act which interrupted communications of one group would totally destroy the ability to communicate to the movement l
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r control center. The Commission, in reviewing the dif ferences in perfor-mance that could be expected from different group sizes, determined that seven armed individuals could provide the necessary protection while lessening labor expense. The rule has been changed accordingly.
(4) Comments questioned whether a " penetration resistant" tamper-indicating container was adequately defined, available, or even necessary.
As the meaning of penetration resistant was not clear, availability of containers was not certain, and the need for such containers was not defined, the rule was changed to delete the terms " penetration resistant."
(5) Commenters stated that requiring a third continuously manned location to monitor closed circuit television was equivalent to requiring a third alarm station. The intent of this provision was to add a third factor to protect against collusion between the two alarm station operators.
After review, the Commission has determined that this factor could be provided without the specific requirements of a third CCTV monitor. The rule has been changed accordingly.
(6) Commenters expressed confusion as to when protection require-ments were required while SSNM is undergoing processing. A definition has been added to 9 73.2 to define undergoing processing and to clarify the distinction between such processing and storage for application of protection requirements.
(7) The implementation schedule has been simplified. There is now one schedule required for planning and implementing a revised security program, rather than separate schedules for the external threat plan and internal conspiracy plan as previously proposed. The prior two schedule approach was to permit time for development of guidance for protection 6
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against the internal conspiracy. This guidance has now been developed l
so that a schedule delay is not necessary.
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(8) Based upon review of the design basis threat, the previous 1
threat description stated as a general performance requirement in l 9 73.20(a) has been modified to reflect a reference to the malevolent act of concern (theft or diversion) rather than a reference to the type of facility to be protected and has been moved to 6 73.1. Appropriate refer-ence changes have been made accordingly. l (9) The existing design basis threat stated in 673.55(a) for' nuclear power reactors has also been modified as in (7) above to be referenced to the radiological sabotage threat rather than to the facility to be pro-tected and has been moved to 6 73.1. Appropriate reference changes have been made accordingly.
(10) The Commission has modified the statement of general perform-j ance requirements. Paragraph 73.20(a) of the proposed rule required the l l physical protection system to prevent theft of strategic special nuclear t
material and to protect against radiological sabotage with high assurance.
l This paragraph has been modified to state that the physical protection i
system will have as its objective to provide high assurance that covered activities are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.
The Commission is also making a conforming modification to 10 CFR .
73.55(a) to state an objective of high assurance in the performance of security systems to protect against radiological sabotage at nuclear power reactors identical to the general performance objective in 10 CFR 73.20(a).
This is a change from the present 10 CFR 73.55(a) which currently calls i
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4 for high assurance in performance as a requirement of physical security systems. It is important to note that this change will not affect the Commission's judgments of what system requirements are necessary to assure provision of adequate safeguards against radiological sabotage, theft or diversion. "High assurance," as used in 10 CFR 73.55(a), is deemed to be comparable to the degree of assurance contemplated by the Commission in its safety review for protection against severe postulated accidents having potential consequences similar to the potential consequences from reactor sabotage. It should be appreciated that the standard " reasonable assurance," commonly used in safety evaluations, is applied to a broad category of safety concerns ranging from the mitigation of minor antici-pated operational occurrences to protection against severe postulated accidents. Thus, the degree of assurance necessary to provide " reasonable assurance" varies with the gravity of the safety concern.
In adopting these amendmetcs, the Commission decided that the require-ments should not be made effective until guidance had been published assisting licensees in conforming to performance-oriented physical protec-tion requirements for affected facilities and activities. Allowance for consideration of public comments on this guidance has been built into the time period specifying the effective date of the amendments. Prior to the publication of these amendments, two guidance documents have been published for public comment. These are: (1) " Fixed Site Physical Pro-tection Upgrade Rule Guidance Compendium, Volumes I and II" and (2) Regu-latory Guide 5.(SG904-4), " Standard Format and Content, Physical Protec-tion of Strategic Special Nuclear Material In Transit."
In addition, revisions to Regulatory Guides 5.7, " Exit / Entry Control to Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," 5.14, "The 8
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Use of Observation (Visual Surveillance) Techniques in Material Access Areas," 5.44, " Perimeter Alarm Systems," and 5.57, " Shipping and Receiving Control of Special Nuclear Material," have been made. These documents also have been published for comment.
Copies of these new and revised guidance documents have been sent to persons who have expressed an interest in this matter. Comments have been received so that final guidance can be published by the time the rule becomes effective on (120 days after publication). Copies of these documents also will be placed in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
The Commission believes that a significant number of comments for which no changes to the amendments were made will be satisfactorily addressed by this guidance documentation ta be published concurrently with the effective date of these amendments.
In addition to the comments that resulted in changes in the proposed amendments, the threat and general performance requirements were again questioned. The Commission believes it is worth restating the purpose and intent of the threat characterization and its relationship to the general performance requirements.
The purpose of the threat defined in the proposed amendments is to define the general character of the domestic safeguards challenge. It is intended to provide a design basis for physical protection systems; therefore, additional adversary attributes are not necessary to serve this purpose. Physical protection systems, when designed to the level specified in the general performance sections of the rule and in accord-ance with the reference system specified in the rule and other design 9
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s guidance to be provided, will be responsive to a general range of threats characterized by that stated in the amendments.
With respect to specific numbers of adversaries, the numbers are not as significant as are the capabilities and resources of the adversary.
For example, the threat from a disorganized mob of fifty or so people is much different from that of only a few well-organized, well-trained people.
Given that the described threat is a design basis for a physical protection system, additional design criteria are given in the form of required system capabilities. These capabilities are further supported by a reference safeguards system (S 73.46) which provides guidance concerning those safeguards measures which will generally be included in a physical protection system that achieves the required performance capabilities.
The Commission has determined under Council of Environmental Quality guidelines and the criteria in 10 CFR Part 51 that an environmental impact statement for the amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 is not required. Concur-I rently with publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking of July 5, l 1977 (42 FR 34310), the Commission made available in its Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C., an " Environmental Impact Appraisal of Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73" to support a Negative Declara-tion. This document is appropriate for the revised amendments as well.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy t
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and sections 552 and 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that the following amend-ments to Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 70, 73 and 150, are published as a document subject to codification.
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TITLE 10 - ENERGY CHAPTER I - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PART 70 - DOMESTIC LICENSE OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
! PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS ,
l PART 150 - EXEMPTIONS AND CONTINUED REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN l
AGREEMENT STATES UNDER SECTION 274 Agency - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Action - Final Rule 1
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- 1. Paragraph 70.20a(a) is amended to replace references ".. 66 73.30 l
through 73.36...." with reference to SS 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, and 73.27. l t
- 2. Paragraph 70.20a(d) is amended to replace references " . 56 73.30 through 73.36...." with reference to Sg 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, and 73.27.
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- 3. Paragraph 70.22(g) is amended to replace references ".. 99 73.30 through 73.36, 73.47(a) and (e), 73.47(g)...." with reference to SS 73.20, l
73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.67(a) and (e), 73.67(g).
- 4. Paragraph 70.22(h) is amended to add references to 95 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.
- 5. Paragraph 70.22(k) is amended to change the reference to 6 73.47(d),
(e), (f) and (g) to reference s 73.67(d), (e), (f) and (g).
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- 6. Paragraph 70.32(d) is amended to replace the reference to paragraph l
l 73.30(e) with reference to f 73.20(c).
- 7. Paragraph 70.32(e) is amended to replace the reference to paragraph (f) with reference to S 73.20(c).
- 8. Porsgraph 70.32(f) is deleted.
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- i i 9. The table of contents for Part 73 is revised to read as follows:
PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS i
i General Provisions l
Sec.
1 i 73.1 Purpose and scope 73.2 Definitions
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l 73.3 Interpretations 73.4 Communications 73.5 Specific exemptions 73.6 Exemptions for certain quantities and kinds of special nuclear material l 73.20 General performance requirements 73.24 Prohibitions Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in Transit 73.25 Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special l nuclear material in transit 73.26 Transportation physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures 73.27 Notification requirements 73.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit.
Physical Protection Requirements at Fixed Sites 73.40 Physical protection: General requirements at fixed sites.
. 73.45 Performance capabilities for fixed site physical protection 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components and procedures.
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73.50 Requirements for. physical protection of licensed activities.
73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
73.60 Additional requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material at non power reactors.
Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate and Low Strategic Significance l 73.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance.
Records and Reports l
73.70 Records 73.71 Reports.af unaccounted for shipments, suspected theft, unlawf"1 l diversion, or radiological sabotage.
73.72 Requirement for advance notice of shipment-of special nuclear material.
l Enforcement 73.80 Violations Appendices
. Appendix A - United "tates Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Offices Appendix B - General Criteria for Security Personnel Appendix C - Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans Appendix 0 - Physical Protection of Irradiated Roactor Fuel in Transit, Training Program Subject' Schedule.
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I Authority: Secs. 53, 161b, 161i, 1610, Pub. L 83-703, 68 Stat. 930, 948-50, as amended Pub. L.85-507, 72 Stat. 327, Pub. L.93-377, 88 Stat.
475 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2201); Sec. 201, Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat.
1242, 1243, as amended Pub. L. 94-79, 89 Stat. 413 (42 U.S.C. l 5841). l
- 10. Paragraph 73.1(a) of 10 CFR Part 73 is revised to read as follows:
6 73.1 Purpose and scope.
(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the establish-ment and maintenance of a physical prutection system which will have capa-bilities for the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites i
and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear material is used. )
l The following design basis threats, where referenced in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material:
(1) Radiological Sabotage.
(i) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the following attributes, assistance and equipment: (A) well-trained (including mili-tary training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (B) inside assist-ance ,, ich may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to partici-pate in a passive role (e.g., provide information), an active role (e.g.,
f acilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, partici-
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pate in violent attack), or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, (D) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying 14
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e reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system, and (ii) an internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position).
(2) Theft or Diversion of Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material (i) A determined external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, by a small group with the following attributes, assist-ance and equipment: (A) well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (B) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack),
or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, (D) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives
- for use as . tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter or container integrity or features of the safeguards system, and (E) the ability to operate as two or more teams, (ii) An individual, including an employee (in any posi-tion), and (iii) A conspiracy between individuals in any position who may have
- (A) access to and detailed knowledge of nuclear power plants or the facilities referred to in 73.20(a), or (B) items that could facilitate theft of special nuclear material (e.g., small tools, substi-tute material, false documents, etc.), or both.
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- 11. Paragraphs 73.2(c), (f), (h), (k), (n), and (p) of 10 CFR Part 73 are revised to read as follows:
S 73.2 Definitions As used in this part:
a a n n n (c) " Guard" means a uniformed individual armed with a firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special nuclear material against theft, the protection of a plant against radiological sabotage, or both, a n *
- n (f) " Physical barrier" means (1) Fences constructed of No. 11 American wire gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets' angled outward between 30 and 45 from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed topping; (2) Building walls, ceilings and floors constructed of stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel or comparable materials (openings in which are secured by grates, doors, or covers of construction and fastening of sufficient strength such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by any opening), or walls of similar construction, not part of a build-ing, provided with a barbed topping described in paragraph (f)(1) of
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this section of a height of not less than 8 feet; or (3) Any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of materials suitable for the purpose for which the obstruction is intended, n a a A n 16
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I (h) " Vital area" means any area which contains vital equipment.
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(k) " Isolation zone" means any area adjacent to a physical barrier, clear of all objects which could conceal or shield an individual.
l (n) " Vault" means a windowless enclosure with walls, floor, roof and door (s) designed and constructed to delay penetration from forced entry.
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(p) " Radiological sabotage" means any deliberate act directed ,,
against a plant or transport in which an activity licensed pursuant to the regulations in this chapter is conducted, or against a component of j such a plant or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
n n n
- s (q) "D0E" means the Department of Energy or its duty authorized representatives.
, 12. Section 73.2 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to add paragraphs (cc) I thru (ii). .
$ 73.2 Definitions. !
I l As used in this part:
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l (cc) " Transport" means any land, sea, or air conveyance or modules 1
for these conveyances such as rail cars or standardized cargo containers.
(dd) " Incendiary device" means any self-contained device intended to create an intense fire that can damage normally flame-resistant or retardant materials.
(ee) " Movement control center" means an operations center which is remote from transport activity and which maintains periodic position infor-mation on the movement of strategic special nuclear material, receives reports of attempted attacks or thefts, provides a means for reporting ;
these and other problems to appropriate agencies and can request and coor-dinate appropriate aid.
(ff) " Force" means violent methods used by an adversary to attempt to steal strategic special nuclear material or to sabotage a nuclear facility or violent methods used by response personnel to protect against such adversary actions.
(gg) " Stealth" means nethods used to attempt to gain unauthorized access, introduce unauthorized materials, or remove strategic special nuclear material, where the fact of such attempt is concealed or an attempt is made to conceal it.
(hh) " Deceit" means methods used to attempt to gain unauthorized access, introduce unauthorized materials, or remove' strategic special
- nuclear materials, where the attempt involves falsification to present the appearance of authorized access.
(ii) " Undergoing proces=ing" means performing active operations on material such as chemical transformation, physical transformation, or 1
transit between such operations, to be differentiated from storage or packaging for shipment.
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- 13. The undesignated first paragraph of section 73.6 is revised to read as follows:
l 6 73.6 Exemptions of certain quantities and kinds of special nuclear material.
A licensee is exempt from the requirements of SS 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.45, 73.46, 73.70 and 73.72 of this part with respect to the
!. following special nuclear material:
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- l l 14. Section 73.6 is amended to add paragraphs (d) and (e) and an unnumbered final paragraph to read as follows:
l l 6 73.6 Exemptions of certain quantities and kinds of special nuclear
! material.
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- a a (d) Special nuclear material that is being transported by the United l States Department of Energy transport system.
! (e) Special nuclear material at non power reactors.
Licensees subject to 973.60 are not exempted from SS 73.70 and 73.72, E and licensees subject to S 73.67(e) are not exempted from 9 73.72 of this l part.
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- 15. Sections 73.30 through 73.36 are deleted.
l 4 16. Paragraph 73.37(a) is amended to replace references ".. 96 73.30 l
through 73.36...." with reference to SS 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, and 73.27.
- 17. Paragraph 73.40(a) is revised to read as follows:
$ 73.40 Physical protection: General requirements at fixed sites.
(a) Each licensee shall provide physical protection against radio-logical sabotage and against theft of special nuclear material at the fixed IL
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sites where licensed activities are conducted. Physical security systems shall be established and maintained by the licensee in accordance with security plans approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
l 18. The first sentence of Paragraph 73.40(b) is revised to read as follows:
(b) Each licensee subject to the requirements of gg 73.20, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, or 73.60 shall prepare a safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in Appendix C to this part.
- 19. New sections 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.45 and 73.46 are added to read as follows:
$ 73.20 General Performance Objective and Requirements.
(a) In addition to any other requirements of this part, each licensee who is authorized to operate a fuel reprocessing plant pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter; possesses or uses formula quantities of strategic special nucisar material at any site or contiguous sites sub-ject to control by the licensee; is authorized to transport or deliver to a carrier for transportation pursuant to Part 70 of this chapter for-mula quantities of strategic special nuclear material; takes delivery of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transporta-
, tion; or imports or exports formula quantities of strategic special
- nuclear material, shall establish and maintain or make arrangements for a physical protection system which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. The physical 20 w.... . . .
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[7590-01) protection system shall be designed to protect against the design basis threats of theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material and radiological sabotage as stated in S 73.1(a).
(b) To achieve the general performance objective of paragraph (a) 1 l
of this section a licensee shall establish and maintain, or arrange for, a physical protection system that:
(1) provides the performance capabilities described in S 73.25 for in-transit protection or in S 73.45 for fixed site protection unless other-I wise authorized by the Commission; I
l (2) is designed with sufficient redundancy and diversity to assure l maintenance of the capabilities described in SS 73.25, 73.45; and l
(3) includes a testing and maintenance program to assure control over all activities and devices affecting the effectiveness, reliability, and availability of the physical protection system, including a demon-stration that any defects of such activities and devices will be promptly detected and corrected for the total period of time they are required as a part of the physical protection system.
(c) Each licensee subject to the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall:
(1) within 150 days after the effective date of these amendments, submit a revised fixed site safeguards physical protection plan and, if j
appropriate, a revised safeguards transportation protection plan describ-ing how the licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) ,
of this section; and (2) within 360 days after the effective date of these amendments or 90 days after the plan submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section is approved, whichever is later, implement the approved plan 21
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C except for activities specifically identified by the licensee which involve new construction, significant physical modification of existing structures or major equipment installation, for which 540 days after the effective date of these amendments or 180 days after the plan (s) is approved, whichever is later, will be allowed.
S 73.24 Prohibitions.
(a) Except as specifically approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, no shipment of special nuclear material shall be made in passenger aircraft in excess of (i) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium-233, or (ii) 350 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope).
(b) Unless otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, no licensee may make shipments of special nJclear material in which individual shipments are less than a formula quantity, but the total quantity in shipments in transit at the same time could equal or exceed a formula quantity, unless either of the following conditions are met:
(1) The licensee shall confirm and log the arrival at the final destination of each individual shipment, and schedule shipments to assure that the total quantity for two or more shipments in transit at the same time does not equal or exceed the formula quantity, or (2) Physical protection in accordance with the requirements of 69 73.20, 73.25, and 73.26 is provided by the licensee for such shipments as appropriate so that the total quantity of special nuclear material in the remaining shipments not so protected, and in transit at the same time, does not equal or exceed a formula quantity.
S 73.25 Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit.
22
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l (a) To meet the general performance objective and requirements of l
S 73.20 an in-transit physical protection system shall include the performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.
l (b) Restrict access to and activity in the vicinity of transports l
l and strategic special nuclear material. To achieve this capability the l
l physical protection system shall:
l (1) Minimize the vulnerability of the strategic special nuclear l material by using the following subfunctions and procedures:
l (i) Preplanning itineraries for the movement of strategic special nuclear material; (ii) Periodically updating knowledge of route conditions for the movement of strategic special nuclear material; (iii) Maintaining knowledge of the status and position of the strategic special nuclear material en route; and (iv) Determining and communicating alternative itineraries en route i i
as conditions warrant.
(2) Detect and delay any unauthorized attempt to gain access or introduce unauthorized materials by stealth or force into the vicinity l
of transports and strategic special nuclear material using the following subsystems and subfunctions: l (i) Controlled access areas to isolate strategic special nuclear mate-rial and transports to assure that unauthorized persons shall not have direct access to, and unauthorized materials shall not be introduced into the vicinity of, the transports and strategic special nuclear material, and l (ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized penetration (or such attempts) of a controlled 23
7.
[7590-01]
l access area by persons, vehicles or materials so that the response will satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of S 73.20(a). l (3) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized materials into the vicinity of transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and access criteria for persons, materials and vehicles; and (ii) Access controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons, materials and vehicles, to assess such identity against current authoriza-tion schedules and access criteria before permitting access, and to initiate response measures to deny unauthorized entries.
(c) Prevent or delay unauthorized entry or introduction of unauthorized materials into, and unauthorized removal of, strategic special nuclear material from transports. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect-attempts to gain unauthorized entry or introduce unautho-rized materials into transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and entry criteria for access into transports for a
both persons and materials; and (11) Entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons and materials and to permit transport entry only to those persons and materials specified by the current authorization schedules and entry criteria.
24
I
[7590-01]
a e (2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized entry or introduce unauthorized i material into transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems I
and subfunctions:
l (i) Transport features to delay access to strategic special nuclear I l
material sufficient to permit the detection and response systems to func-tion so as to satisfy the general performance objective and requirements l i
of 6 73.20(a);
(ii) Inspection and detection subsystems and procedures to detect unauthorized tampering with transports and cargo containers; and (iii) Surveillance subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized presence of persons or materials and any unauthorized attempt to penetrate the transport so that the response will u tisfy the general performance objective and requirements of 9 73.20(a).
(3) Prevent unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear mate-rial from transports by deceit using the following subsystems and sub- ;
functions:
(i) Authorization controls and procedures to provide current sche-dules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material which specify the persons authorized to remove and receive the material, the i
authorized times for such removal and receipt and authorized places for !
such removal and receipt.
' (ii) Removal controls and procedures to establish activities for transferring cargo in emergency situations; and i
(iii) Removal controls and procedures to permit removal of strategic special nuclear material only after verification of the identity of persons removing or receiving the strategic special nuclear material, and after 25
f
' [7590-01] -
[ .
verification of the identity and integrity of the strategic special nuclear l material being removed from t.ransports.
(4) Detect attempts to remove strategic special nuclear material from transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and
! subfunctions:
(i) Transport features to delay unauthorized strategic special l
nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to assist detection and per-l mit a response to satisfy the general performance objective and require-ments of 9 73.20(a); and l
l (ii) Detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material so that response to the attempt can be such as to i satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of 9 73.20(a).
l (d) Respond to safeguards contingencies and emergencies to assure that the two capabilities (b) and (c) of this section are achieved, and to engage and impede adversary forces until local law enforcement forces arrive. To achieve this capability, the physical protection system shall:
(1) Respond rapidly and effectively to safeguards contingencies and emergencies using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) A security organization composed of trained and qualified personnel, including armed escorts, one of whom is designated as escort commander, with precedures for command and control, to execute response functions.
(ii) Assessment procedures to assess the nature and extent of security related incidents.
(iii) A predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events.
26
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[7590-01]
(iv) Equipment and procedures to enable responses to security related incidents sufficiently rapid and effective to achieve the pre-determined objective of each action.
(v) Equipment, vehicle design features, and procedures to protect security organization personnel, including those at the movement control center, in their performance of assessment and response related functions.
(2) Transmit detection, assessment and other response related infor-mation using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) Communications equipment and procedures to rapidly and accurately transmit security information among armed escorts.
(ii) Equipment and procedures for two-way communcations between the escort commander and the movement control center to rapidly and accurately transmit assessment information and requests for assistance by local law enforcement forces, and to coordinate such assistance.
(iii) Communications equipment and procedures for the armed escorts and the movement control center personnel to notify local law enforcement forces of the need for assistance.
(3) Establish liaisons with local law enforcement authorities to arrange for assistance en route.
I (4) Assure that a single adversary action cannot destroy the capa- I bility of armed escorts to notify the local law enforcement forces of the need for assistance.
9 73.26 Transportation Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Components, and Procedures.
(a) A transportation physical protection system established pursuant to the general performance obj ctives and requirements of @ 73.20 and 27
. [7590-01]
4 performance capability requirements of 6 73.25 of this part shall include, but are not necessarily limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (1) of this section. The Commission may require, depending on the individual transportation conditions or circumstances, alternate or additional measures deemed necessary to meet the general performance objectives and requirements of 9 73.20 of this part. The Commission also may authorize protection measures other than those required by this sec-tion if, in its opinion, the overall level of performance meets the general performance objectives and requirements of 5 73.20 and the performance capability requirements of g 73.25 of this part.
(b) Planning and Scheduling.
(1) Shipments shall be scheduled to avoid regular patterns and pre-planned to avoid areas of natural disaster or civil disorders, such as strikes or riots. Such shipments shall be planned in order to avoid storage times in excess of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and to assure that deliveries occur at a time when the receiver at the final delivery point is present to accept the shipment.
(2) Arrangements shall be made with law, enforcement authorities along the route of shipments for their response to an emergency or a call for assistance.
(3) Security arrangements for each shipment shall be approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission prior to the time for the seven-day notice required by 6 73.72. Information to be supplied to the Commission in addition to the general security plan information is as follows:
(i) Shipper, consignee, carriers, transfer points, modes of shipment, (ii) Point where escorts will relinquish responsibility or will accept responsibility for the shipment, 28
I.
- l. .
[7590-01]
(iii) Arrangements made for transfer of shipment security, and (iv) Security arrangements at point where escorts accept responsibility for an import shipment.
(4) Hand-to-hand receipts shall be completed at origin and destina-tion and at'all points enroute where there is a transfer of custody.
(c) Export / Import Shipments (1) A licensee who imports a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material shall make arrangements to assure that the material will be protected in transit as follows:
(i) An individual designated by the licensee or his agent, or as specified by a contract of carriage, shall confirm the co'ntainer count and examine locks and/or seals for evidence of tampering, at the first place in the United States at which the shipment is discharged from the arriving carrier.
(ii) The shipment shall be protected at all times within the geo-graphical limits of the Unite .tes as provided in this section and SS 73.25 and 73.27.
(2) A licensee who exports a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material shall comply with the requirements of this section and 69 73.25 and 73.27, as applicable, up to the first point where the ship-ment is taken off the transport outside the United States.
(d) Security Organization.
(1) The licensee or his agent shall establish a transportation ,
- security organization, including armed escorts, armed response personnel l l
or guards, and a movement control center manned and equipped to monitor j l
and control shipments, to communicate with local law enforcement i p l authorities, and to respond to safeguards contingencies.
1 29 ;
I l
l
! ' - [7590-01] .
4 (2) At least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical protection activities of the
! security organization shall be on duty at the movement control center during the course of any shipment.
(3) The licensee or his agent shall establish, maintain, and follow a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementa-tion, and enforcement of transportation physical protection procedures.
The system shall include:
(i) Written security procedures which document the structure of the transportation security organization and which detail the duties of drivers and escorts and other individuals responsible for security; and Provision for written approval of such procedures and any revi-(ii) sions thereto by the individual with overall responsibility for the security function.
(4) Neither the licensee or his agent shall permit an individual to act as an escort or other security organization member unless such individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security job duty in accordance with Appendix B, of this part,
" General Criteria for Security Personnel." Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission the licensee or his agent shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities. Armed escorts shall requalify in accordance with Appendix B of this part at least every 12 months. Such requalification shall be documented.
(5) Armed escort and armed response force personnel armament shall include handguns, shotguns, and semiautomatic rifles, as described in Appendix B to this part.
I 30
c.
[7590-01]
(e) Contingency and Response Plans and Procedures.
(1) The licensee or his agent shall establisn, maintain, and follow a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radio-logical sabotage related to strategic special nuclear material in transit I
subject to the provisions of this section. Such safeguards contingency plan shall be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part,
" Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plan."
(2) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles attempting to penetrate a moving co.nvoy or persons attempting to gain access to a parked cargo vehicle or upon evidence or indication of penetration of the cargo vehicle the armed escorts er other armed response personnel shall:
(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists; (ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any; (iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat by:
(a) Making the necessary tactical moves to prevent or impede acts of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material, and (b) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and l
requesting assistance. l (3) The licensee or his agent shall instruct every armed escort i and all armed response personnel to prevent or impede acts of radio-logical sabotage or theft of strategic special material by using suffi-cient force to counter the force directed at him including the use of deadly force when armed escorts or armed response personnel have a reason-able belief that it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others, f
31
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0 (f) Transfer and Storage of Strategic Special Nuclear Material for Domestic Shipments.
(1) Strategic special nuclear material shall be placed in a protected area at transfer points if transfer is not immediate from one transport to another. Where a protected area is not available a controlled access area shall be established for the shipment. The transport may serve as a con-trolled access area.
(2) All transfers shall be protected by at least seven armed escorts or other armed personnel - one of whom shall serve as commander. At least five of the armed personnel (including the comnander) shall be available to protect the shipment and at least three of the five shall keep the strategic special _ nuclear material under continuous surveillance while it is at the transfer point. The two remaining armed personnel shall take up positions at a remote monitoring location. The remote location may be a radio-equipped vehicle or a nearby place, apart from the shipment area, so that a single act cannet remove the capability of the personnel protecting the shipment for calling for assistance. Each of the seven armed escorts or other armed personnel shall be capable of maintaining communication with each other. The commander shall have the capability to communicate with the personnel at the remote location and with local law enforcement agencies for emergency assistance. In addition, the armed escort personnel at the remote location shall have the capability to communicate with the law enforcement agencies and with the shipment movement control center. The commander shall call the remote location at least every 30 minutes to report the status of the shipment. If the calls are not received within the prescribed time, the personnel in the 32 L - - - -- -
[7590-01]
remote location shall request assistance from the law enforcement authorities, notify the shipment movement control center and initiate the appropriate contingency plans. Armed escorts or other armed personnel shall observe the opening of the cargo compartment of the incoming transport and ensure that the shipment is complete by checking locks and seals. A shipment loaded onto or transferred to another transport shall be checked to assure complete loading or transfer. Continuous visual surveillance of the cargo compartment shall be maintained up to the time the transport departs from the terminal. The escorts shall observe the transport until it has departed and shall notify the licensee or his agent of the latest status immediately thereafter.
(g) Access Control Subsystems and Procedures.
(1) A numbered picture badge identification procedure shall be used to identify all individuals who will have custody of a shipment. The identification procedure shall require that the individul who has posses-sion of the strategic special nuclear material shall have, in advance, identification picture badges of all individuals who are to assume custody for the shipment. The shipment shall be released only when the individual who has possession of strategic special nuclear material has assured posi-tive identification of all of the persons assuming custody for the ship-ment by comparing the copies of the identification badges that have been received in advance to the identification badges carried by the individuals who will assume custody of the shipment.
(2) Access to protected areas, controlled access areas, transports, escort vehicles, aircraft, rail cars, and containers where strategic special nuclear material is located shall be limited to individuals who have been properly identified and have been authorized access to these areas.
1 33
p [7590-01)
- )
( .
1 l
(3) Strategic special nuclear material shall be shipped in containers I
that are protected by tamper-indicating seals. The containers also shall 1
l be locked if they are not in another locked container or transport. The outermost container or transport also shall be protected by tamper-indicating seals.
(h) Test and Maintenance Programs.
i The licensee or his agent shall establish, maintain and follow a test and maintenance program for communications equipment and other physical protection related devices and equipment used pursuant to this section which shall include the following:
(1) Tests and inspections shall be conducted during the installa-l tion, and construction of physical protection related subsystems and com-ponents to assure that they comply with their respective design criteria l and performance specifications.
(2) Preoperational tests and inspections shall be conducted for physical protection related subsystems and components to demonstrate their effectiveness, availability, and reliability with respect to their respec-tive design criteria and performance specifications.
(3) Operational tests and inspections shall be conducted for physical protection related subsystems and components to assure their maintenance in an operable and effective condition.
, (4) Preventive maintenance programs shall be established for physical protection related subsystems and components to assure their continued main-tenance in an operable and effective condition.
(5) All physical protection related subsystems and components shall be maintained in operable condition. Corrective action procedures and compensatory measures shall be developed and employed to assure that the 34
1 c
[7590-01]
effectiveness of the physical protection system is not reduced by any single failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the physical protection related equipment or structures.
(6) The transportation security program shall be reviewed at leaut every 12 months or prior to each use, whichever is greater, by individuals independent of both security management and security supervision. Such a review shall include a review and audit of security procedures and practices, evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and mainten-ance program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review and audit along with recommendations for improvements shall be documented, reported to the responsible organization management, and kept available for inspec-tion for a period of five years.
(i) Shipment by road.
(1)' A detailed route plan shall be prepared which shows the routes to be taken, the refueling and rest stops, and the call-in times to the movement control center. All shipments shall be made on primary highways with minimum use of secondary roads. All shipments shall be made without i
intermediate stops except for refueling, rest or emergency stops.
1 (2) Cargo compartments of the trucks or trailers shall be locked j and protected by tamper-indicating seals.
(3) The shipment shall be protected by one of the following methods:
(i) A specially designed cargo vehicle truck or trailer that reduces the vulnerability to theft. Design features of the truck or trailer shall i
permit immobilization of the truck or of the cargo-carrying portion of the !
vehicle and shall provide a deterrent to physical penetration of the cargo 35
[7590-01]
l i
0 compartment. Two separate escort vehicles shall accompany the cargo vehicle. There shall be a total of seven armed escorts with at least two
. in the cargo vehicle. Escorts may also operate the cargo and escort vehicles. ,
l Three separate escort vehicles (ii) An armored car cargo vehicle.
l shall accompany such a cargo vehicle. There shall be a total of seven l l f armed escorts, with at least two in the cargo vehicle. Escorts may also operate the cargo and escort vehicles.
l (4) All escort vehicles shall be bullet-resisting.
(5) Procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthorized i
persons or materials are on the cargo vehicle before strategic special l
l- nuclear material is loaded, or on the escort vehicles, immediately before the trip begins.
(6) Cargo and escort vehicles shall maintain continuous intraconvoy two-way communication. In addition at least two of the vehicles shall be equipped with radio telephones having the capability of communicating with the movement control center. A redundant means of communication shall also be available. Calls to the movement control center shall be made at least every half hour to convey the status and position of the shipment. In the event no call is received in accordance with these requirements, the licensee or his agent shall immediately notify the law enforcement authorities.and the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of this l
part and initiate the appropriate contingency plan.
(7) _ At refueling, rest, or emergency stops at least seven armed escorts or other armed personnel shall be available to protect the 36
t l
[7590-01]
l . .
J i
shipment and at least .hree armed escorts or other armed personnel shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo compartment.
)
(8) Transfers to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section.
(j) Shipment by Air.
(1) All shipments on commercial cargo aircraft shall be accompanied by two armed escorts who shall be able to converse in a common language with the captain of the aircraft.
(2) Transfers of these shipments shall be minimized and shall be conducted in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section. Such ship-
]
ments shall be scheduled so that the strategic special nuclear material is loaded last and unloaded first.
(3) At scheduled stops, at least seven armed escorts or other armed j l
personnel shall be available to protect the shipment and at least three armed escorts or other armed personnel shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo compartment.
(4) Export shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts from the last terminal in the United States until the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal and primary responsibility for physical protection is assumed by agents of the consignee. While on foreign soil, the escorts may surrender their weapons to legally constituted local authorities.
After leaving the last terminal in the United States the shipment shall be scheduled with no intermediate stops. _
(5) Import shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts at all times within the geographical limits of the United States. These escorts shall provide physical protection for the shipment until relieved by verified agents of the U.S. consignee.
37
f
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(6) Procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthorized persons or material are on the aircraft before strategic special nuclear material is loaded on board.
(7) Arrangements shall be made at all domestic airports to assure that the seven required armed escorts or other armed personnel are avail-able and that the required security measures will be taken upon landing.
(8) Arrangements shall be made at the foreign terminal at which the shipment is to be unloaded to assure that security measures will be taken on arrival.
(k) Shipment by Rail.
(1) A shipment by rail shall be escorted by seven armed escorts in the shipment car or an escort car next to the shipment car of the train.
At least three escorts shall keep the shipment car under continuous visual surveillance. Escorts shall detrain at stops when practicable and time permits to maintain the shipment cars u.ider continuous visual surveillance and to check car or container locks and seals.
(2) Procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthorized persons or materials are on the shipment or escort car before strategic special nuclear material is loaded on board.
(3) Only containers weighing 5000 lbs or more shall be shipped on open rail cars.
- (4) A voice communication capability between the escorts and the movement control center shall be maintained. A redundant means of conti-nuous communication also shall be available. Calls to the movement control center shall be made at least every half hour to convey the status and position of the shipment. In the event no call is received in accordance with these requirements, the licensee or his agent shall immediately notify 38
[7590-01]
l the law enforcement authorities and the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office listed in Appendix A of this part and initiate their contingency plan.
(5) Transfer to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section.
(1) Shipment by Sea (1) Shipments shall be made only on container-ships. The strategic special nuclear material container (s) shall be loaded into exclusive use cargo containers conforming to American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
MH5.1 or International Standards Organization (150) 1496. Locks and seals shall be inspected by the escorts whenever access is possible.
(2) All shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts who shall be able to converse in a common language with the captain of the ship.
(3) Minimum domestic ports of call shall be scheduled and there shall be no scheduled transfer to other vessels after the shipment leaves the last port in the United States. Transfer to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section.
(4) At all ports of call the escorts shall ensure that the shipment is not removed. At least two armed escorts or other armed personnel shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo area where the con-tainer is stored up to the time the ship departs.
(5) Export shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts from the last port in the United States until the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal and prime responsibility for physical protection is assurned by agents of the consignee. While on foreign soil, the escorts may surrender their weapons to legally constituted local authorities.
39
. [7590,01] .
(6) Import shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts at all times within the geographical limits of the United States. These escorts shall provide physical protection for the shipment until relieved by verified agents of the U.S. consignee.
(7) Ship-to-shore communications shall be available, and a ship-to-shore contact shall be made every six hours to relay position information, and the status of the shipment.
(8) Arrangements shall be made at the foreign terminals at which the shipment is to be unloaded to assure that security measures will be taken upon arrival.
S 73.27 Notification Requirements.
(a)(1) A licensee who delivers formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material to a carrier for transport shall immediately notify the consignee by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, of the time of departure of the shipment, and shall notify or confirm with the con-signee the method of transportation, including the names of carriers, and the estimated time of arrival of the shipment at its destination.
l (2) In the case of a shipment (f.o.b.) the point where it is delivered 1
to a carrier for transport, a licensee shall, before the shipment is delivered to the carrier, obtain written certification from the licensee 1
( who is to take delivery of the shipment at the f.o.b. point that the physi-cal protection arrangements required by SS 73.25 and 73.26 for licensed shipments have been made. When a contractor exempt from the requirements for a Commission license is the consignee of a shipment, the licensee
(
} shall, before the shipment is delivered to the carrier, obtain written I
certification from the contractor who is to take delivery of the ship-ment at the f.o.b. point that the physical protection arrangements 40
[7590-01] l i
i l
required by'the United States Department of Energy Order Nos. 5632.1 or l 5632.2, as appropriate, have been made. (3) A licensee who delivers for-l mula quantities of strategic special nuclear material to a carrier for l
transport or releases such special nuclear material f.o.b. at the point l
l where it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall also make arrange-ments with the consignee to be notified immediately by telephone and i l
telegraph, teletype, or cable, of the arrival of the shipment at it;, l l l l destination or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after j l'
the estimated time of arrival at its destination.
(b) Each licensee who receives a shipment of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material shall immediately notify by telephone l and telegraph or teletype, the person who delive*ed the material to a
! carrier for transport and the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regula-i tory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of the arrival of the shipment at its destination. When a United States Department of Energy license-exempt contractor is the con-
! signee, the licensee who is the consignor shall notify by telephone and l
telegraph, or teletype, the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regula-tory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of the arrival of the shipment at its destination immr',iately i
upon being notified of the receipt of the shipment by the license exempt contractor as arranged pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this section. In the event such a shipment fails to arrive at its destination at the esti-l mated time, or in the case of an export shipment, the licensee who exported l
the shipment, shall immediately notify by telephone and telegraph or tele-type, the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspec-tion and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of this part, 41
i j [7590-01] -
e and the licensee or other person who delivered the material to a carrier for transport. The licensee who made the physical prt'ection arrangements shall also immediately notify by telephone and telegrap , or teletype, the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and l
Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of the action being taken to trace the shipment.
(c) Each licensee who makes arrangements for physical protection of l a shipment of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material as
! required by SS 73.25 and 73.26 shall immediately conduct a trace investiga-tion of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and file a report with the Commission as specified in S 73.71.
6 73.45 Performance Capabilities for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems.
l (a) To meet the general performance requirements of $ 73.20 a fixed i site physical protection system shall include the performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.
(b) Prevent unauthorized access of persons, vehicles and materials into material access areas and vital areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce a
unauthorized material across material access or vital area boundaries by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions: -
(i) Barriers to channel persons and material to material access and vital area entry control points and to delay any unauthorized penetration attempts by persons or materials sufficient to assist detection and permit a response that will prevent the penetration; and 42
[7590-01]
(ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess I and communicate any unauthorized penetration attempts by persons or mate-
, 3 I
rials at-the time of the attempt so that the response can prevent the unauthorized access or penetration.
(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized materials into material access areas or vital areas by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and entry criteria for both persons and materials; and ;
(ii) Entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons and materials and assess such identity against current authorization l schedules and entry criteria before permitting entry and to initiate l
response measures to deny unauthorized entries.
(c) Permit only authorized activities and conditions within pro-l tected areas, material access areas, and vital areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect unauthorized activities or conditions within pro-tected areas, material access areas and vital areas using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
i l (i) Controls and procedures that establish current schedules of j l
authorized activities and conditions in defined areas; (ii) Boundaries to define areas within which the authorized activ-ities and conditions are permitted; and 1 (iii) Detection and surveillance subsystems and procedures to discover and assess unauthorized activities and conditions and communicate them so l
43 l
~~
I [7590-01]
that response can be such as to stop the activity or correct the conditions to satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of 6 73.20(a).
(d) Permit only authorized placement and movement of strategic special nuclear material within material access areas. To achieve this capability l
l the physical protection system shall:
l (1) Detect unauthorized placement and movement of strategic special nuclear material within the material access area using the following sub-1 l systems and subfunctions:
(i) Controls and procedures to delineate authorized placement and control for strategic special nuclear material; (ii) Controls and procedures to establish current authorized placement and movement of all strategic special nuclear material within material access areas; (iii) Controls and procedures to maintain knowledge of the identity, i quantity, placement, and movement of all strategic special nuclear material within material access areas; and (iv) Detection and monitoring subsystems and procedures to discover and assess unauthorized placement and movement of strategic special nuclear material and communicate them so that response can be such as to return the strategic special nuclear material to authorized placement or control.
(e) Permit removal of only authorized and confirmed forms and amounts l
. of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special I
nuclear material from material access ' areas by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
1 44 l 1
[7590-01]
(i) Barriers to channel persons and materials exiting a material access area to exit control points and to delay any unauthorized strategic special nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to assist detection and assessment and permit a response that will prevent the removal; and satisfy the general performance objective and requirement 3 uf 6 73.20(a);
and (ii) Detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and commu-nicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material so that response to the attempt can be such as to prevent the removal and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of S 73.20(a).
(2) Confirm the identity and quantity of strategic special nuclear material presented for removal from a material access area and detect attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) Authorization controls and procedures to provide current schedules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material which specify the authorized properties and quantities of material to be removed, the persons authorized to remove the material, and the authorized time schedule; (ii) Removal controls and procedures to identify and confirm the pro-perties and quantities of material being removed and verify the identity of the persons making the removal and time of removal and assess these against the current authorized removal schedule before permitting removal; and 45
[7590-Q1] .
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(iii) Communications subsystems and procedures to provide for notification of an attempted unauthorized or u6 confirmed removal so that response can be such as to prevent the removal and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of 9 73.20(a).
(f) Provide for authorized access and assure detection of and response to unauthorized penetrations of the protected area to satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of 6 73.20(a).
To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
l (1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unautho- l l
rized persons, vehicles, or materials into the protected area by stealth l l
or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions. l (i) Barriers to channel persons, vehicles, and materials to protected l
area entry control points; and to delay any unauthorized penetration attempts or the introduction of unauthorized vehicles or materials sufficient to i assist detection and assessmu'.t and permit a response that will prevent the penetration er prevent such penetration and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of 9 73.20(a); and (ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized access or penetrations or such attempts by persons, vehicles, or materials at the time of the act or the attempt so that the response can be such as to prevent the unauthorized access or penetration, and satisfy the general performance objective and require-ments of 9 73.20(a).
(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials into the protected area by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
46
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(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and entry criteria for persons, vehicles, and j materials; and l (ii) Entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons, materials and vehicles and assess such identity against current authoriza-l tion schedules before permitting entry and to initiate response measures
! to deny unauthorized access.
(g) Response. Each physical protection program shall provide a response capability to assure that the five capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section are achieved and that adversary forces will be engaged and impeded until offsite assistance forces arrive.
To achieve this capability a licensee shall:
(1) Establish a security organization to:
l (i) Provide trained and qualified personnel to carry out assigned duties and respon:;ibilities; and (ii) Provide for routine security operations and planned and predeter-mined response to emergencies and safeguards contingencies.
(2) Establish a predetermined plan to respond to safeguards con-tingency events.
(3) Provide equipment for the security organization and facility design features to:
(i) Provide for rapid assessment of safeguards contingencies; l
I (ii) Provide for response by assigned security organization personnel which is sufficiently rapid and effective to achieve the predetermined objective of the response; and (iii) Provide protection for the assessment and response personnel so that they can complete their assigned duties.
47 t
[7590,01] .
(4) Provide communications network.c to:
(1) Transmit rapid and accurate security information among onsite forces for routine security operation, assessment of a contingency, and response to a contingency; and (ii) Transmit rapid and accurate detection and assessment information to offsite assistance forces.
(5) Assure that a single adversary action cannot destroy the capabil-ity of the security organization to notify offsite response forces of the need for assistance.
S 73.46 Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Components, and Procedures.
(a) A licensee physical protection system established pursuant to the general performance objective and requirements of 9 73.20(a) and the performance capability requirements of 9 73.45 of this part shall include, but are not necessarily limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section. The Commission may require, depending on individual facility and site conditions, alternate or additional measures deemed necessary to meet the general performance objective and requirements of 6 73.20 of this part. The Commission also may authorize protection measures other than those required by this section if, in its opinion, the overall level of performance meets the general performance objective and requirements of 9 73.20 and the performance capability requirements of f 73.45 of this part.
(b) Security Organization (1) The licensee shall establish a security organization, including guards. If a contract guard force is utilized for site secu-rity, the licensee's written agreement with the contractor will clearly I
48
[7590-01]
l l
i j show that (1) the licensee is responsible to the Commission for maintaining safeguards in accordance with Commission regulations and the licensee's secu-
!. rity plan, (2) the NRC may inspect, copy, and take away copies of all reports l
and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations, orders, or appli-cable license cenditions whether such-reports and documents are kept by the 1
l licensee or the contractor, (3) the requirement, in Paragraph 73.46(b)(4) of this section that the licensee demonstrate the ability of physical security personnel to perform their asaigned duties and responsibilities, include
!. demonstration of the ability of the contractor's physical security personnel to perform their assigned dJ ies and responsibilities in carrying out the l
l provisions of the Security Pian and these regulations, and (4) the contractor i
will not assign any personnel to the site who have not first been made aware of these responsibilities.
- (2) The licensee shall have onsite at all times at least one full time member of the security organization with authority to direct the 1
physical protection activities of the security organization.
(3) The licensee shall have a management system to provide for the I development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of security proce-dures. The system shall include:
(i) Written security procedures which document the structure of the l security organization and which detail the duties of guards, watchmen and l
I <
other individuals responsible for security; and (ii) Provision for written approval of such procedures and any revi-sions thereto by the individual with overall responsibility for the secu-rity function.
49
[7590-01] .
(4) The licensee shall not permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman, armed response person, or other member of the security organiza-tion unless such individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security job duty in accordance with Appendix B of this part " General Criteria for Security Personnel." Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel, whether licensee or contractor employees, to carry out their assigned duties and responsibil-
'ities. Each guard, watchman, armed response person, or other member of the security organization, whether a licensee or contractor employee, shall requalify in accordance with Appendix B of this part at least every 12 months. Such requalification shall be documented.
(5) Within any given period of time, a member of the security organiza-tion may not be assigned to, or have direct operational control over, more than one of the redundant elements of a physical protection subsystem if such assignment or control could result in the loss of effectiveness of the subsystem.
(6) Guard and armed response force armament maintained on site shall include handguns, shotguns, and semiautomatic rifles, as described in Appendix B to this part.
(c) Physical Barrier Subsystems (1) Vital equipment shall be located only within a vital area and strategic special nuclear material shall be stored or processed only in a material access area. Both vital areas and material access areas shall be located within a protected area so that access to vital equipment and to strategic special nuclear material requires passage through at least 50
[7590-01]
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! two physical barriers. -More than one vital area or material access area may be located within a single protected area.
(2) The physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier for a vital area or material access area within the protected area.
(3) Isolation zones shall be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent l
to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and shall be large enough to permit observation of the activities of people on either side of that barrier in the event of its penetration. If parking facil-l ities are provided for employees or visitors, they shall be located outside the isolation zone and exterior to the protected area.
(4) Isolation zones and all exterior areas within the protected i area shall be provided with illumination sufficient for the monitoring and observation requirements of paragraphs (c)(3), (e)(8), (h)(4) and
! (h)(6) of this section, but not less than 0.2 footcandle measured hori-zontally at ground level.
l (5) Strategic special nuclear material, other than alloys, fuel l
I elements or fuel assemblies, shall:
(i) Be stored in a vault when not undergoing processing if the mate- !
rial can be used directly in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.
Vaults used to protect such material shall be capable of preventing entry l
to stored SSNM by a single action in a forced entry attempt, except as such single action would both destroy the barrier and render contained .
1 l
SSNM incapable of being removed, and shall provide sufficient delay to j prevent removal of stored SSHM prior to arrival of response personnel l capable of neutralizing the design basis threat stated in S 73.1.
(ii) Be stored in tamper-indicating containers; 51
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[7590-01] .
(iii) Be processed only in material access areas constructed with barriers that provide significant delay to penetration; and (iv) be kept in locked compartments or locked process equipment while undergoing processing except when personally attended.
(6) Enriched uranium scrap (enriched to 20% or greater) in the form of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solutions or in other forms which result from a manufacturing process, contained in 30 gallon or larger containers with a uranium-235 content of less than 0.25 grams per liter, may be stored within a locked and separately fenced area within a larger protected area provided that the storage area fence is no closer than 25 feet to the perimeter of the protected area. The storage area when unoccupied shall be protected by a guard or watchman who shall patrol at intervals not exceeding 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or by intrusion alarms.
(d) Access Control Subsystems and Procedures (1) A numbered picture badge identification subsystem shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort. An individual nct employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected, material access, or vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area and returns the badge upon exit from the protected area, and that the badge
+ indicates (i) Non-employee-no escort required; (ii) areas to which access is authorized and (iii) the period for which access has been authorized.
Badges shall be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected areas.
(2) Unescorted access to vital areas, material access areas and con-trolled access areas shall be limited to individuals who are authorized 52
. [7590-01]
access to the material and equipment in such areas, and who require such access to perform their duties. Access to material access areas shall include at least two individuals. Authorization for such individuals shall be indicated by the issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas, material access areas, and controlled access areas to which access is authorized. No activities other than those which require access to strategic special nuclear material or to equipment used in the processing, use, or storage of strategic special nuclear material, or necessary maintenance, shall be permitted within a material access area.
)
(3) The licensee shall establish and follow procedures that will j l
permit access control personnel to identify those vehicles that are l authorized and those materials that are not authorized entry to protected, material access, and vital areas l (4) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices, shall be made and author-ization shall be checked at such points. United States Department of Energy :ouriers engaged in the transport of special nuclear material need not be searched. Licensee employees having an NRC or United States Depart-ment of Energy access authorization shall be searched at least on a random a
basis. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a structure, with bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows.
(5) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all hand-carried packages shall be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices except those packages carried by persons having 53 l
1
[7590-013 an NRC or DOE access authorization which shall be searched on a random basis when the person carrying them is selected for search.
(6) All packages and material for delivery into the protected area shall be checked for proper identification and authorization and searched on a random basis for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to admittance into the protected area, except those Commission approved delivery and inspection activities specifically designated by the licensee to be carried out within material access, vital, or protected areas for reasons of safety, security or operational necessity.
(7) All vehicles, except United States Department of Energy vehicles engaged in transporting special nuclear material and emergency vehicles under emergency conditions, shall be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched shall include the cab, engine compartment, under-carriage, and cargo area.
(8) All vehicles,-except designated licensee vehicles, requiring entry into the protected area shall be escorted by a member of the security organization while within the protected area, and to the extent practicable shall be off-loaded in an area that is not adjacent to a vital area.
Designated licensee vehicles shall be limited in their use to onsite plant functions and shall remaic in the' protected area except for operational, maintenance, security and emergency purposes. The licensee shall exercise positive control over all such designated vehicles to assure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.
l l (9) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access to material access areas, vital areas and controlled access areas.
Identification of personnel and vehicles shall be made and authorization 54 i
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[7590-01]
l checked'at such points. Prior to entry into a material access area, pack-ages shall be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.
l All vehicles, materials and packages, including trash, wastes, tools and equipment exiting from a material access area shall be searched for con-cealed strategic special nuclear material oy a team of at least two indi-l viduals who are not authorized access to that material access area. Each individual exiting a material access area shall undergo at least two separate searches for concealed strategic special nuclear material. For individuals exiting an area that contains only alloyed or encapsulated strategic special nuclear material, tne secord search may be conducted in a random manner.
(10) Before exiting from a material access area, containers of con-l taminated wastes shall be drum scanned and tamper sealed by at least two individuals, working and recording as a team, who do not have access to l l
material processing and storage areas. 4 (11) Strategic special nuclear material being prepared for shipment offsite, including product, samples and scrap, shall be packed and placed in sealed containers in the presence of at least two individuals working as a team who shall verify and certify the content of each shipping con-tainer through the witnessing of gross weight measurements and non-destructive assay, and through the inspection of tamper seal integrity and associated seal records.
(12) Areas used for preparing strategic special nuclear material for shipment and areas used for packaging and screening trash and wastes shall be controlled access areas and shall be separated from processing and storage areas.
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[7590-01] .
O (13) Individuals not permitted by the licensee to enter protected areas without escort shall be escorted by a watchman, or other individual designated by the licensee, while in a protected area and shall be badged to indicate that an escort is required. In addition, the individual shall be required to register his name, date, time, purpose of visit and employ-ment affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited.
(14) All keys, locks, combinations and related equipment used to control access to protected, material access, vital, and controlled access areas shall be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. When-ever there is evidence that a key, lock, combination, or related equipment may have been compromised it shall be changed. Upon termination of employ-ment of any employee, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which that employee had access, shall be changed.
(e) Detection, Surveillance and Alarm Subsystems and Procedures (1) The licensee shall provide an intrusion alarm subsystem with a capability to detect penetration through the isolation zone and to permit response action.
(2) All emergency exits in each protected, material access, and vital area shall be locked to prevent entry from the outside and alarmed to provide local visible and audible alarm annunciation.
(3) All unoccupied vital areas and material access areas shall be locked and protected by an intrusion alarm subsystem which will alarm upon the entry of a person anywhere into the area, upon exit from the ,
area, and upon movement of an individual within the area,.except that for process material access areas only the location of the strategic special nuclear material within the area is required to be so alarmed.
Vaults and process areas that contain strategic special nuclear material 56
[7590-01) o that has not been alloyed or encapsulated shall also be under the surveil-lance of closed circuit television that is monitored in both alarm stations.
Additionally, means shall be employed which require that an individual other than an alarm station operator be present at or have knowledge of access to such unoccupied vau'ts or process areas.
(4) All manned access centrol points in the protected area barrier, all security patrols and guard stations within the protected area, and both alarm stations shall be provided with duress alarans.
(5) All alarms required pursuant to this section shall annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other independent continuously manned onsite station not necessarily within the protected area, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or responding to an alarm. The alarm stations shall be controlled access areas and their walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows shall be bullet-resisting.
The central alarm station shall be located within a building so that the interior of the central alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area. This station may not contain any operational activities that would interfere with the execution of the alarm response function.
(6) All alarms required by this section shall remain operable from independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power. Switch-l over to standby power shall be automatic and shall not cause false alarms l
n annunciator modules.
(7) All alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators shall be tamper indicating and self-checking e.g. , an automatic indication shall be provided when a failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, 57 I
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[7590-01]
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when there is an attempt to compromise the system, or when the system is on standby power. The annunciation of an alarm at the alarm stations j shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarm, emergency exit alarm, etc.) and location. The status of all alarms and alarm zones shall !
be indicated in the alarm stations.
(8) All exterior areas within the protected area shall be monitored or periodically checked to detect the presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles, materials, or unauthorized activities.
(9) Methods to observe individuals within material access areas to assure that strategic special nuclear material is not moved to unauthor-ized locations or in an unauthorized manner shall be provided and used on a continuing basis.
(f) Communication Subsystems (1) Each guard, watchman, or armed response individual on duty shall be capable of maintaining continuous communication with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station required by paragraph (e)(5) of this section, who shall be capable of calling for assistance from other guards, watchmen, and armed response personnel and from law enforcement authorities.
(2) Each alarm station required by paragraph (e)(5) of this section shall have both conventional telephone service and radio or microwave transmitted two-way voice communication, either directly or through an intermediary, for the capability of communication with the law enforcement authorities.
(3) Non portable communications equipment controlled by the licensee and required by this section shall remain operable from independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power.
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[7590-01]
e (g) Test and Maintenance Programs The licensee shall have a test and maintenance program for intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarms, communications equipment, physical barriers, and other physical protection related devices and equipment used pursuant to this section that shall provide for the following:
(1) Tests and inspections during the installation and construction of physical protection related subsystems and components to assure that they comply with their respective design criteria and performance specifi-l cations.
(2) Preoperational tests and inspections of physical protection related subsystems and components to demonstrate their effectiveness and availability with respect to their respective design criteria and perform-ance specifications.
(3) Operational tests and inspections of physical protection related subsystems and components to assure their maintenance in an operable and effective condition, including:
(i) Testing of each intrusion alarm at the beginning and end of any period that it is used. If the period of continuous use is longer than seven days, the intrusion alarm shall also be tested at least once ,
l every seven days. )
(ii) Testing of communications equipment required )or communications onsite, including duress alarms, for performance not less frequently than once at the beginning of each security personnel work shift. Communica-1 tions equipment required for communications offsite shall be testcd for performance not less than once a day. 1 i
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(4) Preventive maintenance programs shall be established for physical protection related subsystems and components to assure their continued maintenance in an operable and effective condition.
(5) All physical protection related suosystems and components shall be maintained in operable condition. The licensee shall develop and employ corrective action procedures and compensatory measures to assure that the effectiveness of the physical protection system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related equipment or structures. Repairs and maintenance shall be performed by at least two individuals working as a team who have been trained in the operation and performance of the equipment. The security organization shall be notified before and after service is performed and shall conduct performance verification tests after the service has been completed.
(6) The security program shall be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security management and security supervi-sion. The review shall include a review and audit of security procedures and practices, evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review, audit, and evalua-tion along with recommendations, corrections and improvements, if any, shall be documented, reported to the licensee's plant management, and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibil-ity for the day to day plant operations. The reports shall be kept avail-able at the plant for inspection for a period of five years.
60
. [7590-01) 8 o
(h) Contingency and Response Plans and Procedures (1) The licensee shall have a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the strategic special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of tr.!s section. Safeguards contingency plans shall be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, 1' Licensee Safeguards Con-tingency Plans." Contingency plans shall include, but not be limited to, the response requirements in paragraphs (h)(2) through (h)(5) of this section.
(2) The licensee shall establish and document response arrangements that have been made with local law enforcement authorities.
(3) A minimum of five (5) guards shall be available at the facility to fulfill assessment and response requirements. In addition a force of guards or armed response personnel also shall be available to provide assistance as necessary. The size and availability of the additional force shall be determined on the basis of site-specific considerations
! that could affect the ability of the total onsite response force to engage and impede the adversary force until offsite assistance arrives. The reason for determining the total number and availability of onsite armed l response personnel shall be included in the physical protection plans submitted to the Commission for approval.
l
. (4) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or l
l vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, or upon evidence or indication of intrusion into a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, the licensee security organization shall:
61
[7590-01] -
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(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists, (ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any, (iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat by:
(A) Requiring responding guards or other armed response personnel to interpose themselves between vital areas and material access areas and any adversary attempting entry for purposes of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material and to intercept any person exiting with special nuclear material, and (B) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and requesting assistance.
(5) The licensee shall instruct every guard and all armed response personnel to prevent or impede acts of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material by using force sufficient to counter the force directed at him including the use of deadly force when the guard or other armed response person has a reasonable belief that it is neces-sary in self-defense or in the defense of others.
(6) To facilitate initial response to detection of penetration of the protected area and assessment of the existence of a threa"., a capabil-ity of observing the isolation zones and the physical barrier at the perim-eter of the protected' area shall be provided, preferably by means of closed ,
circuit television or by other suitable means which limit exposure of responding personnel to possible attack.
(7) Alarms occurring within unoccupied vaults and unoccupied material access areas containing unalloyed or unencapsulated strategic special nuclear material shall be assessed by at least two security personnel using closed circuit television (CCTV) or other remote means, 62 4
E
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8' s .
!* 1 i
l (8) Alarms occurring within unoccupied material access areas that l l
contain only alloyed or encapsulated strategic special nuclear material j shall be assessed as-in paragraph (7) above or by at least two security l personnel who shall undergo a search before exiting the material access i area. ;
l
- 20. 973.47 is renumbered to become S 73.67. All references to S 73.47 within this section are changed to 9 73.67.
- 21. The undesignated first parag'.ph of Section 73.50 is revised to read as follows:
5 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities.
I Each licensee who possesses, uses, or stores formula quantities of I strategic special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a total external radiation dose I
l rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any I accessible surface without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter shall comply with the following: )
1
- 22. Paragraph 73.50(c)(1) is amended to change the reference to "an NRC or ERDA personnel security clearance" to reference to "an NRC or United States Department of Energy access authorization." !
- 23. Paragraph 73.55(a) is revised to read as follows: !
973.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
63 1
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[7590-01]
e -
e (a) General Performance Objective and Requirements The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. The physical protec- j tion system shall be designed to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in S 73.1(a). To achieve this general l performance objective, the onsite physical protection system and security I
! organization shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the capabil-ities to meet the specific requirements contained in paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section. The Commission may authorize an applicant or licensee to provide measures for protection against radiological sabotage other than those required by this section if the applicant or licensee demonstrates that the measures have the same high assurance objective as specified in this paragraph and that the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent to that which would be provided by paragraphs (b)-(h) of this section and meets the general performance requirements of this section. Specifically, in the special cases of licensed operating reactors with adjacent reactor powerplants under construction, the licensee shall provide and maintain a level of physical
- protection of the operating reactor against radiological sabotage equivalent to the requirements of this section.
- 24. Paragraph 73.55(b) is revised to read as follows:
9 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
- * * * =
64 L i
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f
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o, e
! (b) Physical Security Organization l (1) The licensee shall establish a security organization, including guards, to protect his facility against radiological sabotage. If a con-tract guard force is utilized for site security, the licensee's written agreement with the contractor will clearly show that (1) the licensee is l
responsible to the Commission for maintaining safeguards in accordance with Commission regulations and the licensee's security plan, (2) the NRC may inspect, copy, and take away copies of all reports and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations, orders, or applicable license conditions whether such reports and documents are kept by the licensee or the contractor, (3) the requirement in Paragraph 73.55(b)(4) of this section that the licensee demonstrate the ability of physical security personnel to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities, includes demonstration of the ability of the contractor's physical secu-rity personnel to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in carrying out the provisions of the Security Plan and these regulations, and (4) the contractor will not assign any personnel to the site who have not first been made aware of these responsibilities.
(2) At least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical protection activities of the security organization shall be onsite at all times.
(3) The licensee shall have a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of security proce-dures. The system shall include:
(i) written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail the duties of guards, watch-f men and other individuals responsible for security; and 65
- [7590-01]
'e .
(ii) provision for written approval of such procedures and any revi-sions thereto by the individual with overall responsibility for the secu-rity functions.
(4) The licensee shall not permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman or armed response person, or other member of the security organ-ization unless such individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security job duty in accordance with Appendix B, of this part " General Criteria for Security Personnel." Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel to carry out l their assigned duties and responsibilities. Each guard, watchman, armed response person, and other member of the security organization shall requalify in accordance with Appendix B of this part at least every 12 months. Such requalification shall be documented. By (300 days after the rule becomes effective) each licensee shall submit a training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified to assure that these individuals meet the requirements of this paragraph. The training and qualifications plan shall include a schedule to show how all security personnel will be qualified by (within two years after the rule becomes effective) or within two years after the submitted plan is approved, which-ever is later. The training and. qualifications plan shall be followed by the licensee after (500 days after the rule becomes effective) or 60 days after the submitted plan is approved by the NRC, whichever is later.
- 25. Paragraph 73.55(g) is amended to add a new paragraph (4) to read as follows:
66
e
> (7590-01)
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o 9 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage. L 1
l i
(g) Testing and Maintenance (4) The security program shall be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security management and security supervi- l l
sion. The review shall include.a review and audit of security procedures and practices, evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review audit and evaluation along with recommendations for corrections and improvements, if any, shall be documented, reported to the licensee's plant management and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsi-bility for the day to day plant operation. The reports shall be kept available at the plant for inspection for a period of five years.
- 26. Paragraph 73.55(h) is amended to renumber paragraph (h)(5) as (h)(6) and revise paragraph h(4) as paragraphs (h)(4) and (5) as follows:
$ 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
- (h) Response requirement.
l a a * *
- 67 I
, , [7590-01]
=
'e (4) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area; or upon evidence or indication of intrusion into a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, the licensee security organization shall:
l (i) Determine whether or not a threat exists, (ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any, l
(iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat by:
l
! (A) ' Requiring responding guards or other armed response personnel l
to interpose themselves between vital areas and material access areas and any adversary attempting entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material and to intercept any person exiting with special nuclear material, and, (B) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and requesting assistance.
(5) The licensee shall instruct every guard and all armed response personnel to prevent or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by using force sufficient to counter the force directed at him including the use of deadly force when the guard or other armed response person has a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.
l a = * *
- i
- 27. The undesignated first paragraph of 973.60 is revised to read as follows:
9 73.60 Additional Requirements for the Physical Protection of Special 1 Nuclear Material at Non-Power Reactors ;
Each non power reactor licensee who, pursuant to the requirements of Part 70 of this chapter, possesses at any site or contiguous sites subject 68 i
)
l,.. [7590-01]
,p>
, 3 t
to control by the licensee uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to
'20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium alone or -in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained in U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium) shall protect the special nuclear material from theft or diver-sion pursuant to the requirements of 6 73.67(a), (b), (c), and (d) and as follows, except that a licensee is exempt from the requirements of this section to the extent that he possesses or uses special nuclear material
, which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour
' ~ '
at a distance of three feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding.
- 28. The prefatory language of 9 73.70 and paragraphs 73.70(c) and (g) is revised to read as follows:
6 73.70 Records.
Each licensee subject to the provisions of SS 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.45, 73.46, 73.55 or 73.60 shall keep the following records:
l x n a n n l (c) A register of visitors, vendors, and other individuals not employed by the licensee pursuant to 96 73.46(d)(10), 73.55(d)(6) or 73.60.
l i (g) Shipments of special nuclear material subject to the require-l
- j. ments'of this part, including names of carriers, major roads to be used, l
flight numbers in the case of air shipments, dates and expected times of departure and arrival of shipments, ver.ification of communication equip-ment on board the transfer vehicle, names of individuals who are to 69 L
"Xew*' (7590-01]
o ,
s communicate with the transport vehicle, container seal descriptions and identification, and any other information to confirm the means utilized to comply with 69 73.25, 73.26 and 73.27. Such information shall be recorded prior to shipment. Information obtained during the course of the shipment such as reports of all communications, change of shipping plan including monitor changes, trace investigations and others shall also be recorded.
- x *
- 29. Paragraph 73.71(a) is amended to change the reference to S 73.36(f) to reference 6 73.27(c) and to change the references to @ 73.47(e)(3)(vi),
or S 73.47(g)(3)(iii) to reference s 73.67(e)(3)(vi), or 9 73.67(g)(3)(iii).
- 30. Part 73 is amended to change the term " industrial sabotage" to " radio-logical sabotage" wherever it appears.
- 31. Paragraph 150.14 is amended to change the reference to s 73.47 to reference 6 73.67.
EFFECTIVE DATE: (120 days after publication in FR)
( Secs . 53, 161b , 161i , 1610, Pub. Law 83-703, 68 Stat. 930, 948-50, as amended Puc. Law 85-507, 72 Stat 327, Pub. Law 93-377, 88 Stat 475 (42 U.S.C. 2201); Sec. 201, Pub. Law 93-438, 88 Stat 1242-1243, as amended Pub. Law 94-79, 89 Stat 413 (42 U.S.C. 5841).) j Dated at Washington, D.C. this MN day of 4f>.-
1979.
l For the Nuclear Regulat y Commission.
l
'l s' Samuel J. CDil k ' 3 Secretary of thej Commission 70
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