ML20205H588

Responds to ,Stating That It Was Not Clear Whether NRC Believes It Necessary to Protect Against Threats Discussed by Builder in 760119 Memo

ML20205H588
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/20/1976
From:	Rowden M, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS
References
NUDOCS 9904080320
Download: ML20205H588 (3)

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R' god CO?E JUL 2 019N hsa 1

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The Honorable Morris K. Udall h 9) r_

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Dear Mr.'. Chaiman:

In your letter of April 20, 1976, you stated that it was not clear I

whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission believes it necessary to pro-tect against threats discussed by Mr. Builder in his January 19, 1976',

memorandum and by Mr. Chapman in his February 27, 1976, testimony.

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, In January 1976, the NRC began a special review of safeguards focusing on licensees who possess significant quantities of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Onsite evaluations were made to assess the effec-tiveness of programs approved and implemented to meet current regulations and to judge safeguards capabilities against postulated threat levels.

The capabilities of 13 licensees (involving 15 facilities) were examined.

Although there are no specific threat levels defined in our regulations, the threat levels used for this review consisted of an internal threat a of at least one employee occupying any position and an external threat?

comprised, at a minimum, of three well-amed, well-trained persons, who might possess inside knowledge or assistance. Licensee safeguards capa-bilities were expected to defeat this threat with high confidence.

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,x This special review focused on fuel cyclo facilities possessing strategic f

quantities of special nuclear materials.

For safeguards purposes,. this.,

is defined as at least two kilograms of plutonium or five kilograms of"

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uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the E f W' -@

M' d $ rfk" U-235 isotope).

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i Weaknesses relative to the threat levels used in this review were found,r * '

at each of the 15 facilities. The most prevalent weaknesses related to

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control of access to significant quantities of special nuclear materiali.

I (both stored and in process), exit search procedures, and adequacy of' s

resp 6nse by onsite and offsite forces. The review teams indicated that f

short-tem fixes could correct most weaknesses and that some could be resolved by procedural changes alone. On the spot follow-up actions

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Du' ring the initial review, guard forces'of some licensees were judged.y::z n,

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-a licensee has significantly. increased.his guard : strength, two others have 4

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Whired more watchmen and all licensees have affirmed their cocinitment to'.

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V3 intervene to protect strategic quantities of-special nuclear material

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Offices..itihas been de % mined subsequent.to'the review mentioned; ve.G:

systems. 60f;the.15' facilities iinvolved in.the'iafeguards" revie that all{ licensees have nade significant improvements in their safegQ' aids

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.0 ' 3 tinternal threats' defined in':the second paragraphfof this. letter.C0f..

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.against the:-internal threat: but notithefexternale. threat. and tw threat but 'not the interrial threat, four were judgeif. adequate to ;defen'd N --

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judged not adequate to protect against eitherithreat with high confidence.

_R s by licensees is presently bein$f % R'

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.v w. Correction of safeguards 'deficiencie/r':

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T licensing procedures.

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SThrough the combination of voluntary licensee corrective actions and new,; ~

>4 license conditions, all fuel cycle licensees are expected'to have thee.g '

g, capability to withstand as a minimum the internal. and external threatsi defined in the.second paragraph of this letter by August 1976. To s @.

f etermine that this capability has been achieved, NRC assessment / eval?gb.

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...juation teams:will review again.all fuel. cycle facility safeguards.f T. ' J measures onsite during August-September 1976..,_ c '

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.f " In a separate series of reviews,it.heLNRC staff'h'as 'been analyzing th vulnerability of road shipments of. strategic _ quantities of specia19 W.'.

nuclear materials-to attack,by one interna 15and'.three external advar s^

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saries havinsmilitary. training and skills.' These reviews,' conducted y

with industrdcooperatiof'and assistance froin U;S. Anny Special".Forc l

4 eams'have"already. led to71rdprovements. in comrnercial transpor.tation' r-.

4 planning and's'cheduling andeinlthestraining of drivers and' guards.i

'.s Furthermore$basedtupon these reviews,..the NRC: staff has implemented ne

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7 license conditions requiring increased protection,$ QW 6

of specialanuelear material in transport. Q$

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.:p Nuclear reactor., facilities;were nottin'clu'ded.inl the, safeguards [ review 0

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discussed above. :However,- special:.phy'sical security inspections have q,

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-t The Honorable Morris K. Udall f been conducted during the period February-May 1976. These inspections indicate that guard forces at certain reactor-sites have recently been l

upgraded in anticipation of a pending amendment to the reactor safe-i guards regulations.

With regard to civil penalties associated with safeguards activities, the first penalty for noncompliance was assessed in August 1974. Since then, safeguards civil penalties have been assessed against 14 licensees l

and three are presently pending. Only one licensee has received two -a. R-civil penalties for noncompliance with safeguards regulations.

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.y In reply to your questions concerning the utility of monetary civil penalties, it should be noted that civil penalties are only one of In addition to several sanctions utilized in our enforcement program, civil penalties, the NRC has authority to modify, suspend, or revoke licenses.

In general, these sanctions are considered to be more severe In than civil. penalties, although the ranking is not a clear-cut one.

terms of impact on a licensee, we generally consider that the most severe sanction is that of revocation of the license, thus denying the firm the ability to perform the activity subject to the license. The

' selection of which enforcement sanction to be applied in a particular case is one of the responsibilities that the flRC must discharge. All of i

the various enforcement sanctions available to the flRC have been used in the past and, as necessary, they will be used in the future to obtain needed corrective action.

The flRC Staff is initiating a study to examine, in more detail, the effectiveness of the various enforcement sanctions available to it. This l

study is expected to be completed before the end of this year.

I hope this letter has clarified these nuclear safeguards matters for "

Please let me know if the Comission can be of further assistance l

you.

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to your Subconnittee.

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Sincerely,

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Delsin.I sign.d by

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O "d Marcus A. Rowden

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