ML20205E656
| ML20205E656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/14/1978 |
| From: | Stoiber C NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904050252 | |
| Download: ML20205E656 (15) | |
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A/$C MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford Carlton R. Stolber FROM:
Assistant General Counsel
,h IMPACT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
SUBJECT:
ACT OF 1978 i
The attached memorandum (prapared with the assistance of Jim Devine, OPE) outlines provjslons of'the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 that the Commission will need to Our latest information is that signing will be deferredim in order to permit until toward the end of February, technical changes in the bill when Congress returns from its recess on February 20.
The Export Study Group (OIP, OGC, OELD, OPE and Act particularly affects the work of the Commission and how meet various tasks required to implement the statute might be assigned.
On Friday, February 17 at 9:30 A.M., an interagency staff meeting has been scheduled at the Department of Energy to Affected NRC offices will be repre-discuss the 1978 Act.
sented (OIP, NMSS, OPE, and OGC) and we are advised that f
The Commission assistants are also welcome to attend. Co guidance to NRC staff on implementing the statute.
Attachment as stated - ( j ', l'( [
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K. Pedersen, OPE (2)
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A PRELIMINARY Acc. V 31 - W-6 SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS AND EXPORT LICENSES dQ
( 706201) 19tc Section 102 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 01 (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 Act) requires the NRC, and the Arms Control Departments of State and Energy, and Disarmament Agency to establish and implement procedures to the maximum extent possible, export which ensure that, licences and subsequent arrangements are processed with This requirement is misplaced in a minimum time delay.
Another section entitled " Uranium Enrichment Capacity".
(section 126) outlines timely provision of the 1978 ActTherefore, Section 102 requirements review requirements.
can be met by establishing procedures which comply with that latter section of the Act.
SAFEGUARDS TRAINING PROGRAM Section 202 of the 1978 Act directs the Department of Energy, in consultation with the Commission, to establish and operate a safeguards and physical security training program for nations that have acquired or may be expected to acquireNo nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes.
time schedule is mandated for the establish of this program.
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS Section 301(a) of the 1978 Act transfers to NRC responsibility Under for licensing most government-to-government transfers.
previous law, the Department of Energy authorized such transfers.
Section 301 allows the Department to distribute only " laboratory samples, medical devices, or monitoring or other instruments" and " material which must be distributed because of an emergency situation in which time is of the essence."
In no event is the Department to distribute more than 500 grams per year of i
All Uranium-233, Uranium-235 or plutonium to any recipient.
other governmental transfers will be licensed by the Commission.
Section 110 of the Commission's regulations will have to be amended to reflect this new Commission licensing authority.
SOURCE MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION Section 301(b) amends Section 64 of the Atomic Energy Act to limit the Department of Energy's authority to export cource material.
Under Section 302(b) the Department will be per-mitted to export only three metric tons per year per recipient.
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s All other source material will be licensed by the Commission.
This modification should not have a major impact upon URC the Commission has been licensing virtually all source material exported under former Section 64 No activities because 110 will be required to implement this amendment to Part provision.
NRC LICENSING OF DOE ACTIVITIES adds a new Section 111 to the Section 301(c) of the 1978 ActAtomic Energy Act granting NRC aut exports previously conducted under the authority of theThese exports Department of Energy.of SNM, source and byproduct material under Section The Commission previously had no 1954 Act.
Under Section 301(a) and 82 of the authority to license such DOE activities.the Department is authorized to au of the 1978 Act, involving only small transfers government-to-government This new section permits the Commis-quantities of material.sion to license governmental transfers for materials prod by DOE which exceed those minimum quantities specified in However, one provision of the new statute Section 301(a).
licensing "nothing in this section shall require that states:
of the distribution of byproduct material by the Department Part 110 will need of Energy under section 82 of this Act."
the Commission's new authority to to be revised to reflect license DOE exports.
PRODUCTION OF SNM OUTSIDE THE U.S.
Section 302 of the 1978 Act amends Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act to prohibit persons from directly or indirectly engaging in the production of special nuclear material outside the U.S., unless specifically authorized by an agreement for The Department of Energy may also authorize such j
cooperation.
an activity after consulting with o;her Executive Branch The Department is required to estab-agencies and the NRC.
lish procedures for implementing this provision within 90 As part of this requirement, the Department must enter days.
into an interagency memoranda of understanding specifying procedures including regular interagency meetings and prompt licensing decisions.
SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS Section 303 or the 1978 Act adds a new Section 131 to the class of, Atomic Energy Act giving statutory recognition to a l
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s nuclear export activities denominated " subsequent arrangements",
and specifies procedures for the licensing of such arrangenents.
Subsequent arrangements are defined to include:
(a) contacts for furnishing nuclear materials and equipment; (b) approvals for a recipient's transfer of source or special nuclear material, production or utilization facility, or sensitive nuclear technology; (c) distribution of nuclear materials and equipment (except those licensed under Sections 126 or 109 of the Atomic Energy Act, or foreign distributions under Section 111(b)); (d) arrangements for physical security; (e) arrangaments for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements (includes reprocessing); (f) arrangements for the application of safeguards; and (g) any other arrangements which the President determines have importance from the stand-1 point of preventing proliferation.
Before entering into any proposed subsequent arrangement under an agreement for coopera-tion, the Department _of Energy must consult with Executive Branch agencies and the Commission.
A proposed arrangement is not effective until 15 days after the Department of Energy has published a notice in the Federal Register stating that the arrangement will not be inimical to the common defense and security.
ACDA is mandated to prepare an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement if -- in its view
-- a proposed subsequent arrangement might significantly contribute to proliferation.
The Department of En' my has 90 days to establish procedures for expeditious conciucration of requests for subsequent arrangements.
These procedures are to include an interagency memoranda of understanding (NRC is included) on how applica-tions will be processed.
Since the Commission does not have licensing authority for subsequent arrangements, Part 110 need not be revised to reflect NRC's consultative role.
EXPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES Section 304 of the 1978 Act adds a completely new Section 126 to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, containing a complex set of procedures for URC's licensing of nuclear exports.
Before descending to specifics, a few general comments may indicate the dimensions of changes wrought by the 1978 Act.
- First, Section 126 constitutes an almost total revamping of the procedural basis for nuclear export licensing.
Some of the new statutorily-mandated procedures were contained in previous versions of the non-proliferation bill, and I
therefore, have already been incorporated into Part 110, as recently pronu1 gated.
Other provisions are new, and l
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4-will have to be reflected in revised regulations.
Special y
attention will be required for dealing with new time limits k
affecting Commist. ion and Executive Branch action on pending export license applications.
Finally, certain provisions in Section 126 will resolve issues now before the Court of Appeals in the Tarayur lawsuit, requiring submissions to the Court.
The following survey identifies the most prominent features of the Section 126 regime:
No Licensing Without Executive Branch Judgment o
Section 126a(1) prohibits the NRC from licensing an export until it has been notified by the Secretary of State that -- in the judgment of the Executive Branch -- the export would not be inimical to the common defense and security.
Of course, this provision merely gives statutory recognition to current Commission practice as codified in new Part 110 (10 CPR 110-.41-42).
Although the new regulations appear to reflect the statutory requirement, the precise language of the regulation should be reviewed to verify this conclusion.
Time Limits on Executive Branch Review An amendment offered by Senator McClure late in the Senate debate added a new requirement that Executive Branch judgments on pending licenses ~he completed not more than 60 days'arter receipt of the application request.
The Secretary of State may authorize additional time for preparing the judgment upon a finding that ic would be in the " national interest" to do so.
However, when such authorizations are granted, notification must be given to appropriate Congres-sional committees.
One ambiguity concerning computation of time limits will have to be resolved at an early date by the Commission and the Executive Branch.
This ambiguity involves interpretation of the term " receipt of the application" -- the event which triggers cunning of the 60-day time period.
The statute does not specify whether Congress intended computation to begin when the application was received by the NRC, or at the time NRC forwards the application to the Department of State.
Since the evident purpose of the amendment's sponsor was to speed the licensing review process, one might argue that the earlier date was contemplated.
However, the better view would be to choose the date of " receipt" by the Executive Branch.
Otherwise, the time allo'<ed for a complex i n tm r'1ge n c y review could be substantially constricted and the possibility
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- . i of an adequate review frustrated, if the Commincion should delay sending forward an application in timely fashion.
However, it can also be argued that the Secretary of State may authorize a time extension in such a situation, thereby protecting the Executive Branch review process.
The Commission and Executive Branch will also have to determine how the time limits will be handled with respect to pending license applications.
The pending fuel license application for South Africa's Safari reactor poses the most dramatic example currently before the Commission.
The statute provides that "[t]he processing of any export appli-cation proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of this Act [ sic] chall not be delayed pending the development and establishment of procedures to implement the require-ments of this section."
(Since this provision becomes part of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the correct reference sh7uld have been to "this Section" or the 1978 Act.)
Two l
approaches are possible here.
If the Act is given a retro-active effect, a Secretarial authorization and Congressional l
notification would be required for all export license appli-cations which have been before the Executive Branch for over 60 days.
However, if the effectiveness of this provision is deemed to conmence on the date of enactment, the Executive
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Branch would have two months within which to take action.
1 Section 126 -- and other provisions to be discussed later i
-- will require a revision of procedures now set forth in Executive Order 11902.
The statute gives NRC a-role in developing such procedures, which must be " mutually agreeable".
l Given the 90-day time limit for establishing such procedures, the Commission will have to give expeditious consideration to Executive Branch proposals in this area.
3 Factors To Be Addressed by the Executive Branch l
The 1978 Act also requires that the Executive Branch l
judgment submitted to the Commission "specifically address the extent to which the export criteria then in effect are i
met, and the extent to which the cooperating party has adhered to the provisions of the applicable agreement.for cooperation."
Also Section 126a(1) lists several optional factors which the Secretary may address at his discretion.
The Commission will need to consider whether and to what extent these compulsory or discretionary factors should be codified in NRC docunents (e.g., in revisions to Part 110 i
or in a new set of standard questions to be posed to the Execu-tive Branch upon forwarding an export license application).
Executive Branch Required to Provide Data i
Section 126a(1) contains a requirement that the Secretary i
" provide appropriate data and recomnendations, subject to requests for additional data and recommendations, as required by the Commission...."
Commission Finding on Export Licensen l
Section 126a(2) contains the operative language spelling out what finding is required of the Commission in export licensing matters.
This important language
- prohibits licensing until the Commincion " finds, based on a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided and other information available to the Federal Government, including the Conmission, that the criteria in subsection 127a or their equivalent, and any other app 11-cable statutory requirements, are met Future Commission export licensing determinations will have to address the meaning of these terms.
A preliminary review suggests just a few issues likely to arise.
First, are the criteria explicitly set forth in the 1978 Act exhaustive of the 1954 Act's " common defense and security" requirement?
Legislative history suggests that inclusion of the words "and any other applicable statutory requirements" was intended to provide the Commission with some flexibility in this regard.
- Second, the words "or their equivalent" introduce a potential for departing from the strict language of the statutory licensing criteria.
The Executive Branch judgnents furnished to the Commission in particular matters will undoubtealy address this " equivalency" concept, however, the statute clearly makes the Commission responsible for determining whether measures adduced as equivalent are, in fact, an adequate basis for licensing an export.
Third, language making the basis of the Commission finding "a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided and other information available to the Federal Covernment, including the Commission" recognises that perfect knowledge is not possible in this area, and further reduces the potential for judicial reversal of an NRC licensing decision.
- A technical amendment in the Senate inadvertently struck the phrase "until the Commission or the Departtent of Energy",
thereby render $ng meaningless the section, as printed in the Congressional Record.
A correction of this and other tech-nical errors will be made in the enrolled bill.
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Multiple Licensing Another provision authorizes but does not compel the Commission to make a single finding for several license applications having the.following characteristics:
the l
exports are for the same country; are in the same general time frame; have similar significance for nuclear explosive purposes; and are under reasonably similar circumstances.
l The Commission will need to consider whether it wishes to adopt such a multiple licensing approach, and whether to codify this procedure in a revised Part 110.
Material Changed Circumstances The statute authorizes, but does not compel the Commission to grant follow-up licenses upon a finding that there have been "no material changed circumstances associated with a i
new application or request from those existing at the time l
of the last application or request for an export to the same l
country This provision could also be incorporated in l
Part 110_, which already contains a provision stating that l
petitions for hearings in export licensing matters will be l
denied where issues have been adequately explored in previous hearings and there are no changed circumstances.
10 CFR l
110.83(f)(2).
If the Commission decides to adopt such an approach, care should be taken'not to unduly narrow the kind of circumstances which are considered.
For example, l
in addition to political, social or technological events in a recipient nation, the Commission should also be free l
to assess changes in U.S.
nuclear non-proliferation policy i
and our knowledge of nuclear technology in making a finding of " changed circumstances".
Presidential Over-ride Another feature of the 197$ Act which the Commission l
will want to incorporate in revislons of Part 110 allows the President to authorize an export for which a Commission license l
has not been issued.
The Presidential authorization followi-l a publicly announced decision that "it is unabic to make the statutory determinations required under this Act."
This phrase comprises two situations:
(1) a straightforward license denial for failure to neet one or more criteria; and (2) NRC deferral because a matter raises issues which Commissioners believe should be resolved by the President.
Such latter circumstances should be rare, in view of the 1978 Act's legislative history supporting need for MRC's independent role in the nuclear
I 8-The President must determine that withholding export process.
the export would be " seriously prej udicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or would i
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security."
Congress has a 60-day period in which to review the President's determination, and may rej ect the authorization by concurrent resolution.
l Timely Commission Action Section 126b(1) enjoins the NRC to act on licenses in a timely fashion "upon a determination that all applicable statutory requirements have been met."
Section 126b(2) gives specific content to this general statutory language by estab-lishing some time limitations on Commission action.
- First, if the NRC has not acted upon a pending export licence l
application within 60 days of receiving the Executive Branch i
it must." inform the applicant in writing of the
- judgment, reason for delay and provide follow-up reports as appropriate."
l This requirement has already been adopted by the Commission in its new export regulations.
l Further, if the Commisaion has not acted on the pending application within an additional 60 days (120 days total),
the President may authorise the export on the same basis as if the Commission had made a formal finding not to issue the license.
In this situation, the President is not required to authorize the export, but may do so upon a finding that "further delay would be excessive".
Additional time for Commission action is provided in two circumstances.
If the l
Commission has commended procedures for public participation, the second 60-day time period only begins to run at the com-pletion of such public proceedings.
Also, if the Commission l
forwards requents for additional information during the l
first 60 days, the second period conmences only after a
" full executive branch response to the Commission's addi-tional concerns of requests has been made consistent with subsection a(1)...."
As with respect to the new time limits for Executive Branch review, a question arises concerning computation of time for license applications already before the Commission.
If the provisions are deemed retroactive, several applica-tions before the Commission may raise issues concerning noti-fication to' applicants and the possibility of a Presidential over-ride for excessive delay.
The better view is probably to regard the time limits as commencing from the date of m
.. enactment of the 1978 Act.
One way of dealing with the pending license situation would be for the Commission to prepare a list of pending licenses and forward that list to the Department of State with a request that the Department advise URC:
(1) whether, in light of new requirements established in the legislation, there are any further matters the Executive Branch wishes to bring before the Commission; and (2) noting that, for applications already forwarded by the Commission which have not been returned with an Executive 4
Branch judgment, the Commission considers the 60-day review period for the Executive Branch to have commenced.
NRC Export Licensing Procedures Section 126b gives NRC come four months in which to promulgate regulations for its export licensing activities.
Of course, Part 110 contains many provisions which meet the requirements of this section.
Revisions will be needed to reflect other statutory requirements.
A significant amendment to the Senate bill also provides that "until the regulations required by this subsection have been promulgated, the Commission shall implement the provisions of this Act under temporary procedures established by the Commission."
This clause would allow the Commission to decide that the new Part 110 should be adopted as the
" temporary procedures" it wishes to establish, thereby making them immediately effective.
There may be additional temporary procedures which the Commission would wish to put into place', particularly with respect to its handling of pending license applications and how the 1978 Act's i
immediately applicable criteria will be applied.
No On-the-Record Hearings Section 126c gives Congressional recognition to the view taken by the Commission in its Tarapur decision that adjudicatory hearings are inappropriate for the resolution of nuclear export licensing matters.
The 1978 Act states that " procedures to be established pursuant to subsection (b) shall constitute the exclusive basis for hearings in nuclear export licensing proceedings before the Commission."
This provision should resolve one of the major questions now pending before the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the General Counsel plans to bring the Court's attention to the language as soon as the President signs the enrolled bill.
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-1C-HEW EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA In three new sections of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Sections 127, 128 and 129), the 1978 Act establishes a complex series of new criteria to govern United States exports.
The Act adopts six immediately applicable criteria, one additional criterion to become effective after 18 months l
(full scope safeguards), and a range of actions by nations j
receiving U.S. nuclear exports which would result in termina-tion of those exports.
In its future export licensing determinations, the Commission will need to give detailed attention to the precise language of each of these provisions; however, a brief overview of the aew criteria will provide some indication of their likely impact.
j Immediately Applicable Criteria Section 305 of the Act, which creates a new Section 127 4
of the 1954 Act, contains the six familiar criteria which have been a feature of non-proliferation legislation for j
approximately the 1ast year and a half.
These include:
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(1) application of IAEA safeguards to exported materials l
or-facilities, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof; (2) no exports may be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of such devices;-(3) maintenance of adequate physical security measures on exported materials or facilities; (4) prior U.S.
approval for any retransfer of U.S.-supplied commodities; (5) prior U.S. approval for reprocessing of l
U.S.-supplied material; and (6) no sensitive nuclear tech-nology (reprocessing, enrichment or heavy water technology) l shall be exported unless the conditions in paragraphs (1) through (5) are applied to U.S.-supplied commodities.
The application of these criteria, as all other licensing t
determinations under the statute, are matters confined to the responsibility of NRC.
However, because of Congressional awareness of discussions both inside and outside the Commis-sion concerning how MRC is to view its role in assessing international safeguards application, two additional provi-sions of.the 197? Act should be noted.
Safeguards Verification by MRC The attempt _to provide some Congressional guidance on how'the Commission is to conduct its review of international safeguards adequacy (with respect to materials accounting l
. and control) resulted in the following nugatory provision in Section 126a(2):
"nothing contained in this section is intended to require or prohibit the Commission from independently conducting country or site specific visita-tions in the Commission's consideration of the application of IAEA's safeguards."
This neutral provision conveys a e
Congressional intention that the Commission make its own judgment about what kinds of verification activities are required in the exercise of its safeguards responsibilities.
Physical Security Regulations Subsection 127(3), which requires a Commission finding that physical security measures on a proposed export will be adequate, is linked to a previous section of the Act mandating regulations on that subject.
New subsection 126(d) of the 1954 Act was added during Senate consideration and requires the promulgation of regulations by the NRC within 60 days establishing levels of physical security.
The Department of State, Energy and Defense and the Arms Control and Dis-armament Agency are given a consultative role in developing these regulations.
Under the licensing criterion, " physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection required by the applicable regulations."
The Commission has previously indicated its intention to use INFCIRC 225 as the basis for its physical security determinations.
However, the degree of formality required by incorporating this approach into regulations suggests a need to revisit the issue, and to do so with dispatch if the time limits contained in Section 304(d) are to be met.
EURATOM Exemption Another provision in the " procedures" section of the 1978 Act bears upon application of criteria (4) and (5).
Section 126a(2) has the effect of exempting EURATOM nations from criteria mandating U.S.
approval rights for reprocessing and retransfer of U.S.-supplied material for two years, if EURATOM agrees to renegotiation of its agreement for coopera-tion with the U.S.
within 30 days of enactment of this [ sic]
Act.
The President may extend the negotiating period for another year upon finding that failure to continue coopera-tion would "be seriously prej udicial to the achievement of l
United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise l
jeopardize the common defense and security."
Further annual extensions are allowed, after notice to the Congress.
.. Full Scope Safeguards New'Section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act would require application of IAEA careguards "to all peaceful nuclear I
activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such statute at the time of the export."
Application of this criterion is deferred unt11 18 months
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after the date of enactment of the 1978 Act.
A Presidential exemption is permitted upon a finding that application of the criterion "would be seriously prej udicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation obj ectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security."
Special Congres-sional review procedures are provided for any such Presidential exemption.
Termination of Nuclear Exports A new Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act is adopted to require termination of U.S.
nuclear exports to nations which engage in conduct described in the legislation.
For non-nuclear weapons states such proscribed actions include:
(1) detonation of a nuclear explosive device; (2) termina-tion or abrogation of IAEA safeguards-3 material violation 1
of an IAEA safeguards agreement; or (k)(ac)tivities involving source or special nuclear material having a direct significance for manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices.
For'all states -- including nuclear weapons states -- sub-section 129(2) mandates a termination of exports to any country which:
(1) materially violates an agreement with the United States; (2) assists, encourages or induces any non-nuclear weapons state to engage in activities having direct significance for manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices; or (3)' enters into agreement for transfer of reprocessing technology to a non-nuclear weapons state except in connection with INFC or a similar understanding.
A Presidential exemption is allowed under this section on the same basic as for the full sc~ ope safeguards criterion.
Congressional review is also specified.
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURES Section 308 of the 1978 Act adds a complex and new Section 130 to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act containing exhaustive and con-voluted procedures for Congressional review of' Presidential submissions required by the Act.
These provisions, which have to be read to be believed, basically incorporate parlincntary devices for ensuring that expeditious review is given by appropriate committees to any Presidential submissions.
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- COMPONENT LICENSING Section 309 of the 1978 Act amends Section 109 of the Atomic Energy Act with the evident intent that part of the Department of Commerce's authority to license component-exports will be transferred to NRC.
Under Section 309 the Commission is to l
determine, after consultation with other agencies, which I
components are relevant from the standpoint of export control because of their significance for nuclear explosive purposes.
The Commission would then license such components, applying the following criteria:
(a) IAEA safeguards to be applied; (b) the component will not be used for any nuclear explosive device; (c) the component will not be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations without prior United States consent.
NRC cannot issue such a license l
if it is advised by the Executive Branch that the export would be inimical to the common defense and security of the U.S.
Provision is made for general licenses in some cases.
The Commission is required to prcmulgate regulations imple-menting this provision within'120 days.
The regulations must include provision for consultation with the Executive Branch prior to licensing.
For items which will continue to be licensed by the Department of Commerce, procedures must be developed providing for Commerce Department consultation with.other Executive Branch agencies and the NRC.
These amendments do not apply to exports contracted for prior to November 1, 1977, which are made within one year after this legislation takes effect.
One provision which can potentially reduce the burden of component licensing authority states "that a specific license shall not be required for an export pursuant to this section if the 20mponent, item or substance is covered by a facility license issued pursuant to section 126 of this Act."
This provision will encourage applicants to list precisely all items to be exported under a facility license, and to eliminate the need for separate licenses covering individual shipments.
AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION Section h01 of the 1978 Act makes several significant changen to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Of particular relevance for the Commission is a requirement that the Executive Branch consult with NRC before submitting a pro-posed agreement for cooperation to the President for his approval.
The Commission is also required to provide the President with a statement of its views and recommendations
w on the propoced agreement, to be included in the package forwarded by the Secretaries of State and Energy.
After approval by the President and submission of a proposed agreement to the Congress, the MRC and other agencies are l
required, upon request of either the House International l
Relations Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee promptly to furnish those committees with its views as to l
whether "the safeguards and other controls contained therein l
provide an adequate framework to ensure that any exports as contemplated by such agreement will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security."
In shorthand form, the following list summarizes requirements mandated for new agreements by the 1978 Act.
With the excep-tion of item 2 (full scope safeguards), the requirements apply to nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear l
technology transferred pursuant to the agreement.
(1)
Application of IAEA safeguards (2)
Full-scope safeguards l
(3)
A "No PNE" assurance (4)
U.S.
right to require the return of any trans-ferred materials and equipment or SNM produced through the use thereof in the event of detona-tion of a nuclear explosive device or termination of abrogation of an agreement providing for IAEA
)
safeguards
)
(5)
U.s. veto over transfers (6)
Adequate physical security assurances (7)
U.S.
veto over reproces' sing and enrichment (8)
U.S.
approval rights over storage facilities (9)
Application of the foregoing criteria to materials and facilities produced or con-structed by or through the use of any sensitive nuclear technology transferred l
pursuant to the agreement.
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i Section 404(a) mandaten a Presidential program to renegotiate agreements for cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of the legislation, or otherwise to obtain the same under-takings in current agreements for cooperation that would be required in new agreements.
This provision allows continued U.S.
nuclear cooperation under an existing agreement for a period of 30 days after enactment of the legislation.
Thereafter, for nuch cooperation to continue, the Secretary of State must notify the Commincion that the nation or group of nations covered by the relevant agreement has agrecd to the negotiations called for in Section 404(a).
This issue has immediate relevance for a number of nationn which have not yet agreed to commence renegotiation of their agreementa, including EURATOM.
j REPORTING TO COh0RESS Section 602(a) of the 1978 Act requirec the Commiscion to include in its annual report to the Congrecs recommendationn regarding U.S.
non-proliferation policy on those itemn within the Commission's jurisdiction.
Section 602(c) requires the Commincion to keep the Senate Committees.on Foreign Relations and Government Affairc and tne Houne Committee on Inter-national Relations " fully and currently informed" with respect to itn activities under the Act of 1978 and the Atomic Energy Act.
GAO STUDY Section 602(e) of the 1978 Act directs the GAO to prepare a report for Congress three years after enactment of the 1978 Act on implementation and impact of the act on the non-proliferation policies, purposes, and obj ections of the Act.
The Commiacion is directed to cooperate with GAO in this endeavor.
Legislative hictory indicates that one purpose of the study la to ascess the role of the Commission in nuclear export policy.
The three year time limit is intended to enable GAO to incorporate the results of the INFCE in its study.
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