ML20205E325

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Insp Rept 50-293/87-03 on 870101-0220.Violations Noted: Failure to Properly Control High Radiation Area Keys,Failure to Initiate Failure & Malfunction Rept & Failure to Comply W/Fire Protection Sys Tech Specs
ML20205E325
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 03/19/1987
From: Wiggins J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205E251 List:
References
50-293-87-03, 50-293-87-3, NUDOCS 8703300592
Download: ML20205E325 (22)


See also: IR 05000293/1987003

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.

50-293

Report No.

87-03

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Licensee:

Boston Edison Company

800 Boylston Street

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Boston, Massachusetts 02199

Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

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Inspection At: Plymouth, Massachusetts

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Inspection Conducted:

January 1, 1987 - February 20, 1987

Inspectors:

M. McBride, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Lyash, Resident Inspector

T. Kim, Resident Inspector

"

L. Doerflien, Project Engineer

Approved By:

hE AJM[A

3h ff2

J. {idgins, gf, Reactor Projects Section 18

~ Date

Inspection Summary:

Areas Inspected:

Routine resident inspection of plant operations, radiation

protection, physical security, plant events, maintenance, surveillance, outage

activities, and reports to the NRC. Licensee preparations for reactor defuel-

ing and subsequent fuel movement activities were also reviewed.

Results: Three violations were identified concerning failure to properly con-

trol high radiation area keys, failure to initiate a Failure and Malfunction

Report, and failure to comply with fire protection system technical specifica-

tions.

Additional inspector concerns included the following:

The possible existence of a single failure affecting the standby gas

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treatment system which had not been identified during recent engineering

reviews (section 3.a).

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The use of an out of date procedure during conduct of a surveillance test

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(section 3.c).

8703300592 870323

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InspectionSummary(Continued)

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The absense of technical specifications for the RPS electrical protection

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assemblies (section 3.c).

The apparent failure of operations and fire protection personnel to

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recognize the status of fire protection equipment (section 3.d).

Poor contamination control and RWP procedure adherence practices (section

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3.e).

Submittal of an inaccurate Licensee Event Report (section 5).

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The inspectors also noted that the licensee's response to IE Information Notice

86-106, concerning piping erosion-corrosion appears aggressive and thorough.

Licensee preparation for and execution of fuel offload activities were well

organized and performed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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1.

S umma ry o f Fa c i l i ty Ac t i v i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.

Followup on Previous Inspection Findings ............

1

Violations, Unresolved Items and Inspector Follow Item

3.

Routine Periodic Inspections ........................

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a.

System Alignment Inspection

b.

Plant Maintenance and Outage Activities

c.

Surveillance Testing

d.

Fire Protection

e.

Radiation Prot'ection

4.

Review of Plant Events ..............................

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a.

Licensee Ma6agement and Organizational Changes

b.

Loss of Offsite Power Test

c.

Reactor Defueling Preparations and Conduct

5.

Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6.

Management Meetings .................................

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Attachment I - Persons Contacted

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DETAILS

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1.0 Summary of Facility Activities

The plant was shutdown on April 12, 1986 for unscheduled maintenance. On

July 25,1986, Boston Edison announced that. the outage would be extended

to include refueling and completion of certain modifications.

A management conference was held at .the licensee's Chiltonville Training

Center' on February 2,1987. NRC and licensee senior management discussed

the progress of program improvements.

During the period, Rear Admiral

R.

G. Bird, U. S. Navy (Retired) was

appointed Senior Vice President-Naclear. On February 4, 1987 the licensee

announced the replacement of the plant manager, and several other station

organization changes.

The licensee commenced reactor defueling on the evening of February 6,

,

1987. The core was completely off-loaded by February 13, 1987.

A third full time NRC Resident Inspector was assigned to Pilgrim on

January 26, 1987.

2.0 Followup on Previous Inspection Findings

Violations

(Update) Violation (84-36-03), failure to continuously monitor the SRMs

during refueling. The inspector reviewed station procedure 1.3.34 Conduct

of Operations, Rev.12, and associated OPER 38, Shift Turnover Checklist.

The inspector also observed Nuclear Operation Supervisor and Nuclear Plant

Operator - shift turnovers and determined that adequate transmittal of

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information regarding plant status and changes in plant conditions were

performed.

This item remains open pending implementation of licensee

commitments, including Operations Section Manager or

Chief Operating

Engineer presence in the control room during important aspects of the

upcoming reactor restart.

(Closed) Violation (85-19-04), failure to specify surveillance frequencies

on Radiation Work Permit (RWPs) for high radiation areas. The inspector

reviewed revised station procedure 6.1.022, Revision 20, Issue, Use, and

Termination of Radiation Work Permits (RWP's). Surveillance frequencies

appear to be adequately addressed. The procedure requires the radiation

protection supervisor or designee to specify the surveillance frequency on

the RWP. It further states that the frequency shall be in specific terms

(i.e.,

once per shift, constant, every two hours, etc.).

The licensee

also instructed the health physics supervisors responsible for approving

RWP's that surveillance frequencies be specifically stated in the remarks

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section of the RWP.

The inspector reviewed selected RWP's during this

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inspection period and verified that the frequencies were specified. This

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item is closed.

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Unresolved Items

(Closed) Unresolved Item (86-25-10), review fire barrier discrepancies and

compliance with. technt. cal specifications.

A number of deficient fire

barriers.were identified by the licensee during April,1985. No specific

corrective actions were taken in response to these deficiencies until

July, 1986. The licensee's failure to effectively utilize the corrective

action program in addressing these items was identified as noncompliance

50-293/86-25-09.

In addition, the inspector questioned licensee compli-

ance with technical specifications during tSis period of time.

In re-

sponse, the licensee conducted a review of each discrepancy. This review,

described in the licensee's written response to inspection report 50-293/

86-25, indicated that fire watch coverage was provided in these areas

during the entire time period. This coverage, although not tied to the

specific deficiencies, provided compensatory measures equivalent to tech-

nical specification requirements. The inspector sampled licensee records

supporting this assertion.

No problems were identified.

This item is

closed.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (86-29-07), evaluate the reportability of fire

barrier deficiencies.

Failure and Malfunction Report number 86-164 iden-

tified nineteen potentially degraded fire barriers.

The inspector ques-

tioned the reportability of this condition.

Engineering evaluations per-

formed justify the operability of the existing barriers. This justifica-

tion was reviewed and approved by the licensee engineering department

under engineering disposition document SUDDS86-146.

Based upon documen'

ted analysis demonstrating that the barriers are capable of performing

their design function, this issue does not appear to be reportable.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (86-34-04), followup on recent fire barrier

inspections.

The licensee recently identified a large number of fire

barrier penetrations which were degraded, with inadequate qualification

documentation or for which proper surveillance was not performed.

In

addition, compensatory measures established by the licensee in response

to the number of deficiencies did not appear aggressive.

The failure of

the licensee to ensure proper implementation of compensatory fire watches

is the subject of noncompliance 50-293/86-36-04. The licensee has insti-

tuted an extensive program to identify all fire barrier penetrations and

upgrade appropriate surveillance procedures.

Review of progress in this

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area is tracked by unresolved item 50-293/86-36-02.

Based on the above

referenced open items, this item is considered administratively closed.

(Update) Unresolved Item (86-36-01), review licensee actions to implement

repairs on fire protection equipment and reduce the number of compensatory

fire watches. Similar concerns were identified as inspector follow items

50-293/86-38-03 and 86-06-12.

Items 86-38-03 and 86-06-12 have been

administratively closed based on the existence of item 86-36-01.

Future

inspection in this area should consider the licensee's commitments and

corrective actions contained in written responses to inspection reports

86-38 and 86-06.

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Inspector Follow Items

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (83-06-01), review ifcensee actions to

assure other fire barrier penetrations are not missed from the program.

This item was last updated in inspection report 50-293/86-21. The licen-

see identified numerous fire barrier penetrations not included in appli-

cable surveillance procedures.

It was also noted that resources were not

available to properly maintain barrier surveillance procedures.

The

licensee has dramatically increased management oversight and staffing

levels in the area of fire protection.

An extensive effort to identify

and document all penetrations is underway.

The progress and completion

of this walkdown program is the subject of unresolved item 50-293/

86-36-02.

Based on ' the increase in fire protection staffing and the

existence of the above referenced item, this item is considered closed.

(Closed) Inspector' Followup Item (84-23-03), general plant working condi-

tions to be reviewed during routine safety inspections as followup re-

sponse to allegation made to OSHA involving drywell industrial safety

hazards. The licensee's records indicate that the item was resolved among

the licensee, General Electric Company, and Bechtel Power Company follow-

ing a meeting with an OSHA representative on July 27, 1984. The inspector

independently conducted tours of the drywell and other plant areas per-

iodically to observe plant safety conditions.

The general plant condi-

tions appeared satisfactory. The inspectors will continue to review plant

safety conditions during routine inspections. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (86-06-12), follow licensee efforts to

reduce the number of station fire watches. The licensee continues to rely

heavily on compensatory fire watches.

Regional specialist inspection

50-2f 3/86-36 identified similar concerns. Followup on continuing licensee

efforts to reduce the number of fire watches will be conducted under unre-

solved item 50-293/86-36-01.

Based on the above, this item is adminis-

tratively closed.

(Update) Inspector Follow Item (86-29-03), review licensee evaluation of

SBGT system single failures.

This item was last updated in inspection

report 50-293/86-37.

The inspectors questioned licensee engineering

personnel regarding a single failure of a backdraft damper which could

affect system operability.

This is described in section 3.a of this

report.

(Update) Inspector Follow Item (86-37-09), review licensee evaluation of

the seismic qualification of HGA relays. On January 16, 1987, the licen-

see reported via ENS that a potentially significant application of this

unqualified relay type had been identified. This is discussed in section

3.c of this report.

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(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (86-38-03), fire protection system mainten-

ance is not always properly prioritized. Similar observations were made

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during a specialist inspection and are documented as unresolved item

50-293/86-36-01.

Based on the existence of the above item, this item is

administratively closed.

3.0 Routine Periodic Inspections

The inspectors routinely toured the facility to assess general plant' and

equipment conditions, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection,

security and radiological control measures. Ongoing work activities were

monitored to verify that they were being conducted in accordance with

approved administrative and technical procedures, and that proper communi-

cations with the control room staff had been established. The inspector

observed valve, instrument and electrical equipment lineups in the field

to ensure that they were consistent with system operability requirements

and operating procedures.

During tours of the control room the inspectors verified proper staffing,

access control and operator attentiveness.

Adherence to procedures and

limiting conditions for operations were evaluated. The inspectors exam-

ined equipment lineup and operability, instrument traces and status of

control room annunciators. Various control rooms logs and other available

licensee documentation were reviewed.

In addition to routine equipment operability confirmation, the inspectors

performed independent walkdowns. of selected safety systems. Confirmation

of the as-built system configuration, identification of any degraded con-

ditions and procedure adequacy were evaluated.

The inspector observed and reviewed outage activities, maintenance and

problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations,

procedures, codes and standards.

Involvement of QA/QC, safety tag use,

personnel qualifications, fire protection precautions, retest require-

ments, and reportability were assessed.

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The -inspector observed tests to verify performance in accordance with

approved procedures and LCO's, collection of valid test results, removal

and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.

Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-

ing period. Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to

radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were

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observed.

Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random

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surveys of radiologically clear points throughout the facility were taken

by the inspector.

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Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory

requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those

checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers,

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identification,

access control,

badging,

and compensatory

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measures when required.

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a.

System Alignment Inspection

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Several potential single failures have been identified by the

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licensee which could affect the operability of the Standby Gas

Treatment Sys' tem (SBGT). These single failures have previously

been reported to the NRC under Part 21, and are the subject of

existing open item 50-293/86-29-03. Each failure identified by

the licensee depends on the presence of an air operated fail-

open damper which crossties the redundant SBGT system trains.

After completion 'of the licensee's engineering evaluation the

' inspectors independently examined the system configuration for

the existence of unidentified single failures.

The SBGT system consists of two treatment trains and two exhaust

fans with a common discharge duct. The trains are also connec-

ted at the outlet of the treatment trains, just upstream of the

exhaust fans, by an air operated fail-open crosstie damper.

A

backdraft damper is installed on the discharge of each fan to

prevent any recirculation flow. During the design basis acci-

dent the crosstie damper would fail open and both exhaust fans

would auto start. After a preset time delay one fan automati-

cally shuts down.

If the backdraft damper on the outlet of the

idle fan failed to fully close, a recirculation path for the

operating fan would be established. This condition could result

in a decrease in flow from the reactor building and result in a

loss of secondary containment. The licensee stated that a low

pressure sensor in the system common discharge duct should

activate to restart the idle fan if this failure were to occur.

Justification that this action would occur under all partial or

full failures of the backdraft damper could not be provided by

the licensee.

The inspector will review the licensee's final

analysis under existing open item 50-293/86-29-03. The accepta-

bility of the SBGT during fuel offload activities is discussed

in section 4.c of this report.

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The inspector reviewed the measures taken by the licensee to

ensure that systems susceptible to freezing were adequately pro-

tected.

The only safety related systems which are not buried or

in a heated area and therefore susceptible to freezing are the

main stack sample line and the jockey fire pump low pressure

switch sensing line.

Both lines are heat traced to prevent

freezing and the licensee verified proper operation of the heat

tracing circuits during November 1986.

In addition to these

annual circuit checks, the inspector noted other controls are in

place, such as weekly surveillance test 8.B.1, Fire Pump Test

which periodically verifies the heat tracing circuits are ener-

gized.

The inspector also noted that the auxiliary boilers,

which provide heating to the station's buildings and compart-

ments, receive extensive annual preventive maintenance during

the summer to ensure proper operation of the station's heating

system during cold weather.

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During a tour of the intake structure, the inspector noted that

routine surveillance testing continues to identify diesel fire

pump battery cell temperatures which are below specification (77

degrees F i 15 degrees F). This problem was previously identi-

fied during inspection 86-06.

Discussions with the licensee

indicated that the unit heater was verified to be operating

properly and that a review of the heater sizing was ongoing.

The inspector will review the results of this analysis in a

future inspection.

b.

Plant Maintenance and Outage Activities

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The inspector reviewed the action taken by the licensee in re-

sponse to IEN 86-106.

Boston Edison has experienced severe

erosion-corrosion (E-C) degradation of the extraction steam

piping, feedwater heaters and cascading drain piping at Pilgrim.

Starting-in 1980 the licensee implemented an extensive equipment

inspection and replacement program in these areas. This program

is ongoing. Two studies contracted by BEco in 1981 identified

six variables affecting the occurrence of E-C in steam piping.

Extensive ultrasonic examination of low pressure steam piping

conducted from 1980 to present identified significant degrada-

tion.

Four feedwater heaters and a large amount of piping was

replaced with less susceptible chrome-moly or stainless steel.

In response to the Surry event detailed in IEN 86-106, the

licensee expanded the scope of examinations to include the con-

densate and feedwater piping.

Inspections of fittings located

in accessible and high personnel traffic areas has begun with

completion expected during the current outage.

The criteria

established in response to the steam piping E-C problems, fluid

chemistry variables such as oxygen concentration, piping stress

levels, industry experience, and academic studies will be con-

sidered in establishing a prioritized inspection plan for the

remaining

piping.

Data

collection

from

the

inspections

currently underway will be used to refine the analysis method.

Licensee consideration is being given to extending this effort

to other systems including main steam and safety related piping

in the drywell .

Recommendations on operational and chemistry

practices, possible replacement material and design options are

under development.

The licensee appears to be aggressively

pursuing evaluation and

resoittion

of

this

industry-wide

concern.

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On January 16, 1987 the licensee reported via ENS that certain

electrical relays used in the core spray system injection valve

logic circuits are not seismically qualified. General Electric

type HGA relays may exhibit contact chatter when subjected to

seismic accelerations. A review by licensee engineering person-

nel identified an application of this relay type which could

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prevent automatic opening of the core spray injection valves

during the design basis earthquake. In excess of 200 HGA relays

exist at Pilgrim.

Licensee review of the application of these

relays is ongoing and will be evaluated by the inspectors under

existing item 50-293/86-37-09.

On January 23, 1987, miscommunication between site Quality Con-

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trol and Engineering sections regarding operability of a pipe

support led to an ENS report. Further evaluation concluded that

the pipe support was operable.

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As documented in inspection report No. 50-293/86-40, the A core

spray pump could not achieve rated flow during post maintenance

testing. The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's

evaluation of the flow problem. During the investigation, the

licensee opened and inspected the pump discharge and test line

check valves (valves 1400-36A and 1400-35 respectively), removed

and inspected the test line restricting orifice, and performed a

boroscopic inspection of the core spray test line.

The only

problem identified was that the disc of valve 1400-35 was found

to be excessively loose on the hinged hanger. It was determined

that the obstruction caused by the deteriorated check valve

resulted in the reduced core spray flow.

After modifying the

internals.of check valve 1400-35, the A core spray pump satis-

factorily completed a full flow test on December 17, 1986.

c.

Surveillance Testing

On February 1,

1987, the inspector witnessed performance of

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Surveillance test 8.M.2-2.10.8.6, Diesel Generator B Initiation

by Loss of Offsite Power Logic. The as-run copy of the test was

Revision 5.

The procedure revision obtained by the inspector on

February 1, 1987 from the licensee's document control center

(DCC) was also revision 5.

During conduct of the test the

inspector noted several apparent technical deficiencies which

were referred to the licensee. The licensee later informed the

inspector that revision 6 of the procedure had been approved for

issuance on January 28, 1987. This revision appears to resolve

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the technical questions raised by the inspector.

However, it

appears the test run on February 1 had used an out-of-date pro-

cedure.

The licensee's Document Control Center issues revised

procedures first to the control roon.

DCC routinely refrains

from general issuance of the new revision until confirmation of

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receipt is received from the control room.

In this case the

delay resulted in the use of Revision

5,

four days after

Revision 6 had been approved.

The licensee stated that until

a long term solution can be achieved, control room confirmation

of procedure receipt would be hand carried to DCC. The licensee

subsequently reperformed the test using Revision 6.

The inspec-

tor will review licensee actions taken in this area.

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The inspector noted that no technical specifications for the

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reactor protection

system electrical

protection

assemblies

exist.

By letter dated September 24, 1980 NRC:NRR requested

that the lic,ensee provide a schedule for modification of the

reactor protection system (RPS) power supply and submission of

Technical Specifications addressing the modifications.

By let-

ter dated November 26, 1980, Boston Edison committed to instal-

latf or of GE-designed electrical protection assemblies and sub-

mission of the appropriate Technical Specifications.

NRC ap-

proval of the design was transmitted by letter dated July 28,

1982.

Submission of technical specifications was again reques-

ted. The EPAs, which function to provide RPS power supply trips

on overvoltage, undervoltage and underfrequency, were subse-

quently installed.

The licensee however, had not submitted

Technical Specifications nor revised their commitment.

In re-

sponse to the inspector's question the licensee submitted to

NRC:NRR, by letter dated February 17, 1987, a commitment revis-

ion stating that Technical Specifications are not warranted.

On February 11, 1987, the licensee reported via ENS that two of

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fo'ur main steam safety relief valves (SRV) had failed lift

pressure tests during checks in an offsite test facility. Tech-

nical Specifications require lift pressures of plus or minus one

percent of nominal setpoint.

One SRV was found to lift 1.4

percent high and the second 2.2 percent low.

Pilgrim Station

has four two-stage Target Rock SRV's. During the 1984 outage,

testing revealed significant failures with one SRV pilot poppet

found frozen on its seat.

In response to these failures the

licensee performed extensive metallurgical evaluations and re-

placed the pilot poppet seat material. While the lift pressures

of two of the four valves recently tested were slightly outside

the acceptable range, the results represent significant improve-

ment over past performance.

d.

Fire Protection

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On January 19, 1987, the licensee reported via ENS that the

diesel driven fire water pump had been declared administratively

inoperable. A nonconformance report (NCR) written on December

3,1986 identified a small tubing fitting in a pump seal water

line which did not meet QA inspection requirements.

The Boston

Edison Quality Assurance Manual (BEQAM) states that the exist-

ence of open NRCs requires that the affected system be declared

inoperable. This requirement was not recognized at the i.ime by

operations personnel who reviewed the NCR.

The equipment was

not declared administratively inoperable until January 19, 1987

when a deficiency report was issued by the QA department high-

lighting the situation.

The pump was functionally tested and

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was - found- to be capable of_ providing the required flow.

The

discrepancy was resolved and the pump returned to operable

status by January - 23, - 1987.

The redundant electric fire pump

was also inoperable during this period due to ongoing mainten-

ance.

The inspector questioned the licensee regarding the

possible existence of other unaddressed NCR's.

The licensee

stated that this incident appears to be an isolated occurrence.

The inspector had no further questions about this incident.

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On February 6,1987, the licensee reported via ENS discovery of

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several potentially degraded fire barriers. The licensee estab-

lished fire watches in the area in accordance with Technical

Specification requirements.

Similar barrier problems have been

reported several times during the outage as a result of ongoing

walkdowns.

Final walkdown results and licensee resolution of

findings will be reviewed under existing open item 50-293/

86-36-02.

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Boston Edison reported _on February 19, 1987 via - ENS that the

fixed dry chemical fire suppression system for the A Emergency

Diesel Generator (EDG) was found to have been inoperable since

December 23, 1986. Technical Specifications require that a con-

tinuous fire watch be established if this system is inoperable.

A maintenance request written on December 23, 1986 documented

that the pressure in one of three chemical storage bottles asso-

ciated with the system was found to be slightly below the mini-

mum required pressure.

At the time the MR was written, the

impact of the low pressure on system operability was not recog-

nized by operations personnel and, consequently, the required

compensatory measures were not taken. The dry chemical system

and the EDG were subsequently assumed operable during fuel move-

ment activities. Upon discovery of the problem on February 19

the licensee established a continuous fire watch in the area.

While no continuous fire watch was in place from December 23,

1986 to February 19, 1987 a roving fire patrol toured the area

on an hourly basis due to unrelated deficiencies.

Operation

personnel initiating the MR did not take appropriate action

regarding system operability.

The MR was mistakenly written

against the diesel generator system rather than the fire protec-

tion system. Because of this misclassification, the Fire Pro-

tection Group was not aware of the problem.

This situation

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appears similar to the case discussed above in which operations

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personnel did not recognize the impact of an NCR on diesel fire

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pump operability.

The sensitivity of the operations staff to

fire protection equipment operability and the ability of the

Fire Protection Group to monitor equipment status will be evalu-

ated during the next inspection period,

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The licensee's fire water system consists of two redundant fire

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water storage tanks (FWST) and two redundant fire water pumps.

On October 21, 1986 the diesel driven fire water pump was re-

moved from service. This pump was returned to operable status

on November 11, 1986.

On November 5,

1986 the B FWST was

drained for maintenance and remained unavailable until late in

November, 1986.

On November 11, 1986 the electric driven fire

water pump sustained serious damage while operating without a

suction source.

This incident was the subjet of special in-

spection 50-293/86-38.

The electric pump was not returned to

operable status until February 4,1987. This series of mainten-

ance activities and equipment failures resulted in a loss of

fire water system redundancy from October 21,

1986 until

February 4,1987. At all times during this period one of the

redundant FWSTs, one of the redundant fire water pumps or a

combination of equipr.;ent was inoperable.

Technical Specification 3.12.B requires that two operable fire

water pumps, two separate fire water supply tanks, and associ-

ated flow paths be maintained. With less than the above equip-

ment, the licensee must restore the inoperable equipment to

operable status within seven days or submit a report to the

Commission within thirty days outlining the procedures used to

provide for the loss of redundancy in this system. Contrary to

the above, as of January 23, 1987 fire water supply system re-

dundancy had been lost for three months.

No steps had been

taken by the licensee to compensate for this loss of redundancy

and no report had been submitted to the Commission describing

such plans. The inspector informed the licensee that the above

constituted

a

violation

of

the

Technical

Specifications

(87-03-01). When informed, the licensee aligned the onsite fire

truck with its suction - from the city fire water hydrant and

discharge into the fire main.

o.

Radiation Protection

On January 6,1987, the inspector noted that little corrective

-

action had been taken for a lost master high radiation area key.

On December 22, 1986, the Watch Engineer notified the Assistant

Chief Radiological Engineer that a master "R" key, number OP-5,

was missing from the control room. This key is normally used by

operations personnel and unlocks all plant areas with dose rates

between 1,000 mrems/hr and 10,000 mrems/hr.

In addition, the

key opens one of two locks on access doors to areas with radia-

tion doses greater than 10,000 mrems/hr.

The Watch Engineer

found the key ring in the control room at that time, but not the

key.

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The Assistant Chief Radiological Engineer initiated Radiological

Occurrence Report (R0R) 86-12-22-0993 which described the inci-

dent and immediate corrective actions on December 22, 1986, He

contacted the Chief Radiological Engineer (CRE) and the Radio-

logical Section Head at that time.

The following problems were noted during the inspector's review.

The immediate corrective action specified on the ROR was

--

not implemented.

The cl0R stated that the frequency of

surveillance checks of high radiation areas would be

increased. This was not done until January 3, 1987, fol-

lowing' the licensee review of a disabled high radiation

area lock'(ROR 87-01-03-003).

--

The licensee did not check the control room log to deter-

mine who had last returned the missing key to the _ control

room.

When the log was checked, the licensee determined

that the key was unaccounted for between December 19 and

December 22.

The licensee did not question all the operations staff who

--

had access to the key to determine if they may have inad-

vertently retained the key.

The licensee took no action to strengthen administrative

--

controls over keys issued from the control room following

the discovery of the missing key. At Pilgrim, high radia-

tion area access keys are issued at two locations, the main

health physics control point and the control room.

The

station key control procedures, 1.3.10 and 6.1-012, de-

scribe the health physics control point key issue method in

detail.

While the procedures mention the control room's

issue method, they do not discuss it in detail.

In response to previous incidents which occurred in the

last quarter of 1986 involving high radiation area control,

the Operations Section Manager issued detailed instructions

on key issuance in a memo on December 15, 1986.

These

instructions were not followed when the key was taken from

the control room between December 19 and 22. At the time

of the inspector's review, the licensee was not aware that

these instructions had been violated and subsequently found

that the memo had not gone to all operations personnel.

Subsequently,

the memo was

incorporated

into station

procedures.

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In addition, the licensee indicated that the key was pro-

bably . intentionally taken off the key ring. High radiation

area key rings have large disks attached to them, to pre-

vent an individual from inadvertently leaving the station

with a key in their pocket.

Removing the key from the key

ring eliminates this administrative control.

However, no

action was taken to address this problem until after the-

inspector's review.

--

Initially, neither the Operations nor the Radiological

Section Managers assumed the responsibility for determining

root cause and implementing corrective action for the lost

key.

Station procedure 1.3.10 indicated that the Chief

Radiological

Engineer in the Radiological Section was

responsible for the administrative control of high radia-

tion area keys as described in procedure 6.1-012. However,

procedure 6.1-012 assigned responsibility for the control

of the high radiation area keys in the control room to the

Chief Operating Engineer in the Operations Section. Subse-

quently,

the

Radiological

Section

Manager

and

the

Operations Section Manager jointly reviewed the incident.

All locked high radiation areas were subsequently reviewed to

determine if radiation levels were below 1,000 mrems/hr and the

areas could be unlocked.

In addition locked high radiation

areas were checked every four hours to ensure that they were

properly secured. New high radiation area locks were installed

after a high radiation area door was found open on January 24,

1987. The locks were changed because at the time the door was

found open no one should have had an authorized key to the area.

The licensee manned all locked high radiation areas continuously

between January 24 and the time the new locks were installed.

Also, the control room key issuance policy was changed to re-

quire operators to obtain high radiation area keys from the

health physics control point.

The keys in the control room

would only be used for emergencies by Operations personnel.

Technical Specification 6.13, "High Radiation Area" requires in

part that areas with radiation levels greater then 1,000 mrems/

hr be locked and the keys maintained under the administrative

control of the Shift Foreman or unit health physicist.

Failure

to maintain administrative control over master key (0P-5) to all

locked areas in the plant with radiation levels greater ti en

1,000 mrems/hr and failure to promptly take corrective action is

.

a violation (87-03-02).

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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'On February 18,1987. during a tour-of L the reactor building the

-

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inspector observed two individuals working in the reactor __ vessel-

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instrument cages.- The area was posted:as contaminated and re-

quiring an RWP.

The applicab1_e ~ RWP required both -cotton and

rubber gloves. The individuals'were removing cables in prepara-

tion for. instrument replacement and were wearing only cotton

. gloves. The health physics technician responsible for the. area

stated that the individuals 'were - having difficulty performing

their task while wearing rubber gloves, and that he had allowed-

.the workers _ to remove _them after. having surveyed the area._ :No

.'

revision to the RWP. had .been processed.

The ongoing' work was -

not being performed in.-accordance with the existing RWP. The'

inspector _ informed licensee radiation protection department

management. The situation was of minor safety significance but

demonstrates a lack- of attention to detail and a . poor . example

~

,

being set by health- physics personnel.

Poor contamination con-

trol practices have been observed in this same area by inspec-

. tors _ several times- in the past.

In-. response the licensee sus-

pended the supervising technician for not enforcing the approved -

RWP.. The inspectors,will-continue to closely monitor this area.

'4.0 ~ Review of Plant Events

The inspectors:followed up on events occurring during the period to deter-

mine if licensee response was thorough and effective. . Independent reviews -

2

of the events were- conducted to verify the accuracy and completeness of

= licensee information.

a.

Licensee Management and' Organizational Changes

During

the

period

Boston

Edison

Company. named

Rear Admiral

' Ralph G. Bird, U. S. Navy (Retired) to head the nuclear organization.

Mr.. Bird, a 28 year veteran of the nuclear navy .and formerly a con-

sultant to the; nuclear power industry, will assume the position of

+

Senior Vice President-Nuclear.

'In' this capacity he will be respon-

sible for all aspects of the licensee's , nuclear operation. Bird will

report directly- to Stephen J.

Sweeney, Boston Edison's Chairman,.

-President and Chief Executive Officer.

A. Lee Oxsen, Vice President

for Nuclear Operations, and J.

Edward Howard, Vice President of.

!

Nuclear Engineering and Quality Assurance, will report directly to

Mr. Bird. The transition from James Lydon, Chief Operating Officer,

to_Mr. Bird was completed on February 20, 1987.

The~ licensee announced on February

4,

that Mr.

K.

Roberts, the'

current

Director

of

Outage

Management

at

Pilgrim,

replaced

'

~Mr. A. Pederson as the Plant Manager.

Mr. Roberts reports to the

Vice President of Nuclear Operations.

Mr. Pederson became a staff

assistant to the Senior Vice President-Nuclear. The site disciplines

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have been reorganized with training, fire protection, security, and

. emergency _ planning reporting directly. to the Vice: President of-

Nuclear Operations. Plant operations,, maintenance, radiation -protec-

tion, itechnical' . and . outage management groups report to the Plant

Manager. This realignment was effective' February 4, 1987.

.'b.

-Loss of Offsite Power Test

- The licensee conducted the once per cycle simulated loss of offsite

power : test on February 5,1987.

Execution.of the test was witnessed

by three NRC resident inspectors.

Independent review of test data

to confirm acceptable results _ was also performed by the inspectors.

During initial 1 test performance the licensee identified four. signif-

icant deficiencies: 1) the Emergency Diesel Generator Breaker closed

onto the A6 bus -later than design ~, 2) the secondary emergency power

source closed 'onto the A6 bus earlier than design, 3) the D RHR pump

-breaker closed earlier than design and 4) the auto transfer of 480-

VAC load center B6: failed to properly function. The first two defic-

iencies' resulted in the emergency diesel and secondary emergency

power supply breakers racing to _reenergize the bus. The-early start

of the D RHR pump resulted in the B and D RHR pumps starting in close

succession rather than the desired sequence. - The licensee initiated

-

Failure and Malfunction Reports (F&MR) for these three problems and

notified-_ the NRC via ENS of the failures. .The applicable timing

relays were ~ recalibrated, and the test reperformed with acceptable

results.

Licensee followup of these four test discrepancies will be

reviewed during a future inspection (87-03-03).

During the test, it was noted that the power source _ transfer scheme

'for 480 VAC- vital bus 86 failed to function.

Bus B6 supplies AC

power to vital loads such as both RHR system injection valves,1 and

containment isolation valves.

The -inspector noted that the opera-

bility of the B6 bus transfer mechanism is tested only once per oper--

ating cycle.= Although the operability.of the transfer scheme for Bus

B6 is not included as a test acceptance criterion, it is a failure of

,

p

a safeguards. design feature which could adversely impact plant

'

safety,

i -

A Failure and Malfunction Report (F&MR) concerning the bus B6 trans-

i-

fer failure was not initiated until February 17, 1987 when the in-

spector questioned the documentation and followup of the failure.

Station

Procedure No.

1.3.24,

Failure and Malfunction Reports,

Revision 14, indicates that the purpose of the F&MR is in part to

i:

ensure that an initial internal review and safety assessment is made

.

of events of potential safety significance. The reports are submit-

,

ted-to the Nuclear Watch Engineer who reviews them to identify events

.

that are related to Technical Specification requirements and that may

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require NRC notification.

Issuance of a F&MR also ensures perform-

ance of a root cause analysis.

Procedure No.1.3.24 states that an

F&MR shall be initiated whenever failures or malfunctions are iden-

tified during surveillance testing of safety related components that

do or could prevent systems from fulfilling their individual func-

tions. The procedure also states that the individual responsible for

initiation of the report shall be the person who first identifies an

abnormality or a deviation from normal condition.

Failure to initi-

ate an F&MR following the discovery of the B6 bus transfer failure en

February 5,1987 is a violation of Procedure No. 1.3.24 (87-03-04).

Several-previous items of noncompliance have been issued for licensee

failure to properly utilize the corrective action program.

c.

Reactor Defueling Preparations and Conduct

The licensee conducted reactor defueling between February 6 and

February 13, 1987. All 680 fuel assemblies were transferred from the

reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool. The inspectors reviewed the

defueling activities periodically.

The review included preparations

and prerequisites for core alterations, witnessing of fuel movement

from the refueling floor, and control room observations.

The inspector attended the onsite Operations Review Committee (ORC)

meeting (#0RC 87-20) held on February 6,1987 to observe the conduct

of the pre-core-offload checklist review.

The committee reviewed

surveillance test records, maintenance requests, and Failure and

Malfunction Reports to verify operability of vital systems including

the emergency diesel generators, the core spray system, the standby

gas treatment system, refueling floor ventilation process radiation

monitors, refueling platform and reactor manual control

system.

The inspector reviewed the pre-refueling checklist (OPER 10). This

checklist was completed prior to fuel movement and included verifi-

cation that the Onsite Review Committee had granted permission to

move fuel. A review of control room logs indicated that the periodic

testing of the refueling equipment (OPER 13, OPER 14) had been per-

formed. Procedure No. 4.3, Fuel Handling, was reviewed to ensure it

adequately addressed Technical Specification (TS) requirements for

fuel handling.

The inspector also observed on-the-job training of

two licensed operators on the new refuel bridge. The training was

performed in accordance with a prepared training check list and

appeared adequate.

Fuel movement activities were observed from the

refueling floor and from the control room. A Senior Reactor Operator

.

supervised the refueling bridge activities and was assisted by a

licensed Reactor Operator and a reactor engineer.

The activities

were well controlled and the communication between the refueling

bridge and the control room were adequate.

.

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The inspector reviewed the status of the standby gas treatment (SBGT)

-

system in preparation for refueling operations.

The licensee sub-

mitted Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 86-21, one LER supplement and

two 10 CFR Part 21 reports which described various potential compon-

ent failures within the SBGT system that could result in offsite

radiation doses exceeding 10 CFR 100.11 limits during a design basis

loss of coolant or fuel handling accident. The licensee determined

that each of the postulated SBGT. system failures could result in

reducing the efficiency of the SBGT system charcoal filters.

These

filters are installed to reduce the potential release of radioactive

iodine to the environment during the design basis accidents noted

above.

To allow refueling during the current outage without. modifying the

SBGT system, the !!censee performed safety evaluation No. 2027 which

addressed the operability of the system under current plant condi-

tions. The inspector discussed this safety evaluation with engineer-

ing, operations and technical support personnel and compared it to

the requirements of the Technical Specifications and the commitments

made in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

The safety evaluation

indicated that, for a fuel handling accident after October 4,

1986-

(175 days after the April 1986 shutdown), and assuming a zero percent

charcoal filter efficiency, the offsite doses would be five orders of

magnitude less severe than for the design basis event.

This was

because the radionuclides produced during power operation which would

be absorbed by the charcoal have been allowed to decay.

The safety

evaluation was reviewed and approved by the Operations Review Commit-

tee during meeting no.86-146.

The inspector also noted that to further mitigate the consequences

of a fuel handling accident, the licensee initiated Temporary Modif-

ication No. 87-02 to maintain the deluge system isolated from the

SBGT system and to cause the crosstie damper to permanently remain

open.

In addition, the licensee modified the SBGT operating proced-

ure to require that a motor operated discharge damper be closed in

the event that one of the SBGT fans is stopped. This addresses the

backdraft damper failure issue described earlier in this inspection

report. The inspector had no further questions regarding SBGT system

operability for refueling. The licensee is evaluating modifications

to the system which must be installed prior to startup from the cur-

rent outage. These modifications will be reviewed by the NRC during

a future inspection and are the covered under existing open item

50-293/86-29-03.

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5.0 -Review of LER's

,

' ' LER's 1 submitted ;to NRC:RI were reviewed to verify that .the details were-

clearly reported, -including ' accuracy of the description of cause and ade-

.

quacy. of corrective action.

The -inspector. determined -whether further

information 'was . required from the' licensee, whetherigereric> implications

-were ; indicated, and whether - the event. warranted 'onsite' followup.

The

following LER's were reviewed:-

LER No.

Event Date'

Report Date

Subject

86-26-00

11/04/86

12/04/86

Failure to perform--Sur-

veillance Tests of Stand-

by. Gas Treatment (System

and Liquid -Radioactive

Effluent Flow - Monitor.

86-28-00.

12/22/86

01/21/87

Failure

to

Recognize

-

Effects

of

Electrical

,

Isolation Resulting' in

an Unplanned 'ESF Actua-

tion.

86-29-00'

12/23/86

01/22/87

Loss of Offsite: Power

While Removing Salt from

Switchyard

Insulators.

LER 86-26-00 describes the licensee'.s failure to perform adequate surveil-

~

lance testing of the standby gas treatment system- (SBGT) -and the radio-

active-liquid effluent flow rate device.

The LER states that .a technical

review of station surveillance requirements and procedures had:been con-

' ducted but that- Amendment 89 was not included in this review because of '

its late issuance.

Inadequate administrative controls resulted in the

failure to properly' implement .the new requirements incorporated by .this

amendment. .The inspector pointed out that the SBGT system-test require-

ments were .not altered by Amendme'nt 89 and had existed' during the refer-

enced technical review. The root cause of this deficiency:does not appear

to be'related to technical specification amendment issuance. The LER also

stated that there was no evidence of the failure of the radioactive ~efflu-

ent flow monitor to perform its design function.

In fact, this device is

not and has not been functional due to a design deficiency. The Opera-

!

tions Department maintains a procedure to calculate discharge flow rate

- based on tank levels.

The licensee stated at the ' exit meeting that an

,

updated LER would be issued.

j

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The . inspector. noted .that the root cause for the spurious ESF actuation . in

-

LER 86-28 was _ attributed to operator error. L However, a lack of preplann-

.ing prior 'to the isolation' of electrical . bus - B-18.was also a major con-

. tributor _to the event. :At the exit meeting,_ the licensee agreed and

stated. that .the ' outage- manual had been changed to - require. more planning

prior ' to major electrical isolations. This event ~ was _ reviewed in NRC

~

-

inspection 50-293/86-40. Thc sequence of events in the LER is not fully

consistent with' that . in inspection report' 86-40.

The inspector-checked

.the LER sequence against plant logs and drawings and concluded that the

LER was-correct. The licensee plans to update the LER to more accurately

reflect the root cause and corrective ' action' for the isolation problem.

The inspector noted that corrective actions were not completely.. described

in LER.86-29. Specifically, the licensee required that the control room-

~

be notifi_ed prior to each switchyard washing sequence. This assured that

the operations staff was ; aware of the washing and could prepare for a

potential loss of -offsite power.

Also, the licensee is -considering an

insulator design: change to lessen the need to wash the switchyard. This

incident was also. reviewed -in NRC report 50-293/86-40.~:The licensee also

plans to update this LER to more completely describe the corrective ac-

tions taken.

6.0 Management Meetings

At periodic intervals during the course of_the inspection period, meetings

were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope

and preliminary findings of the resident inspectors. No written material

was given to the-licensee that was.not pre'vious'y available to the public.

On January 20,1987, _the licensee met with NRC management in the Region I

offices to discuss recent problems .in'the area of.the station fire protec-

tion program. Minutes of this meeting are documented in report 50-293/

t

- 87-07.

A meeting between NRC Region I and Boston _ Edison senior management was

held at the licensee's Chiltonville training center on February 2,1987.

This -is one of a series of ongoing management meetings which provide NRC

management the opportunity to closely monitor the progress of licensee

' improvement programs.

Minutes ' of this meeting are documented in report

50-293/87-08.

.

______________..___-_________.____.____m_

- _ _

r=

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Attachment I to Inspection Report 50-293/87-03

~ Persons Contacted

  • R. Bird, Senior Vice President, Nuclear

L. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear 0perations

K. Roberts, Nuclear Operations Manager

A. Pederson, Staff Assistant - Senior VPN

D. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager

R. Fairbank, NED, Licensing and Analysis Section Head

N. Brosee, Maintenance Section Head

T. Sowdon, Radiological Section Head

J. Seery, Technical Section Head

P. Mastrangelo, Chief Operating Engineer

R. Sherry, Chief Maintenance Engineer

N. Gannon, Chief Radiological Engineer

F. Wozniak, Fire Protection Group Leader

C. Higgins, Security Group Leader

  • Senior licensee representative present at the exit meeting.

.