ML20205D913
| ML20205D913 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1988 |
| From: | Irwin D HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#488-7337 OL-6, NUDOCS 8810270250 | |
| Download: ML20205D913 (19) | |
Text
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- LILCO, October 21,1988 i.
00CKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'83 OCT 24 P3 :07 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board s
in the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-6
) (25% Power)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
LILCO'S REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE AUTHORIZATION TO OPERATE AT 25% POWER LILCO requests that the Licensing Board immediately authorize the operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station at 25% of its rated power.
LILCO's request should be granted summarily for three reasons. First, the OL-3 Licensing Board's finding that Intervenors have engaged in a "sustained and willful strategy of disobedience and disrespect for the Commission's adjudicatory process," and that dismissal of Intervenors as parties to the Shoreham operating license proceeding is the "only appropriate penalty"Il perforce requires Intervenors' concurrent dismissal from the OL-6 subdocket. As a consequence,Intervenors can no longer contest LILCO's 25% power motion.
Second, all of Interveners' remaining emergency planning contentions have been either resolved in LILCO's f avor on the merits or dismissed with prejudice due to Inter-venors' def ault. As these contentions are no longer in controversy, a priori they cannot have any substantive relevance to LILCO's 25% power request.
Third, the NRC Staff's recently-completed technical evaluation (hereinaf ter 1/
LBP-88-24,28 NRC
, slip op, at 129, 130 (1988).
8810270250 001021 PDR ADOCK 05000322 3
pp o
O "Staff Evaluation") of LILCO's 25% power request confirms LILCO's position that any unresolved issues related to the full participation exercise of the LERO emergency plan conducted on June f-9,1988 are not significant for operation of Shoreham restricted to 25 % power.
Therefore, LILCO has demoratrated compliance with 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(c)(1) and, on this basis, the Licensing Board should make a finding under S 50.57(a)(3) and, in turn, S 50.57(c) that existing emergency planning for Shoreham provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected if Shoreham is permitted to operate at 25% power.
I. Background LILCO's request for authorization to operate Shoreham at 25% power has been pending before the Licensing Board since July 14, 1987. See LILCO's biotion for Autho-rization to Increase Power to 25% (July 14,1987).E On January 7,1988, the Licensing Board, af ter considering what it termed an "agglomerate of answers, replies, responses and counter responses" from the parties, ssued a Stemorandum and Order (ASLBP No.
87-553-04-SP) (the "January 7 Order"). The Board found that (1) LILCO was entitled to proceed with its 25% power request under the provisions of 5 50.57(c), (2) Intervenors F
LILCO had earlier submitted its 25% power request to the full Commission, along with a motion that the request be treated expeditiously. See Request for Authorization to increase Power to 25% and Stotion for Expedited Commission Consideration (April 14, 1987). The Commission rejected LILCO's request for immediate relief but indicated that LILCO could refile its request with the Licensing Board pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S 50.57(c). CLI-87-4,25 NRC 882 (June 11,1987). In a follow-on order dated August 12, 1987 (unpublished), the Commission reiterated that the Licensing Board "conducting the Emergency Preparedness (OL-3) proceeding" was the appropriate body to consider LILCO's 25% power request.
The OL-3 Board was at that time chaired by Judge Stargulies.
In an October 6,1987 51emorandum to the Parties, the Licensing Board used the "OL-6" subdocket designation for the first time with regard to the 23% power issue, ap-parently as an administrative convenience. All subsequent pleadings and Board issu-ances concerning the 25% power issue have been under the OL-6 designation. On November 16,1987, the "OL-6" Board (as well as the OL-3 Board) were reconstituted through the appointment of Judge Gleason to replace Judge 51argulies as Chairman.
4 were "entitled to be heard" on the issue of the relevance of their existing emergency planning contentions to LILCO's request, and (3) the NRC Staff should proceed with its technical review of-LILCO's 25% power application. January 7 Order at 15. The Board also solicited the parties' views on whether a Special Master, Alternate Board Member, Technical Interrogator, or another Board should be employed to consider the 25% power issue. M. at 14-15.
In a subsequent order dated February 26, 1988, the Board requested further briefing on the "impact of pending emergency (planning] contentions on a reasonable assurance finding authorized by 10 C.F.R. S 50.57(c)."
Order (February 26, 1988)
(unpublished). The Board directed the parties to file such briefs in order to "develop whether such contentions are substantively relevant to a 25% power operation of the Shoreham Nuclear ^acility." M.
In a separate order of the same date, the Board announced the appointment of Administrative Judge David L. Hetrick as an Alternate Board Member to "assist the Board in resolving whether emergency planning contentions presently before the Board are substantively relevant to LILCO's proposed operation at 25% of full power and whether Applicant's motion should be granted pursuant to the provisions of 10 C.F.R.
S 50.57(c)." Order Appointing Alternate Boaro Member (February 26,1988)(unpublished) at 1-2. The Board indicated that "(w}ithin 20 days following service of Judge Hettick's report to the Board, any party may file exceptions to it." M at 2.
Following the requested round of briefing by the partics on the "substantive role-vance" of Intervenors' remaining emergency planning contentions, the 25% power phase of the Shoreham proceeding essentially remained dormant for approximately six months while the Staff completed its technical review. In the interim, the OL-3 Licensing Board issued, on September 23, 1988, its Concluding Initial Decision on Emergency Planning, L8P-88-24, 28 NRC _ (1938), in which it found that Intervenors' "sustained
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and willful strategy of disobedience and disrespect for the Commission's adjudicatory processes" had "seriously impacted a timely and fair resolution of the realism conten-tions and other emergency planning issues." LBP-88-24, slip op, at 129. Noting that
"(p)rcvious sanctions for disobedience did not curb the present harm," the Board con-cluded that the "sanction of dismissal (of Intervenors) as parties to the proceeding is the only appropriate penalty." M. at 130.E All matters in controversy thiis having been resolved (including any prospective litigation of the June 7-9,1988 FEMA graded exercise), the Doard authorized the Direc-tor of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue to LILCO F. full power op-erating license for Shoreham. M. at 149. This license authorization was subsequently vacated, however, by an Appeal Board ruling on October 7,1988 thGt the OL-3 Board "did not have the authority to dismiss (Intervenors) from those portions of the pro-ceeding that are pending before another Board." ALAB-902,28 NRC
, slip op. at 6-7 (1388).O 3/
In addition, the Board ruled in LILCO's favor on all of the remaining emergency planning issues before it. Specifically, with respect to the issue of LILCO's WCBS based EBS, the Board granted LILCO's summary disposition motion upon its finding that the uncontroverted facts submitted by LILCO were "adeq'.tato to estab!!sh the adequacy of its plan to comply with NRC regulation and guidance concerning a public emergency warning system." LBP-88-24, slip op, at 32-33. On the issue of "role conflict" of school bus drivers, tha Board ruled that LILCO's plan to "supply school bus drivers in the event of an evacuation gives reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will be protected." M. at 63. Similarly, the Board concli!ded that "LILCO's ETEs for hospital evacuation are adequate to meet the standards and criteria of NRC's regula-tions." M. at 87.
Finally, with respect to the eight remainhig "realism" contentions, the Board set forth, in a well-considered, fif ter.n page analysis, what, but for its sanctions ruling, would have "constituted (the E;ard's] resolution of the realism contentions on the merits." M. at 131. Following an examination of LILCO's prima facie case and realism testimony, the Board concluded that the LERO Plan "supplemented by the best efforts responses of the State and County provide reasonable assurance that public health and safety 13 not endangered by the operation of the Shoreham facility." Ld at 117.
F Three days prior to the issuance of LDP-88-24, the Appeal Board had recreated the OL-5 Licensing Board (chaired by Judge Frye), that originally had been designated (footnote continued)
L5
w In ALAB-902, the Appeal Board expressly noted that its holding that a board can dismiss a party from only "the part of the proceeding within that board's purview"in no way "vitiate (s) the nitimate sanction of dismissal from the entire proceeding." ALAB-902, slip op. at 8. That result could still be obtained, the Appeal Board suggested, by "requesting the sanction of dismissal from each of the boards before which different parts of the proceeding are pending." Id. The Appeal Board added that while such an approach may appear to be burdensome, it is an illusory burden: if the conduct allegedly warranting another party's dismissal from the entire proceeding is, in fact, so egregious and pervasive, the party requesting that sanction should have little difficulty in making its case before each board then presiding over dif-ferent f acets of the proceeding.
For example, the party seeking sanctions would not be precluded from arguing to "Board B" that an opposing party's conduct-though above re-proach befcre "Board B"-was so contumacious and prejudicial before "Board A" as to warrant dismissal from the "Board B" proceeding as well.
Ld. at 8-9.
While the Intervenors' right to participate further in the Shoreham proceeding was being determined, the Staff (under cover of a letter dated October 6,1988 from Steven A. Varga, Director, Division of Reactor Projects to John D. Leonard, Jr., LILCO Vice President-Nuclear Operations) released its technical evaluation of LILCO's 25%
power request. The results of the Staff's evaluation are discussed in Part IV below. In general, the Staff concluded inter alla that there are "no new unresolved safety (footnote continued) to conduct a hearing solely on issues portaining to the February 13,1986 Shoreham ex-crcise, and had given that Board jurisdiction over the 1988 exercise. See_ ALAB-901,28 NRC _,(1988). The Appeal Board took this action despite the OL-S Board's determina-tion, nearly seven months earlier, that it lacked the authority to retain jurisdiction over future exercise issucs. S_ee_ LPB-88-7,27 NRC 289 (1988). No party had taken an appeal from LPB-88-7. LILCO's petition for review of ALAB-901 is pending before the Com-mission.
questions associated with 25 percent power operation that have not been analyzed dur-ing the full power licensing review process;'; that "operation at 25 percent power would reduce core-melt frequency;" that there are '%gnificant delays in the time of progres-sion for all the postulated accident sequences (at 25% power] when compared with those during 100 percent power operation;" and that the "distances from the (Shoreham] site within which injury-threatening radioactive doses could occur without evacuation have been significantly reduced" at the 25% power level. Staff Evaluation at 6 1.
With the issuance of the Staff's report, this Board now has before it the neces-sary confirmation to make a finding of reasonable assurance pursuant to S 50.57(a)(3).
LILCO believes that that finding can and should be made expeditiously, for the reasons given below.
II. Intervenors Are Precluded from Contesting LILCO's 25% Power Recuest Except for the Appeal Board's determination in ALAB-902 that the OL-3 Board lacked the "jurisdictional" authority to dismiss Intervenors from the exercise proceed-ing pending before the OL-5 Board (and the Appeal Board's concomitant vacation of the OL-3 Board's authorization of a full power license), LILCO's request to operate Shoreham at 25% power would, for all practical purposes, be superseded by the full power license authorization. The renewed prospect of extended litigation of the 1988 exercise, however, redirects attention to LILCO's 25% power request.
Summary approval of LILCO's request to operate Shoreham at 25% power is ap-propriate because Intervenors have forfeited any right they may have once had to con-test LILCO's request in the OL-6 subdocket.N The Licensing Board's imposition in 5/
Intervenors had no absolute right to a hearing on LILCO's request in any event.
As the Licensing Board noted in its January 7 Order, the requirement of a hearing on this matter turns on the "circumstances of a particular case." January 7 Order at 7.
(footnote continued)
i e
~7-LBP-88-24 of the ultimate sanction of dismissal for Intervenors' years-long strategy of obstruction and delay dictates that Intervenors not be allowed an opportunity to pursue that same strategy lethe 25% power phase of this proco. ting.
Under the "logic" of ALAB-902, however,it might be argued that because the is-sues related to LILCO's 25% power request are pending before the "OL-6" rather than the OL-3 Board, the OL-3 Board's detarmination in LBP-88-24 to dismiss Intervenors as parties does not result in their automatic dismissal from the 25% power phase of the Shoreham proceeding.EI Instead, the argument goes, what LILCO must do in order to ~
effect Intervenors' dismissal from the 25% power phase is to go to the "OL-6" Board and "make its case" that Intervenors should be dismissed from the OL-6 subdoeket as well.
ALAB-902, slip of. a t 9. The problem with this argument, however, is that the Board hearing the 25% power issue is noi a separate Board from that which issued LBP-88-24.
This is made plain by the fact that the Commission, in its order of August 12,1987, au-thorized the OL-3 Board to "take appropriate action under the Commission's rules con-cerning the (25% power) Motion." See footnote 2, supra. In light of this, it is evident that the subsequent use of the "OL-6" designation with respect to 25% power pleadings (footnote continued)
The Board said that it was "bound to consider... whether due process requires such a hearing and upon which of the unresolved contentions it should be based." Id. (emphasis added). The Board concluded that Intervenors had the "right to be heard to the extent that their contentions are relevant" to operation at 25% power. Id. ct 14 (emphasis added). Intervenors' contentions, of course, are no lor!ger in controversy. Morechr, as shown in Part IV below, even if Intervenors were allowed to proceed in the OL-6 subdocket, the Staff's evaluation clearly demonstrates that any potential issues arising out of LERO's performance in the 1980 exercise cannot be viewed as being substan-tively "relevant" to 25% power operation.
9/
LILCO disagrees strongly with the Appeal Board's reasoning and result and is seeking Commission review of the decision. See Long Island Lighting Company's Pett-tion for Review of ALAB-902 (October 21, 1988). In LILCO's view, the OL-3 Board clearly had the authority to dismiss Intervenors from all phases of the Shoreham pro-coeding, including the 25% power phase.
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and issuances, apparently instituted as an administrative convenience only, does not mean that some "jurisdictional" distinction exists between the 25% power issue and the emergency planning-Issues that (until the issuance of LBP-88-24) were being heard by the OL-3 Board.
However, even if the fiction were accepted that the 25% power issue is pending before a se,narate and distinct "OL-6" Board, it is still the case that Intervenors can and should be precluded from participating in this phase of the Shoreham proceeding. As ALAB-902 indicates, if Intervenors' conduct has been "so egregious and pervasive" as to~
warrant sanctions before the OL-3 Board, then LILCO should have "little difficulty" in making a case for dismissal before t : "OL-6" Board. ALAB-902, slip op, at 9. Given that the members of the "OL-6" Board are the same as those on the OL-3 Board (ex-cepting Judge Hetrick, who serves in a limited technical advisory capacity), the argu-ments that LILCO has already made to the OL-3 Board for imposing the ultimate sanc-tion are sufficient to establish the appropriateness of extending that sanction to the 25% power phase of this proceeding. If a specific request is necessary, then LILCO hereby requests that Intervenors be dismissed from the OL-6 subdocket.E The reasons, in light of LBP-88-24, are self-evident and are set forth immediately below.
In LdP-88-24, the OL-3 Licensing Board recognized that Intervenors' conduct in the Shoreham proceeding over the past several years represents a "pattern of sutstan-tial and continual actions to undermine LILCO's efforts to develop an adequate emer-gency plan and frustrate federal review." LBP-88-24 slip op. at 111. Such conduct, the i
Board said, comes "perilously close to constituting interference with the federal gov-ernment's exclusive power to regulate matters of 'adiological safety." Id. at 112 The 2/
In making this request, LILCO does not concede that such a request is necessary as i matter of law or fact or that ALAB-902 is correct in its limitation on the scope of i
sant.%ns which a Licensing Board may impose. See footnote 6 supra. Nevertheless,
(
i ALAB-902 remains the law of the case until it is reversed.
.g.
Board further recognized, perceptively, that throughout the "protracted period of this proceeding, Intervenors have provided little evidence of a motivation to have this controversy... resolved on the merits, an_d in a timely manner." M. at 109 (emphasis added). Instead, a hallmark of Intervenurs' approach to the Shoreham case has been to seek delay at every possible opportunity:
Not only have the Intervenors refused to provide any informa-tion on State and County emergency resources so that the feasibility of emergency plans could be appraised... bui procedural mechanisms have been consistently utilized in delaying the Board and Commission in carrying out its licensing responsibilities.
M. at 110 (emphasis added).
It must be taken for granted now that if Intervenors are allowed to continuo to participate in any phase of the Shoreham proceecing, they will again resort to these same obstructionist, delay-oriented tactics. Simply put, Intervenors are recidivists, a the Board has noted:
This is not the first occasion where Intervenors' actions have precipitated the imposition of a sanction. Onsite emergency planning contentions were dismissed by the Licensing Board, af ter Intervonors refused to participate in Board ordered pub-lic prehearing examinations.
M. at 108 (citation omitted). In choosing the ultimate sanction of dismissal, laterve-nors' congenital bad faith was clearly an important consideration for the Board, which pointed out that "a prior finding of default and dismissal of contentions as a sanction did not have the intended effect of curbing the harm or deterring reproachable con-duct." M. at 115.D LDP-88-24 thus brands Intervenors as repeat offenders. If given an opportunity to delay and obstruct the Board's inquiry into the 25% power issue, Intervonors will surely take it. LILCO believes that the finding made by the Board that the "sanction of dismissal as parties to the proceeding is the only appropriate penalty" for Intervenors' conduct, W. at 130, in and of itself Justifies (if indeed it does not, as a matter of law, compel) Intervenors' dismissal f rom the OL-6 subdocket.
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Should the Board require any further proof that Intervenors' participation would oclay rather than illuminate the 25% power issues, evidence can be seen in Intervenort' approach so far in evaluating the technical materials which underlie LILCO's 25%
power request. intervenors have had all tec.hnical documents supporting the request i
for over a year-and-a-half. These are the sa,me documents that the Staff has reviewed in preparing its report. By all indications, however, Intervenors have devoted little, if any effort te review of these materials.E See LILCO's Reply to Intervenors' Brief on 25% Power (April 21,1988) at 10.
Despite their own apparent failure to have conducted any review of LILCO's original submittal, it is all but inevitable that Intervenors will now claim that they need substantial time to analyze the Staff's report. Indeed, Intervenors have foreshadowed that position in their pleadings to date. See, e&, Governments' Brief in Response to February 26, 1988 Board Order (April 1,1988) at 5 (Intervenors "will require at least (as) much time (as the Staff took to prepare the technical evaluation) to review and analyze both the LILCO Request and the Staff's analyses, if not more....").
Obvi-ously, Intervenors, if given the chance, intend to hold the 25% power phase of this pro-ceeding in thrall while they purport to complete their technical review. Such calculat-ed foofdragging was found to be sanctionable by the OL-3 Board;it cannot be tolerated in the OL-6 subdocket. Intervenors should be dismissed.
III. All Remaining Contentions Itave Been Resolved in LILCO's Favor Even if Intervenors are not dismissed as parties in the OL-6 subdocket, their g/
For instance, in depositions conducted on April 21, 1988, two technical experts for Intervenors, Gregory Minor and Steven Sholly, acknowledged that while each had had the technical materials provided by LILCO in support of its 25% power motion for over a year, neither had undertaken a substantive review. Mr. Sholly stated that he had spent "perhaps a day or '.wo" reviewing LILCO's PRA, but his testimony disclosed an ab-sence of review of the material in recent months. Mr. Minor said that he had "read through" the 25% motion in preparation for a meeting between LILCO and the NRC Staff in the summer of 1987 but gave no indications of any substantive review since.
m participation in the 25% power phase of this proceeding must nevertheless be found to be at an end. The reason is that in LBP-88-24, the OL-3 Board not only dismic.wiInter-venors from the Shereham proceeding, but ruled in LILCO's favor on the merits on all remaining emergency planning contentions as well. ALAB-902's partial reversal on "narrow jurisdictional grounds" of the OL-3 Board's decision does not disturb that ruling whatsoever.E Since the underlying issue scheduled for examination in this proceeding is whether Intervenors' existing contentions in the full power proceeding are "substan-tively relevant" to 25% power operation, now that they have lost those contentions,In--
tervenors simply have no further stake in the 25% power litigation.
This is made plain by the applicable regulation, S 50.57(c), which states that ac-tion taken by the presiding officer under paragraph (c) shall be taken with due regard to the rights of the parties to the proceedings, including the right of any party to be heard to the extent that his contentions are relevant to the activity to be authorized.
10 C.F.R. S 50.57(c)(emphasis added). The Board reflects this in its January 7 Order, making it clear that the question of which conterations currently in litigation are role-vant' a substantive way to the activity to be authorized is a questwa that stands at the core of any litigation concerning the request for 25% power.
January 7 Order at 9 (emphasis added). The Board further indicated that any opportuni-ty Intervenors might have to comment on the validity of LILCO's 25% power request or the Staff's evaluation was necessarily contingent on Intervenors having pendent emer-gency planning contentions. In describing the prospective course of the 25% power liti-gation, the Board stated that it S/
Specifically, the Appeal Board ruled that "(1]nsofar as it purports to dismiss tile Governments from the proceeding now before the OL-5 Licensing Board, LBP-88-24,28 NRC
, is reversed...." A LAB-902, slip op. at 20.
appears certain to us now that the examiriation of this ouestion (of the substantive relevance of Intervenors' exist-ing contentions] cannot be accomplished without some op-portunity for the Governments to review both LILCO's origi-nal request and the Staff's analysis thereof.... Further, in order to focus the inquiry, we believe that the Governments must be given further opportunity to state with basis and spe-cificity the ways in which any of their present contentions are relevant to the proposed operation (at 25% power].
These statements, of course, would necessarily await the pub-llcation of the Staff Safety Evaluation and a reasonable period for review, by the Governments' experts.
Ld. at 11 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Board said that no matter whether a separate _
Board was appointed to preside over the 25% power litigation or whether an Alternate Board Member was assigned to the existing Board, "such Board would be empowered to grant LILCO's (25% power] request upon a finding that no (relevanti contentions existed or,if relevance is found, to deny LILCO's motion." I,d. at 15 (emphasis ad'id).
It necessarily follows that since none of Intervenors' contentions (whether "sub-stantively relevant" or not) remain in controversy, whatever opportunity Intervenors may have previously had to contest LILCO's 25% power request is now foreclosed. In such circumstances, summary resolution of LILCO's request is appropriate.
IV. The Staff's Technical Evaluation Provides Ample Evidence that a Reasonable Assurance Finding Is Appropriate Finally, the Staff's recently-completed technical evaluation confirms LILCO's position that it has complied with 5 50.47(c)(1) by demonstrating that at 25% power the risk and consequences of accidents at Shoreham are so reduced that any remaining unresolved emergency planning issues are not significant and therefore not relevant to reaching the reasonable assurance finding of S 50.57(a)(3). The last issue lef t to be re-solved for a full power lleense, now that all remaining emergency planning contentions have been dec!Ged in LILCO's favor, is whether LERO's performance in the June 7-9, 1988 FEMA graded exercise was so deficient as to reveal any "fundamental flaws" in the Shoreham emergency plan.
For the reasons given below, the Staff Evaluation i
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makes it clear that, as LILCO has argued, that issue is not material to the Board's dect-sion on whether to grant LILCO's 25% power request.
The Staff Evaluation addresses in detail three aspects of LILCO's technical filing related to operation at the 25% power level:
(1)
Systems and procedures for accident mitigation (2)
Accident evaluation l
(3)
Safety of prolonged operation at 25% power Of these, the portion of the Staff report dealing with accident evaluation is most di-rectly pertinent to the matters before the Board.E This I:ey portion of the Staff's re-view of LILCO's PRA-based accident analysis for 25% operation concentrates on a com-parison with accidents at 100% operation.
Specifically, the Staff's comparison focuses on (1) the timing for key events in the accident progression (2) the offsite radiological consequences of accidents, and (3) overall plant vulnerability to core damage accidents. In all significant respects, the Staff's findings on each of these issues serve to confirm the validity of the factual underpinnings of LILCO's original 25% power request. The Staff's findings on the issue of accident timing are particularly useful in assessing the materiality of LERO's 1988 exercise performance and are discussed in detail below.MI M/
As for the various physical and procedural improvements that LILCO has made at Shoreham to enhance accident mitigation, the Staff finds, in short, that theGe im-provements are "acceptable for taking credit in the PRA." Staff Evaluation Enclosure I at 8. With respect to the safety of prolonged operation at 25% power, the Staff con-cludes that LILCO's "evaluation of the low-power operation and proposal of inspecting certain components must be augmented"in certain respects, including: (1) a commit-ment to disassemble and inspect feedwater check valves every two years, (2) a 90-day l
reporting requirement folloetig the inspection, and (3) extension of the investigation and compensatory action to all affected components should any anomalies be detected.
Staff Evaluatio.1, enclosure 3 at 4.
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As for the other issues, with respect to offsite radiological consequences, the Staff EvLluation finds that LILCO's "claim that offsite consequences are reduced by op-l (footnote continued) t
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The amount of time that is available for accident mitigation and offsite response is indisputably one of the most critical factors '.n assessing the importance of emergen-cy planning to protecting public health and safety. For instance, the c:'l-out of LERO personnel is tied directly to emergency classification levels, and therefore, with a slowly developing accident, it is more likely that offsite emergency mobilization will take place in an effective manner. Accordingly, the most significant findings in the technical evaluation are those having to do with the speed at which accidents at 25%
power would develop from the time of the initiating event to a release of radiation to the offsito envircoment.NI (footnote continued) eration at 25 percent power is valid," confirming that the "power reduction translates approximately into a factor of four reduction in initial fission product inventory." Staff Evaluation, Enclosure 2, at 46. Based on its analysis, the Staff finds that by restricting operation to 25% power, the distances over which injury-threatening radiation doses (i.e., those above 200 rem) would occur are reduced by approximately a f actor of three.
M. The Staff does note that the absolute distances at which major reductions occur in the probability of exceeding a particular dose are dependent on various modelling and inpa assumptions and as such remain an area of uncertainty. M.
As for vulnerability to core damage accidents, the Staff's report confirms that at 25% operation, decay heat levels are so reduced that certain additional plant features are capable of mitigating accidents prior to core melt. Moreover, at 25% power, acci-dents will typically evolve more slowly, providing a considerably greater amount of time for recovery actions. As for overall core melt frequency, the Staff concludes that this is not significantly reduced because accident sequences not changed by 25% op-eration. M. at 7. The technical evaluation does find that at 25% power, the frequency of accident sequences leading to core damage is reduced by a f actor of two but notes that such reductica is within the band of uncertainty associated with estimating core melt. M.
M/
An "initiating event" is a individual incident or series of incidents that lead to challenges to the plant's capability to reach a safe and stable shutdown condition. The initiating events from the Shoreham 25% power PR A would very quickly lead an opera-tor in the control room to classify the plant's condition as a "Site Area Emergency" or a "General Emergency." As a result, offsite emergency response actions would begin within at most 15 minutes of the initiating event. (Under NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, the or. site organization is required to notify offsite authoritics within 15 minutes of the operator's recognition of plant events that warrant the declaration of an emergency class. The LILCO onsite emergency response plan has been found by the NRC to com-ply with this requirement.) See LILCO's Drlof on the "Substantive Relevance" of Re-maining Emergency Planning Contentions to LILCO's Motion to Operate at 25% Power (April 1,1988)(hereinaf ter "LILCO's Brief") at 3 n.6.
-1S-The Staff's repon validatas LILCO's position that for the vast majority of core melt acele'ents at 25% pewer, the time that would elapse before offsite radiological re-i lease would occur &conriderable. The results of the Staff's analyses in this regard are virtually identical to the o.*1ginal estimates from the Shoreham 25% PRA. They indi-cate that for approximately 00% of postulated core melt accidents, an offsite release would not occur for at least twe.'ve hours or more from the time of the initiating event.
For another 17% of accidents, offsite releases would not result for at least six to twelve
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hours. Sta'f Evaluation Enclosure 2, Table 10. By comparison, the great bulk of offsite releases at 100% power - approximately 75% - occur between two and six hours. M.
It is towards this group of rapid.ly-developing accidents that most offsite emergency preparedness efforts are directed, yet at 25% power operation the likelihood of such accidents is negligible.E The technical evaluation's verification of the lengthy ti.ne period that would be available to respond to the vast majority of radiological accidents occurring at 25%
l power makes it plain that the June 1988 exercise results are simply not a material con-sideration in the Board's decision on LILCO's 25% request. The 1988 Shoreham exercise was designed and conducted to judge offsite emergency response against the level of preparedness required to make a reasonable assurance finding for operation at 100%
power. The level of preparedness necessary to support a reasonable assurance finding M/
The technical evaluation identifies, as had LILCO, a small remaining group of core melt accidents (approximately 3%) which at 25% power lead to offsite releases in about one hour. For th!small group of extremely-rapid accidents, most aspects of emergency planning are of little aid, however, since sheltering rather than evacuation would bo the recommended protective action. Moreover, as noted previously, this group of accidents is attributable almost exclusively to seismic events of extreme se-verity which induce simultaneous reactor pressure vessel and containment failure.
Staff Evaluation, Enclosure 2 at 24. As LILCO has noted, not only are such accidents extremely rare, but earthquakes of this severity are likely to cause such extensive dam-age in surrounding areas that, apart f rom such functions as public alerting and notifica-tion, emergency planning would simply be of little practical benefit in these circum-stances. See LILCO's Brief at.0.
t- - - - - - - - -
m
9 at 25% power, however, is considerably lower.UI As has been shown, the amount of time available in which to decide upon and im-plement protectivermeasures is much greater at 25% power. Indeed, for 97% of the postulated accidents the time available would be on the order of at least six hours or more. This extended time period lends assurance that during an emergency the consid-erable resources of New York State and Suffo!k County could easily be coordinated with LERO in implementing protective measures, thus providing additional assurance that the public health and safety wc tid be protected. In addition, the offsite radiological consequences of operation at 25% power are so reduced that LILCO's 10-mile planning basis for Shoreham provides a large margin over the planning basis that would be ade-quate for the low risks of 25% power operation. This margin is made all the more sub-stantial when New York State's and Suffolk County's vast resources are taken into ac-count.
Moreover, LERO's deficiency-free performance in the 1988 exercise, and FEMA's overall finding of "reasonable assurance" based on its evaluation of that exekcise and of Revision 10 of the LERO Plan, make it clear that the possibility that Intervenors will be M/
Indeed, with operation restricted to 25% power, the vast majority of accidents would develop so slowly that even if the emergency response were undertaken g hoc (M, without reliance on existing Shoreham planning or LERO's resources) the public l
health and safety could and almost cortainly would be protected. This is demonstrated l
concretely by the fact that g hgg disaster evacuations occur frequently all over the l
U.S. with generally good results. Moreover, with respect to Shoreham specifically, the j
evacuation time estimates for an "uncontrolled" evacuation (M. without LERO Traffic j
Guldes or the police being in place to f acilitate traffic flow) for the entire EPZ under l
normal summer weather condetions is only six-and-a-half hours. In other word, if an l
accident occurring at 25% power necessitated the evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ (which itself is unlikely; see footnote 11, supra) such an evacuation could be accom-plished in the vast majority of cases before an of fsite release would occur, even without traffic assistance by LERO. Of course, this is not to say that at 25% power operation, LILCO would ID Last reduce the level of offsite emergency preparedness for Shoreham that it has provided through LERO. As LILCO has repeatedly stressed,it would contin-ue to devote resources, training, and planning for the full 10-mile zone. See, L L, LILCO's Brief at 3 n.4.
I
e successful in demonstrating (through litigation of the exercise results) any "funda-mental flaws" is vanishingly small.W When FEMA's determination that the public health and safety will be protected in the event of a radiological emergency at 100%
power is considered in the context of the considerably greater amount of time that would be available to respond to emergencies occurring at 25% power,it becomes over-whelmingly evident that LILCO has demonstrated compliance with 5 50.47(c)(1) and l
that therefore a finding of reasonable assurance under S 50.57(a)(3) is justified for op-l eration of Shoreham at 25% power.
V. Conclusion l
For the reasons stated above, LlLCO respectfully requests tnat it be immediately authorized to operate the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station at 25% of its rated power.
Respectfully submitt l
U f.
,w W. Taylor Reveley, Ill Donald P. Irwin Lee B. Zeugin David S. !{arlow Counsel for Long Island Lighting Company liuntori & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 i
Richmond, Virginia 23212 l
DATED: October 21,1988 l
1 i
15/
In this regard, it is significant that the OL-5 Board's determination in LBP-88-2, i
27 NRC 85 (1988) that the February 13, 1986 exercise revealed "fundamental flaws" merely confirmed the findings of the FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment (April 21, 1986)
(the "PEA"), which identified four deficiencies in LERO's performance. All of the sig-nificant f acts and conclusions underlying the OL-5 Board's decision, arrived at nearly two years af ter the exercise was conducted, had already been set forth in the FEMA PEA. Intervenors have themselves conceded this point. Recently,in oral argu'.nent be-fore the Appeal Board regarding LILCO's appeal of LBP-88-2, coun:;ct for Suf folk Coun-ty pointed out that the OL 5 Board "essentially followed... the FEMA find.ngs as to what had been noted and observed as demonstrated deficiencies during the cay of the exercise, and the Iscard essentially wont down the line with FEMA on this." Otal Argu-ment Transcript (September 14.1988) at 49.
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LILCO, October 21,1988 00tM :U-UNC e
~88 OCT 24 P3 :07 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE bcNfi$U\\ h$
ilit A HL 6-In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-6 I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S REQUEST IOR IMMEDIATE AUTHOR!-
ZATION TO OPERATE AT 25% POWER were served this date upon the following by telecopier as indicated by one asterisk, by Federal Express as indicated by two aster-1sks, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.
James P. Gleason, Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel 513 Gilmoure Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comniission Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline
- Adjudlettory File Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel Docket U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers, Rm. 427 Washington, D.C. 20555 4350 East-West Hwy.
Bethesda, MD 20814 Edwin J. Re!s. Esq.
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Frederick J. Shon
- Office of the General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Board U.S. Nuc! car Regulatory Commission Herbert 11. Brown, Esq.
- East-West Towers, Rm. 430 Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
4350 East-West Hwy, Karla J. I.etsche, Esq.
Bethesda, MD 20814 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart South Lobby - 9th Floor Dr. David L. Hetrick "
1800 M Street, N.W.
Professor of Nuclear and Energy Washington, D.C. 20036-5801 Engineering The University of Arizena Fabian G. Palomino. Esq.
- Tucson, Arizona 85721 Richard J Zahnleuter, Esq.
Specla! Counsel to the Governor Secretary of the Commission Executive Chamber Attention Docketing and Service Room 229 Section State Capitol U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Albany, New York 12224 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555
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i o
j Alfred L. Nardelli, Esq.
Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General New York State Department of 120 Broadway Public Service, Staff Counsel Room 3-118 Three Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10271 Albany, New York 12223 George W. Watson, Esq. **
Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq.
Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, hw York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Evan A. Davis, Esq.
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 1222a E. Thomas Boyle, Esq.
Stephen B. Latham, Esq. **
Suffolk County Attorney Twomey, Latham & Shea Building 158 North County Complex 33 West Second Strcot Veterans Memorial Illghway P.O. Box 298 liauppauge, New York 11788 R'verhead, New York 11901 Mr. Philip McIntire Dr. Monroo Schneider Federal Emergency Management North Shore Committeo Agency P.O. Box 231 26 Federal Plaza Wading River NY 11792 New York, New York 10278 hh5. A/-
[Davi@fr.-Inirlow
!!unton & Williams 707 East Main Strcot P.O. Box 1535 Richmend, Virginia 23212 DATED: October 21,1988