ML20205D277

Application for Amend to License NPF-36,consisting of License Change 16,changing Tech Specs to Allow for Exercising Control Rods to Help Prevent Corrosion of CRD Mechanisms & to Provide for Various Functional Tests

ML20205D277
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	10/19/1988
From:	Leonard J LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20205D270	List: ML20205D266 ML20205D277 SNRC-1509, Proposed Tech Spec Table 1.2, Operational Conditions
References
SNRC-1509, NUDOCS 8810270090
Download: ML20205D277 (5)

Text

I LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Operating License NPF-36 Docket No. 50-322 License Change Application 16 <

This License Change Application requests modification to Operating License NPF-36 for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station to allow for exercising control rods to help prevent corrosion of control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and to provide for various functional tests, during hot or cold shutdown.

The request and supporting documentation is contained in Attachments 1 and 2 to this Licensa Change Application.

Long Island Lighting Company By O(7 i)4[(i /'.

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/ John D. Leonard, Jr.(

Vice President - Nuclea Operations

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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19h day of October 1988.

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Notary Public of New York L l'MES A LITTLE l v Y FUfuC, Swe O Nee Yak ,

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8810270090 001019 PDR ADOCK 05000322 P PDC

g* d UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY-COMMISSION T i In the Matter of I

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Long Island Lighting Company ) Docket No. 50-322

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, SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of License Change Application 16 to the Operating 1, dated Licensg October /9 for Sheteham Nuclear Power Station - Unit

, 1988, have been served on the following by hand delivery or by deposit in the United States mail, first class, this /9 hVday of October 1988:

Mr. Jay Dunkleberger New York State Energy Office 2 Rockefeller Plaza Albany, New York 12223 L. F. Britt, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Reguletory Affairs Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17If day of October 1988.

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SNRC-1509 -

Attachment 1 Fage 1 of 3 Attachment 1 To License Change Application 16 1.0 DESC,RIPTION OF CHANGE The change is to Table 1.2, "Operational Conditions," found in the DJFINITIONS Section of the Technical Specifications.

The words "or exercised" are added to the footnote designated

"***" which is applicable to conditions (3) HOT SHUTDONN and (4) COLD SHUTDOWN of the table. With incorporation of this change the footnote will read:

• • • The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Refuel position while a single control rod is being recoupled or exercised provided that the one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE.

2.0 REASON FOR CHANGE This change is requested so that a single control rod may be exercised during hot or cold shutdown to help prevent corrosion. This issue was discussed in General Electric (GE)

Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 427 which stated that corrosion can result on nitrided surfaces when stagnant.

This change incorporates GE's recommended implementation of SIL No. 427.

l l In addition to the coupling already permitted, the change l will allow for the performence of routine functional testing, i stroke timing, notch settle testing, friction testing, and i scram time testing of a single control rod while in

! OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 3 and 4, provided that the one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE.

3.0 BASIS FOR NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS FINDING The proposed license change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with this change, would nots (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously ovaluated. The two accident scenarios that have been analyzed which

, involve movement of control rods are not impacted by the proposed change. These two scenarios are (a) control rod removal during refueling and (b) control rod drop accidents they are described below.

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SNRC-1509 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 3 l

(a) control rod removal during refueling When the reactor mode switch is placed in the "REFUEL" position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist.

In the same manner, if the refueling platform is over the core and fuel is on a hoist, the interlocks block control rod motion.

When the reactor modo switch is in the "REFUEL" position and the platform is not over the core or fuel is not on a hoist, only one control rod can be ,

moved at a time; any other withdrawa3 of control '

rods is blocked by the interlocks.

These interlocks are provided to assure that i inadvertent criticality is not caused by removal or withdrawal of a control rod. The exercising of control rods falls within the constraints for control rod withdrawal and control rod motion. ,

Therefore the propoced change has no impact on this accident scenario.

(b) control rod drop accident The control rod drop accident is evaluated for the worst case occurrence which is during the 100 to 75 t percent rod dencity range. As thia rod density range is during the STARTUP ccndition and exercising of control rods is to be performed during the IIOT and COLD SHUTDOWN conditions, this accir. ant scenario is not applicable to the proposed hange.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of  ;

accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change falls within the constraints of the accident analysf.a previously evaluated for control rod removal during refueling.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. ,

The proposed exercising of control rodo has been added l to minimize the probability of corrosion of the nitrided  ;

surfaces in e.he control rod drive mechanism and to '

perform routine functional testing, stroke timing, notch cettle testing, friction testing, and scram time testing i during an outage. As a result, the margin of safety i I will not be decreased. The exercising of a single  !

l control rod is bounded by the same parameters as F recoupling a single control rod. The one-rod-out interlock must be OPERABLE during exercising of control I I

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. l SNRC-1509 Attachment 1 Page 3 of 3 rods. Per the proposed change, there is no possibility of the reactor being made critical.

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the ,

applicability of standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing l certain examples (48 FR 14870) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards consideration. Example (vii) relates to a change to i make a license conform to changes in regulations w.

the license chango results in very minor changes to facility operations clearly in keeping with the regulations. In this case the proposed change is mado to make the current technical specification conform to a vendor's recommendation rather than a regulation. This '

recommendation is made to help prevent deterioration of equipment provided by the vendor. It will also allow i for the above mentioned testing to be performed during i an out. age. Facility operations will not be altered by the change and the exercising of control rods will be

! limited by the one-rod-out interlocks in the same way that control rod withdrawal and control rod motion are '

limited by them.

4.0 TIMING OF CHANGE ,

This change should improve operation of the control rods by helping prevent corrosion of nitrided surfaces in the control rod drive mechanism. Therefore, LILCO requests that this change becomo effective as soon as possible.

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