ML20205D086
| ML20205D086 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1985 |
| From: | Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NLS-85-329, NUDOCS 8509230409 | |
| Download: ML20205D086 (4) | |
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Cp&L Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-85-329 SEP 161985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. D. B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20$55 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DOCKET NO. 50-324/ LICENSE NO. DPR-62 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTINUED OPERATION
Dear Mr. Vassallo:
On September 11,1985, a conference call was held between members of your staff and Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L). As a result of this call, CP&L agreed to provide additional information regarding our September 6,1985 submittal of revised justifications for continued operation (JCOs) for Brunswick-2. Specifically, JCOs 10 and 4
32 have been revised to include discussions of the effects failure of the subject i
equipment would have on other safety related equipment and on information supplied to the operator. Enclosure I contains the revised JCOs which supersede JCOs 10 and 32 provided in our September 6,1985 submittal.
Please refer any further questions regarding this matter to Mr. Stephen D. Floyd at j
(919) 836-6901.
Yours very truly,
.i S. R.
in merman l
ager
(
Nuclear Licensing Section i
MAT /ccc (1923 MAT) l Enclosure f
cc:
Mr. W. H. Rutand (NRC-BNP)
Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-Ril) l Mr. M. Grotenhuis (NRC) 8509230409 8509 6 DR ADOCK O py4 si,.... m o ee.,ss,. n.,,, q, y 4oof
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ENCLOSURE 1 TO SERIAL NLS-85-329 3COS 10 AND 32 BRUNSWICK-2 (1923htAT/ccc) l
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UNIT 2 BSEP l
JC0 NO. 10 PACE 1 OF 1 EFFECTIVE 9/16/85 1
TER NO.:
67 COMPONENT I.D. NO.:
CAC-PT-1257-2 MFC/ MOD. NO.:
BAILEY KQ12C LOCATION:
RHR ROOM t
f TECHNICAL DISCUSSION:
This transmitter provides Suppression Pool (Torus) pressure indication and isolates the N2 addition valves at high pressure. The indication is used by the operator to take action in the post-accident recovery period.
The function provided by this transmitter is also provided by two independent, redundant, and fully qualified Drywell pressure transmitters (Rosemount). As 4
such, the safety function of this equipment can be accomplished by alternative equipment.
l Except for approximately one minute immediately after the accident initiation, Torus pressure will track Drywell pressure (-1.8,
+.5 psi) due to the i
configuration of the mechanical connections between the Drywell and the Torus (see Figure 6.2.1-22, BSEP updated FSAR). Therefore, Drywell pressure will be a correct indication of Torus pressure and a non-functioning Torus pressure transmitter can be verified against the two qualified Drywell pressure transmitters. The operators are trained not to rely on a single indication.
i Since the safety function is performed by alternative qualified equipment, and failure of this equipment will not degrade the safety function nor cause misleading information to be given to the operator, this analysis meets the
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criteria of 10CFR50.49, paragraph (i)(1) and (i)(5).
j Therefore, continued operation is justified.
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UNIT 2 BSEP
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i JC0 NO. 32 PACE 1 OF 1 j'
EFFECTIVE 9/16/85 i
f TER NO.:
141, 155 COMPONENT I.D. No.:
E41-C002 MFC/ MOD. No.:
TERRY STEAM TURBINE MODEL CCS HPCI PUMP SYSTEM LOCATION:
REACTOR BUILDING EL. -17' TECHNICAL DISCUSSION:
ri An operational analysis has been performed on the Terry Steam Turbine Model
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CCS HPCI Pump System. The following postulated BSEP accidents were considered in this evaluation:
2 1.
HPCI Steamline Break 2.
Large Break LOCA 4
3.
Small Break'in RCIC Steamline 4.
Small Break LOCA In all cases alternate qualified ECCS systems in. conjunction with the ADS j
system (auto or manual mode) are available to maintain core cooling for a safe shutdown. Operator response is covered in the Emergency Operating Procedures.
Failure of this equipment will not further-degrade any safet) function, nor will it cause misleading information to be given to the operator.
Since the safety function is performed by alternative qualified equipment and failure of this equipment will not further degrade any safety function, nor I
will it cause misleading information to be given to the operator, this i
analysis meets the criteria of 10CFR50.49(i)(1) and (i)(5).
Therefore, continued operation is justified.
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