ML20205A388
| ML20205A388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8504250501 | |
| Download: ML20205A388 (140) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
IN THE MATTER OF:
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UPDATE OF INFORMATION FROM THREE-MILE ISLAND
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Place.-
Washington, D. C.
Date.
Friday, April'6,, 1979 Pages 1-#
(THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED FRbM A TAPE RECORDING.)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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A NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION I
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CLOSED 3
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Commission Meeting a
5 Update of Information from Three Mile Island 6,3 4
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10 11 Chairman's Conference Roomj 12 !.
1717 H Street, N.W.,
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Washington, D.C.
13 April 6, 1979 14 9:51 a.m.
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9:51 a.m.
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, CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Hello, anybody there?
a, 2 I MR. DENTON:
Denton here.
I 3
MR. GOSSICK:
Gossick here.
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-CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: By George, we've got the whol'el t
5 crowd.
Harold, how are things going this morning?
What's n<
6 wrong with that waste gas pump back?
7 MR. DENTON.:. We -- That one of those frustrating 8
little problems.
. e've spent.about four or five days with W
9 them trying to cjet that system going, and Collins and Benaroya 10 have been there working around the clock on it.
It 11 was all nitrogen' tested, ready to go.
4 12 Last night they started on Tank A or B, I've 13 forgotten which, about 6:00 this morning and they couldn't get t
14 l a~ needle valve open.
And, which, you know, they're going to put, I
in the flow for those tanks very slowly.
x15 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, I know ---
17
'MR. DENTON:
Because if it does burn on the other i
18
- and, the input rates are very small.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, that's the way needle 19 valves are designed, so once you close them you can never l
20 Pen them again.
21 22 MR. DENTON:
Then they switched to the other tank and started it going and remember these are very low flow g
U rates and s f rth ---
25 000002
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I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes.
2 MR. DENTON:
-- and found a leak in the, the system 3
started leaking somewhere.
They shut it off a half hour 4
later and now they're all pouring back through the schema'ic's';
t i
5 and figuring out what did the nitrogen pressure test the first' 6
time that, that would be the source of the leak.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes.
8 MR. DE$ TON:
T hat's one of the nagging high-9 priority areas is to get that thing going today, and I think 10 we're getting closer to it, but it's been a struggle, 11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: What kind of a release ---
12 VOICE: (Inaudible)
MR. DENTON:
Today is a very windy day, so in terms 13 ;
14 of conversion today ---
VOICE: (Inaudible) 15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It's been a superb time to be 16 transferring.
17 MR. DENTON: Right.
It's about 30 miles an hour yg ou s de.
19 I*'
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"9 20 detectable release was -- in the plume was about 3 mr per hour. Does that correspond?
MR. DENTON:
It was something on that order.
I think that's a very good number because it went back to about 24
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N-where it was a couple days ago.
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1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
2 MR. DENTON:
And -- but it was a short burst.
I 3
don' t -- I think in terms of total activity, it may have been 4 i a whole -- if we integrate up the full day, it might be more l
5 l than yesterday, but back up a few days it's probably not that i
6' much different than it was a few days ago total.
l ld CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, then, it won' t amount to 7
8 h much by the time it gets across the river.
i MR. DENTON: 'They were detectable offsite on that 9 !
10,
short-term puff.
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CHAIRMAN HEN 6RIE:
Yes.
MN DENTON:
I'm getting briefed on the auxiliary 12 13 :
building situation at 10:30.
That's one that's also i
14 [ increasing in attention -- to find a way to get all that contamination clean'ed out.. There's some concern about how 15 1
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l ng the filters will continue to work effectively and whether i
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iae should, immediately build another set of filters above 17 t
l 18 these or whether was should try to replace these, but they're
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so hot maybe they can' t be replac'ed.
So that's the purpose g
of the 10:30 meeting.
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:.You said fail, do they fail g
suddenly, Joe?
g MR. DENTON:
(Inaudible)
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: -- filters --
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24 MR. DENTON:
(Inaudible)
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Hang on a second, Harold, there l
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!i was a question here.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
If the filters fail, do I
3 they fall suddenly or do they ---
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T CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The question was ---
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
-- gradually --
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- if the filters fail, do they 7
fail suddenly, and I.think not.
What happens is you load 8
the charcoal so that ---
9 MR'. D5NTON:
I'm just beginning to get 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- so that you'd no longer have 11 effective, enough effective surface to remove-the incoming 12 iodine and then you begin to get breakthrough; that is, the 13 ; ' product which was supposed to be removed appears down the I
14 line.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What kinds of iodine releases 16 would that result in?
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I don't know.
How much iodine 18 do you think is coming out of that water, Harold?
19 MR. DENTON:
I think there's about a'-- I think our 20 best estimate is about 145 curies still left in the water in',
21 there.
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
23 MR. DENTON:
Now, how much of that is evolving due:
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24 to evaporation and others, I don't have a good number for.
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CHAIM MRIE:
Yes.
25 000005
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V MR. DENTON:
We've been trying for days to get the 2
chemists to settle down as to what to put in there.
They've.
thought of several solutions that are on-site, sodium
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4 hydroxide among others.
5 And I hope today, too, that they'll begin to pick 6
one of those and' start spraying it'in there and chemically 7
tying up the iodine, making it unavailable for release.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Now, if the water is on unpainted 9
concrete, or'in' contact with a significant unpainted 10 concrete surface, the chances are it's picking up enough 11 alkali out of the concarete to keep a pH on the high side of 12 neutral, and that's really all you're looking for on the 13 lodine, I think.
14 MR. DENTON:
- Yes, I -- this is an area that I 15 haven't had a chance to get well briefed on.
That's the purpos e 16 of the meeting.
There's been an awful lot of looking in there 17 by a team 'from DOE and Oak Ridge to get a handle on the process -
l 18 by our people, apparently a walk-through the auxiliary building 19 just bri~efly to -- people receive a dose of several hundred, 20 mr.
Now, this is -- it is on an area ---w have to be carefully -
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Did he say several hundred?
22 l
23 MR. DENTON:
-- of contaiminated monitoring.
l 77 24 After the meeting, I can give you a much better feel for it.
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l 2s CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay, coad.
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MR. DENTON: ' Core conditions are steady, there's 2 I been no more instrument failures.. In fact, I've just been 3
told that the pressurizer level that failed the other day is.
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now back to life.
5 VOICE (Inaudible) 6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Wait, wait.
The number three or 7
the number two that was faultering?
8 MR. DENTON:
The very first one.
9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Number three --
10 MR. DENTON:
I haven' t -- I've just been told that, 11 I haven't heard any explanation as to what caused it to come 12 back to life, but someone just said, " Hey, it's working again 13 properly."
14 MRj GOSSICK:
Don' t you think that the number (inaudible)
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
(Inaudible) 15 MR. DENTON:
The second one that ---
16
' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Wait, there was.---
17 MR. DENTON:
-- the second one that occasionally 18 acted up is working fine.
19 MR. GOSSICK:
Yes.
Harold, somebody told us yesterday that they had located the source of the, you know, couple of spurious signals and it was from the computer, that apparently was not from the instrument itself.
MR.*DENTON:
I.had heard --
24
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No, that. was told last evening.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Lee,- that was on the number two.
l transmitter which had recently begun to get, to show a littl'e 3
4 flaky sign.
It was finally decided that the flakiness was 5
computer-related and not intrinsic in the ---
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6 MR. GOSSICK: That's right.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- the containment part.
But 8
I'm curious, in fact, have we got three level instruments?
9 (Simultaneous discussion.)
10 MR. DENTON:
Well, that's the problem.
Just hand 11 it to you right'as you walk to the phone.
12 MR. GOSSICK: We're plugged directly into the control 13 room.
i 14 Dudley Thompson is checking now to see if they've 15 got anything on it, ' Harold.-
16 MR. DENTON:
One thing we're trying to do here is 17 get a squawk box-installed on this line back to Bethesda 18 between the control room, because the -- quite often the ---
19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Yes, I know.
Bethesda knows about it before MR. DENTON:
20 they pick up the phone and ---
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Cheer up, Harold, we'll try to 22 let y u know if anything important happens in the control,
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l' F MR. DENTON:
The organizational efforts down here 2
continue to increase.
We've got the safety committees,
3 review committees are being formed and our interaction with 4
them.
Fred Stern was over this morning with (inaudible) 5
- ,We've got the 9:00 planning session (inaudible) 6 (Simultaneous discussion).
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This is the short phase of 8
the accident.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This is the consolidation.
10 We' re going to consolidate the NRC in Harrisburg.
l'1 MR. DENTON:
So I've -- the whole organization has 12 changed the morale of the people here and feel it is a 13 ' certain one of motion that we think will turn out correctly.
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What is the status of the 15 natural circulation?
16 MR. DENTON:
Well, I guess the way I see things is 17 we' re -- Bethesda is still reviewing the preferred plan which 18 -
starts with the natural circulation aspect.
We found that Arkansas was not avaiilable for running the research tests 19 because they had already progressed and had taken the 20 head off to the state that it didn't seem-feasible to go "back.
21 Bill Lee agreed to voluntarily shut down one of the Oconee 22 lants and m de test if de technical stan found -- ht it 2 3.,
0 w uld ptovide any useful infonnation. ' mat's still being looked at. People 24 en as en se u
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sma d in decay 25 heat rates that would be present.
So we may not get that actual circ test we talked about yesterday.
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hl'offunctioning,heneedstopullbackfromhavingsomany 1
i 2 l people up around the response center and to ;oncentrate the -
3 NRR forces back in the Phillips Building.
He thinks two 4
12-hour shifts, they can pretty well cover and still send you 5
the additional people you need.
6 MR. DENTON:
I agree with that.
We're planning --
7 haven' t done it yet,. but with all the engineering effort that 8
is now going on' on the day shift and the procedures that we're able to review in advance and concur in and put in place, 9
10 we're planning to go on two day shifts.
One would be from 6:00 in the morning till 6 :00 at night.
The other would be 11 fr m 12:00 at Noon till 12:00 at night,so we have an overlap.
12 During the six hours when most of the people are home 13 sleeping, we can maintain a skeleton crew here to monitor --
4 We Can keep people in the control room, Bill and I and E, we'd maintain a small crew to monitor what was being done because we' re all just five miles away from the motel anyway.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
18 l
MR. DENTON:
Because they would get there if anythinc
-- or before it happened.
And I think that would enable us to interface a lot better with the staff-industry buildup 21 here now that they' re taking charge of the problem.
22 l
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
23 I think down --
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I see the real big issue being control of the possible continuing releases -- the basis of it, of that 2
pump back system going so that the decay tanks and the. letdown line 3
m areDW M d h @ out & achty @m ) -
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Westinghouse has a full-scale effort ' going on to 5
upgrade the RER -- a five-day crash program, on how best to have that (inaudible).
I was talking to Edson about whether 7
we should try to review this in the normal review route, using 8
the papers back there to Bethesda or up here. The advantage of 9
sending them back there would be it would be the more 10 g
traditional way of review and it would be by branch chiefs and so forth.. If it's reviewed up here by a task force, five or six. people, they could meet in the morning and irr-the evenings and have direct communication, they probably also would be able to consider better all the inter ties with 15 things like radiation levels and other systems.
I. opted to beef up the project team we put together and have it reviewed up here -- take it to the QA man structural engineer and an electrical engineer.
And 19.,
.U put it under Bill Bag (phonetic) and make that a project 20 H team, the job and reyiew of the (inaudible).
In view of the need to move ahead promptly,we just might not get it 22 reviewed in.five days with an additional route --
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay, Harold, I've talked to 24 O
Ed.-
In order to man the support that you need.at Three V
25 Mile and also keep the rest of NRR in some kind of a semblance l
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MR. DENTON:
- And rely on the incident center to r
2 I kind of go on the same kind of phasing.
And --
I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, right.
3 4
MR. DENTON:
-- I think we ' re getting more r'outind)".
5 in that, looking at natural circulation flows for example,.
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6 it's more. Mattson calling back Tedesco, who's in the 7
Bethesda Phillips. Building.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
9 MR..DENTON:
to go, over the technical problems, 10 and necessarily re-routing it through the incident center 11 and back to Tedesco --
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
MR. DENTON:
-- it's moving the time frames of 13 ;
m ving so that the decisions could be made in a more orderly, 14 n rmal fashion.
15 MR. GOSSICK:
Harold, if we do that I would like 16 1
your view on the need for a drop on this White House line g
over in Phillips.
I understand some of your regular lines that we' ve got in up there, the press has it and, well, you're g
having trouble sometimes with a free line, was that right?
MR. DENTON:
Yes it -- that's a good idea.
Occasionally, the activity clears up.
There's an abundance-of phones but every now and then when you look around, 23 somebody has called in on each one.
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MR. GOSSICK:
Yes.
We11 we're --
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That would be desirable.
i, 2 I MR. GOSSICK:
We would do that, then.
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3 MR. DENTON:
So I -- today is frankly -- well, 4
today.is and yesterday was a routine day compared to t.he
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5 past days here.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, well look, your judgement 7
on whether you.want.that technical review team sitting right.
8-with you, you know, that's your decision to make and we'11 9
support it here.
10 MR. DENTON:
We, we would --
l 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I do think, however, I do think 12 out, a few weeks down the line, once we get on to stable 13 mode, wherever that is, that we'll want to think about pulling; 14 back from the site, people who are primarily doing analysis 15 and review rather than sort of sitting on top of operations.
MR. DENTON:
Right.
I fully agree and I think we 16 17 can begin' to phase that quietly now.
We have done that with the recirculation flow issue, we completely delegated back 18 t
Bethesda because they' re the ones who have access to the 19 Codes, paper mill, and the analyzing.
And the effort up here is to continue to handle the day-to-day flap.
But I think if we could get this aux.
building problem: moving ahead over this weekend and if it turns out favorable for the deferred plan, I guess we'11 O
really --
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CHAIRMAN HEN'DRIE:
Yes.
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MR. DENTON:
-- really phase down,, suffices.
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3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Is that -- do you know, has 4
that guy from Electric Boat, the health physics type,.'got.'
I 5
his Navy --
6 MR. DENTON:
All six people reported in.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
8 MR. DENTON:
They talked about the Admiral 9
this evening.
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Are they --
11 MR. DENTON:
One by one.
12 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Have they had a chance to get 14 a hold, and have you got a report from him?
Probably not.
15 MR. DENTON:
I got a report this morning from our 16 health physicist who had talked to him.
They're really 17 getting the place structurally organized as to who's going.
to do what towards cleaning it up,and surveys are being 18 made, but the upcoming meeting will be the first time I'll 19 really hear how the situation is viewed by.them.
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That's going to be a long, 21 messy job.
You get into -- you want to keep the doses g
down, you hate to shoot up the occupational allowance on 23 just tidying up the aux. building.
There are going to
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1 So they'11 have to kin'd of work in there, you know, start i
2 I in a corner and clean as they go and it may take some time.
3 MR. DENTON:
We had a meeting yesterday.
I
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4 didn' t attend -- with Robin from NIOS, National Institute 5
for Occupational Safety, and he had Califano's memo recommendfr.g 6
to pass out iodine blocking tablets to all the workers and 7
to the people wi. thin five miles.
8 The meeting finally got started, we had some 9
people there - ' I think he's backed off considerably af ter they 10 understand the situation, what happened.
They intend to --
11 they were intended to be taken when you could anticipate 12 exposure of 10 rems to the thyroid being imminent.
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
14 MR. DENTON:
We intend to maintain that exposure for, 15 for people over the'ir --
Part 20.
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Yes, 17 MR. DENTON:
That did create some ripples here --
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Oh, it's going to go on.
My 19 understanding is that Von Hipple's going to do an Op Ed piece f r the Post over the weekend saying we ought tonsend iodine 20 ut, you know, he's going to quote doses out to a couple 21 f hundred miles, I understand, or something like that, and 22 make it sound as though most of the population east of the 23 Mississippi ought to be taking potassium iodine.
24 O
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MR. DENTON:
Well, the State has retained Neal 25 Wall and we --
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1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, well.
2 BR. DENTON:
-- with the Governor, and ifall and I I
3 i just see eye-to-eye on this.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, I agree.
t 5
MR. DENTON:
We're beginning to' rotate some' 6
people back. If you haven' t heard -- various personal problems.
7 And we're trying to.get replacement persons.
We need the 8
person who's bee'n working the problem at the other end.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
10 MR. DENTON:
So now with the couriers coming up, 11 we're able to send people home and tell them when, what day 12 they'll go and so forth, so there's a gradual rotation.
Many 13 of the people felt they'd be willing to stay here and stick i
14 it out but others for various reasons -- needed to 15 get back.
There have been, I understand, some personal crises 16 as a result of the whole thing.
There's been one heart 17 attack of a section leader, back --
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Who was that?
19 MR. DENTON:
That's Kulin Desai.
He's in the hospital l
20 l
and is going to have to be there for several weeks It was 21 l
I a severe attack.
L 22 And one secretary up here was rather emotionally disturbed and under stress, and I sent at least one other
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person back to our Bethesda office who had a sort of
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25 breakdown about it.
(Inaudible) 000016
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CHAIRMAN HEN'DRIE:
- Yes, I --
i.
2 I MR. DENTON:
(inaudible) 3
. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I talked to that one the other ^
I' 4
day.
5 MR. GOSSICK:
Harold, this is Gossick, have you had' ~
6 any contact or conversations with Joe Deal up there about 7.
DOE's assets 'and. rea.lignments there about -- I got a call 8
here, I see thati --
9 MR. DENTON:
Deal has been trying to get together 10 with me and tell me what they're doing, and I think he'll 11 be at this 10:30 meeting.
DOE has been working a lot on 12 this auxiliary building problem as well as their off-site 13 monitoring.
I spent just a few minutes with Bob Catland, who 14 was here and was from DOE and some of his people.
MR. GOSSICK:
I called Bratton's office yesterday 15 to tell him. that we were getting some calls that looked 16 like pressure from the staff over here at DOE about, you 17 know, trying to bring some of their people back and I --
18 MR. DENTON:
- Yes, Catland.
That was.the impression g
20
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iliary building until the problem was scoped out in view of the unique capabilities to respond and as the utility, groups come up to speed and get people here, they can take_
over and he agreed to do that.
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MR. GOSSICK:
Good.
2
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MR. DENTON:
But I see the aux. building-- youtre right.--
V 3l being outside the containment is going to sit there and require 4
a lot of close attention until all the water is put in tanks 5
and the building is kind of cleaned.up.
6 They are finally now releasing the industrial waste 7
treatment water that had been ascended several days ago.
It's 8
being released within normal license conditions.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Okay.
Lee, in connection with Tuesday's 10 ! dicussion, it will be fairly important that we have reliable l
I 11 reports on the assay of that stuff, all the way from the first i
II dump back on Thursday or whenever it was-- on down the line.
13 This is that industrial waste water which they 14 l
analyze --
15 MR. DENTON: That it was thought to be over and it turned I
1 I
i 16 out to havelbee5' just__5 bout at the limit -- rechecked several times. I I
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l MR. GOSSICK: Yes, we're getting a complete,'you know, l
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i 19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, and that's going to be a sensitive item I
20
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and it's very easy to get, you know, numbers transposed when 21 you're phoning them back and forth,so the sample analysis on that 22 industrial waste, I think -- double check those numbers all the i
23 i
way back as you can to, you know, the original report papers 0
or whatever, just-so that we don't have -- we don't go in with j
25 a set and then have to correct them and so on.
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MR. GOSSICK:
Harold -- in connection with this I
ay, MaHng, they interfaxed;up to p last night a chtmology that our 3
4 guys have put together, taken of f of the firs t TRS, the tape';".the t
5 logs so we really would like to have any corrections, 6
additions or whatever that you might have up there back as
~
7
'soon as possible.
8 MR. DENTON:
As of about 8:30 last night, I think 9
both crews here had seen the chronology and made just minor 10 little changes on the back.
I think we're happy with the 11 chronology that you've got attached to the bulletin.
12 MR. GOSSICK:
No, no, no, I'm talking about a 13.
-different chronology.
i MR. DENTON:
Oh, I see.
14 I
MR. GOSSICK:
-.about, you know, from the time 15 that we were informed of the (inaudible) 16 MR. DENTON:
Oh, I see.
17 to the reaction by NRC and MR. GOSSICK:
yg 8 #
"E 19 about midnight, I think.
20 i
MR. DENTON:
Okay.
That's one I haven' t seen.
MR. GOSSICK:
- Yes, well you ought to, you know, take a look at that if you can.
23 MR. DENTON:
But who's the hearing Tuesday with, to 24 (o
show how out of touch I am.
j U
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes..
Senator Hart and I had l
000019
T 20 g
i i
. (d l
- )
1 lI d conversation the other day in connection with, in part, trying i
!lj! to see if a reason -- we could make some reasonable arrangement 2
3
! where we weren' t going down sort of on a daily basis to have
- 4 a hearing before endless committees.
And we agreed th'at we' d.',
5 be committed to his committee for the first full report and 6
he felt that ': bile he was perfectly willing to wait on off.
7 sometime for an inquiry to work so that it could be a fairly-8 detailed and well considered discussion, that he did need to 9
have something fairly early on to put on the record, oh, the 10 chronology and sort of --
MR. DENTON:
All right, we'11 take --
11 the situation as we know CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
12 it now even recognizing that that is a preliminary -- we have to regard that as a preliminary view of things.
y MR. DENTON:
On the other chronology, we have gotten a lot of inquiries in the press briefings and I've deferred them.
I did -- today we have someone available to talk about it since you've now released it, and my thought was to get Stello or Ross up who, who are up to speed on this speaking to the events of the accident -- as opposed to the chronology we're discussing, respond to questions about" 21 what happened when in the accident scenario -- not our 22 response side, but physical plant problems.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDIRE:
Yes, well --
24 O
MR. DENTON:
That's already been done.
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- presumably if we -- Darrell worked out _that chronology for the Commission briefing.
000020
2DA 1
2 MR. DENTON: And that's attached to the -- I believe.
p_s i
\\
V 3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Wascit yesterday?
4 No, the day before.
5 -IONERGHEEENE: No, the day before.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: And, you know, everybody did the best they 7
could but it was a fairly limited time effort.
I trust that's 8
being reviewed with whatever care sort of spare forces can put 9
into it, I don't want to divert effort from the site --
i 10 I MR. DENTON: Well we looked at it last night.
I think it's 11 attached to the bulletin, so it's -- released.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, okay.
13 MR. DENTON : I --
14 'HAIRMAN HENDRIE : I think to a certain extent, Harold, you need 15
+
t to, from your side, play down that end a little bit so that, l
I 16 i
you know, so that you don't become -- the site team doesn't I
17 l
begin to sound like an investigatory body rather than an 1
l l
18 I
emergency situation management team.
l 19 i
t MR. DENTON: I've tried to do that and ended up saying, t
5 20 you know, some time we might come back and discuss that and I
21 of those l
sort of bolted it out, it seemed like 22 facts f
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Sure.
24 MR. DENTON: -- and someone other than myself available to l
ussrm
, Inc.
25 answer whatever standard questions about it.
t 000021 l
22 I
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yeah.
~
2
(^T MR. DENTON:
-- Trying to get out of the daily briefings 3
l up here anyway in that there's so little changing in the status 4
I that we're out of the crisis.
l 5
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yeah.
I 6
Well you're going to continue to have a number 7
of people who are paid by newspapers and radio stations to 8
make news because they're there and they'll continue to harass 9
you and everybody else on the site to do that.
10 '
I think you need to continue to caution,at least NRC
{
i 11 team members,to try to stay within the bounds of what you've I
12 discussed at the press briefings in anything they say to the 13 press.
14 You know, there will continue to be radio reports 15 quoting people with what I would regard as extended statements i
16 i
which I'm sure are offhand remarks to press people and partly 17 taken out of context and so on, but it continues to be a problem.*
!10:16 am 18 19 to drown all the instruments or is that situation gone up, 20 I
down or sideways?
21 MR. DENTON: Well it, like many of these problems, it's l
22 tuft-shaped.
You know, yesterday it flared out to be a major 23 problem, we went through the identification of our instruments, r3 I
24 mi_}
the where and how much it was rising.
This morning,since I've j
25 walked in, not a soul has mentioned it.
And I dont know what's t
000022 l
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O
' :6 * ~
c s.
I b,
N happened to that issue.-
DEESSIONER BRADERD: Fatalism comes quickly.
m r
3 MR. DENTON*
Let me just ask the people who walked in, see if they can verify this pressurizer level.
5 (Pause. )
6 Well,they say all three of them:are back.
7 Well I'll be darned.
MR. GOSSICK:
8 MR. DENTON: So I'll have to check on this.
9 THAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well I can see --
10 11 t
MR. DENTON: -- Another question is radiation level in the 3
12 containment, a lot of people ask about,is it rising or falling 13 and I've got people trying to look into that one and get a 14 better handle, maybe by comparing the radiation: levels with the 15 gaseous sample.
16 i
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Rising or falling.
Why would it be rising?
I 17 MR. '.DENTdN': An increased release of the. primary coolant, l
I 18 perhaps, in there.
j 19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Gee, you're not popping much coolant there.
l l'
20 1
MR. DENTON: Well maybe just a little control rod leakage l
21 and that's where --
l 22 ::HAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I shouldn't think that would catch a five day 23 decay on the xe.aon but maybe.
Harold, maybe what that third pressurizer level instru '
25 ment needed was for the transmitter to be immersed in water I
- 0000.23,
c~
j l'
h..
l l
i O
( and the containment level's just gotten up high enough to i
1 1
2 l do that and, you know, we're in great shape.
3 MR. DENTON:
I was really shocked to find that.
4 Because a lot of those containment basements I've walked in,-
5 I have never seen an instrument rack mounted on the bottom 6
floor.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, I don' t understand what 8
that stuff's doing down there if it, if anything critical 9
is down at that level --
10 MR. DENTON:
And even if it's on the bottom floor, 11 I've never seen them such that you had to s'toop down --
1 12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
13 14 MR. DENTON:
-- we'll have to get I&E to check 15 those at some other plants.sometime, to see if they're 16 really down there.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Considering that we were about 18 to pump six more feet of water, river water in there, to make sure the bottom head of the vessel had outside water in 19 20 contact with it, I think that's going to be an interesting 21 question about where safety instrumentation transmitters are I
mounted on containment walls and so on.
(pause) Elsewhere, 22 too.
Other questions?
Let me, let me see if there are 23 other questions.
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What is their current 25 figure for population exposure total?
0 0 0 0 2 4
E
--25 I
.. - i l
i li r~'N lI 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Harold, do you have anything 2
better than that -- for population exposure, better than that 3
HEW /NRC/PA team estimate?
4 MR. DENTON:
- Yes, we've made our own and they're 5
compatible with those.
I asked Frank Conjol this morning.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Yes, They came out at something 7
like 1800 mem.
8 MR. DENTON:
Right.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Gee, Yes.
10 11 MR. DENTON:
rem.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Yes, well __
13 MR. DENTON:
Well Frank says we've accumulated 14 yesterday 70 more rem.
15 (Laughter) 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
How much?
17 MR. DENTON:
70 more, an additional 70 man-rem.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Like 1870?
19 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
That was --
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You know, I mean, Frank 21 thinks he's out in the third significant --
MR. DENTON:
Well, no, the 70 is just the 22 additional one if you just take that day's TLD ' reading 23 and kind of integrate it out.
And you know, it's just an 24 incremental one not calsulating back to scratch again.
25 000025
a i
26 l
l i
a k
1
-t i
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
h t
i 2
Well, let's see --
i MR. DENTON:
than they did.
We had a slightly'different 3
forget exactly the numberI think our number was number 4
800 to 2000, I 5
calculate the man-rem best estim tAnd w of 6
then ae each 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> day, and 7 -
'l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I And it's adding about 70 l
8 MR. DENTON:
l added about 70.
And he thinks the last 24-h 9
our period 10 g
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:Yes.
I 11 MR. GOSSICK:
I
- Harold, 12 down here after you people the PN that we just put out l
l of 2100 with an average dose of 1 approved
-13 now t
l 14 the estimated maximum dose t 1 millirems, and l
15 l hypothetical continuously preo an individual off-site i
1 16.
17
~ plant is estimated to be less thsent 0.5 mile northeast of th
'MR. DENTON:
an a hundred millirem.
Right.
And that's
.18 t
DOE and the HEW estimates a dconsistent with the l i
n
- ours, 19 MR.
GOSSICK:
I Okay.
gm.
20 '
l i
MR. DENTON:
I the FDA.iand -- I still don' tThe iodine in the milk sampl 21
\\
es yesterdar
\\
We've got some people lookinunder iodine'in milk.
22 g
is the FDA finding it and w '
23 g at this, why i
e re not, 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
a laboratory at Winchester that liI think it's because they'v 25
- c e got Q
kes to find iodine.
i
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,w,
.r.-
-, ~ ~ ~ -
.. - - ~ ~ ~ - - ~
~
27 q
1 MR. DENTON: I found it in fewer. samples., in the maximal 2
8 level, at about half of the earlier day.
So that's going in 4
3 the right direction.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Around what,- 10 to 20 picocuries per liter?
5 MR. DENTON:17 or 18, so in that sense -- I think those 6
numbers, I believe, are also in the PN, aren't they, Lee?
7 MR. GOSSICK:
I'm just looking for them here.
8 MR. DENTON: I think they're back in the dose level summary.
I I think our own calculations show that even the highest 10 I milklevel,thedosetoachilddrinkingaliteradayuasaboutl 11 one millirem a day.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yeah.
MR. DENTON:- So I think the dose leve"1s are dropping, but 3
14 I don't want to minimize the potential for the aux. building 15 to continue to produce.these same kinds of doses and --
l i
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's exactly right, and furthermore, we've got i
17 i
a couple of big tanks of pressurized gas that came out of the j-i 18 primary system.
19 i
MR. DENTON: The Governor asks each night should I change j
0 my recommenda. tion to them and I keep hoping they have some 21 milestone progress to say we are now pumping it all back or 22 that we've now immobilized the iodine and are kind of going from 23 day to day, and he's, I'm sure, going to get under mounting 24 pressure from the women and children and families that have j
25 been evacuated.
000027
- _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, -.. ~..
~.
...-...m.
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,m.
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V 28 3
II
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1 ll CHAIRMAN.HENDRIE:
_Yes.
- t I
2 h' MR. DENTON:
So we're really planning to move l
3-forward today on-both of these auxiliary building efforts.
4 l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Tell Beneroya and Collins 'I know +
i 5
they're having lots of fun down there, but to quit fooling
~
6 around and pump the gas back.
~
7 MR. DENTON: I think.they're pr6bably-gassed - --working 8
themselves day and night.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
10 Anybody else?
MR. GOSSICK:
Harold?
11J 12 MR. DENION:
Yes, sir.
13 MR. GOSSICK:
I just was handed a thing here from 14 the guys monitoring the control room and they say that the i
15 sixth level instrument is not operating reliably.
MR. DENTON:
I see.
16
'MR.
GOSSICK:
For whatever that's worth.
I have 17 18 People out here that are in touch with them, get this.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Put another inch of water in 19 the containment.
20 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay?
22 MR. GOSSICK:
7.11 right.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Good, we'll talk to you later 24 and --
25 000028 u
29 i
i
.j i
i-ll t
i m
(s 1 h MR. DENTON:
Plans for this weekend, the ACRS called il 2 !! and said they probably will send a member orTMcr' cp and 3
we'll have them begin interface with some task force.
4 5
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Yes, look, Harold, I -- we 6
discussed that in a full meeting of the full Committee and 7
the full Commission yesterday and they said they wanted to 8
send somebody down --
9 MR. DENTON:
I don' t think that's any problem.
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I made it clear that if you tell 11 them that, a, they couldn't hang around tbs trailer, there just isn't 12 the roantfor-them to hang amwrl, but if they want to go over and bunk in 13 with that industry-tWm1 group or scznething like that, why it's up to you.
14 But dcm't ha*4 ate to pitch them out if they or any of the rest of us get 15 to be a nuisance.
16 MR. DENION:
Well I think their main contact will 17 be with these industry planning groups.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
.19 All right.
Thank you very much.
i 20 MR. GOSSICK:
21 (End of phone conversation - 10 :25 a.m. )
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well now let's see, I go back 22 to the note where the level instrument is.
Let's see,
23 I crossed'out --
24 AV 25 e
000029
30 t;
q i
il f
1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- I put it's off, it's on, N
2 !! now I put it's off, right?
i 3
i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Joe?
'I
'4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Question mark.
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It's on but not reliable.
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's been a problem for 7
some time, I guess.
8 But Joe, what is the -- there's -- in yesterday's PN 9
an indication that they had installed some other, some 10 further type of pressurizer hookup, pressurizer level 11 i measurement, can you remember the name of the device?
I 12 ll COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
High-C gauge?
I 13 -
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
A high-C gauge --
14 !
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No, I don't know.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
-- we're all'--
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think what they're trying to 17 do is to rig some sample lines so that they can get a 18 differential pressure and infer level from differential across 19 a couple of sample lines and come out at different places in l
20 the primary system.
They've been looking hard for some days 21 now --
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
They talked --
at ways to replace the existing 23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
l 24 pressurizer level instrumentation.
l l
25
(
M
l 31 l,
t l
i.
I i-
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/
l' l
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
They talked about a steam 2 [ versus water measurement and I couldn' t see how you could do l
3 that away from the pressurizer itself, as obviously no ones 4
gotten to the pressurizer, so --
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I don' t know the details and 6
I haven' t asked to find out.
But there were these several 7
schemes, one of them was to sample lines to try to get a 8
differential pressure at a couple of points in the system 9
that would help you in giving indication level and then other 10 modes of operation like the raminant solid mode just running on 11 the pressure gauges and relieving to containment.
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What does that do to the 13 valves, I mean, if it's full of water?
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The relief valve?
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes, does that work as 16 well in water as it does on steam?
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, Yes, probably.
In some 18 ways, it may be a little easier than, at least, full pressure 19 steam service.
When those relief valves pops -- when you get 20 those things popping at, you know, 2200 pounds, the gauge, 21 and the steam comes out of that thing and like I don' t know 22 how they build. anything in which the seats and plungers 23 retain sufficiently good surfaces so if when they mate again 24 they're tight.
It's brutal service.
O b
25
- - - _ _____ _ ___ __ _ 000031
i i
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li 1
il So in a case like this where you would be pumping 2
into the vessel and it would come up solid water, and then i
3 you pump some more and the pressure goes above the set 4
point, or you just hit the button and decide to relie.ve that-5 pressure which you.can do on the controllable one.
6 What's coming out -- the plunger comes up and 7
what comes out across the seat is a much lower flow rate of 8
liquid water at rather modest temperatures, so you know, 9
in that sense I think that it's an easier service than, at 10 least, you know, the full pressure, normal 2200 pound steam 11 relief.
12 But, you know, the containment is, it's damp in 13 there and here's more water spraying out of this thing.
I 14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE :
You know, I don' t want to suggest 16 that, you know, that this is --
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Standard operations.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- an exericse one would 19 necessarily carry out just because it was Saturday af ternoon 20 and we couldn' t think of anything else fun to do.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's been there for a 22 week or 10 days now.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well we're -- I e:pect it's 24 getting those waste gas tanks hooked up.
It's probably (Q,,/
t 25 hot down in there and they' re picking up a lot of exposure
i 33
~
t\\
l which means that their ability to stay in the spaces.
h
-2 and, you know, to chec)( things, is limited.
They go in 3
come out and find it difficult..
4 It's a miserable job and I'll be -- I'll be 5
a lot happier when they manage to pump those tanks.
6 We were going to meet --
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What about the containment 8
pressure and those ghs tanks - does.-it~make~. any differenoe?
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No, there just isn' t enough 10 volume.
You see, the tanks are like 80,000 cubic feet at 11, 80 pounds and the containment's two million feet and --
12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Well' it's, it's one pound.
g 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Pound negative.
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yes, pound negative now?
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
And they'll bleed back slowly 16 to maintain negative pressure.
[
CI1gamTrNERIGNNEDT:. It won't make any differenm.
g COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
- hey still running the 18 I
recombiners?
19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Oh Yes, it'11 just run l
20 i
ntinuously, take about a couple of weeks.to pull the 21 hydrogeti out.
g n
e waste gas tanks are word, I believe, 5
23 s
- 0. 6 percent or something like that --
1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Each.
25 t
1
e---,<
m
i 34 l
i, l
I t
(T l
's /
i 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- each-- so that the total dump 2
of everything that's out in the aux. building still doesn' t 3
get you into the flammable or up to the flammable, lower -
l 4
limit of the flammable range.
5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
When they take the containment i
6 from positive to negative pressures, do they do it by cooling i
7 it or do they do it by taking something out?
I 8
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I'm not sure whether they' re,
9 what the circumstance is therejPeter.
I' ve got a notion that j
10 they're negative because there was some burning of gases that 11 went into it and because typically in a pressurization -- you l
12 see, we went through a period when the containment had, oh, j
-RE 13 two, three, four pounds --
~
14 COMMISSIONER AHFM NE: _Up to 4.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
gauge in it, which would have 16 been a combination of water vapor and increased, just 17 increased temperature in the gases in the containment.
18 Now to the extent you get water vapor in there 19 driving the pressure up, when you go above atmospheric there 20 is leakage, it's like a tenth of a percent per day of 21 v lume is the design, typical design basis for a tight 22. containment and they maintain that, the tech. specs require they maintain that.
N._J 23 24
, but a tenth of a percent per day, and that's at S
O
(__ '
design pressure. ThhtEs a lot of gas.
You know, the 25 1
000034
35 I
1 (o
)
v i
l ceiinlisment's.two.milliem cubic feet and one part in 1,000 of that is still a 5/
2 couple of thousand cubic feet a day at 40 pounds and ten 3
times -- well, not ten times, but something, you know, a 4
lot more than that --
5 Now, while it's up there and this leakage occurs, i
i 6
the leakage is, you know, characteristic of everything that's 7
in the atmosphere.
It's a non-condensable -- the air that was 8
in there to begin with and some of the water vapor.
9 So if you started out with enough non-condensable.
i 10 gas in there so that at ambient temperature it was just 11 atmospheric pressure and now you've pushed some of that out --
12 now when you cool the atmosphere down and condense the steam
=5 t
~
13 out,you get a little less of the air composition than you 14 had originally and you get a little, it goes a little 15 negativo.
16 In a losa of coolant accident, where you expect 17 to drive it up, you know, to 40 pounds odd of steam pressure, 18 that's quite an important effect.
And in some, in the 19 small containments, drywell to BWR is why you worry, then,,
20 when that condenses about a vacuum condition, you have to 21 w rry about the vacuum loading facilities.
In this case, I would imagine that the combination 22
[f) 23 of a small amount of that effect from the overpressure at four pounds gauge, coupled with the burning apparently of a 24 A
couple of percent of the oxygen in the containment there 25 000035
36 j
i a.
i i
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U l
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lt 1-l!at the early stage of your transieht, simply leaves you with
!l h
2
'a non-condensable gas as oxygen, hydrogen nitrogen content 3
in the building which is a little less - at ambient temperature 4
than would give you gaseous compression.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Ycu had to come down about lfivepunds.
6 CHAIMAN HMDRIE:
Huh?
7 L
COMdISSIONER AHEARNE:
You had to down about 8
f lifive p unds.
l 9
CHAIRMAN HM DRIE:
Yes.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Four to about negative one.
l 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yeah, but what's important g
8 is you start out With a non-Condensable gas volume in the bottle which, at ambient temperature, is at atmospheric 15, pressure.
f Now you heat that, you see, and that raises it,
^
f and put water vapor in and that raises 14f ut you cool it --
b i
they ran the, containment sprays ran and --
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's right.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- so it's a cooling effect 1
20 I
~
that brings the temperature back down.
And then you've just
!i j; got fewer moles of non-condensable gas in there.
h COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are the sprays automatic,
- 23 h.
i manual or trigger on a temperature?
i 25 :j CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
They're automatic, I believe, on h the containment I don' t know, high pressure --
t.
1:
mn
1 37 1
I
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l i
~
s Q
1 (i.
d COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Pressure?
2 l!
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- a high pressure signal in 3
!the containment which would be thought to be characteristic 4
of a serious loss of coolant accident, because you get a lot of '
~
5 steam you want that spray in there to, you know, getthdtpreks'ur e
~6 down as soon as possible.
S they'd be automatic on that.
You cold also line tu?
7 them up and tick them off manually, and I suspect-that they 8
trigger -- well,.I don't know at Three Mile.
g COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Do they trigger containment 10 isolation, typically?
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think it kind of goes the other way COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The other.way around?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You will decide -- for each plant 14 j you will decide on some characteristic set of signals which may 11 15 containment high pressure, radiation level or temperature or 16 some combination of the three, and in many plants, a safety 17 injection signal also is input'to that, you will decide that a 18 certain combination triggers the isolation, kicks off the sprays 19 I
and does that -- and puts any other containment' systems that 20 you'll want to go, in the event of a big accident, into action.
21 10:35 a.m.-
Mr. Austin:
I tihink that Case indicated that' that 22 20 psi pulse triggered this then.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
24
( S i"" *^"* "" di" """i " - )
2s 000037
I I
I 38 i
t I
n p
1 I' CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That's right.
Because apparently (v) 2 l'the low pressure over several hours did not trigger it and 3
bhat's why we had that damn sump feed pumped out.
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It's not clear whether it'was A 1 1 ~ ~
5 the pressure or the heat, though.
6 MR.? AUSTIN:
I think he said pressure.
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Did he?
3 8
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
you're right, John.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
9 (Simultaneous discussion) 10
'yy MR. SNYDER:
-- sprays came on, sodium hydroxide was i
injected at 20 psi into containment.
12 csmmN ussDmE: m appamnuy u a lot of heemst m me.
13 Now let's see.
Why don't we take - we want to talk about the --
1 4 l-COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think we ought to.
Yeah.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- the investigation sort of thing.
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It would help to have'that i
17 l
fact sheet as soon as. --
(
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Yes, where -- do y.ou want to the a two-minute break here and --
20 l
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That would be useful.
~
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I'm going to go back to the 22 other end of the table.
(End of tape) 10:36 a.m.
o 24 25 l
000038
I
/
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
INVESTIGATION OF THREE-MILE' ISLAND
~(CLOSED MEETING) u 3-a t'
~..
i,,4 l
Place -
Washington, D. C.
Dat,.
Friday, April 6 1979 Pages 1 - 49 f
(THIS TRANSCRIPE WAE PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.)
Telephone:
(202)347 3700 s
ACE.FEDERALREPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporsers 444 North Cap:*ol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY
V
<R.3903
~
l
~'
1 UNITED ' STATES OF AMERICA l
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/m\\
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3 CLOSED 4
~
5 Commission Meeting 6
Investigation of Three Mile Island 7
8 9
10 Chairman's Conference Room, l
1717 H Street, N.W.,
j Il Washington, D. C.
I i
12 April 6, 1979.
11:05 a.m.
13 14 15 l
16 l
l l
17 l
l 18 i
i 19 1
THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.
21 l
22 23 24 25 l
l nanonn
$d3A 2
11:05 A. M.
I bl 1
CHMN. HENDRIE:
in which it occurred intact, except for 2
the affected individuals in the cabinent.
3 COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
And there was also--
It didn't start 4
out with the sense of skepticism of the basic program and the l
5 organization that I think we have to recognize we start out 6
with.
7 COMM GILINSKY:
That would have been a point with a NASA 8
person?
9 COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
It was one of--
It wr.3 the director !
10 I of one of the other centers.
In fact the whole board was j
II basically NASA people.
And :that way they--
1 12 So you're talking about a huge organization.
COMM GILINSKY:
13 COMM AHEARNE:
No, no, the board wasn't very large.
I l
I#
COMM GILINSKZ:
I mean NASA.
l 15
- NASA, Yes, a huge organization with lots COMM AHEARNE:
16 of money.
I7 The board ended up--
The director of another center, 18 was the chairman, and then they had an astronaut, an engineer t
ing director, a research director, an Air Force I.G., a NASA f
I9 20 Q&A guy, a NASA Operations guy, and then a fellow from the l
21 I
Bureau of Mines.
22 COMM GILINSKY:
And what sort of staff did they have at 23 their disposal?
24 COMM AHEARNE:
By the time that Apollo 13 investigation seeral Reporters, Inc.
25 ended, they had 2700 people working on it.
l 000040
3
~
l' i COMM GILINSKY:
You could handle that.
2 (Laughter) 3
_ MR. SNYDER:
That's just about the right number.
4 CHMN HENDRIE:
Cancel all leaves.
5 MR. CUMMINGS:
It's an enormous number.
1
- COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
6 7
COMM GILINSKY:
We might have to reduce the I&E modules.
8 COMM AHEARNE:
Joe, do you have any -- Do you have a rough 9
sense of how long we'll be here?
10 CHMN HENDRIE:
Not until I see how the discussion goes.
11 CHMN HENDRIE:
Why don't we --
~
12 COMM AHEARNE:
And also, Admiral Rickover felt it was a great waste of money.
They need to --
13 COMM GILINSKY:
The investigation?
14 COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
They wasted -- he felt they wasted
-15 beaucoup money.
His estimate was $80 million it. cost them 16 to do that investigation.
17 CHMN HENDRIE:
Apollo?
g COMM BRADFORD:
I assume that in many ways was a much simpler 79 20 a! investigation.
n CHMN HENDRIE:
Yes,.I would think so.
COMM AHEARNE:
Except -- Well, it was much simpler but I would guess that ther -- probably used it as an opportunity to I'
rescruh everything they were doing in the sense of whether that one flaw might have been the first of many.
They probably wen b 000041
i
~
1l
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l I
i 4
i i
i 1
T')
d
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1 I; back -- They set up sozie 24 panels; each panel ha'd about 10 2 I members, and the staff, and the contract work.
I 3
They got everything done in about five months.
- ']
4 MR. CUMMINGS:
The whole program was riding dn tliab?1 1
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think realistically'--
~
'6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Do you want to try to break at noon 7
sort of --
8
- COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, why don't'you tell them; 9
have Mary Rose tell them that it may well be in an hour or an 10 hoar and a half.
11 V., Harding: How about telling them (inaudible) ?
MR..SNYDER:
It's interesting they took a few months; 12 but the Hanauer report took 11 months.
13gl COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
Yeah.
One of the different --
Well, let's see.
15 (Simultaneous' discussion.)
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But Steve made a big point to 17 me that one of the main recommendations that he made to me was 18 that whatever we do when we assign NRC people to this thing, 19 they should be full-time and decoupled from other programs 20
~
responsibilities because that just extended it.
21 MR. SNYDER:
It's almost axiomatic, it seems to me,'
22 in this case.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But that's why he felt it took 24
[]
so long.
It could have been done much shorter.
k>
25 MR. CUMMINGS:
John, the people that were on t: hose I
y boards really were heamr hitters from the center.
The center j
5 E*Dircctor wac cleo in chargo of the panol invectigation, and onl:
r ab4 I
had to pick up the phone to everybody from the center 2
q absolutely loose on whatever problems he was having to get C' 3 resolved.
MR. SNYDER: It sounds like NASA didn't do much else 5
besides this.
6 MR. CUMMINGS: They didn't_. Well, remember that the whole 7
program rode.on that 204 fire.
8 COMM AHEARNE:
They couldn't launch until they had --
9 they were really sure they understood.
(Laughter.)
10 !
There is a similarity.
l C O M M A H E A P. " ;;
l Yes, that's right. -- Got it.
12 13 MR. CUMMINGS:
The whole Apollo program rested on the reso-14 lution of that event.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY -- Davis Besse --
16 i
CHMN HENDRIE:
John, do you want to sketch out what you've I7 got here in the discussion which I hope --
i 18 (Simultaneous discussion.)
i l
I9 MR. BICKWIT:
Before you do, I think you should vote a 20 i
short notice meeting.
l 2I To consider the investigation?
CHMN HENDRIE:
22 MR. BICKWIT:
Which you've already voted to close.
23 CHMN HENDRIE:
Okay.
I 24 l
You say we have voted to close this?
mn
. ine.
I 25 i
COMM AHEARNE:
Yesterday, three of us voted that way.
Two i
.. J nnnn.,
6 t
@5 I
of you weren't here, so there was a majority.
2
('
CHMN HENDRIE:
Thank you very much.
&s 06 am) 3 COMM AHEARNE:
We ought to decide what we're going to do.
4 At the moment we have a short-term I&E study underway, which 5
is trying to make sure that memories aren't lost, that is, that 6
the infor--
They're out interviewing people, trying to make 7
sure they capture the information before it begins to float 8
away.
9 Steve Hanauer had made the point that that was one i
l 10 I of the problems that they ran into in Browns Ferry, that that i
II wasn't done early enough, and in going back and checking a 12 month later, he felt that some of the problems they were running 13 into was that the essence of the moment had been los't.
14 COMM GILINSKY:
Who's in charge of the I&E effort?
15 I don't know.
{
COMM AHEARNE:.
16 Bernie?
I7 MR. SNYDER:
I'm sorry, it's someone whose name I don't I8 know, but he's somebody from another Regional Office.
I think it was Region II.
A senior reactor guy
-- but I don't have his 20 name.
I 2I COMM AHEARNE:
We also--
22 MR. SNYDER: Pt's. net.. John Davis -- or somebody like that.
23 C.0MM. AHEARNE:
We also have, as you know, this NRR study 24 n.,e n J on the feedwater transients.
\\_
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25 We have the President's Commission on--
1 I
raanna D R.
f 7
y 56 I
COMM GILINSKY:
Which NRR study?
2 COMM BRADFORD:
The ten day-the former ten day, now a month 1 ng
\\-
3 COMM AHEARNE:
We have the-the President 's Ccmnission announcenent, l
4 I think, complicates our task a bit, particularly as we go for l
5 outside people and write a charter, because in defining the 6
relationship between what we're doing and what they're doing, 7
it may be a difficulty.
8 Now I think we have to find out a number of things.
That is "we," independent of what the President's group, l
9 i
10 I and we have to define the chronology of the accident, and f
Il that has to, I believe, include--
At some point, 'it is going to, l
12 have to review that first year of operation, the operating 13 license mode of that plant, to see what -- whether there were 14 indications of problems.
15 l It's going to have to address that two-week-ago f
i maintenanceacttotheextentitcan,andobviouslythetimeofI 16 i
17 the accident.
I i
18 Now we've got this tentative chronology.
We'11 have to go through what the operators did, what they thought they 19 l
20,
did, as best we can, and more carefully go through all that 21 data.
22 It's going to have to go through a chronology of the 23 NRC response.
I think the NRC has to make sure we understand 1
24 what have we done during this process.
I don't know when the j
mers
. inc.
25 cut-off--
Bernie had raised the point in one of his memos that i
g i
eb7 I
2 you may have to leave it open-ended but (g) 3 for purposes at least of. starting out, you ought to put some cut-off.
period which you may adjust later.
5 I think we have to look at the relationship of our 6
reaction with the State and our interaction with the federal 7
government, and the interaction with industry, and the inspec-8 tion history at TMI.
9 Now we also I believe have to look more carefully--
10 I,.not having enough information about it, I'm skeptical about l
~
II whether this quick NRR study is going to be an adequate analy-12 sis of the B&W.
Lack of forgiveness, to use your phrase, John, 13 less forgiving quality.
I think it--
But we will have to make I
i 14 sure we, as best we can, understand the B&W plant.
15 We have to get -- draw some conclusions with-respect to 16 TMI, with respect to B&W,, and then with respect to NRC, any 17 modifications of the licencing and review process, any modi-l i
18 fications in the inspection process, any modifications in the emergency response function.
l 19 l
20 And then we have to make -- some group has to make l
I 21 recommendations to us on what changes ought to be made.
22 I think that what is most important for us is 23 to decide, as soon as possible, what is the basic approach O
24
\\ J we're going to use, and then get started on doing that.
These j
meeres Pleconen, Inc.
25 other things are going to be churning along, and unless we can
9 cb8 1
attempt to get some order in what we're doing, I think.that we 2
will sincerely regret it at a later stage.
3 Now what I had done, and Bernie, Jim Cummings, I
l 4
Vicki, and various people have helped put stuff together, i
I 5
is try to review some of the ways other organizations have 6
done to go about this.
The National Transportation Safety 1
}
7 Board is a structured organization whose sole purpose is to 8
investigate accidents.
9 What I found interesting about their approach is l
i l
10 !
that they go at the first stage with a fact-finding organiza-i 11 tion and, at least as far as I understand, that enables them to !
1 12 bring in industry, union representatives, a variety of people 13 and still have it in a closed process.
They do go open every 1
14 day.
They have a press briefing every day on what they're doing.
But it enables them to very rapidly get at all of the 15 t
16 issues and lay out the facts.
Their purpose is fact-finding.
l 17 That's something we might consider.
i 18 In talking to Admiral Rickover, he very much said l
19 that we ought to use our own structure, that we ought to know l
l l
20 how to do these things, and we, as Bernie has pointed out, do j
i,
(
21 have a structure in place.
It obviously was set up to--
At l
22 least me, I think it was obviously set up, as I look at it, to 23 put in place the Hanauer-Browns Ferry review structure into
(
24 the manual chapter, eeres nesonen,inc.
25 It hag as its head,the Technical Advisor to the EDO, l
l' l
I GAV5LGL/1 '
10 b9 I
and my only comment on that is that I think that's just too low 2
level review.
e) t v
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COMM GILINSKY:
Also, there isn't a technical advisor any, more.
COMM AHEARNE:
Right.
It's a vacant spot.
5 (Laughter.)
1 6
MR. SNYDER:
It also calls for it being an investigation l 7
under the FDO unless we perform it otherwise 8
COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
9 Now there are several possible structures we can 10 I use, and that is a strictly NRC, a strictly outside, a mixed.
l U
We can set up a semi-Licensing Board Panel and go through an 12 adjudicatory process with witnesses, et cetera.
We can set 13 up the Apollo' type or the NASA type structure which is really Id a technical administrative board approach.
They do have wit-i i
II nesses at appropriate stages, but they're focused upon trying
{
6 to do technical issues.
I7 We could separate into having a fact-finding panel 18 and then later an Advisory Act panel which could be - quote --
"a full panoply of the legal profession." -There are a variety 'of I9 ways and I couldn't really come down on any one of them.
20 21 But I have this overriding sense that we are both 22 allowing things to dissipate, understanding is going to dissi-23 pate, and we have got these various reviews starting off in A
k different directions, both internal and external, and we ought i sowei neoorews, Inc.
25 to try and pull ourselves together and get some direction.
l i
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1 CHM..HENDRIE: whither we go outside NRC for the investi-llgationsgroup-In reading some of the literature accumulated 2
3
{onthissubjectinoddmomentsoverthepastseveraldays, it seems to me that there is an advantage in at least s' icking; ;
t 4
with full-time federal employees having to.do with theJFederdl-
5 6
Advisory Committee Act.
COMM AHEARNE:
Unless you separate into a fact-finding 7
section and another section.
You stick it into the fact-finding 8
section -- At least the preliminary advice I got from Carl 9
was that as long as the threshold was that if they do not 10 render advice and recommendations and are purely fact-finding, 3
then the-Advisory Committee Act doesn't come into play.
COMM GILINSKY:
Well, it seems to me you've got an j
i.
14 l accident and a response and you've got to just lay those out i
I in. tremendous detail.
15 COMM AHEARNE:
U-huh.
16
.COMM KENNEDY:
Following which --
17 COMM GILINSKY:
And'then you want -- you can draw 18 lessons from that.
Y 19
~
COMM AHEARNE:
Right.
l 20 COMM KENNEDY:
That's riyht COMM GILINSKY:
And that s not necessarily the same 21 kind of people who laying the detailed chronology, and 22 COMM AHEARNE:
I agree.
23 COMM GILINSKY:
-- following through the events.*
l COMM HENDRIE:
In most of the investigations that
- 24 25 have been i
o 000049
12 All I
done it is the same group of people, however.
2 COMM AHEARNE:
In the NASA investigations that is true.
]
3 COMM BRADFORD:
NTSB I gather not.
4 COMM AHEARNE:
NTSB, it's not, because NTSB really does 5
have this fact-finding set - and rightly maybe -
6 CHMN HENDRIE:
Well, for a major accident a team goes out 7
immediately experts specialists and experts, and a board 8
member goes along.
9 COMM KENNEDY:
They are the fact-finders.
i 10 I MR. CUMMINGS:
- John, I think that the NASA approach, too, ob ~
U fact-finding is quite the same except that it's below the b~ard 12 level.
It's called a panel.
You can call it whatever you wish 13 but they still turn out to'be a fact-finding.-
I 14 COMM AHEARNE:
But NASA has restricted to government
{
employees.
f 15 COMM BRADFORD:
So one of the other questions here I think l
16 17 is that if you have a Presidential Commission running, they're l
18 going to be looking at the same questions and it would be l
desirable to have only one fact-finding process going on at 20 i
the same time, or in fact only one fact-finding process going l
21 on, period.
22 COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
23
-- which means that whatever decision we COMM BRADFORD:
24 arrive at ought to be acceptable to them, too, because they are l seeral
, irm.
25 going to want a factual record and if ours is not done in a I
13 l
L
)
1 way that's acceptable to them they're going to have to go do b12 2
the same thing all over again.
/O i
O 3
COMM AHEARNE:
Even worse than that, they may decide that tlkey I
I don't like the approach we're using and they'll try to do it 4
l 5
at the same time.
i l
6 COMM BRADFORD:
Well, right, yes.
7 COMM AHEARNE:
And then really people do get in each 8
other's way.
9 COMM KENNEDY:
That's something we could influence or i
10 !
control only to, I think, a very limited extent.
Itseemstomeourrelationshiptowhatever!
11 12 that institution may be should be that of offering whatever 13 assistance, cooperation, they need, in any way that they want 14 it, but that, by the same token, does not say that we then have 15 to tailor what we do to meet their needs.
16 It means we have to do whatever it is they ask of 17 us, but we have to structure our own activity to meet our own i
18 particular needs.
I i
19 Isn' t that right?
j 20 m m:
I agree with that.
Wehaveourownrespon-l l
21 sibilities and we just have to carry on an investigation --
l 22 COtt KENNEDY:
That's right.
23 There will inevitably,I think,be some dupli-l 24 cation.
l
.cerm
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25 Well, I think that they will probably, if COMM GILINSKY:
l l
m n n s.
L
't 14 l
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cb13 1
they get themselves going--
Also, I don't think we can wait 2
around for them to get themselves organized.
But if they do qb 3
get themselves organized soon enough, they'll have some ideas 4
about what else we ought to be doing, and we will want to do 5
that, too.
6 COMM KENNEDY:
And it may well be that when they give us 7
those ideas we can structure the way we go about pulling some 8
stuff together for our own needs so that the one job will do.
9 for both.
But we can't--
I don't think we can put ourselves l
10 1 in the position of consciously deciding that we will take --
j I
11 that we will do whatever they want, and make do from that.
I 12 COMM-GILINSKTi'- I think what we want to do is just set this 13 thing up in a way that it will be so comprehensive and so 14 thorough that it will be the basic document from which others i
15 work.
16 I think we ought to try to do that and we COMM AHEARNE:
17 ought to be able to do that for the fact-finding part.
18 That's what I mean.
COMM GILINSKY:
l9 COMM GILINSKY:
You see, the other part they can easily do i
i 20 separately.
That's a different kind of review.
i l
21 COMM AHEARNE:
That's right.
l 22 And we have to do--
23 COMM GILINSKY:
And we want to do separately, we should do 24 separately.
mww
. inc 25 COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
i I,
nonaro
15-1:19 aln) bl4 I
MR. CUMMINGS:
If I may, I think it's important, too, on l
2 something like this that whoever is going to head this up be l
t 3,
of such a stature that he or she is going to be respected by i
4 the Congressional side and whoever is going to head up the 5
Administratio'n task force so that maybe there could be a very 6
easy meshing of ideas and there's not going to be any suspicion!
l 7
about the qualifications and integrity of the person who is I
8 going to l
u 9
COMM GILINSKY:
You're talking about an outside head?
10 1 MR. CUMMINGS:
In that case, yes.
Il COMM KENNEDY:
Could we talk about the effect of the 12 Federal Advisory Committee Act here?
i 13 MR. STOIBER:'
I think--
l t
14 I keep thinking these mandates were not COMM KENNEDY:
15 created to make it impossible to do one's work, but somehow 16 facilitating -- trying to find out how that works.
.220 am) 17 MR. STOIBER:
You have two separate tests.
You have the l
18
" render advice and recommendation" test, and then you have the i
l9
" full-time federal employee" test.
You need to have both of l
thosebeforeyoufallh.nundertheFederalAdvisoryCommittee 20 I
21 Act.
I I
22 So if you structure a two-stage process and the one 21 stage is strictly (inaudible) -- then it doesn't matter whether 2'
or not you have outside people involve d in that process because,
mes,si
,im j
you're not rendering advice or recommendations.
i nonnsa
.16 I
cbl5 Similarly, if you enter into the second stage and 2
you have all federal employees, you don't have an Advisory
/O l
l Committee either, because you're all within the federal x
l 4
government so it's only because --
COMM KENNEDk':
But suppose you did have non-federal em-6 ployees in the second stage.
What would the effect be?
6 7
Well, I think if they were recommending MR. STOIBER:
8 (inaudible) -- the Commission or the President any or any other 9
body empowered to take action, we would have to comply with i
10 !
l the FACA --
COMM KENNEDY:
Which would require us in essence to do what?
MR. STOISER:
I sent along a short memorandum that stated'shap i-14 involves.
Basically it involves drafting a charter which is sub 15 mitted to the Secretariat which used to be in OMB and its new in the 16 General Services Administration.
And the charter has to set t
I7 out the purposes of the effort, the personalities that are going to be involved.
I 19 It has certain notice requirements.
No meet-i 20 ings can be held or decisions taken until a 15-day 21 period has passed.
22 The meetings of the body have to be open.
Unless 23 they can be exempted under the Government in the Sunshine Act, t
any materials developed by the Advisory Committee are subject l
25 to disclosure unless you have an exemption under the Freedom 1
000054
~
17 s.
/'S.
of Information Act.
)
j
(/
So it's those typical kinds of things that apply, 2
ji for example, to the ACRS that apply also to that body.
3 a N
COMM AHEARNE:
I would think that if we could do that 4 II separation we would be much better off, but I would also
. ]
believe that we have got to have some ~outside people on that fact-finding side.
I certainly would feel much more comfortable.
7 COMM BRADFORD:
I think it's necessary at eyery step in t his 8
MR. STOIBER:
I think to avoid any challenge-- If you 9
structure a.two-stage process you avoid any sort of trouble 10 about setting up your first phase.
The whole package has to 11 be --
12 :
h COMM.BRADFORD:
Done at the same time.
13 d 14 !l!
i MR. STOIBER:
-- available at the outset --
j!
COMM AHEARNE:
Absolutely.
l 15 MR. STOIBER:
-- to indicate to people that you do com-16 '
prehend this second stage in which you'll have the openness 17 -
ll provisions of the Advisory Committee Act.
18 i!
COMM GILINSKY:
How big an effort is this likely to be?
19 MR. CUMMINGS:
As a matter of fact, you might you might 20 want to consider -- If we go ahead and decide to do this, giv e
lI 21 this fact-finding board, if you will, a certain mandate of 22 independence to make sure that we're going to get something that's full and that they're going to follow down th'e trail that 2 4 i:
they feel happened following that.
I) 25 i
'w /
h And I think that gives you a certain amount of i'
i i,
00100A5-
i 18 Db17 1
independence to the board and there will be obviously people on the 2
board from NRC who are totally competent to answer all these ques O3 And I think you have to give them a certain leeway to go ailead and do their thing and do it independently, and that's 4
l 5
what we are looking for.
6 And I think that gives you better credibility with 7
everybody else that's going to want to look into it, and less 8
of a chance -- and more of a chance that this board will be 9
allowed to go ahead and finish their job without someone takingl 10 '
it away from us or getting into the act at the same time.
II COMM KENNEDY:
I keep thinking, unless they want to change-12 the statutes under which the agency functions, there are certain 13 things they can't take away from us.
They may duplicate them i
14 if they want, buttheycan'trelieveusoftheresponsibilities!
\\
15 without some new statute, if I'm correct.
i i
16 Isn't that right?
We have some clear, unmistakable 17 responsibilities which we have to discharge, and we have to
(
i 18 discharge those credibly.
j 19 So they may duplicate them--
20 MR. CUMMINGS:
I meant more in the sense of everybody try- !
i I
21 ing to talk to one witness at the same time kind of a thing l
22 rather than letting the initial fact-finding complete itself 23 and having some integrity to that aspect, so that each other 24 investigative group or board is going to rely on that basic data --
usersi
, Inc, l
COMM KENNEDY:
Yes.
L w cvov6ta n e
19 18 I
MR. CUMMINGS:
- as being correct, and true, and a starting off point.
I 2
COMM GILINSKY:
So how big an effort is this fact-finding
(~')s3l
(
stage likely to be?
4 COMM AHEARNE:
How long?
How many people?
l 5
COMM KENNEDY:
Well,.what does Hanauer think?
He went througt1 6
all this.
7 COMM AHEARNE:
He didn't have an estimate of how--
8 MR. SNYDER:
Gossick 25 am) estimated that he was going 9
to cut off at the point at which the plants were in a cold 10 I shutdown condition, not the cleanup operation.
Investigate l
II up to that point.
t l
12 His rough-- kind of pull-it-out-of-the-air es'timate was 1
13 six months for the fact-finding.
I i
14 COMM GILINSKY:
For how many people?
l l
15 MR. SNYDER: He was talking I think somewhere like a half a dozen.
i
~ 16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
l I7 COMM KENNEDY:
I was thinking it would be more than that.
18 MR. SNYDER:
It may be more, and that doesn't mean its 19 time is going to be any shorter.
20 COMM KENNEDY:
That's right.
j Steve really thot$ght that the time - he 21 COMM AHEARNE:
22 didn't give me an estimate of how big an effort it would end 23 up being, but he really thought that three or four months was 24 the time.
He felt the Browns Ferry one had been dragged on
. gl i
m ru 25 l much more than it need to have been because it didn't have a l
000057
20 n
1 sufficiently high priority..
That obviously won't be the case 2
here.
3 COMM KENNEDY:
My impression was-- Am I wrong?
Were n't 4
they working full-time?
5 COMM AHEARNE:
No, according to Steve, they were not 6
COMM GILINSKY:
Live and learn.
7 COMM KENNEDY:
You only live and learn; right.
You 8
know, I thought they were.
And this is the first time that I 9
have ever heard Steve say that they weren't.
10 COMM AHEARNE:
He said that that was one of the major l1 Problems, that they were not.
- MR. CUMMINGS:
I think a point that was made earlier--
12 13 CHMN HENDRIE:
You say they've got to work--
MR. CUMMINGS:
This is continuous - This is not likit 14 a P ane crash or an Apollo 204 fire.
It's an svent that ju'st l
15 doesn't seem to end for 10 or 12 days.
And that.'s going to 16 really complicate things in terms of the efforts, the fact-find-17 ing eff rts that are going to have to be put in.
18 You can't' underestimate.
It's just a deadly mistakit 19 g
to underestimate the amount of manpower and hours that are 20 g ing to have to be brought to bear on this.
21 COMM KENNEDY:
That's right, and time 22 CHMN HENDRIE:
If it's going to run as a full-time g
operation there are a limited --
g OM mm:
That's right.
0' 25 CHMN HENDRIE:
-- rather limited number.of senior NRC o
000058
21 ab20 I
officers who could be committed to it.
I 2
COMM KENNEDY: I don't see how it could be otherwise though.
[3 i
V 3
COMM AHEARNE: I think you're right, Joe.
And that's w[1yinconstructingtheboardwemightevenbebetteroff 4
j by weighting it more -- that is, in the fact-finding, weighting l 5
6 it towards the outside.
7 CHMN HUNDRIE:
Yes, because it doesn't seem--
8 COMM GILINSKY:Now when you said board, what are the board 9
members doing?
Are they engaged in investigation full time?
j 10 I COMM AHEARNE: Yes.
II COMM GILINSKY: They are actually doing the interviewing?
12 COMM AHEARNE: No, I would think that they would be--
You 13 would probably end up getting--
As far as the interviewing 1
Id goes, the recommendations I got from the NASA people who 15 essentially did both of those were to have the interviews done.
I 16 I
by people who are a two-member team, a lawyer and a technical l
i I 7 person to go out and do the interviews and collect--
i t
18 COMM GILINSKY: Would you use the interviews that are being i I
I9 collected now, or would you reinterview?
20 COMM AHEARNE: I've only seen a rough--
I've seen this I
21 rough transcript that was floated around, and unless it's a 22 lot better, I think they'd have to--
That was the--
J 23 The guy who's a board member of the first accident said the-mistake they made is they first just quickly collected 24 mine
. ine.
25 j
interviews by word -- by the technical people just go out and i
l nnnosa
22 I
t l
/
ll t'ake them, x_-
p
,and then they sat down to try to look'through them q
j 1
2 l and they found there were too many inconsistencies, they 3
lweren'twelldone,andtherewasaboarduptheretogobackahd s ".
4 redo them again.
t 5
That's why the advice, and I'm afraid that thats.
6 where we'll end up.
7 COMM.GILINSKY:
So the board members were sitting, 8
sifting through all this material and trying to make sense out of it, and trying to report?
g MR. CUMMINGS:
And redirecting people to go out and 10 do more work or --
COMM GILINSKY:
And how many people were attached to 2
.them?
In other words, if you're talking about half a dozen-l 14 ll board members, with how many'--
MR. CUMMINGS:
I can only tell you the NASA example 15 in the 204 fire, and I think they had five or six board members--
l 16
.CCMM GILINSKY:
- Yeah, 17 COMM AHEARNE:
Seven 18 MR. CUMMINGS:
-- and they came out with 21 panels.
19 And those 21 panels had probably-between five and six pe'ople
[
20 on the panels.
And then there was a board member who kihd.of 21 overseered their activities.
22 COMM AHEARNE:
But Jim, that was the whole effort, 23 not only finding out what went wrong but then trying to figure I
24
(}
out how to fix it, 25 MR. CUMMINGS:
That's right.
0000G0 a
n 23 122 1
COMM AHEARNE: -- what recommendations.
2 MR. CUMMINGS: No question about that.
7
!\\
3 COMM AHEARNE.
It included all of the industry people 4
running retests of the design --
5 COMM GILINSKY: Organization of the five billion dollar 6
budget --
7 COMM AHEARNE: -- dollar budget --
8 COMM GILINSKY: - and bigger dollars.
9 COMM AHEARNE: That's right.
i 10 1 MR. CUMMINGS: It was the whole fact-finding, determinations, i
11 recommendations, and everything, i
12 COMM AHEARNE: As for example, one possible structure of
-13 that kind of a board would be to have a technical person from 14 the outside as a chairman, apublicvicechairman,[
)
i 15 for example, an ACRS member, a DOE lab head if we can figure i
i 16 out which lab --
l l
17 An ACRS member.
Now the ACRS also will I
COMM KENNEDY:
I i
18 undoubtedly -
l 19 COMM AHEARNE: I understand.
l 20 COMM KENNEDY: -- there's a possibility of an investigationj l
i 21 COMM AHEARNE: I'm just giving a straw structure, j
22 If there's one DOE lab where we would tend to turn 23 to get more work donE, the head of it or the deputy head is 24 another piece of advice out of NASA, that you have much more w nemonm. inc.
25 response from getting work done for you.
0000A1 i
24 ab23 1
Someone perhaps from the Houston Space Center who 2
has a lot of experience with emergency response in crisis
[3}
l
'/
3' situations in control rooms.
l l
i i
4 And then Denton or Case.
Certainly Harold would lend l
5 a lot of credibility, he has a lot of credibility vdda the piblic.
6 That kind of a structure is one possibility.
I 7
COMM KENNEDY: Who was the chairman you were--
l 8
COMM AHEARNE: Technical chairman.
9 COMM GILINSKY: Let's see.
Isn't it awkward to have Harold 10 !
on it?
He's one of the principal players.
l 11 CHMN HENDRIE:
- yes, 12 COMM AHEARNE: It's awkward to have him on it, but I think 13 that you ought to have some senior NRC guy on.
i f
14 But you're right, that could be awkward.
i 15 CHMN HENDRIE:
What have we got in moving toward outside i
i 16 people on the board.
Do we seen to be moving in the' direction od i
17 the Presidential commission,in any sense be appearing to l
18 occupy some of the same ground that they would occupy?
COMM GILINSKY: Maybe in the sense the President's--
19 20 COMM BRADFORD: That certainly is a problem, at least in f
21 terms of getting--
There may be--
We might wind up being 22 after the same people.
23 CHMN HENDRIE: But again--
l 24 COMM BRADFORD: But we do have to draw our own set of con-ens 7 nws. ire 25 clusions, at least in the interim we don't know when their repard will be finished.
But it seems l
000062
25 I
24 to me we have to, in whatever consultation we can manage with' 1
2 te) them, set up and run our own effort, simply doing the basis V
3 l
for continued operation and licensing of plants.
COMM AHEARNE: Well, another name I thought of on that 5
possiblelistwouldbe.{
}
who is now outside.
6 COMM BRADFORD: I thought of that, too.
The difficulty there though is the same as with Harold; that is, to the extent I
8 that this leads you back into --
l i
COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
10 1 COMM BRADFORD: -- questions about I&E and other --
i i
II COMM GILINSKY: Well, I don't know.
I mean we would, after all,havepersonsfromNRCand(
]ismoreremovedthanthat.
13 So I would think he'd be pretty good.
He's a pretty organized I#
sort of fellow.
o i
15 COMM KENNEDY:
I'm thinking of the name of a fellow who j
6 Ileftitonmydesk--whowasthedirectorof(
was--
) operations.
He might be in-i I7 j
terested in such an enterprise, too.
His business was, you f
8 19 i
know, making sure that every procedure existed to cover every i
5 20 nit picking conceivable problem-.
A physicist.
I I
21 COMM AHEARNE:
Well, that's'a good possibility.
l 22 MR. CUMMINGS:
I can see Joe's i
23 COMM BRADFORD: My faith was shaken by those laser beams.
l i
9 rim. inc.
24 (Laughter.)
nse,es n j
l 25 I can offer a suggestion of the DOE lab MR. SNYDPR:
i I
000083
26
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cb25 1
National Lab head, with fine credentials in the Navy program j
(
It's[,
~
))
l 2
as well.
,-)
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3 COMM KENNEDY:
Yes.
4 He's a real --
MR. SNYDER:
l 5
COMM KENNEDY:
What --
i i
6 MR. SNYDER: very energetic figure.
Whatabout[
)
7 COMM KENNEDY:
8 He's no longer employed --
9 COMM GILINSKY:.
Isn't he president of some --
i
(
]Ithinkthat's--
10 COMM BRADFORD:
(Laughter)
That's(
)
II l
l l
I2 COMM KENNEDY:
- Yes, he took on new employment.
l 13 COMM GILINSKY:
Of course I suppose he's not involved in I
14 light water reactors.
l 15 (Laughter.)
i l
l 16 MR. SNYDER:
is a name, but I 17 don't know if he'd be interested.
18 There's a possibility.
He's completely 19 out of the industry now, and he certainly has the expertise.
20 COMM GILINSKY:
Yes.
l fisnot--
l 21 COMM BRADFORD:
22 COMM GILINSKY:
He's not involved in any way.
23 MR. SNYDER:
He's, that was intentional.
f'N i
Q 24 COMM GILINSKY:
I don't know-- how the company would feel userel Reoorters, Inc.
25 about it.
l' Onnne*
27 ab26 I
CHMN HENDRIE: Not very good.
2 3
COMM KENNEDY:
Whatabout(
)
4 COMM AHEARNE:
I'd be surprised if he doesn't end up on l
5 the Presidert's commission.
Butyou'reright,(
I think would be, be' good.
6 7
There's another passibility.
Well, he's MR. SNYDER:
obviouslya(
)-.beinvolved.
8 9
MR. AUSTIN:
(Inaudible) -- the ATS study, Vic l
10 I (inaudible).
j i
II Are you going to give the list of those -who are i
i 12 on here?
Well, for the chairElan, though, you need 13 COMM AHEARNE:-
14 someone who is a hard-driving, very thorough, methodical, 15 tough person.
i 16 CUMMINGS: Is (
) out of the question, John?
l MR.
fes, - [
)-
who's the one person I did 17 COMM AHEARNE:
18 talk to -- said he's just so strappef at ( )that i
l9 there's no way he could do it.
Thisisnotatechnicalperson,but(
20 MR. STOIBER:
}isaprettyhard-driving 21 22 COMM AHEARNE:
That's right.
)
23 MS. HARDING:
How about o) 24
\\,
COMM KENNEDY:
He would be excellent.
j no,e memorim. Inc.
COMMGILINSKY:(
2 t
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28 cb27 I
COMM KENNEDY:
Huh?
t
(
]
()
2 COMM GILINSKY:
i
~
3lI
~
]
COMM KENNEDY:
l 4
]oughttobesomebody--
COMM GILINSKY:
I think l
(
)
l 5
COMM KENNEDY:
t 6
COMM GILINSKY:
-- you might want to involve in one way or i
7 another.
8 COMM KENNEDY:
Oh, yeah.
Sure.
Iwasthinkingof(
]for--
9 10 1 COMM GILINSKY:
Does it need to be a technical person, the j
lI chairman or the head of it?
COMM KENNEDY:
Not necessarily.
12 13 COMM KENNEDY:
Probably--
You know, this is our activity.
I Id I don't think the President's commission ought to be, or 15 necessarily should be, i
i 16 COMM GILINSKY: Well, but our--
l 17 COMM KENNEDY:
Our activity, it seems to me, probably ought' f
18 to be.
l t
i9 COMM GILINSKY:
Yes.
1 COMM AHEARNE: '
I would think so.
21 COMM GILINKSY: I mean does he have to be a reactor expert? l 22 COMM AHFARNE:
Oh, no, I don't think that.
Forexample,(
]isnot.
23 COMM GILINSKY:
I wasn' t thinking of (
]asthe--neces-24 COMM AHEARNE:
w nemonm. inc.
25 sarily as the chairman.
000066
a 29 cb28 1
Really, I think we' be better off if we could get g
a chairman who people are going to recognize as someone that 2
b 3
they have confidence in, that's not unknown.
4 COMM GILINSKY:
Do we have a "for instance" ?
5 COMM AHEARNE:
Well, by " recognize" I mean you have to identifywhoheis,butlike(
]-
6 7
COMM GILINSKY: Who?
8 (Laughter.)
9 COMM BRADFORD: Earl Warren.
I 10 COMM AHEARNE:
Pardon me?
i i
i 11 Earl Warren.
l COMM BRADFORD:
He'stheguywhoranthe(
I2 COMM AHEARNE:
]
13 Id COMM KENNEDY:
He was a very good guy.
l COMM AHEARNE:
Yes.
j 15 i
16 MR. CUMMINGS:
He was the number
]
l t
COMM AHEARNE:
Very tough.
l 17 l
18 MR. CUMMINGS.-
He's an organized guy.
Private industry
.)
19 in the Washington area.
f 20 COMM GILINSKY:
Yes.
(
)isanotheradditional--from--
2I MR. CUMMINGS:
22 My only knowler' te is of-(
]isanotherhighlyresp-ted -
Obviouslyh would have that
- 2. aspect.
23 COMM AHEARNE:
Well,has(
]everrunaprogramofthis j
24 COMM GILINSKY:
omr : n oorwes.inc.
25 sort?
I mean, you know, this is a big effort, getting a lot 000087
30 t
eb29 1
of facts together.
2 r~
COMM AHEARNE:
I don't know.
3 COMM BRADFORD: It's different from exhuming the Rasmussen<
4 Report.
5 COMM GILINSKY: Yeah.
I mean that report was not--
6 COMM AHEARNE:
That's why I was--
My--
When you said an 7
example, the examples that I kept on running across from peoplewho--reallycutof(
)andsoon,whohadhadex-8 I
9 perience at running--
I Whatabout(
}
That's about the 10 !
COMM KENNEDY:-
II most organized guy I've ever seen.
12 COMM AHEARNE:
I think he's so closely allied with 13 ERDA and. DOE that that' might be a difficulty.
Id Why would that matter in this context?
COMM KENNEDY.
i 15 COMM AHEAR'4E:
Just the threshold of confidence the public j 16 would have, and it might not be reached.
l f
I7 This is obviously an area in which the COMM BRADFORD:
l
?
l 18 susceptibility of NRC and DOE both to being charged with having' t
t 19 something to hide is pretty high.
And I think that the l
1 9
l 20 chairman and other members of this group have to be chosen I
21 with that in mind.
COMM KENNEDY:
I-Let the record be clear that I don't 22 23 think that's a correct statement.
No, wait, wait.
A()
2d ou don't think we will be seen as having COMM BRADFORD:
w moomn, Inc.
25 something to hide?
000063 l
.l
~
31 cb30 1
~
COMM BRADFORD:
I was not stating we do, but --
2 COMM KENNEDY:
I do not think we will be seen as having 3
something to hide --
g 4
COMM BRADFORD: The perception I think is certainly there.
5 COMM KENNEDY:
We may be charged with it by some people.
6 I do not think we will be seen--
Indeed, every report that 7
I'm getting from far and near suggests quite the contrary, 8
that indeed we are seen to have done rather well, and as a 9
responsible agency of the United States government.
10 I Now my sources of course,are only in universities l
11 and --
12 COMM BRADFORD: Ivory towers, that sort of thing.
I3 COMM KENNEDY: Coffee houses don't call me too often.
Id COMM BRADFORD: I haven't been in any coffee houses lately j
15 either.
16 (Laughter. )
I 17 COMM KENNEDY: Anyway, aside from that, it seems to me thatl 18 John's point is whoever it is, it's got to be somebody credible.
COMM AHEARNE: That's right.
f I9 COMM GILINSKY: Well, can you think of another one other f
20 I
than[
]
l 21 22 (Laughter.)
23 COMM AHEARNE: The other name I had was --
)
24 COMM GILINSKY: This is for a chairman?
seerm neoorters, Inc.
25 COMM AHEARNE: Yes, yes.
I I
000089
32 I
531 COMM BRADFORD:
That is --
It's(
}whoisthe(
COMM AHEARNE:
3;
]andwasheavilyinvolvedinthe
)Iguesshef Yes,{
J 0
0 CHMN HENDRIE:
What was his name?
COMMAHEARNE:(
}
8 He's currently with --
(
9 COMM AHEARNE:
I 10 I
} yeah..
l I
11 MR. CUMMINGS:
I COMM AHEARNE:
Oh?
He(
MR. CUMMINGS:
Hewasthe(
]at COMM AHEARNE:
15 the time.
I 16 COMM BRADFORD: The person clearly I don't think has to be I
l a household word as long as --
COMM AHEARNE:
No, no.
He h u to be --
[
I0 l
l 19 i
COMM BRADFORD: -- we know he can do a good job.
But he i
l 0
l i
can't--
He really can't have ties in the DOE --
l 21 COMM AHEARNE:
Right.
22 COMM BRADFORD: -- or us.
23 COMM AHEARNE:
Once you say here's the guy and here are his 9etm, inc.
24 credentials, people have to have confidence against that.
i j
meerm COMMAHEARNE:(
} whose arm might be able to l
i n00070 l
33 Heusedtobethe(
cb32 I
be twisted.
Heisnowthe(
2 V
3 l
COMM KENNEDY:
Who?
I
]He'stheonewhoadvisedon 4
COMM AHEARNE:
}He'shighlystressedinthesensethathe'scover-5 inganumberofthesetopjobsat(
]becausehe's 6
7 looking for replacements for people, but under great duress, he 8
probably would serve.
CHMN HENDRIE:
Howabout{
}
l 10 !
COMM AHEARNE:
I --
l 11 COMM KENNEDY:. I'd be surprised if he could get away frcm 12 COMM AHEARNE:
I don't know his--
The point was raised Idon'tkno(
organizational --
13 here about how--
I4 Ithinkhe'stoocommittedto(
)
COMM GILINSKY:
Howaboutsomebodylike(~
]
IS MR. SNYDER :
COMM GILINSKY: Well, there's no harm in asking, I think.
l 6
I7 COMM KENNEDY:
Howabout{
}
MR. SNYDER:
Howabout(
]
18 i
19 l
COMM AHEARNE:
Pardon?
Howabout(
}
l 20 MR. SNYDER:
l 21 COMM BRADFORD: I just don't think he'd--
l 22 You're pulling names out of the nuclear past, 23 but
~ COMM KENNEDY:
Whatabout[
Jisnuclearpast G
24 was terminated before it. began.
seers nemorws, ine. '
25 COMM BRADFORD:
I don't think Gary Hart would take very kindl:(
to that.
000071
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COMM'AHEARNE:
Going back.to a point that was made-
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earlier,.we ' d like to try, I think, to have this fact finding- '
f 7
U 3
COMM KENNEDY:
He's now the L_
- a-4 No, he's the 5
CHNM HENDRIE:
Down in the structure, and -- be 6
regarded as-There are a batch of people like that in the 7
laboratories, first class people, who do sound service..
8 If you want this image of a person who hasn't much past 9
association with the government, the industry, or whatever-10 COMM AHEARNE:
I wasn't saying the person shouldn't have Il association with government.
I don't think that.
I don't 12 think that's a' problem.
13 I do think it's a problem if you.take someone 14 who's closely allied with the development of nuclear power.
15 And in no way meaning to impugn their integrity.
I0 COMM GILINSKi?
Are we talking about having two boards, 17 then, one a fact finding board and a board that will draw 18 lessons from this experience?
19 I would recommend that.irection.
I COMM AHEARNE:
20 think if you-- Particularly a point that you or Dick made 21 earlier, that if we - maybe it was Peter -- that if you do 22 it that way then I do think you have some reasonable chance, 23 if we set it up well, of having it be the fact finding--
24 That seems like a fundamental decision to COMM GILINSKY:
ederal Inc.
2,5 make at the outset, so we know what it is we're talking about 000072
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this guy doing.
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COMM GILINSKY:
Now it seems to me you could then have 3
some of those members continue on in the.next board, but not 4
necessarily, 5
COMM AHEARNE:
Yea.
l 6
COMM KENNEDY:
Or some of them, structure a new board 7
with some of them and have that understood in the first 8
instance.
9 COMM AHEARNE:
Right.
10 COMM GILINSKY:
Seems t'oEme a reasonable way to approach it.
II COMM AHEARNE:
Me too.
12 COMM KENNEDY:
You certainly don't want, I don't think 13 you want to have a fact finding enterprise which at some point 14 ends with the curtain coming down, house lights going up, 15 the audience filing out, and then the lights flicker and the 16 audience files back in and the curtain goes up and a whole 17 new group of characters comes on stage.
You know.
18 The second group of characterssis going to have l
19 to start from Ground Zero, and may not have -- and may not 20 appreciate in detail what they've got.
21 CHMN HENDRIE:
I agree with that.
But if you start with 22 some people who are not full time federal employees and say, 23 This is not a committee, an advisory committee under the 24 Federal Advisory Ccumnittee Act, because they're only doing l
25 fact finding and not making recommendations, and four months I
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later you say, Great,'that was a. great' fact: finding report,
,e. ri_. _._ j y -.;.
2 I now reconstitute you as a board that is an advisory ccm-O3
.,l--
mittee.
I think it may be possible, but I'm not sure it's 4
piactical.
5 COMM AHEARNE:
But, on the other hand, if you have, say, 6
five or seven members of the fact finding board and then you 7
transition to the other,.I think it is entirely feasible to t' ) e a
8 say two members of that and put them on this second.
I don't 9
think there would be any difficulty in that.
10 If you're only going to carry one or two CHMN HENDRIE:
Il members across I'm not sure that you achieve the purpose of 12 continuity that Dick was talking about.
13 I would have thought more than one or COMM KENNEDY:
14 two members.
I don't think that's going to carry continuity.
15 You need more than that.
16 What I'm concerned about is a second group 17 of stellar players comes on the field, and the trouble is 18 they don't know how the game was played in the first half.
I9 It's a little hard for them to pick up the ball and start 20 running,n6theven sure which end of the field they're playing 21 on.
(Pause) 22 COMM KENNEDY:
It's one thing to pick up a mass of facts 23 and start sifting through them.
The facts themselves may 24 raise more questions in their minds, questions, wh.ich if they ed mi inc.
25 realized -- if they'd had a chance to look at those facts as rov 6VdV6u u
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they were2.beidg developed they miglit have been able to pursue.
2 COMM BRADFORD:
Let's see: it is'.also possible, at least bd3 theoretically, to constitute this thing as a fact finding 4
enterprise whcse record will be submitted ultimately to the 5
Commission, on one hand -- this cc C asion,.on one hand, 6
and the President's group, on the other.
And I'm not sure 7
you have to have an intermediate board drawing conclusions 8
at all.
9 COMM KENNEDY:
That's true.
What does the Commission do 10 about that?
11 COMM BRADFORD:
You see, we have to draw conclusions 12 anyway, whether you have an intermediate board that's sorti 13 of doing a preliminary job for us or not.
In the end it's up 14 to usewhat we do with them. And --
15 If there weren't a presidential commission I'd 16 say we needed, clearly, an independent group drawing conclu-17 sions as well.
But we're certainly going to be given that 18 in spades by the President's group.
19 I m not too sure.
There are a lot of COMM GILINSKY:
20 lessons that deal with our detailed procedures.
They may 21 not get down to our level.
22 COMM BRADFORD:
But can't we draw them?
23 COMM GILINSKY:
Yes, but somebody has got to do that.
24 You mean the C,wnnisaloners?
m inc.
l 25 COMM BRADFORD:
Somebody like that.
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CHMN HENDRIE:
_ Listen, we approach noon rapidly.
Why 8
2 don't we each try to say a few remarks: and 'then adjourn for 3
recuperation and further thoughts.'.-
4 COMM AHEARNE:
Can we possibly get back to this after-5 noon?
0 CHMN HENDRIE:
I can.
7 COMM AHEARNE: ~
Pardon me?-
8 CHMN HENDRIE:.
I say I can.
9 COMM KENNEDY:
I can.
COMM AHEARNE:
Me, too.
lI COMM GILINSKY:
That's three.
You've got a_ quorum.
4 12 (Laughter) 13 COMM KENNEDY:
I'll deputize you.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Listen, that's what the fellow at the Treasury pays me to do, is to stay around so we can have a 15
~
meeting this afternoon.'
So I feel. a strong compulsion.
You know, John, Dick and I are wil:"ng to go.
17 18 (Laughter) 19 I can see it now, a press release:
The COMM AHEARNE:
20 Nuclear Regulatory Cnmmi ssion has established a task force, 21 Mr. Gilinsky--
22 (Laughter) 23 COMM KENNEDY:
Commissioner Gilinsky notes.
Commissioner 24 Bradford demurs, saying....
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25 (Laughter) 000076
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CHMN HENDRIE:
The Chairman added, He would have 2
preferred....
ON 3
COMM KENNEDX:_.
Mr. Kennedy noted.
~
4 Commissioner Ahearne said the whole thing 5
is confusing.
6 (Laughter) 7 CHMN HENDRIE:
Before we breah, may I voice some concerns 8
that I wish you'd think about a little bit, and maybe we can 9
discuss them, as well as others, this afternoon.
10 It seems to me that we are assured of a configura-11 tion in which there will be a presidential commission which 12 has a charter briefly spelled out in the fact sheets and 13 probably to be further amplified as
' the President appoints 14 the members and tells them, in effect, what to do.
They will 15 do what they have to do.
16 It seems to me almost, if there is not a signifi-cant congressional investigation beyond the normal probing 17 18 by a multitude of committees, that will kind of si.u. prise 19 me.
20 I wonder, in terms, then, looking at that context 21 and also some of the problems of the Advisory Committee Act, 22 it's not clear to me whether the NRC - that.is, our own look 23 at things, ought to be done by a board which is either, or 24 heavily weighted by people outside NRC, since there are other mi.ms inc.
25 bodies that may be, as I say, occupying much the same ground, 00A027
b 40 wb7 1
and I'm not sure whether if we go that way we may not be, 2
you know, no matter what we say, creating the impression we're' 3
trying to protect the tariff by establishing bodies which 4
look very much like those others.
5 To some extent, I think to acconsiderable extent, 6
if we went mora with an in-house operation that would not be 7
- a. perception, and we could then say clearly, these are 8
the outside people who look carefully at what we all did, 9
and for our purpose we need inside people.
10 I don't know: there are clear-- if these other 11 things weren't going forward, then, indeed, you would want --
12 then, in fact, we might commission almost a two-level opera-
\\
13 tion: an in-house review, Okay, Staff, what do you make of 14 this; what happened in the plant, and what's wrong, what 15 should we do, and so on, and an outside body. But with the 16 guarantee that at least one major outside body is looking 17 at it, then I'm not so sure.
18 And maybe it would be helpful te have some dis-19 cussion, with Watson and Company over there to see what 20 the thoughts are on that side.
And I think--
You know, why 21 don't people who have contacts sort of probe over there, 22 and see what--
23 COMM GILINSKY:
What sort of person did you have in mind?
24 CHMN HENDRIE:
If it was an in-house proposition, well mieral W lac.
25 when I say "in-house," I don't mean, you know, necessarily 0000211
41 wb8 1
strictly fulltime NRC employees, but I'd include ACRS and 2
consultants who would be consultants to the Ccanmission for 3
this purpose, but "in-house" sort of in the sense of our 4
own close sphere.
5 That wouldn't rule out somebody like COMM KENNEDY:
6
.or somebody, a lab director?
7 CHMN HENDRIE:
No.
We just 8
He's been a to us, and so on.
9 But, I don't know, in terms of if it were to be 10 that sort of thing, that kind of a thing, I think I'd think II pretty seriously about Now I don't know whether he'd 12 touch it with a ten-foot pole.
But he's certainly well 13 organized and hard driving.
And he:knows the shop.
's 14 not, you know, a nuclear industry figure.
His only association 15 was to come here and be the 16 that I know of.
And yet he, having been 17
, is, in a sense - he knows the shop, and it wouldn't 18 be a stranger running it.
19 So that seems to me a possible--
And furthermore 20 it would put the heavy burden of running the investigation, 21 avoid placing it on one of the senior officers of the Com-22 mission who would then have to be pulled out a job which 23 is presumably important and would be left to a deputy to do.
24 Now I don't know whether--
Look, I don't know M
toe.
25 whether that's the right way to go or not.
But it does seem 000078
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board route even though it has the obvious -- it has all 2
.jsortsof--ithasvariousadvantages.
The perception is 3
better that the Commission is not trying to hunker down.and,',',
let nobody in to see what's going on.
1 5
COMM GILINSKY:
Well falls somewhere in between.
6 CHMN HENDRIE:
would fall somwhere in between.
7 But, as I say, if.we went the in-house 8
COMM KENNEDY:
9 COMM GILINSKY: Or 10 COMM KENNEDY:
Either one.
11
. CHMN HENDRIE:
That's a name I'd forgotten.
Somebodyi 12 told that to me and I'd forgotten.
13.
I i
COMM KENNEDY:
Would either of them fall in that 14 I
sort of half way category?
15 COMM GILINSKY:.
I think they're both more identified 16 with nuclear energy than is.
17 COMM AHEARNE:
But, yes, an outside person looking 18 at that, if we name as chairman, is going to be -- the 19 identification is going to be, is the guy for i
20 21 CHMN HENDRIE:
I think unquestionable.
And I think 22 if one went -- Look, I think if one went that way it would be.
23 with the very clear announcement that it is specifically being 24 done that way because there -- you know, that there is the presidential commission that constitutes the group of people
(
25 i
000080
43 wbl0 I
outside the NRC who will look et our past record, how we 2
behaved in this case, and the broader spectrum of things, 3
and that for our own purposes we need an in-house one.
Ahd then you inevitably carry -- that's right; you inevitably I
5 carry, if you go that route, creating the perception because a 6
lot of people will ignore your statement that you're doing 7
that deliberately because of the presidential commission, 8
they'll ignore that and say, There they go again: they're not j
9 l
going to let anybody but their own team look at it, and they're i
10 all going to stand around in a circle congratulating each II other on lucking out, and that's going to be it.
12 That's a down side to that -- just as there are some --
13 The down side to that down side, if I COMM BRADFORD:
14 can just pick up on it for a second, is that if it is.per-15 ceived that way then the presidential commission can't possibly 16 use the fact finding of that enterprise as a basis for its 17 enterprise --
18 COMM AHEARNE:
That's in general the down side of an interna 19 NRC'--
(Simu.Ltaneous discussion) 20 COMM GILINSKY:
Wait ~a minute.
An internal board of six or how 21 many members, and there can still be outsidezmembers on this board.
COMM AHEARNE:
Picking up on--
If I go back to Joe's 22 23 original point there, if :it!s essentially an in*arnal NBC then I 24 think that you-that would have to be done with almost the ederal Inc.
25 understanding that therefore the presidential commission is 000021
44 wb11 1
going to have to do its own fact finding.
COMM GILINSKY:
Well, I mean', just to use your example, 2
3 suppose were the chairman and was on the 4
Board--
5 (Simultaneous discussion) 6 COMM KENNEDY:
Gentlemen, I keep thinkina it's coina to 7
do it anyway.
No presidential commission is going to accent 8
somebody else's work.
You know, it may take it and evaluate 9
it and use it to the extent it wants to, but they're still 10 not going to take it.
1 II COMM AHEARNE:
They could use it as the base of the 12 chronology.
13 CHMN HENDRIE:
Frankly, I'd be surprised if they'd 14 accept it from anybody but-Well, look, I don't mean -- And 2 15 must say I'm a little--there are these ups and downs--one of tle 16 things that worries me about the outside group is --
17
-- and I wonder if there aren't ways to fix 18 it -- we seem to not want to allow it to make recommendations 19 so that it can run -- so it can plunge in and do a fast fact 20 finding and not be subject to the Advisory Committee Act 21 provisions for noticing meetings and running. things openly 22 and so on.
On the other hand-That seems to imoly there 23 are going to be two of those groups: one to do fact finding 24 and the other to do -- which will be under the Act, and would 25 do analysis and so on, and that the overlap can't be very s
000082
45 wb12 1
large,otherwise it will be perceived to have been, you know, 2
subverting the intent of the Act in the firstthase.
3 A, it bothers me to have to have two bodies whose 4
overlap cannot be very large.
Here all these guys scend months 5
finding out what was going on, and now they're just going to go 6
away and leave behind them some writings, and another aroup 7
is going to decide what to make of all that.
8 COMM AHEARNE: If you don't go that route then you are 9
forced to either bring the Advisory Committee Act into play 10 immediately, or no outside people.
II CHMN HENDRIEi I wonder if that isn't--
The thing I'd 12 like for us to think about is whether it isn't possible to 13 bring it into play immediately.
But to recognize, and announce 14 in its -- lay out in its charter and all the public things, 15 that the first phase of its work is going to be a fact finding 16 phase, that the fact finding will be carried out by board 17 members acting with support from subpanels, or whatever, 18 contractors, or whoever, established for that purpose; that as 19 the panel, the Board as a whole gathers to have ' meetings and conside2 20 progress these will be public meetings and under the Act unless 21 there is good cause to close them.
There are a few provisions 22 I think in the Act for closing, which have to do with -- the 23 same sort of liability provisions in the Sunshine Act; talk 24 about whether somebody is a criminal or not, things like that 25 could allow you to close, classified information.
And then whem 000083
46 Dbl 3 1
they moved on into analysis and forming of recommendations, 2
again would be just like the ACRS.
3 I wonder if it's practical to run in that mode.
4 Wh'at it means is that the Board as a whole simply can't have 5
closed sessions in which they as a group grill somebody or 6
discuss among themselves where they're going, to any great 7
extent.
I guess some executive sessions are allowed, but there l
8 has to be a reason why there has to be an executive session.
9 Anyway, that would allow you to establish a single 10 body to conform to the law, and let it move on all the way on 11 through.
I 12 Now I wonder if that would be such a difficult 13 mode of operation.
14 COMM AHEARNE:
I guess going that mode, th et, since your 15 Board would also end up being the one we would be getting 16 recommendations from, then I think it would be even more 17 critical to choose a chairman who has substantial public 18 credibility.
CHMN HENDRIE:-
Yes.
(Pause) 20 CHMN HENDRIE:
I think that may be hard to do.
21 COMM AHEARNE:
Because that's going, you know, past the 22 collecting of information, it's really--
23 CHMN HENDRIE:
But you're going to face that-- You know, l
24 it's not a help to say, I'll avoid that by having two bodies, www iac 25 one of which does this factifinding, and they can be workers, 000084
ll 47 wbl4 1
and then there'll be the grand body who'll do analysis.
2 COMM AHEARNE:
But you see, you might have been able to g
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3 get, have a.better chance.of getting that Wmle. public indivirb1 4
for the second one for two reasons:
First, a lot of the dog work 1
5 would have been done, and, the second, by that time the select.on 6
of the field of the presidential commission would have-been 7
over, and, for whatever reason--
8 COMM GILINSKY:
And we get what's left over?
9 COMM AHEARNE:
Well, for whatever reason that a group
\\
10 hadn't been chosen.
1 11 COMM GILINSKY:
Let me ask you: do you feel that--
l 12 COMM AHEARNE:
But your approach certainly has a lot l
13 more efficiency in it, because you don't have the difficulty 14 of the decoupling.
15 COMM GILINSKY:
I mean, suppose one did pick someone l
16 like -.
do you feel whatever drawbacks there are in that 17 would be compensated for by picking other members from the 18 outside?
19 COMM AHEARNE:
I think in the public aspect of it I'm just--
20 COMM GILINSKY:
I'm not talking about him personally.
21 COMM AHEARNE:-
yes, yes, It's a close call.
It could certainly 23 establish within some selected segments-For example, let's 24 say, if were on it, say as vice-chairman of it, w
noe.
25 clearly amongst the knowledgeable nuclear concerns groups, 000085
48 ibl5 1
they would see that as a very definite positive sign of his 2
credibility.
I'm not sure as far as the general public is 3
concerned that it would make that much of a difference.
4 But at some point you just have to weigh all of 5
these factors.
You can't allow any one of them to overwhelm 6-the others.
7 COMM BRADFORD:
I would not have.
chair it, I 8
don't think.
But the point may be a moot one: the guy just 9
10 11 in which case....
12 CHMN HENDRIE:
Yeah, I think that!s probably right as j
i 13 a practical matter.
I think there's going to be enormous 14 difficulty in getting people to serve.
I really do.
15 I mean, I agree with you that he's a very COMM BRADFORD:
16 capable guy.
I just think the business of -- the fact that 17 this does lead you back into 18 makes it pretty awkward to have him as chairman.
CDM KEtEEDY: Have we thought of st2neale as Deputy Director?
COTE GILINSKY: Is it ccmceivable. that Mascn would'be interested?
20 COMM KENNEDY:
Do you think it would be possible?
21 COMM GILINSKY:
I don't know.
22 COMM AHEARNE:
What kind of a guy is he?
23 COMM GILINSKY:
He's a pretty honest fellow.
24 I mean as hr as a dr M ng--
COMM AHEARNE:
.dwai lac.
25 COMM GILINSKY:
Very organized, very--
000086
I i
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1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Oh, yes.
2 ll COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
On my sheets, one of the op.ticins 3 lifforan l
4 l
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
How about
- 1 1
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Going in that direction.
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Strong.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We'll end up with t:he Governor 10 of Washington.,
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Why don't we break and come back.
11 What time would you like to gather again?
Do people 12 have any sense of their schedules?
l 13.I t
i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Two o' clock?
3 t
I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Maybe a little afte'r.
15 l12:13 p.m.)
(End Cassette B) 17 18 19 20 a
i 21 22
.]
I l
23 24 25
- fl0D087
h A
i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/
IN.THE MATTER OF:
I C
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e Co::nnission Meeting 4
N.
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l Place Washington, D.. c. -
Date. Fridpty, 6 April 1979 Pages 1-45 l 00
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Telephone:
(202)347 3700 i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC 1'
OffidelReporters 444 North CapitolStreet
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Washington. D.C.20001 -
NATIONWIDECOVERAGE DAILY e
394Y 1
eb 1
~
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA c3
"""""^^ """" "'
3 I
l 4
l 5
Commission. Meeting 6
7 8
9 i
10 11 Chairman's Conference Room,-
1717 H Street, N.W.,
j 12 Washington, D. C.
i I
13 April 6, 1979.
-l 3:23 p.m.
14 15
~
16
~
17 18 19 1 20 21 THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.
22 23 24 si Reoorters, Inc.i
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25 l a
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I 2
l j
R 1 li CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay, let's continue the' discussion i
~
2 lof the investigations and their character and scope.
I can't, 3
Iread them now because my head is not able to receive.
4-COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
You ought to read it.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We've got a lot of blocked'chan el's 6
there.
Do you want to -- Why don't you.give it to me and I'll 7
tuck it in my bag here.
~
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The last few lines are probably as much --
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The bottom of the page ought 10 11 to clear your sinuses at least.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It went out on March 30th.
12 That's when it was-for, at least.
13 (Simultaneous discussion.)
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Who's been sabotaging my pipe -
15 I undertand why-it.is a cruelty.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I think it's interesting, the 17 date of the thing.
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
March 30?
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yeah.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
A week ago today.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I think that one sort of 22 comes in the category of You can't win them all.
I don't 23 know how what else to describe it.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
What's that?
25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You haven't seen that?
Its an exemption to Three Mile Island one. --
a m.
i 3
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What is that, John?
i I
2 MR. AUSTIN:
ECCS is --
3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
On the grounds that - '
l' 4
MR. AUSTIN:
For small 5
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
For small LOCAs.
~
6
. COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes, a small LOCA.
Would it 7
be a public health.and safety matter for protection in a smali 8
LOCA.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
John, what's the -- So I don't 10 have to read a page of small script, what is the exemption?
11 MR. AUSTIN:
I didn't read it.
It doesn't for certain 12 small break m1m1*i
, you have to have a certain amount of flow-in, and l
13 then the operator has to take some action within ten minutes.
i (Simultaneous discussion.)
l 14 MR. AUSTIN:-
But it's on what they identify - accept-15 able Calculational model.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, I guess I can't get g
that upset about it.
g (Simultaneous discussion.)
(COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
No, it 's nothing to get up -
~
set about, except in the sense of another piece of paper.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Oh, sure-- Oh, no.
It's some-.
22 thing I'll certainly read.
23 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I don't know.
I guess somebody who did it on the staff will have to explain that.
I'm unable 25 to read the language of the Federal Register it's. dry.
evarvsuaa
4 4
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4 lll
' COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The key things at the moment 1
l-i 2 j!is that there is a definite accounting for the Federal Register.
3 But that' thing may have been 10 or 12 days -- It's not that.
4 somebody decided on that day to issue it,.and therefore it appeer. erd.
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Did I--
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
At least I trust that's not what it was.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
This is an exemption to cover.the 8
accident.
(Laughter.)
9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I think we need that, not them 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's_see.
You know what'-the 3
Commission deliberations need occasionally is a blackboard.
2 4
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
There's one right there on thatl 3
~
wall right behind where those gentlemen are sitting.
l MR. HASSELL:.
Okay.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
One merely opens those doors.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Son-of-a-gun - Yes, as a matter of fact I'm glad that you are keeping your head and. are able to 18 remember these things.
I would have probably ended up painting 19 on the wall or.something like that.
20 We'd be better off with a blackboard.
Have we got 21 any goodies to go with it?
That's got lovely little cabinets 22 dowr. there.
23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
They apparently didn't order the chalk.
That comes in next year's appropriation.
L 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We've gotaa screen tha.t runs down.
Anybody like the screen run down?
i
{
s (A) v 1 lCHAIRMANHENDRIE:
Anybody got anything I can writ'e on this with?
2 1 MR. BICKWIT:
Let's -- Bob's going to get some.
3 3
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Somebody getting some?
4 COMeiISSIONER BRADFORD:
Actually Tom ' used tc> 'have
.f!'
5 some.
I used to, you know, carry some chalk in my pocket for. -
6 just such occasions.
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That's a pretty nice blackboard.
(Simultaneous discussion.)
8 l
l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The backs of those doors are 9
peg boards 10 MR. BICKWIT:.
Yeah.
g COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The backs of the doors are for l
73 sticking pins, are't they?
13.
i CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
For pinning things on?
g l
1s CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We do nice work here.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It's almost beginning to look like a working room.
(Simultaneous discussion.)
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
All right, Joe, your equipment 20 is here.
21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Chalk.
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I saved this effort because I was 23 attempting to sketch for Jim Cummings -- I think I can remeber it.
It looks to me like there appears, there may be ucre variaticms,but intrinsic-25 ally there er to me to be sort of tw, two things under Mv'=sicn or at 000040
I s
l l
I i
v' hieast that I think are worth ~ talking about, this is with regard to the -
1 2
sort of the charter and scope of the investigating bodies. (chaiman writes 3
'on blackboard) And cne of them I will call the ot+=ida vi*re, in cpHm 4
marks because pra=wn=hly it would have cne or - it could very well have cne.
5 or more NRC people on it, or NRC-connected people on iti 6
And that in turn seems to have two possibilities.
7 One of them is one.which we talked about at some length, which 8
is that there is first'of all a fact-finding enterprise which4 9
because it woulc be explicitly limited to that function in this 10 phase, would be non-Federal Advisory Committee with regard to 11 its procedural requirements and so on.
That it's-- The facts as sorted out by this group 12 would then flow down to a -- what should I-call it?
-- a con-13 clusion and recommendat' ions --
l 14 i
B M IT:
For want of a better --
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- body.
I'll call it the Con and 6
Rec body, and they would be a -- because they would have an p
advisory function
-- in the sense of the law, would be Federal 8
Advisory --
MR. BICKWIT:
Right.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
How many people, Counse' lor,'do 21 you think we could have --
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Transmit across the horizontal line?
23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yeah, go across that line?
h 24 d
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Less than 50 percent.
25 000093
i i
i 7
(D i
\\, )
I h
1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
50 percent of what?
i j
2 MR. BICKWIT:
Legally, all of them.
It's just-- It's a
!questionofappearance.
3 4
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yeah.
~
J 1
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Legally, all of them.'
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, it seems to me the other 7
version'of this is that there is a single body and it does fact 8
finding and then moves on to the conclusion and recommendation 9
function and finds a way to do this in a regime which is through -
10 out FA-- under the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
11 This is what I was talking about.
Is it practical 12 for a body like that to do its fact-finding by having that 13 single member or two-- I don't know, is two a committee meeting i
14 under the Advisory Committee Act?
j Then it would have to be a single member working with 15 consultants and working groups to investigate this thing, and 16 another member over here, but when they came together to discuss 17 results then they would be under the rules of the Federal Adviso n 18 Committee and their meetings would be noticed and public for the yg most part.
l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are you referring to this 21 description?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Is this Presidential Commission i
22 going to perform in that mode?
MR. BICKWIT:
We assume so.
MR. FITZGERALD:
I spoke to a fellow over at Justice and 25 he indicated that.he assumed that that would be their charter.
nnOnQA
8
?
l i, -
O 1 ll CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
Then it. appears to me that i!
2 j!the other possibility that I was suggesting that ought to be 3
' considered is one which I will call "Inside," in quotation mark's 4
because we understand this doesn't mean they have to be NRC oesple 5
but could include ACRS and some consultants.I guess -,
6 MR. FITZGERALD:
Full-time government employees would 7
get you out from,under the Act.
CHAIRMAN.HENDRIE:
Okay.
8 MR..FITZGERALD:
ACRS members I think --
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- are part-time.
10 MR. FITZGERALD:
Yeah.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
They are part-time government 12 employees or special government employees..
g COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Excuse me.
Now what does that mean?
15 l
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Well, 16 (IM1ISSIWER RENNEDY: Jim? It means you cannot - you could not use consultants?
18 MR. FITZE RALD: No, you could use consultants but -
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The members of the panel.
20 MR. FITZGERALD:
The members of the panel --
21 l
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Okay.
22 MR. FITZGERALD:
-- can't be consultants.
23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Okay.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
So I guess maybe --
25 MR. FITZGERALD:
Full-time.
nan...........
JL.
g
.l A
]
k li I
GAIIBMT HENDRIE:
(writing on blackboard)
I guess maybe over
~
1 d
2 Ihere you've got full-time government, which means that this is a 3
hon-FACaffair,andoverhere,callitmixed,whichmeansit - '
4 would be a FAC.
And this would be a body which in each case
.i ',
5 would do fact-finding and lead on to conclusion!s and reca.
.Ind-6 the same here.
7 And what.I was asking-- We were talking primarily 8
down this channel-but I was asking, is it possible-- If we g
go this way, is it possible to run that way so that you don't have this decoupling of the membership which appears-- As I 10 11 say, it's not legally required.
I think it is going to raise a certain amount of hoorah if you start out and say we're going to 12 have this body that's going to do fact-finding --
13 pl COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Oh, you couldn't - yeah.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- so they don't have to be FAC, but 15 later on we're going to have conclusions and recommendations by the same people and then it will. And I dcn't think that will wash.
I suspect that the coupling of membership across 19 this line', as somebody suggested, is like one or two at most.
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yeah, but without it, 21 GAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, that's cme of the reascns that I was.
worried about it.
And the other reason that I was worried 22 about this whole array over here was to what extent is this, 23 Perceived as instituting a bo.dy which.looks like the poor 24 J
man's Presidential Commission?
25 000096
10 f
I i
s l
f}
The down side obviously over here is that people l!
1 i
2 pouldsay, "There they go again.
They won't let anybody in to 3
see what they're doing," and so on, no matter how carefully we explain that because there's the Presidential Commission and' 5 4
there could be a Congressional investigation--
['
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
If announced at the beginning 6
that everything the inside, so-called inside body -- and "inside" 7
an be defined in certain ways, too.
They don't have to be all 8
NRC people.
9 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
They sure don't.
And they better 11 not be.
12 (Commissioner Gilinsky enters the room) 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Hi.
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
You know, I don't think it i
15 ! necessarily follows that because--
16
. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Is that an aye vote?
Come in.
COMMISSINER KENNEDY:
I don't think it necessarily--
17 (Laughter.)
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
A lecture?
yg 20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I had hoped --
0 15,
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
(Looking at blackboard) my God!!
(Laughter)
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We've just agreed that you are going O
24 1
(/
to be the chairman of the. investigating panel.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Independent -- panel.
000097
i i
11 i
<~3 i
<l j
1 [l.
CCNMISSICNER AHEARE: There is one step you have to take i;
2 Ibefore you get there.
3 (Laughter.)
4 MR. BICKWIT:
Can't that be automatic?
- I' '
5 (Simultaneous discussion.)
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:~
I don' t think it necessarily --
follows,.that because they are government employees, they are 7
biased.
Any indication-to that effect I think is not in anyone' s
interest.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Now Jim points out that there are 9 }
rays to inject in any of these things assorted other people.
10 One is that --
11 MR. CUMMINGS:
You can call them the official cu,wrvers.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Official observers.
For instance, 13 in any one of these channels over here, and you'd be more --
14 pr bably more interested in it here than there, you could have bservers from I don't know,. Congressional staff, and all kinds 15 f
utside people, but they wouldn't be formal voting members of 16 the so-called board or panel or whatever.
17 MR. CUNMINGS:
It's a pacifier.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It's a way of getting people into g
the proceedings without--
MR. CUMMINGS:
The intentien of the proceeding is to 21 have integrity.
But that board is going to get back to the principles.
That this particular board or fact finding group is doing a legitimate inquiry.
O CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yeah.
25 MR. CUMMINGS:
This particular board or fact-finding 6
12 eb11 I
group is doing the.egitimate -- asking tough questions kind 2
q of a procedure and they seem to be going along the lines of O
3 using this, you know,--
4 (IMESSIQ1ER MNEDY:
But in the unlikely event that that were 5
not true we'd want to know that anyway.
6 MR. Cutt!INGS: That's ri.ght.
7 CHAIRM HENDRIE: Well,-
8 MR. CUtEINGS : It's a device more than anything else.
9 i
l 10 MR. CQ9fINGS:
It gives a certain openness to the--
II CHAIPMAN HENDRIE: Yeah.
12 Have you talked at all about what sort of I3 facts they would be finding?
Id CHAIPMAN HENDRIE: We haven't settled down on scope of work.
15 I would--
16 CDEISSIDER GILINSKY: That might affect what they do here.
CHAIRM HENDRIE: Well, I guess the left side, the outside I7 18 group, would be at least perceived as having a better basis 19 I
to do things like critique the over-all agency posture with i
20 regard to the way it's established, the safety regulations and j i
21 implemented those,and reviewed plants and so on, as well as i
22 the particular response in this incident.
l l
23 Now my own view is that with regard to the response j 24 to the particular incident, critiquing what we've done our-yJ0
. Inc.
j 25 selves, I have no doubt we'll get as piercing an inquiry into i
000n40
13
~
cb12 1
that from the inside side of.the board as the other, perhaps 2
even deeper because of the greater knowledge of where all the -
O i
3 you know, who should have done what, what could have been done, 4
and so on.
5 But I think with regard to any conclusions and 6
recommendations chat is the over-all safety structure under 7
which the Commission has done its licensing process and then 8
kept track of the operating plants, I suspect that fairly 9
broad sort of an aspect would be better received from the left i
10 I side channels.
E 11 On the other hand, maybe that's'more a Presidential 12 Commission sort of thing, or a Congressional investigation sort 13 of thing anyway.
~
14 (INEISSIDE:R GIIJNSKY : Well, just comparing.it with Browns Ferry, 15 what little I rs=nar**r of it, the NBC effort at Browns Ferry was i
I 16 relatively not as level.
You had some inspectors over there, l
17 initially at least.
I i
18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Oh, yes.
l 19 CONISSIGE:R GILINSKY: And when you were critiquing you could have i
20 persons of equal or greater rank, and who were not involved in !
l 21 any way, you know, in the actual operation, because that was l
22 pretty modest.
23 Here you've got the whole agency from--
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yeah.
- s...o n norms, inc.,
25 CONISSIDE:R GILINSKY:-- bottom to top involved across several I
fh
4 I
14 1
('3 3
\\v/
yill offices.
The only one who wasn't involved was Bill Dircks, as e
2 far as I could see.
3 And you're asking, you know, a group to critique 4
what the Executive Director did, what the Commission did,
-- - 2 4
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The Commis~sioners did.
~
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yeah.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
When you say " critique," are you 8
going down into the conclusion side?
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, even getting the facts 10 down I think bears on--
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yeah.
12 COMISSIOER GTTTEKYi-It's how.you, sift thEr facts and So on.
I 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And what the five of us did.
~
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Right.
15 CDmuiSIOER AHEARE:. You can't get any MgMr than that.
16
.MR.
SNYDER:
What interference might have been caused 17 by outside influences --
18 (Simultaneous disc'ussion.)
l 19 MR. SNYDER:
-- like Congressmen showing up at the Incident Center there.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Or whatever.
21 At any rate, I guess I don't think the problem is 22 s
simple.
If we would categorize, you know, the various 23 kinds of components of this inquiry, one would be just a 24 pb technical inquiry on what happened in the reactor.
You know, 25 000101
i 15 i
j i,
1 ow did the opeators respond?
How did we respond initially, 2
and so on?
3 Some of these things could--
~
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
How did the Incident Response?I 5
center function?
6
-COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yeah.
I mean I think some of 7
these could very well, you-know, be handled by our own people.-
8 I don't think there is any question about that.
And one wants 9
to get going on eme of that before --
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yeah.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- memories get dimmer.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It's already too late for me.
~
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
There are other parts of it 14 that probably needs to have your outside participation or some-15 thing, sort of.
I don'.t know exactly what.
16
. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think you need outside 17 participation evenin some of the things you mentioned, once you 18 pass-- once you start getting into the interaction between the licensee people and our people and the Incident Response Center 19 in that loop.
20 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But you know, if you ask what 21 happened at Three Mile Island, I think we can send a bunch of 22 guys out there and they'll dig it out.
And maybe that ought to 23 get done right'now.
g COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No matter what happens, that's 25 000102 a
4 16 j
I 8
1 go't to be done.
~
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Right.
And I&E is doing that,
.3 and I think that we need to be assured.that that's being'done:pell.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
They're doing a prelimina'ry
.t'.
5 version, very preliminary view.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
In any case, -- that's what 7
we'.ve got to get.. done;-- and -- that ought to get launched.
8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's all you can do, while the 9
people are still trying to make sure that the reactor goes down.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Okay.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You ought to launch it, though, 12 I think after you've decided a little bit more about how you 13 want to launch it, what are they really trying to collect, and 14 the technique you're having them collect it.
Do you want just the I&E inspector to go out and sit 15 down--
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, one can talk about that - --
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yeah.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- but I don't have too much yg 9"Y' E
20 as well as anyone and can use it for -- you know, have it be useful for subsequent evaluations.
As you start broadening the inquiry, I'm less sure of that, So I think it might be useful to, you know, divide the problem 24 up in several pieces.
I think it is going to have to he done anyway.
000103
f lN i
1 COMMISSIONER HEARNE:
2 I think the review that's done 3
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
4 functional considerations.
That there are a whole l'o
!did the Commission do what it didWhen you tal 5
,h 6
that's not the way'to look at the problem., you kno
\\
7
\\
The way. to look at the problem i 8
Communications system function?
s how did the whatever needs existed?
To what extent did it serve 9
then you find out how it imping dAn 10 didn't, c
it
~
11
- Response Center, the Commission upon the Indident e
12
, and so on.
That at least is one way to look 1
13 at it.
If you try and take it-- You're 14 and take it in great big globs --
right, if you try 15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
going to have to develop a chronoloWell, it seems to 16 gy, you know.
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
18 )
Sure.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
19 g t a reactor.
As time goes this way you've Just what is the machinery doi 20,la control room where the licensee or what l
ng?
You've got interaction, the utility.
ever, that whole 21 22
(
You then have our Center back
- th 23 you've got our Center, you've got the C e Regional Office, ommission, you know,,
24 other --
25 O
000104 i
u
'h 18
=
...j t
i
- i i
l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You have the State.
hl 1
2 lj COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
--the State.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And in fact you've got --
-l 1And this time. doesn't really start when the accident starteh.:
4 5
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, --
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Some of those started in fact 7
sooner.-
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- yes. And, you know, others.
9 So--
You know, compared to this Apollo accident or Browns 10 Ferry, you know, COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Certainly compared to Browns 11 12 Ferry.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: -- this is a enormously complex 13 enterprise.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Much more complex.
5 OMSSIONER KNDY:
H any W ng, it is lhe de 16 Apollo.
It is not like Browns Ferry.
p COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Right.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Except that Apollo was over g
instantly.
~It didn't involve Headquarters.
MR. SNYDER:
It didn't impact the public.
They didn't 21 evacuate the Kennedy launch pad.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yeah.
23 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
This was more like a --
24 O
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
They tracked the causes back to a 25 lot of places.
000105 I
19 I
i 1 h*
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
-- more like a dam failure.
e 2 I CCPMISSICNER GILINSIC(: As you may have to do here, too 3
GAIBMhN HENDRIE: But the incident itself was very y=. ' '
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It was discrete.
i 5
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That's right.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It was only about this big, as a 7
matter of fact.
8 02MISSlDEER GIIJNSKY: 'Ihat's right. It was just dbuble file.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: And in a very short time.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I know the lawyers handled the 11 lawsuit but I don't know who did the investigation.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now some of this is available 13 in the sense that it's not going to get lost in that all the 14 Phone calls to the Response Center were taped, and so on.
The part that is most likely to get lost are th'e 15 memories of people I suppose up there when it happened.
16 MR. SNYDER:
That's exactly what I&E is attempting not 17 1 se, as understand it.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, any large. number of 9
Participants during that time, whether it was at the reactor or 20 in the Operations Center or anybody.
It's memory, non-record'ed memory that will tend to slip away or adjust.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could put this in a Commerce Business Daily.
24 CHAIRMAN.HENDRIE:
Wanted a board?.
- m. CU MINGS: 'Ihe thing that doesn't change there are the
~
1 000108 m
s 3
=
20 i
i
,m 1
fa' cts.
Whatever has happened and whatever transcripts there i!
l{are, they're still there, you know.
2 3
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yeah, but some of these -- - '
~
4 MR. CUMMINGS:
And if this fact-finding function is T' 5
.to make sure -- their only job is to make sure they get all.of.
6 that, and maybe take them out of certain conclusions and recom-7 mendations areas., to make conclusions and recommendations with 8
respect to what happened to the reactor.
They'll make con-g clusions and recommendations as to how I&E responded, or what-10 have-you.
11 But as to other aspects they will not; they will simply gather facts.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I'm a little uneasy about just 13 gl leaving I&E, for example, to go do their thing and NRR do their I
I thing.
It almost sounds as though we are treating it as a minor g
-- important but not that significant event.
l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I didn't mean that at all.
You know, let's do the parts that we know are going to 1
18 have to get done anyway, can be done by the NRC, and let's get l
that started as soon as possible.
There are other parts, of course, the answer is less 21 l
simple.
22 l
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But a lot of those parts that l
23 you have-- Certainly, before you hit the State, they arecall 24 parts that can be done by the NIC. And any cne of those four are a variety
\\.s 25 l
\\
O f} f) 1 A
- l
?
l r
21 l
l O
- 1. (of' other sets.
9 1
2 i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I guess I'm not sure.
l l
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I just think that it might bel 4
too large a task for what -- for our --
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, you're in effec't askingl~
6 some staff group to, putting the terms together, get information 7
on the activities of.their bosses.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yep.
That's right.
And that's
~
9 why--
It's under tha. auspices of someone who is clearly not l'
their bosses.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, that's the point.
l yy
~ " '
12 full-time government employees.
They can be outsiders.
13 3l CMESSICNER GILINSKY: No, no, but the questicn is who is going i
l to run that.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's right.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
They start coming against--
OCMISSIOtER AHEAINE: But you're right. And no matter-I think l
abnost any pison of this prnhlam that gets looked at, they're going to be
.l 19 rimning up===4nat the questian of c:=4ning in sczne way actists of their.
20 e
l bosnes, whether it is lack of cxmtrol over the 14-=4ng process or lack of 21 ocntrol over the inW process or faulty interacticms with the l
22 l
Operational Center or any of those things.
To an extent, those l
23 threads are throughout it all.
24 O
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Did you ever get through to any other body?
)
l CM4N(NER BRIUulv?:
The answer is almost certainly not.
m.
00ninc
22 i
.i 1
I 2
(Laughter. )
t iO V
l I don 't remember talki 3
ng to (Laughter. )
anyone.
No.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
~
5 slipping away. I about memory.
You see 6
It'sth COMISSIONER BRADEURD:
7 1 hat's right.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What did he say?
8 our expense, is I believe they're maki g
'the table.
what they're doing down th ng merry at ere 10 at that end of COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
11 the comment that memory does tI was just pointing out 12 end to about COMMISSIONER BRADFORD slip away.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I haven ' t heard that 14 CCPMISSICNER RENNEDY:
You had another version I have
'; though.
15 MR. BICKWIT:
still a different version We have 16 0
- 0"**
another version.
- U'0***
COMMISSIOSER AHI*AR'IF:
government but a majoritysultants, that they would b I'm 22 e full-time majority of them would be of them, whatever the numb 23 agencies of the government relatively senior er is, the 24 officials of other CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
, outside this agency.
25 Are you looking dom cne of th ose channels?
z ODD 109
23 l
t
_l' COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The third from the left.
2 I'm assuming it could use consultants.
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yeah:
with the FAC, the pro-4 visions apply only to the board itself.
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Let's say it's a five man 6
board.
At least 3 of them would be outside, and one of them 7
would be Chairman.
They would be outside this agency --
8 senior government officials outside this agency.
Hopefully,
.9 therefore to get over some of this problem about who's ---
10 concerning his boss.
Secondly, -- well, it would go through l'1 this whole panoply of activity.
It would divide it up into 12 task forces, most of the work being done by NRC people, but 13 there could be consultants involved, or even panel members, 14 from time to time, directly involved.
The am=n1= tion of the data and information has got to be done by a lo~t of people,'
15 16 and a board can't do that.
So, most of the work.would be 17 done by NRC people under the direction of this outfit.
18 l
19 (Continued on next page) 20 l
21 22 23 24 25 000110
i 24 I
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i
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)
(
)
I
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1 j!
Now it would go ahead and do its fact-finding and it would wrap up a whole report reaching conclusions and recom-2 mendations which, on the basis of what it sees and what it has.
3 d ne, w uld, at least, make sense.
4 Now you have another board.
Now you have John's 5
sort of group of stars or something, whatever, to take the 6
report that this outfit did and all the data it developed 7
and go through all of that, consider the recommendations and 8
so on, in a s.ense do an audit of it, and -- draw up a completely g
different kind of report because these guys should have been 0
focusing on a bunch of rather specific things, do a different kind of report which would assess what it sees and what this r.eport and..the work of these people means in terms of implica-tions for the licensing process, implications for design and therefore licensing requirements, and implications for in-15 spection services, and implications for organization of the 16 Commission.and the organization of the Commission in its rela-17 tionship to other government agencies.
18 That's the way I view it.
19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But then we have to take that 20 report and decide what to do with it.
21 CDlHISSICNER KENNEDY: Sure, but we have to do that anyway.
22 CCMESSICEER BPADECRD:
Right. So that's really a three-step -
23 CDtEISSICNER.KENNEDr:::Sure Now as to the. big.questicnse thIat 24
)
25 000111 I
25 I
Db24 would be done by somebody who would in fact have this view 2
of external participation, direct participation.
3 I Now I would also use--
As to that inside first d
fact-finding and conclusion and recommendation package, I would 5
also use the idea that you could have observers, official 6
observers, who would be associated with other fact-finding and 7
other review panels.
8 If they felt that in some way the fact-finding 9
enterprise was not being conducted effectively or completely, i
10 1 it would be well to know that and they would make that known.
I AndthenthePresidentialCommissiongoe!
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFOSD:
s 12 its own way, apart from all this and feeds back in at the end?
13 COMMISSIONER KENNEEE:ThePresidential Commission would have avail;-
14 I
able to it anything and everything that we do, from the day it l 15 begins work.
Anything it wants, it gets.
16
,,,ve got to do--It seems to me, whatever the f
17 Congreasional Commission does or whatever the Congress desires 18 to do, we ultimately have an obligation to do all that ourselves
~
19 I
anyway in terms of our own self-examination.
We cannot rely 20 on somebody else in the sense they'd be doing it for us.
I 7I Somebody else can do a lot nore of it if they want to, or ar*a%.
22 can criticize what we've done or add to what we've got, but 23 they can't -- we can't do less than a full panoply of review 1
24 of our own activity.
25 0000ESSICNER BRADEORD: I still cling to this notion of keeping it singler by one i
n n neuta-
a 26 Db25 1
layer.- I woul'd like to make an effort, together with the 2
O Presidential Review Commission, to agree on a fact-finding 3
framework that both we and they could use to prepare one record 4
of what happened, fix chronology basically, and conceivably 5
aven work out an arrangement'whereby we would include on that 6
board some members whom they would suggest, or at.least 7
fill certain categories that they suggested.
8 Then we would take that record and draw from it 9
whatever conclusions we felt.we needed in terms of licensing.,
l 10 I l
inspection and operation.
They would take it--
And I suppose l I
II also for our purposes, recommended legislation.
[
12 Then they would take it as a basis for whatever l
~
13 conclusions they thought were necessary within the scope of Id their charter.
l 15 And that would really only involve one investigationi 16 and two reviews, plus of course whatever the Congress did with 17 the outcome.
,1 18 I think that's at least worth a try..
It may turn 1
19 out that in talking with the President's people we can't agree !
20 on what has to be done and we'll just have to go separate ways.!
l 21 But I don't--
Because there is going to be a Presidential 1
22 review which is going to try and extract from this chain of 23 events all the policy significance anyway, I don'.t see too 24 much appeal to another level of review between the Commission
, e nemenm. iac.
j 25 and the fact-finding board.
l
--m O O O 'l I '2
gy ab26 I
The' significance of this eventis obviously so great, 2
for what we'll be doing over the next two or three years, p'd 3l thatitdoesn't'Jeemtometobeabadidhasimplytohavethe 4
Commission come to grips with the fset-finding group's recom-5 mendations right away, without running them through someone 6
else to --
7 (Simultaneous discussion.)
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You said recommendations?
8 CDtWISGICNER BRADEORD: I didn't mean recommendations; I'm sorry.
9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:I see.
10 !
CDMESSICNER BRADECED: Recommended body of fact.
I wouldn't mind l
Il them giving recommendations.
It's just I gather it can't be 12 done without getting into the Advisory Committee..--
13 CDMESSICNER AHEARNE: Right.
I4 CDlWISSICEER BRADEORD:- problem.
15 (IMESSICNER KENNEIE: Well,'that depends on what kind of a board l
16 it is.
t 17 (IMESSIONER BRADEORD: Now it may be that we don't lose so much l.
18 by being within the Advisory Committee framework but --
l i
U (IXEISSICtER AHEARNE:
For me, the critical question would be 20 whether or not we can try to get an acceptable levei of fact-l 21 l finding -- level of acceptance that it would at least hold the l I
22 other reviews that are going to be occurring, hold them back 23 until they saw what our fact-finding led to.
C(
2d I don ' t-I'm not saying that I think that it would al Reporters. Inc, j
D necessarily then be the only set of facts developed.
But if I !
0 0 () *1 f a
28 cb27 I
felt that we could do that, then I would definitely opt for 2
p trying to have the fact-finding with the outside because I 3{
think that would be the only way of getting that kind of ac-4 ceptance.
5 On the other hand if I concluded that no matter.what 6
we did, that the Presidential Review Commission was going to 7
come in and develop its own body of fact, and if the Congress 8
were going to set up one or two committees to develop their 9
own body of facts, then I probably would definitely opt for l
10 I over on the right-hand side because tnat's a more--
We can tune it up quicker and it will go faster.
f 12 I would definitely,though like to try for the single 13 fact-finding.
I think it has a lot of advantages.
And.I think that all of us and everybody else would be better serve?..
l I4 15 CDl411SSICNER BRADEORD: I guess that involves getting in touch 16 fairly quickly with--
I7 CDMLESSICNER KENNEDY:
I don't see how that--
I don't see how that t
18 though,isnecessarilyimprovedbytheso-calledoutsidegroup.l It depends entirely upon what you're talking about as facts.
20 CQtEISSICNER BRADEORD: For me, you gain two things --
l 2I COENISSIONER EENNEDY: What?
22 CDBMISSICNER BRADEORD: -- from the outside group.
One is that I I
23 don't think we can hope to get the Presidential Commission to l
C's
\\j 24 l accept an entirely inside -- a factual record developed that
_ o neoorwn. inc. ;
25 I way.
l 000lis
29 d328 I
The other is even --
2 (ItNISSICHER IGNNEITI: You mean -- they would not accept as V
3l facts or as an adequate representation of facts the record 4
prepared by senior federal officials, the bulk of whom -- the 5
majority of whom were not even members of this agency.
That's-6 we got to be sure what we're saying here because I think that says-7 smething pretty bad about federal offiHalm -
8 COMISSImER BRADEURD: Well, remember --
9 COMISSIONER KENNEDY: -- or the way they're seeing, which I don't 10 happen to agree with.
l II If I agreed with that,I think I would have to feel 12 that-I think I would have to join a lot of people in re-13 signing, because I couldn't believe that that's true.
I Id Nm NRD. Just this, Dick.
Remember that--
15 CDMISSICNER-KENNEDY: I have a high regard for the integrity of 16 federal servants.
t I7 CDMISSICNER AHEARNE: So do I,. Richard. That's not the 18 issue.
l9 COMISSICNER KENNEDY: Then I think, by God, it's time that we 20 stopped going around pretending that we don't.
I 2I COMISSICNER AHEARNE:
I never pretended that I don't.
l 22 GAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Wel2., the Presidential Commission--
23 let me -
l 24 CDM ISSIN ER KENNEDY: You' re just saying that the reason you can' t '
J Reco,te,s, Inc.
25 do this is because people won't accept it.
000116 l
s
30 b29 I
CHAIRMAN HCORIE:
Let me suggest that the Presidential--
2 CDtt!ISSICNER AHEABNE: It's a separate question. I'm sorry, v
3 remr.
I i
I 4
(Laughter.)
i l
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Can we say--
Look, it may be, and it wouldn't l
6 surprise me at all if the Presidential Commission would feel 7
that in order to accept a record which, while they might have 8
strong influence on, you know, where it went and who was -
9 and even some discussion on who was on the board, I can very l
10 I well see that they might feel unable to accept a record which II l
wasn't developed in a procedural framework'that would be a l
quite open - sort of F%1 Advisory Camittee sort of context, l'
12 t
13 and not with any implication that they didn't trust anybody, l
6 l
I4 but just the nature of their charter and mandate and composi-f 15 tion and so on made it necessary that everything they 16 operated with be developed in that framework.
I7 So,I think you could find yourself, even if you got 18 agreement that yes, it makes sense to do a single -- have a l9 I single group doing fact-finding --
20 COMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Well, there is no way to find this out--
21 CHAIPMAN HENDRIE:
- that you'd be over on the right side with!
22 a mixed group.
l l
COEISSIONER KE@EDY:
There is no way to find this out until the 23 24 Commission itself is formed, because it isn't going to make any L.d R
,Inc.,
25 l difference what the-- I,. if anybody was going to 0001I7
31 se t
i ob30 1
appoint me as chairman of the Commission,'I darn well would noti 2
expect them to tell me what kind of a record I would accept.
O=
3l l
I would tell them.
I I
4 And so until he gets there and he decides i
l 5
how he -- he and his Commission, decide how they wish to pro-l 6
ceed, I guess there is no way to get that answer.
i 7
CI2EESSI0tE:R BEUNORD: Well, it would be at least hard to get it l
I 8
definitively.
l 9
CCM4ISSIOER IGNE:DY:
I don' t-let me just say that whatever I got,--
10 I I would consider in the interests of hearsay, but nothing 11 more-.
12 QiAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We might get some indication what the thoughts l
13 are from the group over there that's going to try to.think I
l I
t 14 about it.
But I think you're -
15 C3HESSINER KENNEDY:
But, you'll recall, it's an independent Commission.
l 16 OIAIRMAN IENDRIE:
But I think you're right, I think they will 17 not find it possible to commit on behalf of an as yet unnamed 18 Presidential board.
19 00mISSINER AHEARNE: So where do you think that leaves us, Joe?
20 CDMISSICNER BRADEORD: Maybe I should go back to the telephone.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It leaves me with a strong feeling that I'd 22 like to talk to some people, to Watscm, maybe scam people on the Hill.
i 23 CDMISSIONER AHEARNE: Why don't you at least, though, in the
~
24 interim,have someone, maybe it's Bernie and 02:,. draw up two j
L _.o nee==. inc. ;
25 ]
separate -- a couple of separate charters, just drafts --
}
j Q00nR
32 i
i eb31 I
GAIRW HENDRIE: Oh, I think it would be a useful exercise.
I 2
I think it's bound to contribute to --
f3
\\
C/
3l' i
CCMESSICNER AHEARNE: Because we've got to begin getting more 4
focused on'--
1 i
I 5
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Youalreadyhaveanumberofthingsinyour; 6
layout, you know, what ought we to look at, your various 7
categories of things.
And so I might get hold of that.
i i
8 I'd be glad to have thoughts from people.
I just
{
9 have that feeling that we ought to talk to some more people and, 10 I understand what some of the other views are in important places II and as I say, it seems to me --
12 (End Tape 1, Unit 1. )
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1
21 22 23 24 i AC
,Inc.l
~
25 i
I 00011G
- ---- i
Unit 2
!j 33
.. i.
g 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I'd kind of like to.have some 2 i feeling where at least the authorization oversight chairmen 3
you know, what their sense of where it ought to go is, i
4 as well as the Commission staffing operation.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In this exploration, 6'
at least I'd urge whoever is doing the exploring to address lI this, whether it would be feasible, and' taking 7
11 8 !!
Dick's point into account, still whether they'think 9
it would be feasible to have this single fact finding.
I 10 I think we ought to try to get an answer to that 11 li relatively rapidly, and, if it isn' t then we --
j 12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yeah.
While Dick is 13 rig $t, that if they say yes it won't necessarily tell 14 l us it will happen, I suppose i
15 16 17 t
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I
1 000120
34
.-s wb 1
we can take it if they say no we can also plan that it won't.
2 So that is useful --
3 CHAIRMANIEORfE:
That's one'of those situations where vou 4
don't have to have complete information, you can have some 4
5 information.
6 COtEISSfCNER BRAMORD: I don't think the thinking is too far 7
advanced.
The one or two people that I have talked to in 8
the other agencies who migh be involved-9 CHAIPMAN IDRIDRIE:, Yes, I have that impression, too.
10 You have the feeling that it's got just about far enough to 11 create these words, and not much beyond that.
12 Well, shall we ask for OPE and OGC, and e
13 I guess Jim Cummings ought to join that venture to try to --
14 0;FMISSIONER BRAM ORD: Yes.
15 CDLEISSIONEli AHEARNE: When?
16 MR. BICENIT:
Just charters'.
l 17 COMISSICNER AHEARNE: Yes.
When?
18 GAIRMAN IEGIE':
i Try some framing of charters, here's what 19 it ought to look like, a series of things.
~
20 cnMgrssIcNER AHEARNE: Monday.
r l
21 MR. SNEDER:
And you want charters, as I understand it, l
22 for the separate fact finding, separate conclusions and recom-23 nandatione approach, as well as the combination of those two.
24 CHAIINAN HENDRIE:
Yes, I would guess so.
And if, indeed, one si R Inc.
25 eventually ended up being able to work with the presidential 000l91
35
_~
~ :. '
'wb 1
~ commission to have a single fact finding thing, I would suspect 2
that they would want to be able to suggest modifications or O
3 additions to the charter, perhaps.
But in particular, 4
the fact finding charter is -
5 MR. BICEWIT:
Pursue that first, I think.
6 GAIRMAN HEIRIE:
..is a fairiy important thing.
7 MR. CUMINGS:
Will you consider a fact finding charter 8
that d6&s not lead to the fact finders making conclusions and 9
recommendations?
10 COMISSINER AHEARE:
I would certainly like that considered.
MR. SNYDER:
That was my question.
12 CDWISSIONER AHEARNE: I think both versions - there is one set which-13 MR. CumINGS: -that would eliminate some of the objections 14 that you had and Dick had on whds investiaating whom.
15 CC1HISSIONER AHEARNE:
Not really, Jim.
When you start digging 16 down into the facts,to just lay out the chronology,you have to 17 start asking people who are--
18
~
You end up addressing the bosses and the 19 bosses' bosses.
What did they do?
20 Even if you don't draw any conclusions, 21 just putting down what was done.
22 Cn HISSIONER KENNEDY: Some of us have experience in that; den't 23 we, Jim?
24 MR. FITZGERAID:
Yes, sir.
si it isc 25 (Laughter) 000122-
36
~
wb5 1
MR. FITZERAID:
It's known as instant job security.
2 (Laughter)
~
3 MR. CUMMINGS:
Don't knock the SES.
4 (Laughter) 5 CCMISSICNER AHEABNE: And I guess at some point probably we'11 6
have t'o consider waivers of immunity and those issues.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.
Yeah.
8 CCMISSICNER KENNEDY:
You know, that's something else.
Itseems 9
to me--
10 CCMISSICNER AHEABNE:
Or granting immunity.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yeah.
12 CCMISSICNER KENNEDY:
It.seems to me there's sort of a philosophy 13 about all this that ought to be thought about, too.
14 This could start out as a sort of psuedo criminal 15 investigation, which would be very interesting and maybe 16 even useful.
l 17 But if in fact, or if the pureose of the exercise i
18 is (a) to find oitt what really went wrong with this machine 19 and what that means for the technolocy that it reeresents, 20 on the assumption that that technologv exists and oerhaps will 21 continue to, and,how that can be prevented from occurring 22 again, and what steps, therefore, in the licensing process and 23 in the review process,and in design, design recuirements,that 24 would be laid on in the licensing context, and what inspection al R lac.
~
25 techniques and steps need to be improved, and what operating 000I9R
37
~
~ wb6 1
techniques and systems need to be improved That ain't likely 2
to develop out of a psuedo criminal investigation.
We should O'
'~
~
'~~~
3 not forget that 4
COEISSICNER NEARE:
What do you mean by "psuedo criminal f
5 investigation?"
6 COMISSIOER KENNEDY:
If the aim is to " assess blame," -
i 7
COMISSIOER AEEARE:
Oh.
8 CONISSICNER KENNEDY:
--you aren't ever going to get to all 9
these other things.
10 CI2EISSIOER AHEABNE:
That's richt.
II CONISSIONER KENNEDY:
That's the problem.
12 COEISSIONER AHEARNE:
And that's why I raised--
13 COMISSICNER KENNEDY:
Because nobody is going to help you with 14 those things; they're going to be all running around protect-15 ing their tails.
16 COMISSICNER AHEARNE:
Right, Dick.
And that's why I raised the 17 question that at some stage we ought to consider whether or 18 not to grant imm$tnity, because then you have the best opper-19 tunity of really addressing what happened, as opoosed to 20 raising that other spectre.
21 CONISSIOER KENNEDY: Well, let me just make a point there.
22 I guess I would appreciate it if counsel could 23 think aboutthat question, because all the grants of immunity i
24 in the world on our part might not do very much for the cuy.
si R fnc.
25 COMISSIONER AHEARNE: Oh, that's certainly true.
000124
i 38
'wb7 1
CM4ISSICNER AIORE: :They be'gan to' address it a little bit in pointing out that--
~
2 O'
3 MR. CtM4Db:
You don't have the Tower.
4 CDfdISSICNER AHEAME:
--you have to go to the Justice' Department 5
of the State of Pennsylvania.
6 CDMISSICNER KENNEDY:
Yes, that--
7 (Simultaneous discussion) 8 CHAIPMAN HENDRIE:.
That's what I meant when I.said I didn't 9
understand, that I wasn't cuite sure what our power was and 10 whether--
11 COMISSICNER AHEARNE: Oh, no, no, I didn't say we would neces.-
12 arily uniquely have the power.
13 It's just an issue we ought to have 14 thought through.
15 CDMISSIONER KFNNEDY: What I'm saying is we need to be facing 16 in some direction as we undertake this thing.
What is the 17 exercise for, you know.
And it's the kind of an exercise 18 which I think some of us have been through many times on 19 the grounds that, you know, events occur and every time an 20 event occurs in your business you ought to learn something 21 from it, so that however it is you're doing your business, 22 and whatever it is you are doing, you do it that much betterr l_
23 which is the name of the game.
Or you maybe conclude that 1
, 24 it's something you can't do any better and therefore the 21 inc.
25 question is whether you ought to do it at all.
~
000125
39 wb8 1
But that's the purpose of the exercise.
That's 2
what you learn.
If you start out in a different mode you O3 i
never get there.
4 COMISSICNER AHEARE:
That's why when I characterized it as 5
fact finding and I listed the chronology of the accident 6
and the chronology of the response and the interactions and 7
the previous inspection history in B&W plants, what I was 8
trying to address is what happened, why.
Not who is to blame 9
for anything.
10 Because, as you say, what we have to do is to try II to make sure we develop all of that so we can draw our own 12 conclusions as to what ought to be done.
13 MR. CtMmG3:
It's basically the approach of the 14 National Safety Transportation Board.
We don't care who's 15 at fault, we're more interested in findina out why this 16 plant died.
17 CCMISSICNER KENNEDY:
Yes.
18 And the same thing in the NASA experience, 19 the Apollo finding, that one can't recover from the event, 20 one can only find out what caused it so that it can never 21 happen again if that's humanly possible.
22 Speaking of that, they ought to have a 23 fascinating time with that airplane I was reading about in 24 the paper this morning.
- d inc.
25 Did you read about that?
00012a
i, 40 a
I
~CCMISSICNER BRATORD:
'There are certain similarities.
wb9 2
CCMISSICNER KENNEDY: A 727 was flying along with eighty pass-m 3
engers--
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The one that did the barrel roll?
5 COBEISSICEER KENNEDY: Yes.
Barrel roll.
Supersonic.
And 6
landed.
7 CDLEISSICNER AHEARNE: And drove the landing wheel up into the 8
wing.
9 CCMISSICNER KENNEDY:
Huh?
10 C][HISSICNER AHEARNE:
And drove the landing wheel up into the II
- ~
wing.
I2 CCMISSICNER BRADEURD:
I think to the extent different technologies 13 can give you parallel events there can be a lot of similari-I#
ties.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.
I take it that wasn't just pilot exuber-16 ance.
17 CIMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No.
As a matter of fact it is interesting l
18 to note that they said that there is no such event, the airplane l9 wasn't designed:.to fly at a speed like that at an altitude 20 like that, and it was presumed that it couldn't, that in 21 fact it would come apart.
22 COEISSICNER AHEARNE:
I doubt if the 727 was designed for 23 barrel rolls.
24 COLEISSICNER KENNEDY:
Well it wasn't.
They assumed it would M
Inc.
25 come apart, that it would just never happen.
And therefore evavauurt-
r 41 o
wb10 1
there'was no - nothing.
~
2 CCMiISSICNER AHEARE: Boeing buil,ds them tough.
0' 3
COMISSICNER KEMEDY:
Therefore there was nothing that was in the 4
book about h'ow to recover from that.
The pilot d5d it all by
~
5 himself.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That's going to be B&W's motto.
7 (Simultaneous discussion) 8 caggssicugg Aggnpse.
Where do we go from 51ere, Joe?
9 CHAIREN HENDRIE:
.For myself, I don't feel confident enough 10 that a Commission decision on any of these channels -- you 11 know, the forward action, the announcement, and so on--
12 CCM(ISSICNER AHEARNE:
--is anpropriate.
I agree.
13 CEATRMAN HENDRIE:
I just feel it's all too murky out there 14 to understand whether--
15 CDMISSICNER AHEARNE:
These guys are going to be looking for 16 some options.
17 I think we ought to try some charter m m.
18 language for the fact finding charter, the conclusions and 19 recommendations, and whether you perceive any kind of varia-l 20 tion between fact finding that might be done by, I don't 21 know, a broader based group of people, mostly outside senior 22 people, their points of view versus the other one, why, 23 develop that difference.
Thereemay not be a difference.
24 But do that,and it's available then as draft material.
ofR Inc.
25 And it seems to me that I ought to trv to call 00012li
~
wbil 42 t
~
1 l3, Jack Watson, and also see if 2
Call anybody you know who's....
!i 3 ii 00lHISSIOER AHEARNE: The only thing, when you talk to Ted 4
it's not obvious,that he'll be the action office.
5 [
CHAIBMAN IGNDRIE:
I've got the feeling I'd like to touch ll 6' P base in sczne way down cri the Hill.
(Pause) I don't know whether-there l
7 are any well dev=1% thoughts down there or not, but -
8 CGEISSICNER ?RAEURD: We can check.
i.
9 OIAIBMAN IENDRIE: Well, let me try to call Watson, you 10 call whoever you were trying to call and couldn't get through 11 to, and anybody call anybody that's -
12,
I'll make scxna. effort to see the - to get through to the l'.I 13 i' great chiefs down there, and the Ocamissioners can ccmuunicate i.
14 as they have the u m Lanity.
15 i Probably sczne time Mcxxlay af++E-x6, -=Gdng like 16 that?
17 I've got a hearing Tuesday, and I'm afraid a piece of i
j Monday has to go --
18 CCBMISSICNER REEARNE: Yeah.
I 19 03EISSICNER BRACEURD: Carl asked me and I said I'd do whict=va 20 they preferred.
21 CCBSESSICMER AHEARNE: I thought Carl had iMimted that he 22 thought they preferred all of us.
23 OtBeESSICNER BRAMORD: Preferred what?
Il 24 i:
CIBMISSICNER KEtEEDY: 21at was my lage-ssion.
i, 25 COBSESSICMER AHEARNE: That they would prefer all of us.
f I
000.12S l
[
43 wbl2 1
~
'I would do whatever you Isreferred.
CQ HISSI W ER KENNEDY:
2 CDNISSICNER AHEARNE: I guess it doesn't have to be decided right
,C) v 3
now anyway.
4 CHAMM HENDRIE:
Yeah, I don't think we have to decide.
5 I tl. ink generally the oversight Chairman would like to see 6
the Commissioners, build up the witness table.
i 7
(Laughter) 8 Maybe we could draw straws to see who 9
gets to be the operations officerg.or the duty officer, while 10 all the rest have to go on.
II MR. SNYDER:
I have a question.
12 In drawing up the charter, in my own mind at least 13 I. separate that~from the scope of the job itself, you know, 14 what that group is going to rmrsue, in some detail, as far as 15 a list of areas.
16 Do you want us to consider that also?
17 CQHISSICNER AHEARNE: I think it has to, to some extent.
I'm 18 not sure how could--
19 MR. SNYDER:
You have to cut it at some level.
20 COLHISSICNER AHEARNE: Yes, but you need enough of that so that 21 one can get a sense, if you were to try to use that to 22 explain to people, either people to come onto it or else 23 other people, what it is, 9rters, Inc.
24 CDMISSICNER BRADETED: Bernie, what did the AEC do kith Fermi I?
alR 25 MR. SNYDER:
With what?
0 0 0 1 R G
44 t
d
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~
COf!ISSICE BRATORD: With Fermi I?
2 MR. SNYER:
That was their problem.
To my knowledge
\\
3 there were no offsite releases above tech specs.
It was 4
pretty much the utility's problem.
5 My recollection is Detroit Edison did their mm 6
investigation.' John Fuller did his own investigation 7
(Sinultaneous discussion) 8 MR. SNYDER.
I' don't recall anything being done, at 9
leant on the Reactor Development side.
I don't know what 10 the Bethesda people did.
I wasn't working on the regulatory side.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, it was a licensed machine.
It i
l 12 wasn't an AEC machine, so that the Licensing side, or 13 whatever was the Licensing side in those. days had to do i
14 something or other.
15 I expect they made some kind of an investigation 16 may be to bring out wha ~t the licensee found.
17 I can check that.
MR. SNYDER.
18 NSICNER BRATORD If there is a report I guess I'd like to 19 see it.
20 MR. SNYDER:
Yes, there is a report written by the 21 utility, I'm sure.
PRDC, who was the designer, wrote the 22 report, as I recall, Power Reactor Development Company, 23 or Corporation.
y 24 CNER BPM.We could leave this to Metropolitan Edison il Inc.
25 for a little while.
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f 45 s
2 tbl4 1
(Simultaneous discussion) 2 cmHELE EMDRIE.
Why don't we quit, then, for this (D
\\J 3
afternoon?
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^
The attached transcripts and those which have been released
(,/
previously have been prepared directly from tape recordings of meetings of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the course of the recent accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility.
That accident and related matters were discussed.
The emergency nature of the situation at Three Mile Island led the Commission to meet frequently with little advance notice to its staff and often in locations other than where its meetings are normally held.
As is the case with all closed Commission meetings (except wholly adjudicatory sessions) the meetings were recorded, and transcripts have been prepared in accordance with the Govern-ment in the Sunshine Act.
In accordance with Commission practice, the transcripts have been, and will continue to be, released to the public as promptly as practicable.
The conditions under which the meetings were recorded made the keeping of complete and high quality recordings: impos-sible and, as a result, it has been a difficult tasic to prepare transcripts.
In accordance with normal Commission policy, moreover, the transcripts have not been edited for possible inaccuracies in the discussion.
Accordingly, it should be understood that these transcripts are incomplete, may contain errors, and do not represent formal or official Commission statements on the matters discussed therein.
2 O
These meetings were closed for one or more of the following reasons: to protect the rights of individuals or corpora-tions who are discussed in connection with the possible imposition of sanctions (Subsection (c)(5) of the Sunshine Act), to protect the rights of an individual not to have his privacy invaded in an unwarranted fashion (Subsection (c)
(6)), to allow the Commission to discuss possible actions that would be significantly frustrated if prematurely dis-cussed in public (Subsection (c) (9) (B)), and to permit the Commission to discuss in private the possible initiation of adjudicatory proceedings (Subsection (c) (10)).
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