ML20204J571
| ML20204J571 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1988 |
| From: | Pellet J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204J555 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-OL88-04, 50-285-OL88-4, NUDOCS 8810250180 | |
| Download: ML20204J571 (4) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV NRC Optrator Licensing Exam Report: 50-285/0L88-04 Operating License: DPR-40 Docket:
50-285 Licensee: Omaha rubile Power District (OPPD)
Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)
Examination at:
Combustion Engineering (CE), Windsor, Connecticut Examination Conducted: Week of May 31, 1988 Chief Examiner:
W IO I
J.'L.
Pellet, Chief Date Operator Licensing Section Division of Reactor Safety i
i Approved:
O lo J. L. Pellet Chief Date Operator Li:ensing Section Division of Reactor Safety I
Inspection Sumary 4
t NRC Administered Examinations Conducted During The Week of May 31, 1988 (Report 50-285/0L88-04) i NRC administered simulator requalification examinations to two crews consisting of two reactor operators and six senior rea*. tor operators. All examinees and crews passed these examinations.
i 0810250100 881020 PDR ADOCK 05000205 V
PNV
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2 DETAILS l
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Persons Examined f
CREW SRO
_R_0 TOTAL 0
Requalification Examinations:
Pass -
2 6
2 8
Fail -
0 0
0 0
f 2.
Examiners J. L. Pellet, Chief Examiner L
R. Cooley R. Eaton 3.
Examination Report Performance results for individual examinees are not included in this report as it will be placed in the NRC Public document Room and these 1
results are not subject to public disclosure.
a.
CE Visit Sumary l.
l During the week of May 31, 1988, NRC and FCS training personnel L
administered simulator examinations to the individuals and crews agreed upon, to conclude the NRC administered 1988 requalification examinations.
The following personnel were present during the week, at least part-time, not including the crews examined:
}
N_R C,,
OPPD l
J. Jaudon 1 Gasper J. Pellet G. Gu11ani (CE)
R. Cooley E. Kirkland (CE)
R. Eaton J. Nielsen D. Mamoran J. Tesarek It was agreed that the nonplant reference simulator was a valid tool for evaluating time critical team dependent crew performance l
even with the limitations on control manipulation due to differences between FCS and the CE simulator.
The only critical performance error observed involved one crew improperly transitioning to an uncomplicated reactor trip after a loss of forced circulation.
FCS and NRC evaluators agreed that three factors other than licensed operator knowledge or ability contributed to this error:
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E0P-01, "Reactor Trip," Step 3.8 required that forced circulation be verified, but does not specifically note that lack of forced circulation requires entry into E0P-02, "Electrical emergency," for a loss of RCP's due to CCW problems.
2.
The STA incorrectly reported that all reactor trip recovery safety functions had met their acceptance criteria whereas the core heat removal acceptance criteria, Safety Function 5 on page 27 of E0P-01, was not met.
3.
FCS had at least two procedures capable of controlling a natural circulation cooldown (E0P-02 and 01-RC-11), but use of the E0P was required for the event in progress.
Even though proper E0P transition was preidentified as a critical step, that is are whose failure to successfully perform would constitute grounds for fi.ilure of a crew or individual, it was not determined to require failure during the scentrio.
The error was mitigated by the crew urderstanding that a natural circulation cooldown was in progrest., and perfoming the actions required.
The contributing weaknesses described above do r.ot mitigate or excuse the performance problen.
The NRC and FCS evalua. ors independently identified this performance problem and its significance during the scenario, b.
July 14,19R8, Meeting Sumary On July 14, 1988, members of your staff and NRC met in the Region IV office to discuss the weaknesses identified in our March 28, 1988, letter to R. L. Andrews and improvements in the FCS licensed operator training program and lessons learned from the 1988 cycle.
The following personnel were present:
NRC OPPD J. Milhoan J. Gasper L. Callan
- J. Fluehr J. Pellet J. Tesarek T. Westennan
- Part-time The ODPD presentation was documented in our June 22, 1988, letter to you enclosing an attendance list and handouts.
In response to specific NRC questions, your staff responded:
1.
no quantitative analysis of the 1988 requalification results to determine perfomance or training weaknesses had been performed,
4 2.
marginal performers have not'been subjected to additional evaluation, 3.
training was.not formally consulted on crew composition or rotation.
4.
no analysis of the events used in evaluation scenarios, or sample plan to assure representative evaluation existed, and 5.
no comprehensive performance evaluation for licensed personnel, including training and operations input, exists.
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General Comnents The initial report on NRC administered 1988 FCS licensed operator j
requalification examinations (OL88-02), which was transmitted to l
R. L. Andrews on March 28, 1988, identified program weaknesses, i
That report requetted that OPPD analyze these weaknesses, and ths facility administered requalification examinations, to determine any I
lessons to be learned.
The July 14, 1988, meeting described above was intended to discuss l
the NRC and OPPD identified weaknesses and lessons learned, based not only on the areas identified in our March report, but on an assessment of the entire 1988 requalification process. As evident from the FCS response to NRC questions at that meeting, the OPPD presentation was basically reacting to NRC concerns identified in our March report. There was little indication that the overall results had been analyzed with respect to fundamental areas such as training effectiveness or crew and individual performance evaluation.
l This pattern of response indicates that the FCS licensed operator I
requaliff cation training program continues to be driven by l
NRC-identified problems and concerns, rather than comprehensive self-analysis. The weaknesses and concerns described in our report on the March examinations, and the lack of depth of analysis displayed i
l by your staff at the July 14. 1988, meeting indicate that OPPD has a continuing management weakness in this area.
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