ML20204J338

Forwards FEMA Final Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Rept, for 851203-04 Exercise & Evaluation of 860514 Remedial Drill.Immediate Action Requested Re Limitation of Primary Dedicated Hot Line Telephone Sys

ML20204J338
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	07/09/1986
From:	Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Kingsley O MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 8608110067
Download: ML20204J338 (4)

Text

-

4 JUL 09 Iggg Mississippi Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. O. D. Kingsley, Jr.

gf Vice President, Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 23054 Jackson, MS 39205 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA EXERCISE EVALUATION TEAM REPORT FOR THE DECEMBER 3, 1985, GRAND GULF EXERCISE Enclosed are copies of correspondence received from FEMA documenting their evaluation of the offsite emergency preparedness for the Grand Gulf exercise which was conducted on December 3-4, 1985, and the remedial drill conducted on May 14, 1986. Three deficiencies were identified as well as several improvement items.

According to FEMA correspondence dated May 28, 1986 (see enclosure, letter from R. D. Greer to B. Spell), most of the identified items were corrected during the offsite remedial drill.

However, we direct your attention to the remaining deficiency as identified on Page 18 of the FEMA Report:

Limitation of the primary dedicated hot line telephone system in the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center.

This matter is being brought to your attention for immediate action in assisting the State of Louisiana to correct this deficiency. We request that you provide to the NRC, documentation of corrective actions.

Based on our discussions with Mr. L. Dale of MP&L, it is our understanding that actions to be taken include:

1.

Installation of " call waiting" on the phone line to the Control Room as soon as possible, and 2.

Installation of reverse " ring down" capability for phone service from the State of Louisiana to Grand Gulf to supplement the current " ring down" capability from Grand Gulf to the State of Louisiana.

We also encourage you to work closely with the States and counties within the 10-mile EPZ in the development of a scenario for the next exercise that will test as many of the areas as practical in which the previously identified deficiencies were found.

i i

PDR f

i F

I I

2ZI/E3 5'

e We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely, Luis A. Reyes, Acting Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1.

Memorandum from R. W. Krimm to E. L. Jordan, dated May 1, 1986 with Attachment 2.

Letter from R. D. Greer to B. Spell, dated May 28, 1986 cc w/encls:

f.H.Cloninger,VicePresident, Nuclear Engineering and Support t#. E. Cross, GGNS Site Director W R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager f. F. Dale, Director, Nuclear Licensing and Safety tf. T. Lally, Manager of Quality Assurance Middle South Services, Inc.

7. B. McGehee, Esquire Wise, Carter, Child, Steen and Caraway t. S. Reynolds, Esquire N

Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell

& Reynolds pf W. Jackson, Project Engineer bec w/encls:

kNRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk State of Mississippi W. Matthews R. Trojanowski di%I RI&I RII E RIIW RII RII RII R

a.B.

p am AGooden TDecker DCollins

/ HDance DVerrelli JP lohr RTrojanowski 6/A7/86 '

6/p/86 6A1/86 f~J/(//86 j/ /86 f/j/86 f/p/86

^

Mc

e n

wr,mn e o

Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI Federal Center Denton, Texas 762013698 NTH May 23, 1986 f,}i I.h:.

ihi:,

Bill Spell, Administrator N N N [i I b i

i Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division J.

P.O. Box 14690 lU -

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70898 t

Dear Mr. Spell:

Based on the preliminary results of the Grand Gulf remedial drill conducted May 14,1986, and confirmed with you at the critique meeting on May 15, 1986, the identified deficiency concerning the State field monitoring teams, field team staging area, and EOF was corrected. This previous deficiency noted from the December 3-4,1985, REP exercise related to the lack of direction and control of the field monitoring teams.

Installation of a new two-way radio base station at the EOF for directing the field l

monitoring teams proved to be very effective in providing d'rection and control to the teams.

Therefore, this deficiency has been adequately corrected during the May 14, 1986, remedial drill.

Most areas requiring corrective actions identified in the December 3-4, 1985. Grand Gulf Final Exercise Report were corrected during the remedial drill. However, one of the two State field monitoring teams (team #2) failed to adequately demonstrate FEMA objectives #7 and #8. Description of these two FEMA objectives are as follows:

FEMA Objective #7 - Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.

FEMA Objective #8 - Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radio-iodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uC1/cc in the presence of noble gases.

As discussed with you in the critique meeting, it is r,equested that field team #2 redemonstrate objectives #7 and #8 either in a second remedial drill or during the up-coming scheduled REP exercise at Grand Gulf in December 1986.

l If the State chooses to retest field team #2 as part of the Grand Gulf full-scale exercise in December 1986, rather than a second remedial drill, FEMA suggests that all three field monitoring teams participate.

7 ur~a ~mg h CG OtM51FHMWLS@

'x1 7de n!N DWN WoMd Bill Spell, Administrator 2

, As soon as possible, we would like for you to advise us in writing when you plan to redemonstrate the two objectives relating to field team

1. 2. A draft report of the May 14, 1986, remedial drill will be forthcoming.

This draft addendum to the Final Grand Gulf Exercise Report will be sent to you for review and coment no later than June 14,1986, in order to meet the 30-day time frame requirement.

If you should have any questions, please~ contact Al Lookabaugh, Chief, Technological Hazards Branch.

Sincere,1y, f k Md-]

R. Dell Greer, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division cc: Gloria Joyner, FEMA-HQ 6 Gary Sanborn, NRC l

John Heard FEMA-RIV Gary Kaszynski, ANL 1

I

r j,#Mp k.sV Federal Emergency Management Agency it g

Washington, D.C. 20472 o

o e

FEFORANDUM FUR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S Nuclear latory Cannission FROM:

. Arimn Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards SUtkTECT:

Exercise Report of the December 3, 1985, Exercise of the Louisiana Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Attached are two copies of the exercise report of the December 3, 1985, full-participation exercise of the Louisiana radiological emergency pre-paredness plans site-specific to the Grarrl Gulf Nuclear Station. This exercise report was prepared by the Region VI staff of the Federal Emergency mnagement Agency (FE m).

There were three deficiencies identified as a result of this exercise which can be sumnarized as follows:

o limitations of the primary dedicated hot line telephone system in the State Emergency Operations Center; unsatisfactory direction and control of the field monitoring o

teams including connunication problems involving the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division; o unsatisfactory handling of contaminated individuals by the mdison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Services; There are several areas requiring corrective actions as well as areas recomnended for improvement.

A copy of this exercise report has been transmitted to the State of Louisiana and a schedule of corrective actions has been requested. The State of Louisiana j

has also been requested to conduct a remedial exercise prior to June 4,1986, to address the deficiencies identified above. A copy of the schedule of cor-rective actions and the results of the remedial exercise will be forwarded to l

you when they becane available.

l

-Qm 57~

~

a

r

-7.-

While there were impediments to protecting the public identified in the exercise, the approval of offsite radiological energency preparedness plans under FEMA rule 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect pending the results of the renedial actions since:

(1) the State of Iouisiana is already.

working on a schedule of corrective actions, and (2) it is anticipated that required 'renedial drills ~will be conducted during late April or early

~

May 1986.

If you shauld have any questions, please contact Pobert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological llazards Division, at 646-2860.

Attachments

I W

3 2fl b

o o

I FINAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT I

Nuclear Power Plant: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Applicant: Mississippi Power and Light Company Location of Plant: State of Mississippi Port Gibson, Mississippi Date of Report: March 4,1986 Date of Exercise: December 3-4, 1985 I

Participants:

State of Loulslana (full scale)

Tensas Parish (full scale)

Tallulah Reception Center Madison Parish IIospital and Ambulance Service I

Federal Emergency Management Agency I

Region VI Federal Center 800 N. Loop 288 l

Denton, Texas 76201 l

I I

CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................

11 EXERCISE

SUMMARY

iii S t a te of Loui s iana Ope ra t ions....................................

v lo c a l Gove r nme nt O pe ra t io ns......................................

vi 1 INTRODUCTION.....................................................

1 1.1 Exe rci s e Ba ck gr ound.........................................

1

1. 2 F e d e ra l Eva lua t o rs..........................................

2 1.3 E xe r ci s e O b je c t ive s.........................................

4 I

1.4 Exe rci se Sc e na rio Summa ry...................................

8 1.5 Eva lua t io n C ri t e ri a.........................................

12 I

2 EXERCISE EVALUATION..............................................

13 e

2.1 Louisiana State Operations..................................

18 2.1.1 State EOC............................................

15 i

2.1.2 S ta t e LNED He adq ua rt e r s..............................

21 l

2.1.2.1 LNED Radiological Labo ra to ry................

25 2.1.3 Field Monitoring Activities..........................

26 2.1.3.1 Field Team Staging Area and LN ED Mo ni to ri ng Co nt ro l.....................

26 2.1.3.2 Field Monito ring Teams......................

29 i

2.1.4 EOF Dose Assessment..................................

33 2.2 Local EOCs and Suppo rt O rganiza tions........................

35 g

2.2.1 Te ns a s Pa ri s h........................................

35

' E 2.2.2 Te ns a s Pa ri s h EOC....................................

36 2.2.3 Me di a Ce n t e r.........................................

41 2.2.4 Tallula h Re cep t io n Ce nt e r............................

45 2.2.5 Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service........

47 3 SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION................................

50 4 EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES.........................................

70 4.1 Summa ry of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Me t..............

70

4. 2 Objectives Met or Yet to be Ach i eve d........................

74 TABLES 1 Remedial Act ions fo r the Grand Gulf Exe rcise.....................

50 2 Summa ry of FEMA Obje ct ives Remaining to be Met...................

71 I

3 FEMA Objectives Tracking Chart - Grand Gulf Nuclear Station......

75 I

mum I

m,I I

ABBREVIATIONS ANL - Argonne National Lab

• oratory DOE - Department of Energy DOT - Department of Transportation EOC - Emergency Operations Center EOF - Emergency Operations Facility EPA - Environmental Protection Agency EPZ - Emergency Planning Zone FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency FRC - Field Response Center GGNS - Grand Gulf Nuclear Station HHS - Health and Human Services HP - Health Physicist IGSOC - Inter granular Stress Corrosion Cracking KI - Potassium Iodide I.

LNED - Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division L0EP - Louisiana Office of Emergency Planning LP&L - Louisiana Power and Light Company LPRM - Local Power Range Monitors MP&L - Mississippi Power and Light Company NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAG - Protective Action Guide SAE - Site Area Emergene.y USDA - United States Department of Agriculture 11 I

I 1

I EXERCISE

SUMMARY

The Grand Gulf Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise held on December 3-4, 1985, was the fif th exercise testing the response capabilities of the off-site organirations. Previous exercises were held on November 4, 1981; January 26, 1983; April 11, 1984; and February 27, 1985. The Federal I

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluated the off-site response capabili-ties in each of these exercises. The State of Louisiana participated in the Grand Gulf exercise to support the Tensas Parish response effort and to dem-onstrate State emergency response capabilities.

The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station is located on the Mississippi side of the Mississippi River. Portions of the 10-mile EPZ extend into Tensas Parish, Louisiana, for which Region VI has evaluation responsibilities for off-site response capabilities. Tensas Parish has also assumed responsibility for the evacuation of a small portion of Madison Parish which enters into the I

10-mile EPZ. There are no permanent residents in this area, however.

Oc-cupants would be limited to hunters and fishermen in the areas.

On December 5, three post-exercise meetings were held: An 8:00 a.m.

I meeting with the 19 member Federal evaluation team to develop a preliminary evaluation and an 11:00 a.m.

evaluation meeting with Louisiana State rep-resentatives and Tensas Parish officials at the Ramada Inn, Natchez, Mis-sissippi. A public critique of the exercise was held at St. Joseph, Loui-siana at 2:30 p.m. with representatives of the NRC, Mississippi Power and Light Company, Federal, State, and Parish of ficials, and the general public.

This document provides narratives and evaluation of performances of the response agencies as well as Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action, and Areas Recommended for Improvement for each jurisdiction and field activity I

tested. The demonstrations of response capabilities of the Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service and the State Field Monitoring Teams were inade-quate to the extent that remedial drills for these specific areas are requested by the Regional Assistance Committee Chairman.

l Remedial drills addressing these deficiencies must be satisfactorily con-l ducted within six (6) months from the exercise date.

The remedial drills thus must be conducted by 6/4/86. Following satisfactory completion of the remedial drills, an addendum to this report will be published and distributed to all appropriate emergency response organizations.

1 iii i I I

I

't E

The first problem area identified concerns control and direction of the field monitoring teams. As presented in the exercise critique, the g

flow of information was cumbersome between the LNED EOF personnel and the g

field monitoring teams via the LNED field team staging area. This resulted in transfer of misinformation between the three locations and a lack of con-trol and coordination of the field teams. FEMA believes that this situation can be remedied by having the appropriate LNED personnel direct the field teams from the EOF. The use of Tensas Parish Courthouse complex as a field team staging area should be continued.

Pecause of other field team problems identified, we also recommend that the following activities of the field teams be demonstrated as part of the remedial drill.

• Proper calibration of all field team equipment

• Capability of all field teams to measure radioiodine levels in the air.

• Equipment checkout procedures.

• Method of determining the correct locations of monitoring points.

• Proper radio procedures.

• Proper sampling techniques.

The second area which requires a remedial drill relates to the activities 4.t the Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service in Tullaluh. Based on the exercise evaluation, it was determined that the two objectives (FEMA Objec-tive 30 and 31) applicable to these activities could not be evaluated.

Prior to conducting the remedial drill, priority should be given to train-ing and radiological equipment needs. Demonstration should include but not be limited to the following activities:

• Setting up a radiological management room (closing duct vents, etc.)

i

• Wearing of protective clothing and dosimeters

• Decontaminating the patient

• " Hotline" procedures

• Patient surveying techniques iv I

I

I

• Exit procedures in removing protective clothing

• Proper disposal and security of contaminated waste

• Transportation of a contaminated injured patient

• Surveying of Ambulance vehicle and EMS personnel following I'

removal of contaminated patient and exchange of patient to hospital staff

• Security of ambulance vehicle

• Communication capabilities and coordination between Parish Civil Defense Director, EMS and hospital.

Section 1 of this report provides an introduction which includes exercise background information and explanation of other exercise related items.

Sec-tion 2 of this Report provides individual narratives, Deficiencies, Areas Re-quiring Corrective Actions, and Areas Recommended for Improvement for each jurisdiction and field activity tested.

Section 3 provides a summary listing I

of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action in tabular format (en-titled Table 1 Remedial Actions For the Grand Gulf Exercise) and provides space for State and Local agencies response and scheduled corrective actions.

Section 4 of the report contains in tabular format an " Objectives Met or Yet to Be Achieved" compilation, based upon FEMA Objectives developed f rom NUREG-0654, II, as well as a summary sheet of those Objectives which have not been satisfactorily demonstrated to date.

STATE OF LOUISIANA OPERATIONS I

The State of Louisiana's planned participation in this exercise in cluded 25 specific objectives designed to test capabilities of State re-sponses to the Plume Exposure Pathway as well as the Ingestion Exposure Pathway. Generally, many of these objectives were ef fectively demonstrated I

However, problems encountered in performances of State Field Monitoring ac-tivities necessitated that these objectives be redemonstrated by remedial drills. Additionally, the scenario content did not provide sufficient de-I velopment for full testing of Ingestion Pathway capabilities.

The State did not sufficiently demonstrate that their response role during an Ingestion Pathway incident would be adequate to provide the required protection of I

the citizens within the 50-mile EPZ.

It was determined that this Ingestion Path way capability should be repeated during the next regularly scheduled exercise at Grand Gulf, but within the six-year cycle allowed for successful demonstration of all 39 FEMA Objectives.

I I

I l

\\

I While the communications center seems to be completely adequate for other nuclear facilities in the State, it has two key drawbacks for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

First, the communications to Tensas Parish (telephones and telefax) are both telephone-line based.

The Communica-E tions Director expressed that the limited Tensas Parish telephone system 3

could handle the flow of messages required in a real emergency.

The m M Planning Standard F (section F.1.2.

page F.2) in the recently w re-g leased FEMA-REP-10 (Nov. 1985) does not allow primary and backup communi-E cations systems to be subject to common failure under adverse environmental conditions.

A second problem arises from the inability of the State of Louisiana to initiate a telephone call to all affected parties on the dedicated hot-line system.

If it were necessary to coordinate EBS messages during a g

joint Louisiana-Mississipi exercise, such coordination would be more diffi-E cult on those occasions when Louisiana wished to initiate a message.

A full discussion of problems encountered is presented in the appro-priate narrative topic of Section 2 of the report.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS Tensas Parish is the only Louisiana Parish which is within the 10-mile g

EPZ of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, with exception of a small area of Madison

[

Parish for which Tensas Parish has agreed to provide emergency response mea-sures. The State, through coordination with Tensas Parish, prepared exercise objectives to correlate with the scenario developed by Mississippi Power and Light for the Grand Gulf Exercise.

However, since Mississippi was not test-ing Ingestion Pathway emergency response actions, the basic scenario did not establish situations on which to build Ingestion Pathway objectives. The E

State of Louisiana's adjustment to the scenario to provide this basis was 3

inadequate to provide for full demonstration by either the State or Tensas Parish response agencies of their capabilities to protect the residents re-g siding in the Ingestion Pathway Exposure Zone. It was decided that this ca-E pability will need to be redemonstrated during the next regularly scheduled Grand Gulf exercise, but within the six-year cycle for accomplishing the 39-FEMA Objectives.

Local government activities included the Tensas Parish EOC, Communications, Media Center, Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service, and the Tallulah g

Reception Center. Overall, performances at the local government level were 3l very good and successfully demonstrated an adequate preparedness capability to protect the citizens within the 10-mile EPZ. However, insuf ficient training j

by the Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance service prevented their successful vi I

Il

I demonstration of capabilities to respond to the need to treat an injured, con-taminated individual. These capabilities are to be redemonstrated by a remedial I

drill. Other specific problems identified at individual locations are described in detail under Section 2 of the report.

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I vii I

I I

i l

I I

1 INTRODUCTION I

1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility for all offsite nuclear power facility planning and response.

FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radio-logical Emergency Response Planning include:

• Taking the lead in off-site emergency response planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans insuring that the plans meet the Federal criteria set forth in NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1980).

• Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise I

conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdictions.

• Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved I

Federal agencies. Representatives of these agencies listed below serve as members of t.he Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

- U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) lI

- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)

- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) l I I

I I

1

,I lI I

I 1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Nineteen Federal Evaluators participated in this fif th year exercise-E evaluating the emergency response capabiities of the State of Louisiana, 3

Tensas Parish, Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service, and the Tallulah Reception Center. These individuals, their agencies and evalua-g tion locations are listed below:

E Al Lookabaugh FEMA Overall Coordination John Benton FEMA State EOC (Baton Rouge)

Dottie Nevitt USDA State EOC (Baton Rouge)

Dan Santini ANL State EOC (Baton Rouge)

Jim Levenson ANL State LNED Headquarters (Baton Rouge)

Mar:retta Cunningham FEMA Tensas Parish E0C (St. Joseph)

Travis Ratcliff FEMA Tensas Parish Communications (St.

Joseph)

Gary Sanborn NRC Media Center (St. Joseph)

Michael Brooks FEMA Media Center (St. Joseph)

Jeff Slack DOE State Dose Assessment at EOF (Plant in Mississippi) and LNED Laboratory (Baton Rouge)

Gary Kaszynski ANL Field Monitoring Teams Staging Area & Emergency Workers Monitoring g

Area (St. Joseph) g Leon Zellner FDH State Field Team #1 (St. Joseph)

Harry Harrison FEMA State Field Team #2 (St. Joseph) and LNED Laboratory (Baton Rouge)

I I

2 I

I I

I

I I

Don Fingleton ANL State Field Team #3 (St. Joseph)

I Gary Jones FEMA Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service (Tallulah)

Phil Edgington HHS Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance I

Service (Tallulah)

Tom Goertz FDA Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance I

Service (Tallulah)

Grace Fossati FEMA Tallulah Reception Center (Tallulah)

Dee Demmitt ANL Tallulah Reception Center (Tallulah)

I I

I I

'I I

i 3

I I

I I

lI

I

1. 3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The State and Local objectives were developed through joint discussion between Mississippi Power and Light Company (MP&L); the Nucicar Regulatory Commission-Region IV (NRC); the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VI (FEMA); the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED); Louisiana Office of g

Emergency Preparedness (LOEP); and Tensas Parish Officials.

Exercise objec-E tives for Mississippi Power and Light Company, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and Mississippi State / Local organizations come under the jurisdictional reporting of FEMA Region IV, Atlanta.

State of Louisiana Exercise Objectives 1.

Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2.

Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

3.

Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

=

4.

Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

5.

Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.

6.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.

7.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of air-borne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10-7uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.

8.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection g

Transport, and analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, g

water, and milk.

9.

Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appro-priate protective measures, based on PAGs available shelter, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.

10.

Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via inges-tion pathway exposure, based on field data; and to determine I:

4 I1 I

I

I I

10.

(cont'd)

I appropriate protective measures based on PAGs and other relevant f acto rs.

11.

Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for inges-I tion pathway hazards.

12.

Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to I

manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

13.

Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

14.

Demonstrate ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or general I

population.

15.

Demonstrate ability to supply and administer KI once the decision has been made to do so.

16.

Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

17.

Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

18.

Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

19.

Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination l

of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

20.

Demonstrate the ability to identify need for, request, and obtain l

Federal assistance.

21.

Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure.

22.

Demonstrate the ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and re-entry.

23.

Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and ef fective use of emergency I

communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.

'I 5

I llI 1

I I

State of Louisiana Exercise Objectives (cont'd):

24.

Demonstrate the ability to monitor emergency classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.

25.

Demonstrate the capability to effectively process all incoming l

messages in a timely manner.

5 Tensas Parish Exercise Objectives:

1.

Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

I 2.

Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

3.

Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

4.

Demonstrate ab111ty to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

5.

Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for ingestion l

W pathway hazards.

i 6.

Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes 7.

Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

8.

Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

9.

Demonstrate ability to supply and administer KI once the decision has been made to do so.

10.

Deronstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and tinely manner.

11.

Demonstrate ability to pnVic advance coordination of information released.

I I

6 I

I I

r-I I

12.

Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

I 13.

Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

14.

Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

15.

Demonstrate adequacy of EMS transportation, personnel and procedures for handling contaminated individuals including proper decontamina-tion of vehicle and equipment.

I 16.

Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

17.

Demonstrate the ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and re-entry.

18.

Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.

19.

Demonstrate the ability to monitor emergency classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.

20.

Demonstrate that the authority exists in activating a reception center (as necessary) in a timely manner.

I I

I I

I 7

I I

I I

I I

1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant shut down 16 days ago f rom a 92% power level af ter a high organic contaminant concentration was found in the reactor coolant. Power was limited to 92% prior to shutdown in an attempt to maximize fuel utiliza-E tion prior to entering the plant's first refueling outage which was scheduled 3

to start next week.

Activity was near the maximum allowed by the Technical Specifications. Many incore monitoring instruments became inoperative as a result of the organic contaminant.

The core has been completely off-loaded into the new high density racks in the containment fuel storage pool.

The Fuel Pool Cooling system is being l

used to maintain pool temperature. The vessel cavity and vessel have been E

drained down and are being decontaminated prior to vessel inspection.

Both hydrogen recombiners on the Containment refueling floor are being replaced g

by the manufacturer due to a design problem. The B unit has already been 5

transferred and the A unit is to be moved today.

A crop duster crashes onto the roof of the Division 1 diesel building.

It does not catch fire or cause extensive damage; however, the exhaust duct of the diesel is crushed.

No toxic or environmental hazards result from this eve nt.

An Alert is declared due to an aircraf t crash on the facility.

A CAM alarms in the Rad Waste building in the vicinity of the liner dewatering skid.

Inspection by HP determines the cause to be high airborne E

activity being released by a thermally hot radioactive liner. There are no 5

significant releases of radioactive material and there are no environmental consequences from this event.

I The operator of the hoist in the Containment on the refueling floor raises the A recombiner to move it, violates procedure to save time, and transfers it across the refueling area too close to the fuel storage racks.

E When he gets halfway across, all the lif ting lugs break, allowing the recom-E biner to swing downward and strike the upper containment fuel pool gate. This causes a major failure of the seal. The recombiner then falls onto the top of g

the steam dryer and then into the fuel storage pool resulting in damaged fuel 5

and increased radiation. As internal radiation levels increase, a Hi alann on the Containment Ventilation radiation monitor is received and a Site Area Emergency is declared.

I S

I I

I

I I

l There is an airborne release from the plant, compounded by an inability I

to secure the emergency ventilation system for an extended period of time.

(The Filtration and Iodine removal components of this system were removed in error by a maintenance crew replacing the same components in a redundant piece of equipment.) A General Emergency is declared based upon increased I

dose rates.

Protective Action Recommendations are made to evacuate out to 2 miles and shelter out to 5 miles. The water in the Fuel Storage Pool leaks out and into the drained reactor vessel. The residual water in the I

Fuel Storage Pool begins to boil releasing first the Iodine being held in the water then causing additional fuel damage. A wind shif t occurs and the Iodine release increases, resulting in an additional recommendation to evacu-I ate out to 5 miles and shelter out to 10 miles. Water level and then cooling are returned to the pool and the boiling stops. The vent system is finally secured and the release is terminated.

Dose rates at the site boundary de-crease as the plume dissipates subsequently to Alert level.

Assumptions and Inputs The assumptions and inputs which are germane to the development of the radiological results follow:

I

• MP&L's off-site dose calculation procedures were used to determine the magnitude of the release required to cause the selected off-site dose. This activity was assumed to originate entirely from damaged fuel in the Containment Fuel Storage Pool.

• No filtration of Iodine or particulates is assumed as the filtration media has been removed by mistake.

• Projected of f-site doses were calculated as a function of distance from the plant, time af ter release, and meteorology.

• Dose rates in the Containment and the Auxillary Building were es-timated as a function of time after the hypothetical release.

In these estimates other fission products released with the iodines I

were considered.

I

• Deposition of airborne fission and activation products and stratifi-cation of the heavier noble gases may be ignored.

• There is no infiltration from the Auxillary Building into the Control Room /TSC habitability envelope.

• The operators are assumed to comply with Emergency Procedures.

• Insuf ficient Hydrogen is released to form a combustable concentration.

I e

I l

' I

I

• High density Fuel storage racks are installed and all plant systems are lined up to support a total core of fload in the Containment.

I Discontinuities The following identified discontinuities depart in some respect from the expected.

Only those discontinuities associated with development of the radiological consequences of the scenario are included. Discontinuities as-sociated with the plant design and operational performance are not included.

• The excessive Iodine levels used in this scenario are unrealistic and are utilized to accomodate the off-site agency to implement l

ingestion pathway response and recovery techniques.

B

• The time involved prior to Fuel Handling Ventilation isolation is g

extended to maintain scenario objective at Site Area Emergency prior 5

to escalation to General Emergency.

• Standby Gas Treatment System is not allowed to be secured to enable extended radiological releases to the environment.

• When recommended Protective Actions provide for an extended evacuation E

out to 5 miles, the state of Mississippi will maintain its evacuation 5

radius at 2 miles to complete their stated objectives.

• Essentially no dilution of the containment concentration to release concentration is given from Auxillary Building volume in order to achieve off-site doses but still have facility access.

• Several Operator errors and procedural violations were necessary to establish the scenario.

(Initial conditions to be given to all key exercise participants prior to the beginning of the exercise.)

• This scenario takes place in early summer; school is not in session.

• Construction is halted on Unit 2 at this time and there are no per-sonnel on the Unit 2 side of the plant.

J

• The plant shut down 16 days ago from a 92% power level af ter a high organic contaminant concentration was found in the reactor coolant.

An extensive review determined the source of the contaminant to be a cleaning solvent used to strip floors in preparation for painting.

I 10 I

I I

I I

The contractor, aware of MP&L's chemical control program, received approval for the use of a solvent. The approved solvent did not per-form as well as expected, so to save time he placed a non-approved solvent in the approved container.

I Calculations based on a coolant ph of 4.4 show that at least 13 gallons of the solvent was dumped into a floor drain. The organic portion of the solvent was not removed by the rad waste deminerali-ze rs.

Since chemistry's total organic carbon analyzer was inopera-I tive, this was not detected prior to being sent to the CST.

When the organic contaminants were injected into the reactor, they were broken down by the action of the heat and radiation, causing the observed decrease in pH and increase in conductivity and chloride con-centration. The plant had been operating at increasingly more restric-I tive power levels due to increasing offgas pretreatment monitor readings for the previous three months.

The forced shutdown occurred just prior to entering the plant's first refueling outage which was scheduled to start next week.

Activity was near the maximum allowed by GGNS Techni-I cal Specifications; off gas pretreatment was 360 millicuries /sec; cool-ant activity was 0.19 microcuries/cc. Many local power range monitors (LPRM) are inoperative.

One LPRM detector failed within six hours of I

the first indication of the incident and within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> twenty-seven detectors had failed.

Due to the high potential for inter-granular stress corrision crack-I ing (IGSOC), the decision was made to perform a full core off-load and a full vessel inspection.

(Installation of the upper containment high density fuel storage racks to permit full core off-load was recently I

completed.)

TIMETABLE FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS 0810 ALERT - Plane crash on facility.

0940 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Hi-Hi Alarm on Containment Vent Rad Monitor.

l 1110 GENERAL EMERGENCY - 1R/hr projected at site boundary.

1520 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Dose rates at the site boundary decreased.

Plant conditions stable.

1535 ALERT - Dose rates at the site boundary and off-site have decreased.

I 11 I

l I

1

I I

1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA The Grand Gulf exercise evaluations of Section II, NUREG-0654-1, Revision 1 (November 1980).

Region VI evaluated the exercise using the modula r fo rmat.

Each jurisdiction or of f-site activity evaluated is discussed by narra-tive and listing of Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Actions, and Areas for Improvement with accompanying recommendations. Deficiencies would E

cause a finding that the off-site preparedness was not adequate to provide 3

reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity B

of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.

At least one deficiency g

in this category would necessitate a negative finding. Areas Requiring Correc-tive Action are assigned when the demonstrated performance during the exercise was cormidered f aulty or needing corrective action. Even with the presence l

5 of these problems, other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that in the event of a real radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public.

Areas E

Requiring Corrective Action should be relatively easy to correct in comparison 3

to Deficiencies. A finding of Adequate could include several Areas Requiring Corrective Action.

I l

Areas recommended for improvement are also listed, as appropriate, for each jurisdiction or off-site activity where suggestions for improved perform-mances were documented by evaluators.

I I

l I

I 12 I

I I

I I

2 EXERCISE EVALUATION On the basis of general criteria has been performed of the December 3-4, 1985 exercise of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. This evaluation, including Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Actions and Areas for Improvement and Recommendations, is presented herein.

FEMA Region VI will maintain close liaison with the State and Local governments in determining the corrective action (including time frame) needed to resolve each problem in accordance with established criteria and guidelines.

2.1 LOUISIANA STATE OPERATIONS Louisiana participation consisted of exercising the Office of Emergency I

Operations at the EOC, the Nuclear Energy Division Headquarters and State Field Monitoring Teams, and Dose Assessment at the EOF. There were 25 objec-tives for these locations and field activities. Detailed discussions of per-formances are provided under the specific narratives. Demonstration of most I

objectives successfully showed a satisfactory level of State emergency re-sponse capabilities. However, problems arose in field monitoring coordina-tion that necessitate remedial drill (s) to correct the deficiencies. (See l g E

Field Monitoring Activities). The communications at the State EOC to the Tensas Parish (telephones and telef ax) are both telephone-line based.

I While the communications center seems to be completely adequate for other nuclear facilities in the State, it has two key drawbacks for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. First, the communications to Tensas Parish (telephones and telefax) are both telephone-line based. The Communications Director expressed I

that the limited Tensas Parish telephone system could handle the flow of messages required in a real emergency. The h Planning Standard F (section F.1.2, page F-2) in the recently released FEMA-aEP-10 (Nov. 1985) does not allow pri-mary and back-up communications systems to be subject to common failure under adverse environmental conditions.

I A second problem arises from the inability of the State of Louisiana to initiate a telephone call to all affected parties on the dedicated hotline system.

If it were necessary to coordinate EBS messages during a joint Louisiana-Mississippi exercise, such coordination would be more difficult I

on those occasions when Louisiana wished to initiate a nessage.

I 13 I

I J

I The State of Louisiana was unable to successfully demonstrate Ingestion Exposure Pathway capabilities because of insufficient scenario situations for l

developing response actions. Those objectives relating to Ingestion Pathway, E

therefore, will require redemonstration during the next scheduled Grand Gulf Exercise within the six-year cycle for accomplishing all FEMA objectives.

The narratives provide descriptions of other response capabilities demonstrated, and summarize problems identified and objectives which were met during the exercise.

I I

I I

I I

I I

14 I

I I

I

I 2.1.1 STATE EOC Na:*rative The State of Iouisiana had a limited staff participating in this exer-cise. The only Department represented aside from the LNED (Louisiana Nuclear Ene:rgy Division) and LOEP (Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness) was I

the Department of Agriculture. The State EOC was able to only partially demonstrate ability to mobilize staf f and activate facilities due to the lack of participation by those agencies and participants who were assigned response roles at the EOC.

With the few exceptions mentioned below, the facilities were excellent.

Three formal work spaces were used. These were the EOC, the comcunictions I

room, and a separate LNED working area where LOEP and LNED executive secre-taries jointly reached key decisions. Key decisions directly related to the emergency were reached within this LNED working areas as well as outside I

the main EOC room. This arrangement inhibited coordination of the EOC opera-tio ns.

If decision making is to be conducted under these arrangements, pro-visions should be made to make these decisions known to all participating agen-cies in the EOC. Decisions relating to simultaneous non-nuclear emergency were handled within within the EOC. The staf f demonstrated excellent knowledge of the technical requirements of their positions in particular and the emergency in general. However, on two specific occasions, (late in Day 1, and on Day 2) messages were not typed up or sent out in a necessary, timely manner. No r was there any documentation that this was simulated, making it difficult to judge whether instructions were appropriate. There was not good simulation and docu-mentation of communication messages.

Outgoing directives by the State were too few (only three were sent) and sometimes too late.

While the communications center seems to be completely adequate for other nuclear facilities in the State, it has two key drawbacks for the Grand Gulf I

Nuclear Station.

Fi rs t, the communications to Tensas Parish (telephones and telefax) are both telephone-line based.

The Communications Director expressed that the limited Tensas Parish telephone system could handle the flow of mes-l E

=asca required in a real emergency.

The w elanning Standard r (section j g F.1.2. page F-2) in the recently released FEMA-REP-10 (Nov. 1985) does not l

allow primary and back-up communications systems to be subject to common fail-I ure unde r adve rse environmental conditions.

l A second problem arises from the inability of the State of Louisiana to initiate a telephone call to all affected parties on the dedicated hotline system.

If it were necessary to coordinate EBS messages during a joint Louisiana-Mississippi exercise, such coordination would be more dif ficult on those occasions when Louisiana wished to initiate a message.

15 I

I l

Telephone calls in the EOC operations room are to be picked up as a result of messages sent over the speaker system from the communications room to the EOC.

The use of this system might cause some problems when many calls come in to the EOC simultaneously. While the State is to be commended for

~

its ef fort to eliminate confusion arising f rom multiple ringing of telephones within the EOC, the system might be improved with lights on the telephones.

Evacuation and access control is a local responsibility. Access control points that were established during the exercise were displayed on a map in the State EOC.

Local Standard Operating Procedures allow the Parish Civil De-fense Director to make direct contact with the State Police to request their assistance in traf fic and access control, including rail traf fic.

During this exercise air and river traffic control was the responsibility of the State of Mississippi. Special evacuation problems are also a local responsibility.

The Louisiana State Plan delegates to the Louisiana Office of Emergency B

Preparedness the responsibility for providing infomation concerning Protective g

Action Recommendations to parishes in the Ingestion Pathway EPZ. The State De-partment of Agriculture reviewed and analyzed data to submit information to the parishes. This data included lists and designated map areas that described names and locations of dairy fams, food processing plants, and specific crops that are grown in the af fected EPZ sectors. This infomation was used in con-structing a draf t EBS message for use by the parishes.

The EBS message provided for placing milk producing animals, livestock, and poultry on stored feed and covered water; contacting County Agricultural Agents before harvesting crops; and contacting the Parish Fisheries Agent or Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries before releasing fish and shell-fish for human consumption. The EBS message also included a statement that if famers were not allowed to permanently return to their farms for several days, they would probably be allowed to return for a short period to tend their live-s to ck.

The State Department of Agriculture also put their Emergency Response Teams on standby in the event their assistance was needed for sampling or other agri-cultural response actions. Names, locations, and phone numbers of County Agri-cultural agents; and State and Local Food and Agriculture Council personnel were available.

The State EOC was not in the plume EPZ nor were field worke rs dispatched from this EOC. However, the evaluator, was shown a supply of low-range, mid-range, and high-range dosimeters and chargers that were available, if needed.

There were no film badges or TLDs. The Louisiana State University representa-E tive stated that they did not feel use of dosimetry was necessary since they 3

were so far away from the reactor.

I 16 I

I

The EOC did not hold press briefings. This decision was made because it was felt that it would be unreasonable to hold press briefings when there was to be very little play for Louisiana in this exercise.

Public informtion regarding safety precautions during recovery, health effects of low-level exposure, and financial compensation is the responsibil-ity of the local parishes.

I Ingestion Pathway I

As explained in other narratives of Section 2, the exercising of Ingestion Pathway was determined insufficient to allow for demonstration of the capabili-ties of State and Local governments, and must be redemonstrated by a future exercise.

The following criteria related to the State's (LNED and LOEP) responsibili-ties -- Communications, Decision-Making, Field Measurements, Sampling and Labora-tory Tests, Protective Actions and Public Information.

If the scenario had been stronger for the State of Louisiana, more areas could have been demonstrated.

The lack of representation by responsible agen-I cies at the EOC may have lessened the impact of actions that could have been taken. Possibly, those Agencies with specific expertise could have provided further input to expand the opportunities for demonstrating the required capa-bilities.

A stronger scenario could have brought further recommendations such as:

washing leafy vegetables, turning of soil, use of soil stabilizers, and draf t-ing a cost analysis report on losses for insurance purposes.

The LNED official briefed the group on significant actions taken during Day 1 and provided the actions that were currently in ef fect.

Samples that were taken in Day 1 included water, air, vegetation, and s ediment. No milk samples were taken since there are no dairies in the area.

These samples were taken to the laboratory at Louisiana State University for analysis and were found to be below EPA level guidelines except for a water sample in Sector P, 5 or 6 miles out at the lake in St. Joseph. This problem sample was too small in volume; this additional water samples were to be made-Although the State had not requested Federal assistance, EPA was also doing a water analysis as backup.

A restriction on fisheries was placed in effect. The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries removed fish from the lake for transmittal to the lab for analysis.

The State Department of Agriculture was requested to draf t an EPZ message to lif t restrictions for sheltering or animals and the use of stored feel and water.

17 I

A second briefing advised agencies that the water and fish analysis showed the water was at background levels and there was no significant contamination in the fish.

A recommendation was made to Tensas Parish to lif t sheltering restrictions and to bring evacuated people back to the area. The release of this public in-formation is the responsibility of the Parish.

During the course of the exercise the State was able to accomplish some, but not all of the objectives for activities which the L0EP would technically perform at the EOC. The EOC activities on Day 2 relating to Ingestion Pathway l

were insufficient to evaluate accomplishment of all objectives relating to In-5 gestion Pathway emergency response. There was very little flow (or simulation of flow) of instruction from the State to appropriate local officials.

The g

State only partially satisfied FEMA objective number 32 by demonstrating the g

ability to correctly identify the need for Federal assistance.

In this exer-cise, the State correctly recognized that the scenario did not cause Federal assistance to be required.

Since the scenario was deficient in this respect, the State did not demonstrate its ability to request and obtain Federal assist-ance. The State partially satisfied Objective 34, in the sense that it ade-quately demonstrated an ability to determine appropriate measures for controlled B

recovery r,nd reentry.

However, because of an inadequate scenario, and an inap-3 propriatrly staffed E0C, the State was not able to demonstrate its ability to implemenu appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

DEFICIENCIES:

1.

==

Description:==

The primary dedicated hotline telehone system does not allow the 3

State of Louisiana opportunity to initiate conversation with the 3

State of Mississippi or other af fected parties.

(NUREG 0654 II, F.1.b)

I Recommendation: Redesign dedicated phone system to allow for two-way or multi-contact capability.

I AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

2.

==

Description:==

Due to lack of participation (except for the LA Department of Agriculture) of agencies having a response assignment at the State EOC, capability for activation and staf fing could not be determined adequate (NUREG-0654, II. E.1, E.2).

I 18 l

l I

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd)

Recommendation:

Those agencies and personnel having a response role at the State EOC should be required to participate during the next exercise so that determination of capability to mobilize and staff can be established.

3.

==

Description:==

Message handling capabilities were not successfully demonstrated due to failure to actually send messages or at least to fully document their simulated dispatch and receipt methods (NUREG-0654 II, E.).

I Recommendation:

All incoming and outgoing message handling procedures should be fully demonstrated or documentation carefully performed to verify the State's capabilty.

4.

==

Description:==

A satisfactory back-up communications link between the State EOC and Tensas Parish has not been established (NUREG-0654, II, F.1).

Recommendation:

Capability should be established for initiation of calls by State EOC on the dedicated line, or establishment of a two-way radio system.

5.

==

Description:==

E Capability to successfully perform State EOC functions relating to g

Ingestion Pathway was not successfully or fully demonstrated.

(NUREG-0654, II, I. 10, I. 11, J. 9, J. 11, M. 1)

Recommendation:

State EOC must redemonstrate Ingestion Pathway response activities within the six-year cycle for accomplishing all FEMA objectives.

l 19 I

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(cont'd) 6.

==

Description:==

Decisions made by executive staff were not provided in briefing form to the Operations staff.

Recommendation:

Staf f members should be kept knowledgeable through briefing on all activities at the LNED Headquarters.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

==

Description:==

Possible confusion could arise during an actual incident when incoming calls are relayed over the speaker from the communica tions room to the E0C.

Recommendations:

Ir.utall lights on telephones to indicate calls rather than announc-ing over speaker system.

I I

I I

20 I

I I

2.1.2 STATE LNED HEADQUARTERS Activation of the LNED Headquarters in Baton Rouge was accomplished aCCording to planned procedures.

The Director arrived for normal duty.

Other staff were notified and placed on standby using a current call-up list. Personnel with dose assessment responsibilities (at the EOF) were prepositioned in Natchez as were field team members. The Director of LNED was effectively in charge of the Agency's operations. The dose assessnent and field teams were dispatched by the Director.

Following dispatch, the Director and his deputy relocated to the State EOC.

A new concept of operations for Grand Gulf comparable to that used for Waterford and Riverbend was demonstrated at this exercise.

It involved dis-patch of the dose assessment team to the EOF to work directly with the util-ity dose assessment / projection groups.

Concurrences with assessments, pro-jections, and protective action decisions were jointly made at the EOF.

These actions were communicated to the Director at the State E0C for State concur-rence. At the State EOC, authorization for the actions was obtained from the Governor's of fice and coordinated by LNED with the State EOC.

In sho rt, the new concept was smoothly implemented and represents an improvement over earl-ier concepts.

Copies of the plan and procedures were present. Decisions and media releases were fully coordinated among the executive committee (LOEP, LNED) and members of the E0C operations staf f.

During the exercise (both plume and ingestion pathway), decisions were ve rbally communicated to tha EOF, Tensas Parish, and the Media Center.

How-ever, press releases in hard copy form were prepared slowly and dissemination was, fo r the most pa rt, simulated.

Overall, the facilities were adequate for LNED at their headquarters and the State EOC.

Capabilities for extended operations at each facility were ex-celle nt.

At the State EOC, status boards and maps were used and kept current.

However, maps indicating areas for protective actions were outdated and incom-plete.

It is recommended that LNED develop or obtain maps that are up to date and consistent with those used by the utility.

Protective action zones used by the utility should be indicated on the LNED maps (e.g., utility recommended sheltering in Zone 12, but LNED had no sector 12 on their maps).

Communication capabilities at LNED were fully demonstrated.

The Grand Gulf hot-line worked well.

Radio communications capabilities were available for use, but were not demonstrated; commercial telephone was used to notify and activate staf f.

21 l

I

According to the new concept of operations, dose projections are pe rformed at the EOF.

The Exercise Evaluation and Simulation Facility (EESF) computer program was operational and used in the executive room for plotting plume location.

Additionally, the plume was plotted on a map of the EPZ using plant release data and field readings received in the State.

Protective action recommendations (PARS) were made at the EOF with joint concurrence by the utility and LNED. These PARS were relayed to the executive room at the State for concurrence.

Final decisions were made and relayed to the State operations room and the EOF.

For the most part, decisions are all

" automatic" as dictated by specific events.

The State does reserve the right to sign of f on each decision. As such, decisions were in accordance with planned procedures.

The decision to administer KI was an exception to the procedures. At 3:26 p.m., LNED received a call from the EOF requesting authorization to ad-minister KI.

Even though the exposure times and rates did not justify its administration, authorization was granted.

State SOPS require consideration of KI use for emergency workers receiving an exposure of 10R.

Maximum exposure was projected to be 4R at 5 miles af ter 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Based on these values, the authorization for KI administration appeared to be conservative.

A demonstration of ingestion pathway protective actions was limited by the relatively little data provided f rom field samples. Of the 13 samples collected,12 had values below the EPA's protective action guidelines.

The remaining sample was from Lake St. Joseph. The Lake had approximately twice the threshold value for prescribing protective actions. An excellent dis-g cussion was conducted concerning whether the lake was a source of drinking g

water, the level of fishing (for consumption), metabolic uptake of iodine nuclides, and recreation uses.

Additional samples of lake water, tap water and fish were requested and collected.

Based on results of the other 12 samples, reentry into the af fected area was allowed and shelter restrictions were relaxed.

A press release was pre-pared and issued.

A follow-up message regarding the lake was being prepared when it was learned that the lake was a backup water supply and that a deep well was the primary water source.

Further, the additional water and fish samples proved to be at background.

The Agriculture Department provided briefings regarding field crops, dairy animals, and food processing areas. In each case, no problems with contamination could be expected or confirmed.

Reentry / recove ry decisions were communicated promptly to Tensas Parish, E

the EOF, and the media center.

However, hard copy press releases were prepared 3

only through observe r prompting and, for the most part, transmission was only simulated. Verbal decisions should be followed as quickly as possible with hard copy transmissions, and simulation of such kept to a minimum.

22 I

I

I The scenario was adequate to drive the plume pathway portion of the exercise; however, it was not adequate to force the demonstration of the exercise objective to request or obtain Federal assistance. At best, the scenario minimally tested the State's resources.

Although ingestion pathway activities were appropriate for the Level of play, the scenario did not allow for adequate demonstration. As a re-sult, objectives remain undemonstrated and another exercise emphasizing these objectives should be scheduled in the future.

l DEFICIENCIES: None AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

7.

==

Description:==

The authorization to administer KI was unwarranted based on the projected and sample data. The Department of Health policy and LNED headquarter's SOPS differ as to the threshold for administering KI. (NUREG-0654, II J.10.e,f.)

Recommendation:

A clear policy statement should be formulated regarding exposure levels warranting the authorization to administer KI.

SOPS and the plan should then be revised to reflect the policy statement.

Decision-makers should be trained in these resultant policy changes.

8.

==

Description:==

Different maps were used by State and local agencies than those used by Utility to identify protective action zones.

(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a)

Recommendation: All response organizations and Utility should assure consistency in identification of protective action areas by

~

I using identical zone designation maps.

9.

==

Description:==

Capability to successfully perform all required functions relating to Ingestion Pathway was not fully demonstrated. (NUREG-0654, II; I.10, I.ll, J.9, J.ll, M.1)

Recommendation:

LNED must redemonstrate Ingestion Pathway emergency response activities within the sixyear cycle for accomplishing all FEMA objectives.

23

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(cont'd) 10.

Description:

Media releases which were verbally passed to the EOF, Tensas Parish and the Media Center were not always prepared in hard copy form and transmitted for verification of the verbal deci-sion.

(NUREG-0654, II., E)

Recommendation:

For future exercises, messages should actually be draf ted and distributed and simulation of media release kept to a minimum.

Additionally, telephone message logs should be maintained as record of communications in the executive room.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

==

Description:==

The LNED new concept of operations was implemented during the exercise but was not reflected in State plan.

Recommendation:

Plan should be updated to include LNED concept of Operation as implemented.

24 I

I I

2.1. 2.1 LNED RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY The Lab is located in Baton Rouge at the LNED Headquarters. Gene rally the lab's operation was successfully demonstrated. This was the first time I

for of ficial evaluation of the Lab.

State Lab personnel, by actually receiving samples from the Field Monitoring Teams, identified the following suggestions for improvements for the sample taken by the field teams.

• Primary containers for samples should be labeled prior to filling

• Double bagging should be used for each individual sample

• Tape should be carefully placed in order to prevent its removing the label when peeled of f.

• Samples taken should be surveyed by the field teams and tagged in some way that will warn lab personnel of high readings or gross contamination.

DEFICIENCIES: None I

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: None AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

==

Description:==

No area was available for screening samples outside of the Lab.

Recommendation:

Consideration should be given to establishing a sample screening area outside the lab.

==

Description:==

No portable instrumentation was available except that used for smear counting. Also, an additional person should be assigned with a portable GM detector with pancake probe to screen samples and check for contami-nation.

Recommendation:

Additional portable instrumentation should be made available along with staf fing to carry out this activity.

I 25 I

2.1.3 FIELD MONITORING ACTIVITIES 2.1.3.1 FIELD TEAM STAGING AREA AND LNED FIELD MONITORING CONTROL NARRATIVE Field Monitoring Team activities were evaluated f rom three dif ferent locations by Federal evaluators: (1) Field Team Staging Area; (2) LNED staf f at the EOF (communications); and (3) the three field teams who were deployed. Problems encountered and level of performances made it necessary g

to request a retesting of the activities of the field teams in a remedia E

drill.

The following is a narrative summary of the activities and findings which were evaluated at the Field Team Staging Area and LNED Field Monitor-ing Controls.

The field monitoring team staging and development occurred at the LNED trailer at the Tensas Parish Courthouse Complex. The field teams who were prestaged in Natchez, Mississippi were put on standby at the Alert classifi-cation at 8:14 p.m. ; activated af ter SAE and arrived at the staging area between 10:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.

The field team coordinator and dispatcher arrived at 10:45 a.m.

FEMA Objectives (1,6) to mobilize, staf f, and deploy field monitoring personnel in a timely manner were satisfactorily met.

Communications between the field monitoring teams and the field team coordinator and dispatcher were by radio. A repeater was set up to eliminate g

" dead spots" in the field.

Communications between the field team coordinator 3

and the LNED personnel at the EOF were by commercial telephone.

Based on the ef fective operation of the communication equipment, FEMA objective (#5) to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met.

The direction and control of the Field Monitoring Teams from the LNED trailer were not satisfactory. at the EOF to the field monitoring teams via the field team coordinator and dispatcher.

It is not likely that this exist-ing arrangement would be improved within the LNED trailer either by the addi-g tion of personnel to log messages or rearrangement of the space and equipment.

g This arrangement resulted in the field teams not being ef fectively tracked (one team was directed to the plume centerline and not immediately redirected out following monitoring) and inaccurate information being transferred between all three locations.

Thus, FEMA Objectives (#3) relating to coordination of emergency activities; (#4) to demonstration of adequacy of facilities and dis-plays to support emergency operations and (#36) demonstration of adequate com-3 munications procedures and methods were not met.

E I

26 I

I

The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met.

This was accomplished by request-ing dosimeter readings approximately every 45 minutes. However, it was not clear who was responsible for recording emergency worker exposure either in the field, at the LNED trailer or at the EOF.

Field Monitoring Team #2 was directed to take KI at approximately 3:15 I

p.m.

This was based upon a directive from the LNED personnel at the EOF.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI to a field team was met; however, it was unclear how the decision was reached to adminis-I te r KI.

Based on a controller input, one field monitoring team was contaminated.

I This team returned to the Tensas Parish Courthouse complex to be monitored for contamination. The monitoring procedures were ef fectively carried out and proper equipment was used.

Demonstration of adequate equipment and pro-cedures occurred; this activity was simulated.

DEFICIENCIES:

11.

Description:

Direction and control of the three field monitoring teams was I

unsatisf acto ry.

The conveyance of information from the LNED staf f at the EOF to the Field Monitoring Teams via the field team coordi-nator and dispatcher was awkward and inef ficient. This arrangement resulted in the field teams not being effectively tracked and inac-I curate information being transferred between all three locations.

This resulted in objectives 3, 4, and 36 not being met.

(NUREG-0654, II, A. 2. a., F.1. d, 1)

I Recommendation: Consider directing the field monitoring teams by two-way radio from the EOF.

I AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: None l

I 27 I

I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMFROVEMENT:

Desc ription:

It was not clear who was responsible for recording emergency worker exposure either in the field, at the LNED trailer or at the EOF.

Recommendation:

Assign an individual who would be responsible for recording emergency worker exposure readings.

I I

I I

I I

I I

28 I

I I

I

I 2.1.3.2 FIELD MONITORING TEAMS Narrative There were three (3) field monitoring teams (staff of LNED) who parti-I cipated in the exercise.

Field monitoring activities were conducted as pro-vided for in the exercise objectives and scenario.

Problems encountered and level of performance made it necessary to request a retesting of these activi-ties in a remedial drill.

The drill must be conducted no later than June 4, 1986. The major deficiency related to the lack of control and direction of the three field monitoring teams as discussed in the previous section. The I

flow of information being communicated was cumbersome between the LNED EOF personnel and the field monitoring teams via the LNED field team staging area.

This resulted in transfer of misinformation between the three locations and lack of control and coordination of the field teams. This situation can be I

remedied by having the appropriate LNED personnel with appropriate radio com-munications equipment direct the field teams from the EOF.

The use of the Tensas Parsh Courthouse Complex as a field staging area should be continued.

Mobilization of all three field teams was not from Baton Rouge.

The teams were prepositioned in Natchez, Mississippi and deployed from St. Joseph.

I According to field team members, they could be activated at any time via tele-phone. Key management personnel also have radio pagers.

Before deployment, the field teams were briefed on plant and meteorological conditions and the other pertinent information. Dosimeters were zeroed and distributed. A shift I

change was not demonstrated, however, back-up monitoring teams are available from the State and through mutual agreements with neighboring states.

I Federal evaluators for teams #1 and #3 did not observe such things as equipment checks, exposure control (they did receive dosimeters and record cards) and work roles. These should be routine checks before going into the field.

Team #2 was directed tg take a reading at a point in the plume. The team leader received the information and did not direct the team to a point out of the plume. Team #2 took initiative and immediately withdrew to non-radiation point. Team #2 is commended for its action, however, the team leader should be faulted for this oversight. Otherwise, Team #2 had adequate equipment and demonstrated competancy with its use.

l Team #3 seemed to have had the most problems identified.

Several survey

'g meters had not been calibrated recently, the ability to measure radio-iodine lg concentration was not demonstrated nor could they have determined the concen-I t ra tio ns.

Team #3 members were familiar with the region being monitored, how-ever, sample locations were difficult to identify (lack of landmarkers).

No samples were collected by Team #3 so proper collection techniques were not dem-ons trated. Also, the Communicator did not appear to be familiar with the technical aspects of radiological monitoring.

I 29 l

l I I

I I

All teams throughout the day were kept informed of plume location, meteorological and plant condition, as well as, dose projections. Teams E

also were equipped with anti-contamination suits, boots, gloves and respi-E ra to rs.

Potassium iodiate was provided for field team members in their kits. Dosimeters were read throughout the day.

DEFICIENCIES:

12.

Description:

Direction and control of the three field monitoring teams was un-E satisf acto ry.

The conveyance of information from the LNED staff 5

at the EOF to the Field Monitoring Teams via the field team coordi-nator and dispatcher was awkward and inefficient. This arrangement g

resulted in the field teams not being ef fectively tracked and inac-g curate information being transferred between all three locations.

This resulted in objectives 3, 4, and 36 not being met.

(NUREG-0654, II, A. 2. a., F.1. d, 1)

Recommendation:

Conside r directing the field monitoring teams by two-way radio f rom the EOF.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACIIONS:

13.

Description:

Team #3 had survey meters and the air sampling pump which were not calibrated within the past year.

(NUREG-0654, II, H.10.,I.9)

Recommendation: Team #3 should ensure that their equipment is cali-brated and calibration dates noted on the, instruments.

14.

Description:

Team #3 did not have the capability to measure radio-iodine levels in the air. The appropriate calibration curves were not available with the field team or at LNED Base to determine con-centration in uCi/cc.

Or, they were not sufficiently trained to l

make the conversion. (NUREG-0654, II, I.9)

E Recommendation:

Instrument calibration curves should be available with the field team and at LNED Base for converting cpm, to uC1, for the determi-nation of radio-iodine concentration in the air.

Additional train-ing in this area is needed by field team #3.

30 I

I

I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

==

Description:==

It was not clear who was responsible for recording emergency worker exposure either in the field, at the LNED trailer or at the EOF.

Recommendation:

Assign an individual who would be responsible for recording energency worker exposure readings.

I

==

Description:==

Team #1 did not have a team briefing before deployment.

Recommendation: It is suggested that a plan be implemented to assure that all necessary subjects are included in the briefing before the teams are dispatched.

==

Description:==

Teams #1 and #3 had briefing on plant conditions and meteorological conditions. These teams did not review such things as equipment I

checks, exposure control (they did receive dosimeters and record cards) and work roles. These should be routine checks before going into the field.

Recommendation: Teams #1 and #3 should have a check list to review all check-out procedures to be sure some are not overlooked during the rush to get dispatched to the field.

==

Description:==

Although the maps for Team #3 were excelle' t, it was difficult to n

determine the correct location of monitoring points.

Recommendation:

A better method needs to be designel o identify radiological I

monitoring points.

31 I

I I

I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: (cont'd)

==

Description:==

Proper radio procedures for Team #3 were not followed during the E

exercise.

E Recommendation: Additional training is necessary for the radio g

communicator on proper radio protocol.

5

==

Description:==

The radio communicator was not knowledgeable in radiological health and monitoring. This sometimes caused some confusion for E

Team #3 in the transfer of information.

3 Recommendation:

Additional training is suggested in radiological health and termi-nology for the radio communicator.

I I

I I

I I

32 I

I I

I I

2.1.4 EOF DOSE ASSESSMENT Narrative Facilities at the EOF were excellent. There were adequate space and I

equipment for all personnel in performing their assigned functions. There was even a separate room assigned to FEMA.

This would be an excellent room for other Federal agencies or State personnel if a private meeting room was needed.

Facilities were hardened to prevent entry of airborne contamination.

I Board space should be available for State personnel to post field team data so that it can be readily discussed with other State and Utility personnel.

Activation was adequate with exception of communication capabilities during the two hours while LNED staf f members are in route to the EOF.

If a release occurs before they arrive they may not be able to get into the EOF.

Both the administrative assistant and alternate were out sick; and I

consequently no information was recorded except for personal notes by each staff member.

Communication systems appeared to be adequate for LNED except for communicating and coordinating with the field monitoring teams.

(See Field Monitoring Activities) Four commercial lines were available to LNED; they I

were effectively used.

Noise in the EOF was a problem for the State person-nel because of the air samples being taken. This was later corrected.

The addition of a new LNED base radio station for communicating and coordinating directly with the field monitoring teams from the EOF will greatly increase I

their capability to protect the public.

Protective actions were consistent with the utility's recommendations.

I The staff showed professionalism and dedication to their assigned responsi-bilities. They used good judgment in confirming data and ecommending ac-tions. Use of KI was not recommended except to meet the exercise objectives.

I This was inconsistent with the scenario which did not require KI for emergency wo rke rs.

The approval of KI use is a little cumbersome because it must be ap-proved by the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Quality before it is re-commended for field monitoring teams.

Field teams are in and out of the plume, I

and should be well informed of the consequences of taking KI. Its use should be optional based on available plant information or the recommendation for other emergency workers or selected population.

The scenario was not adequate to demonstrate the use of KI under realistic conditions. The scenario would have been more effective if both Mississippi and Louisiana personnel had been given a common problem. The radiological data I

for the scenario was not clearly defined in the copies distributed.

Color cod-ing was not included for Section A and B which was confusing.

However, this was explained to controlle rs.

The scenario did not include any deposition for the ingestion pathway portion of the exercise held on the second day. Therefore, the objectives relating to the ingestion pathway were not demonstrated and still remain to be demonstrated within the six year cycle.

I

I I

DEFICIENCIES:

I!

15. Descriptinn:

No back-up communications exist at the EOF, and fiald teams cannot g

be coordinated from the EOF. Alternatives have been arranged to E

cover most contingencies but the field team coordination and in-formation flow is cumbersome at best.

(NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a.,

F.1.d., 1)

'tecommendation:

i LNED's radio (base station) should be installed in the EOF as soon as practical in order tu provide for direct coordination of field teams and a radio relay for back-up communications.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None.

I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

==

Description:==

Boards were not posted and field team information was not g

recorded in an observable form because field teams are not g

directed f rom the EOF and becausa full staff was not available.

Recommendation:

Posting of data would provide a common log of information for Louisiana, Mississippi and Utility coordinators to view.

It would also assist in briefing incoming shif t.

I I

I I

34 I

I 2.2 LOCAL EOCs AND SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS Parish participation included the Tensas Parish Emergency Operations Center, Media Center, the Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service, and the Tallulah Reception Center.

Detailed narratives and evaluations of individual performances are presented below under the appropriate location.

2.2.1 Tensas Parish Na rrative I

Tensas Parish, Louisiana, lies within the 10 mile EPZ of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The EOC is located in the Parish Courthouse, St.

Joseph.

The Town of St. Joseph itself is located 12 miles from the plant.

Howeve r, I

the Parish does have a mobile EOC which is being equipped for relocation should such become necessary in a real emergency.

Tensas Parish has agreed to assume the notification and evacuation I

responsibilities for the area of Madison Parish which lies within the EPZ.

No permanent residents live in this area but transient population could be present during an emergency since the area is a designated hunting and fish-I ing area. The sirens can be heard and the fish camps have been briefed in emergency response procedures.

I I

I I

I I

35 I

l 1

l I

I.

I 2.2.2 TENSAS PARISH EOC Narrative Tensas Parish EOC regular staf f members were on duty, as normal, when 5

the Notice of an Unusual Event was received at 8:04 a.m.

At 8:16 a.m. when 3

the situation was upgraded to an Alert, the staff initiated call up of emer-gency response personnel and placed them on standby.

In response at 9:30 a.m. to a Site Area Emergency, the Civil Defense Director activated those on standby; staffing was completed by 10:20 c.m.

The Parish EOC had no uncorrected deficiencies or unresolved problems from previous exercises. There were 20 objectives assigned to Tensas Parish for this exercise, 13 which specifically related to EOC activities. Nine of these objectives were met by this exercise. The three objectives relating to E

Ingestion Pathway emergency response capabilities could not be demonstrated E

due to inadequate scenario situations to warrant Parish responses.

Direction and leadership roles during the exercise were capably demon-strated by the Civil Defence Director and his new Assistant Coordinator. All staf f members and volunteer employees capably and seriously accomplished their assigned duties with continuous enthusiasm for the exercise.

Staf fing in addition to EOC staf f consisted of Police Jury representa-tives, Fish and Wildlife Commission, State Highway Patrol, LOEP representa-g tives, and local Departments of Health and Office of Family Security.

g Security measures were not demonstrated due to unavailability of suffi-cient State Police workers.

Their presence possibly would have curtailed the continuous flow of visitors in and out of the EOC.

Because the room is small, it of ten became difficult to hear while conducting required activities.

In future exercises, security measures should restrict entrance into the EOC g

to only those having a role in the on going, day-today functions of the EOC 3

or in the exercise itself.

Unofficial observers should not be allowed in order that those who must be there will have sufficient operational space.

Monitoring of personnel was promptly initiated and readings taken every 45 minutes using 0-20R and 0-200R dosimeters. Additionally, room readings were taken several times by the Director using a survey meter.

The EOC was adequately furnished with sufficient equipment.

Back-up 4

power is available if a primary power source failure occurs. All needed ma-terials such as appropriate maps, status board and Parish plans were in place EI and used as necessary during the exercise. The status board was updated ap-g propriately with all changes in status as soon as information was received.

The Director informally briefed all participants on status, proposed parish actions, and accomplished actions as they occurred. Logs were maintained by the Director and other staff of all incoming and outgoing calls, as well as other actions taken.

I 36 I

I I

The communications center is located in a separate building adjacent I

to the Courthouse where the EOC is located. Messages over the dedicated line are received here, recorded, then hand carried by a runner to the EOC for logging and posting of data to the status board.

Communication systems at the EOC consist of dedicated landline with police radio and commercial telephone as backups to the following:

State EOC, other local EOCs, reception centers, neighboring states and utility.

I Conferencing on the dedicated landline can tie together LNED, LOEP, GGNS, Mississippi OEP, highway patrol, Claiborne County Mississippi Civil Defense, Port Gibson Mississippi Police, and Tensas EOC and sheriff's office. Omni-I fax is also available.

Information can also be received via a radio backup and a telef ax machine utilizing telephone lines.

The overall communications system is adequate to receive information, I

alert and warn the public, and communicate with emergency response forces in Tensas Parish. The Parish has had problems with one or two of the sirens self-s ta rting. A new system has been approved for the Parish which will re-I place / supplement the current system. Demonstrations of radio communications capabilities reflect excellent training on all systems. Personnel is suffi-cient for extended communications operations when necessary.

The hard copy equipment jammed on Day 2 of the exercise creating a 15-minute delay in receiving hard copy information. However, telephone confir-mation was initiated immediately.

Communications staf f and the EOC staf f very capably interpreted and clarified the confusing information received from GGNS regarding the emer,

l gency action level changes and updates. Messages came ove r the hotline uhich could possibly provide confusing PARS to novice or inattentive re-

=

l cipients. Messages were announced as follows:

Message #9 (11:09 a.m.)

"... Evacuate to 2 miles in all sectors.

Shelter to 5 miles Sectors A-B-C."

Message #10 (11:40 a.m.) "... Evacuate to 2 miles out.

Shelter to 5 miles (no sectors given). New information i

l in 10 minutes."

Message #11 (11:55 a.m. )

"... Evacuate to 5 miles all sectors, shelter l

to 10 miles in A, B, C, N, P, Q."

l 37 l I

! I

I:

I1 In Message #11 Sector R was completely ignored. Although that sector g

is sparsely populated, it should not have been ignored in issuance of PARS 3

since it would not be possible for a windshif t from A, B, C to N, P, Q to escape effecting Sector R.

The Parish EOC staf f, in placing the messages on the status board,

~

correctly interpreted the intent of the messages and reflected the intended meanings on the board.

The Director issued evacuation orders for Sector R l

as well as N, P, Q.

5 Most activities relating to siren sounding, dispatch of personnel for g

roadblocks and parish monitoring assignments were simulated.

The Director g

explained the actions he was taking and those simulated for each problem arising during the event. The staf f, led by the Director's recommendations,

[

made each " controller-given" problem realistic by addressing other problems l

which they could foresee arising from the problem handed them. They either took or simulated creative responses to address these.

Ii l

i The Director personally met with representatives of the EBS Network to j

present his messages for broadcast.

Sirens were simulated. They had been

)

tested in November and 10 of 13 sirens worked correctly. They used this gl g

l situation to bring into play the need to simulate sending mobile sirens into the areas where the 3 sirens had failed in November.

r The identification of mobility-impaired persons had been updated earlier this year, and these were used for determining the number of vans to place on

[

I standby and later activate to transport the handicapped.

At the end of the plume exposure exercise, available staf f, as well as the reception center Director, were placed on standby for participation in the Ingestion Pathway exercise to begin the following day.

E l

3 Plume exposure activities necessary to demonstrate EOC capabilities were timely, efficiently and capably handled by the Director, Assistant Coordinator and their volunteer staf f workers.

No deficiencies or Areas Requiring Correc-tive Actions were identified.

l INGESTION PATHWAY - DAY II 3

l l

All Ingestion Pathway Objectives must be redemonstrated in a later exer-l cise because of the inadequacy of the scenario for establishing Ingestion g

Pathway situations. However, the following summarizes Tensas Parish EOC per-g formance on Day 2.

I I

38 I

l I

I The EOC activities for Ingestion Pathway exercising began at 9:15 a.m on December 4 with a pre-briefing by the Director to update players on the status of the exercise. He then announced that he would be available in an I

advisory capacity and that leadership of Ingestion Pathway activities would be assumed by the new Assistant Coordinator. Testing of capabilities at the Parish level during Ingestion Pathway exercising involves four specific ob-jectives: (1) communication with all locations, organizations, and field per I

sonnel; (2) Decision-making and coordination of emergency activities in the ingestion zone; and (3) Implementation of protective actions for Ingestion Pathway hazards; and (4) Recovery /Re-entry. Activities for these objectives from the E0C viewpoint were capably and effectively demonstrated to the limited degree possible using information and guidance provided by the State.

Pa rish plan involvement in Ingestion Pathway states that the Parish will implement I

protective action recommendations according to the State plan and as determined necessary by the State.

\\

Inadequacy of the scenario for providing both Ingestion zone situations and seriously af fecting plume situations which would result in Ingestion Zone

/

contaminants severely limited the participation of Tensas Parish.

Three EBS messages were issued by the Assistant Coordinator as they were received from L0EP. They were approved by him, and the Police Jury, then co-ordinated with Mississippi State prior to, or concurrent with, release for b roadca s t.

To the limited extent that the scenario and State decisions permitted, Tensas Parish demonstrated capabiities for Ingestion Pathway emergency re-I s po ns e s.

When the State notified the EOC that no contamination was found, the Assistant Director appropriately released all agencies and representa-tives on standby.

DEFICIENCIES: None I

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

16.

Description:

Capability to successfully perform Parish functions relating to l

Ingestion Pathway could not be demonstrated since they must imple-i ment decisions or recommendations made by State of Louisiana.

(NUREG-0654, II, I. 10, I. 11, J. 9, J. 11, M. 1)

Recommendation:

Tensas Parish must redemonstrate Ingestion Pathway response activi-ties within the six-year cycle for accomplishing all FEMA Objectives.

I 39 I

I

I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

==

Description:==

A continuous flow of traf fic into and out of the E0C Room caused much confusion, crowding within the small area, and disruption of activities.

Recommendation:

In future exercises or events, restrict the presence in the EOC to those who either have a required assignment at the EOC or who must conduct on-going day-to-day matters in the EOC room.

I

/I

\\

I I

I

~

I I

I 40 I

I I.

I I

I l

I 2.2.3 MEDIA CENTER Narrative Public information activities were conducted by the State of Louisiana and by Tensas Parish, Louisiana.

For the State, the Office of Emergency Pre-paredness and the Nuclear Energy Division were represented by spokespersons.

Normally the Governor's press secretary would be present, but was not for this exercise. The normal Tensas Parish public information officer (PIO)

I also was not present for this exercise. The parish was represented at news briefings by Parish Civil Defense of ficials.

The Media Center for this exercise was a single room located in the Parish Agricultural Extension of fice adjacent to the Parish courthouse (in which the Parish E0C is located). This is not the facility that would normally be used I

as the Media Center.

If it were, it would be found seriously lacking in many of the qualities that an adequate Media Center should have.

Parish plans call for using the courtroom and adjacert office space on the second floor of the Parish Courthouse as the Media Center during an actual emergency. However, I

it could not be used as a media center during this exercise as Court was in session.

It apparently has several advantages over the facility that was used for this exercise, the most important being that it would permit P10s to con-I duct their information gathering and verification activities in private rather than across the table from news reporters. Efforts should be made to use, for the next exercise, the Media Center that would be put into use in an actual eme rgency.

In general, the State and the Parish demonstrated their ability to gather pertinent information and disseminate it to the news media and the public.

In I

doing so, they demonstrated either fully or partially four of the six exercise objectives that applied to this activity. There were rough spots, and at times there was confusion; but to their credit, the PI0s managed in each case to smooth out the rough spots and eliminate the confusion in a reasonable amount of time.

The Media Center was activated upon the arrival of the PI0s from LOEP and lE LNED. The State dispatched its representatives at the Alert stage, resulting

'E in a timely activation of the Media Center. Mobilization was only partially demonstrated for this exercise because the State participants were dispatched from Natchez rather than from their normal work stations in Baton Rouge.

There were virtually no problems with the commercial telephones that served as the primary link between the Media Center and other energency facilities.

I However, the State, Parish, and Utility should recognize the limitations of this system should it be called upon in an actual emergency and attempt to understand the implications of those limitations.

For example, it is unlikely lE that this Media Center could function if reporters from other locations began lg calling in for information because the'f would tie up the few phones that are vital to the PI0s for incoming calls from other emergency facilities and for I

41 i

,I l

l

I I

outgoing calls to gather information prior to dissemination.

PI0s in this facility are extremely dependent upon a commercial phone system that may not E

be reliable in a real emergency.

There is a need for additional telephones 5

to be available for State and Local PI0s. Also, reporters would need access to phones in a real emergency.

Despite some problems, the Media was briefed in a clear, accurate and timely manner. There was a problem at one point in describing protective act ions. While the State PI0s announced protective action recommendations in terms of numbered areas (including one number which was not printed on the available maps), the Parish announced protective action recommendations in terms of lettered sectors (R, for example). This problem could have been B

avoided if: (1) the Parish and State PI0s consulted prior to the parish repre-3 sentative briefing the news media; (2) both parties described protective ac-tion areas in terms that are familiar to the public (in this case, the calendars distributed to the public identified these areas by number); and (3) the State r,ef rain from announcing recommendations and announce only those actions that the Parish has decided to implement.

(This is particularly important when you consider the confusion that could result from actions announced by the media prior to EBS messages being issued.) On a positive note, the PI0s took prompt steps to eliminate the conf usion that had been created. They also did an ad-mirable job of relating information and following it with an explanation of g

all technical terms they may have used.

3 As noted in the previous discussion, there was not in all cases consulta-tion between the State and Parish PI0s prior to news briefings.

Although the facility is partly to blame (no private place for PI0s to confer), all should keep in mind the need to exchange information prior to briefings to avoid the possibility of conflicting information being released.

There was no coordinated rumor control ef fort.

Although State PI0s attempted to function to a limited extent in this capacity, it is not likely that their telephone numbers would be widely available in the event of a real emergency.

In f ct, it may be better that they are not, considering the limitations of the phone system and the number of phones. The only published numbers for membe rs of the public to call for information are those published in the emer-gency preparedness calendars and information brochures.

In Louisiana, those numbers are for LNED in Baton Rouge and for Tensas Parish (the Sheriff's of-fice). There seems to be some question about how or whether they would serve E

as rumor control phones during a radiological emergency at Grand Gulf.

Al-E though there may be no easy solution to this problem, efforts should be made to resolve it.

The objective was not satisfactorily demonstrated for this g

exercise.

E Based on observations and discussions with State and local representatives, there are many reasons to doubt whether a media center can work in St. Joseph or anywhere in Tensas Parish.

If the State of Louisiana intends to operate a single-state media center (a joint center is preferable), then it may be advan-tageous to establish it in Baton Rouge where both the PI0s and the media would have adequate resources, phones, etc.

This could be done without diminishing the Parish role in disseminating information.

42 I

I I

FEMA Objectives 1, 4, 5, 24, 25 and 26 were applicable to the Media Center for this exercise.

Objective 1 was partialy met since the media representatives were dispatched f rom Natches rather than from normal work I

stations in Baton Rouge. Objective 4 was not met since the Facility used was not adquate. Objective 5 was met by State and Parish, however, concern should be directed toward the limitations of the communications system should it be used for an actual emergency.

Objective 24 was met but concern should be directed to solving the problems which arose in describing Protective Ac-tions (see Narrative for full description). Objective 25 was only partially I

met by State and Parish since coordination between PIO's was sought prior to only some news briefing (see Narrative for full discussion). Objective 26 was not met as there was no coordinated rumor control ef fort during this ex-e rci se.

(see Narrative for discussion)

DEFICIENCIES: None AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

17.

Description:

Facility used for the operation of Media activities is not adequate to allow successful conduct of Media Center.

Recommendation:

Efforts must be made to establish, and demonstrate use of a facility I

adequate for the successful conduct of media activities by State and Parish media of ficials.

18.

Description:

I Advance coordination between all PIO's was not obtained prior to i

(

all news briefings, although some limited coordination was obtained a t times.

Recommendation:

To avoid contradictory or conf using releases of information by the media, coordination should be obtained prior to all issuances of l g all press releases.

l g 19.

Description:

I There was no coordinated rumor control ef forts although this was a stated objective for the exercise.

Recommendation:

Established procedures for Rumor Control should be reviewed, and determination made as to their adequacy.

I

I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

==

Description:==

Communication system, although it performed for this exercise, probably would not be adequate to allow for successful media telephone activities during an actual emergency.

Recommendation:

Concern should be directed toward increasing the number of tele-phones for use by State and Parish PIOS to improve communication capabilities at Media Center.

==

Description:==

Although the media was briefed in a timely manner, descriptions of protective actions were not uniformly described by PI0s, Parish, and Utility.

Recommendation:

One uniform designation of af fected areas should be used by all response organizations to eliminate confusing information being released to the public.

I I

I' I

I I l I

I I

I I

2.2.4 TALLULAH RECEPTION CENTER Narrative The Director of the Reception Center was placed on standby at 8:30 a.m. by a call from the Tensas Parish EOC Director. At 10:15 a.m.

it was I

requested that the Center be activated.

This was accomplished quickly and at 11:00 a.m. communications were established between the Reception Center and the EOC.

I Activation and staf fing were ef ficiently demonstrated. Agencies parti-cipating and their roles were: Civil Defense Director - overall coordination; I

Home Demonstration Council - monitoring and registration; Family Security -

registration of decontaminated; Council on Aging Relocation; Public Health medical needs; High School students - evacuees.

Excellent participation was demonstrated by all voluntary groups.

They were interested and followed instructions; however, all expressed desire for additional training for better performance. The Civil Defense Director demon-I strated good leadership qualities even though he had been in his present posi-tion for only one week, and had no back-up coverage dtie the to resignation of his assistant one 6ay prior to the exercise. He showed confidence in volun-I teers, was courteous, and expressed deep appreciation to all workers for their help. He realized he needs more help to enable him to give better leadership and guidance to the total reception / relocation process. He could also benefit from available training, especially Congregate Care Supervision.

Prior to the next exercise, a request to the school for a select group of students to do role play, including specific needs to be addressed would challenge both regis-tration and relocation processes.

There also is a need for more tables and chai rs.

The monitoring / decontamination volunteers were able to very ef fectively perform their duties, with only a brief training session.

The designation of a lead registrar would facilitate the paper flow and provide the Facility Manager with all necessary forms in an orderly manner.

I This procedure would be necessary for establishing the whereabouts of dis-placed families from a central location.

I DEFICIENCIES: None AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None I

I 45 I

I

I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

I

==

Description:==

The " evacuees" were unfamiliar with what they were to do at the reception center.

Recommendation:

In future exercises, pre-selection, good orientation and some rehearsal of " role playing" problems of evacuees would benefit the whole process and provide opportunities for workers to test their responses in preparation for an actual emergency.

I I

I I

I I

I I

46 I

I I

I I

2.2.5 MADISON PARISH HOSPITAL AND AMBULANCE SERVICE Narrative The Madison Parish Hospital is located in Tallaluh, Louisiana, approxi-mately 2 miles from Interstate 20.

The hospital also operates the local ambulance (EMS) service.

Since this hospital is currently undergoing reno-I vation, it was necessary to simulate a large part of the medical exercise j

at the facility.

The exercise play was also hampered by an actual emergency.

Based on the exercise evaluation, it was determined by the three Federal evaluators that the two FEMA Objectives 30 and 31 applicable to these medical activities could not be evaluated.

Problems encountered and level of perform-I ances makes it necessary to request a retesting of the activities in a remedial drill. Tne drill must be conducted by June 4,1986.

The following is a narrative summary of the findings of performance evalu-I ated during the medical exercise.

A communication call was received by the hospital that two persons who I

were not contaminated were being brought to the hospital by local ambulance.

According to the emergency room nurse, these persons were monitored both at the decontamination center and by the ambulance crew and were determined not to be contaminated.

Since they were not contaminated prior to arrival or I

transport and due to the normal high activity in the hospital emergency. room, these persons should have been eliminated f rom the exercise.

A second communication call was received by the emergency room staff that a third person who was contaminated and injured was being being brought to the hospital. At first the ER nurse did.not know who had sent the message I

and ecoid not verify the message.

She later was able to contact the person who had telephoned the message and was able to verify it.

The hospital did not have radiation warning placards. Hospital personnel stated that they would put paper over the area in which the contaminated per-son would be transported to the treatment room. No mention was made about the posting of placards or the roping off and securing of the area to prevent the spread of contamination.

Hospital personnel who actually performed the decon-tamination were not wearing dosimeters. During the exercise, EMS and hospital personnel did not demonstrate dressing out in protective clothing because they did not have any.

I 47 I

I

When the injured contaminated person was transported into the hospital, proper contamination procedures were not established to prevent the possible spread of radiation. At the conclusion of the exercise, emergency room per-sonnel did not demonstrate how they would exit the radiological management E

area used to treat the patient.

Also, neither the vehicle which transported I

the contaminated patient nor the EMS personnel was surveyed. Also, security and decontamination of the vehicle was not demonstrated.

A post exercise meeting was held with persons participating in t.t e ex-e rci se.

At this time it was learned that personnel were not familiar in setting up a radiological management area and that they were not trained in exiting a radiation area.

DEFICIENCIES:

20.

Description:

Both Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and hospital personnel need necessary radiological training in the proper handling of an injured, contaminated individual, including demonstration of procedures on how g

to decontaminate an injured contaminated patient and how to properly E

set up a radiological management room (including proper demonstration of " Hotline" and " Exit" procedures) etc.

(NUREG-0654, II, 0.)

Recommendation:

Insure that proper training is received prior to remedial drill.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

21.

Description:

Proper demonstration EMS personnel following the removal of the contaminated patient.

Proper security of the EMS vehicle should also be demonstrated along with proper disposal and security of the contaminated waste.

(NUREG-0654, II, 0.)

Recommendation:

Insure that the above training and techniques are demonstrated at the remedial drill.

I I

48

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: (cont'd) 22.

Description:

There was inadequate communications capabilities and coordination demonstrated between the Madison Civil Defense Director.

EMS and hospital. (NUREG-0654, II, F.)

Recommendation:

Proper communication between all three parties should be established and coordinated before the remedial drill is conducted.

I I

I I

!I

'I

'I 4,

I I

REMEDIAL ACTIONS FOR THE GRAND CULF EXERCISE Deficiencies and Areas Proposed Actual Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local Comnletion With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions De Dm for Correction And Detenninat ion of Adequacy or Inadequacy State Emergency Operations Canter (EOC)

DEFICIENCIES:

1.

==

Description:==

The primary dedicated hot-line telephone systems does not allow the State of Louisiana opportunity to initiate conversation with the State of Missis-sippi or other affected pa rties. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.b)

Racommendation:

Redesign dedicated phone system to allow for two-way or multi-contact capability.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

2.

==

Description:==

Due to lack of participa-tion (except for the la Department of Agriculture)

M M

MI M

M M

MI M

M M

M M

M M

l

m m

m m

m M

Deficiencies and Areas Proposed Actual Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local

"*E " ' "

With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions U"'"

for Correction And Detennination of Adequacy or Inadequacy State EOC (cont'd) 2.

==

Description:==

(cont'd) of agencies having a response assignment at the State EOC, capabil-ity for activation and staffing could not be determined adequate (NUREG-0654, II, E.1, E.2).

Recommendation:

Those agencies and per-sonnel having a response role at the State EOC should be required to participate during the next exercise so that determination of cap-ability to mobilize and staff can be established.

3.

==

Description:==

Message handling capabil-ities were not success-fully demonstrated due to failure to actually send

FEttA Evaluation of Deficiencies and Areas P o osed Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local Comoletion With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions Date for Correction And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy State EOC (cont'd) 3.

==

Description:==

(cont'd) messages or at least to fully document their simu-lated dispatch and receipt i

methods (NUREG-0654, II, E. ).

Recommendation:

All incoming and outgoing message handling procedures should be fully demonstra-ted or documentation care-fully performed to verify the State's capablity.

4.

==

Description:==

j A satisfactory back up l

communictions link between the State EOC and Tensas Parish has not been estab-lished (NUREG-0654, II, F.1 ).

Recommendation:

Capability should be es-ofhaih0byStaEed6 bon a

m 555 5

5 55 sus e

um m

ms Ems smE sus em

-g h3 m

m m

m m

m m 7 rm r7 ra na r-- 7 F-- a

_ro n-FEHA Evaluation of g

Deficiencies and Areas Proposed State and Local I

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and I.ocal (L) gg,

g,,

tJith FD!A/RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions g

Corrective Actions De Da u And Detennination of for Correction Adequacy or Inadequacy State EOC (cont'd) 4.

Recommendation: (cont'd) the dedicated line, or es-tablishment of a two-way radio system.

5.

==

Description:==

Capability to success-fully perform State EOC functions relating to Ingestion Pathway was not successfully or full demonstrated.

(NUREG-0654, II, I. 10, I. 11, J. 9, J. II, M. 1)

Recommendation:

State EOC must redemon-strate Ingestion Pathway response activities within the six-year cycle for ac-complishing all FDIA objec-tives.

u LJ

'"^ "" "

Deficiencies and Areas Proposed Actual Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and I.ocal (L)

State and Local Comnletion With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions DC Date for Correction And Detenntnation of Adequacy or Inadequacy State EOC (cont'd)

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

6.

==

Description:==

Decisions made by execu-tive staf f were not pro-vided in briefing form to the Ope rations staf f.

Recommendation:

Staf f members should be kept knowledgeable through briefing on all activities at the LNED lleadquarters.

State LNED lleadquarters AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR CORRECTIV B ACTION:

7.

==

Description:==

The authorization to ad-minister KI was unwarran-ted based on the projected and sample data.

The De-pa rtment of IIealth policy and LNED lleadquarter's I

m m

m m

e

-' g pg m

m m

m M

mul F7 F7 F7 F-a r.- U T n'

fella Evaluation of Deficiencies and Areas P o osed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions De And Detennination of for Correction Adequacy or Inadequacy l

l State LNED lleadquarters (cont'd) 1 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

(cont'd) 7.

(cont'd)

SOPS dif fer as to the threshold for administer-ing KI. (NUREG-0654, II, J. 10.e, f.)

Recommendation:

A clear policy statement should be formulated re-garding exposure levels warranting the authoriza-tion to administer KI.

SOPS and the plan should then be revised to re-flect the policy state-ment.

Decision-make rs should be trained in these resultant policy I

changes.

l l

8.

==

Description:==

Dif ferent maps were used by State and Local agencies

• Edhrlggg usggthEtSN k$

II,J.10.a)[NUREG-0654, b2on zonesE i

,u l

Deficiencies and Areas Proposed Actual Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local

, *P With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions U '"

for Correction And Detennination of Adequacy or Inadequacy State LNED Headquarters (cont'd)

Recommendation:

All response organizations and Utility should assure consistency in identifica-tion of protective action areas by using identical zone designation maps.

9.

==

Description:==

Capability to successfully perform all required f unc-tions relating to Inges-tion Pathway was not fully demonstrated. (NUREG-0654, II; I.10, 1.11, J.9, J.ll, M.1)

Recommendation:

LNED must redemons trate Ingestion Pathway emer-gency activities within the six year cycle for accomplishing all FEMA objectives.

B e

u

E E

Deficiencies and Areas FEMA Evaluation of Proposed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local gg Comoletion With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions De DMe for Correction And Detennination of Adequacy or Inadequacy State LNED Headquarters (cont'd 10.

Description:

M:dia releases which were verbally passed to the EOF, Tensas Parish and the Medio Center were not always pre-pared in hard copy form and transmited for verificatior of the verbal decision.

(NUREG-0654, II., E)

Recommendation:

For future exercises, mes-sages should actually be draf ted and distributed and simulation of media release State LNED Headquarters kept to a minimum.

Addi-tionally, telephone mes-sage logs should be main-tained as record of commu-nications in the executive l

room.

l t

l l

fella Evaluation of Deficiencies and Areas l'

osed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (I.)

State and Local

ompt tion Comnletion Ce4 M M Ws With FEMA /RAC Recommendations l'roposed Corrective Actions Date And Detennination of for Correction Adequacy or Inadequacy

! State LNED Headquarters j (cont'd)

Field Team Staging Area and l LNED Field Monitoring Control DEFICIENCIES:

11.

Description:

Direction and control of tl e three field monitoring teau s was unsatisfactory. The conveyance of information from the LNED staff at the EOF to the Field Monitoring Teams via the field team coordinator and dispatcher was awkward and inef ficient.

I m

m m

m

M M

M-M M

M M

M M

Deficiencies and Areas Proposed Actual Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local g

Comnletion With FDIA/RAC RecommendationE Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions De Date for Correction And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy Field Team Staging Area and LNED Field Monitoring Control (cont'd) 11.

Description:

(cont'd)

This arrangement resulted in the field teams not being effectively tracked and inaccurate information being transferred between all three locations. This resulted in Objectives 3, 4, and 36 not being met.

(NUREG-0654, 11, A. 2.a.,

F.1.d, 1)

Recommendation:

Consider directing the field monitoring teams by two-way radio from the EOF.

Deficiencies and Areas FEt1A Evaluation of osed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and I.ocal (1,)

State and I.ocal Coml d on With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions De Date for Correction And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy Field Monitoring Teams DEFICIENCIES:

12. D:scription:

Direction and control of the three field monitor-ing teams was unsatisfac-to ry.

The conveyance of information from the LNED staff at the EOF to the Field Monitoring Teams via the field team coor-dinator and dispatcher was awkward and inef fi-cient. This arrangement resulted in the field teams not being ef fec-tively tracked and inac-curate information being transferred between all three locations. This re-sulted in Objectives 3, 4, and 36 not being met.

(NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a.,

F.1.d, 1)

I e

O I

IM mi m

m m

m

m M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M FEMA Evaluation of Deficiencies and Areas P

iosed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local Comnletion With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions DC Dm for Correction And Detenninat ion of Adequacy or Inadequacy Field Monitoring Teams (cont'd:

12. (cont'd)

Recommendation:

Consider directing the field monitocing teams by two-way radio from the EOF.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

13.

Description:

Team #3 had survey meters and the air sampling pump which were not calibrated within the past year.

(NUREG-0654, II, H.10.,

I.9)

Recommendtion:

Team #3 should ensure that their equipment is calibra-ted and calibration dates noted on the instruments.

?

Deficiencies and Areas FEttA Evaluation of posed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local sledon With FDIA/RAC Recommendations l'roposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions for Correction And Detenntnation of Adequacy or Inadequacy Field Monitoring Teams (cont'd:

14.

Description:

Team #3 did not have the capability to measure radio-iodine levels in the air.

The appropriate calibration curves were not available with the field team or at LNED Base to determine con-centration in uCi/cc.

Or, they were not si.f-ficiently trained to make the conversion.

(NUREG-0654, II, I.9)

Recommendation:

Instrument calibration i

curves should be avail-able with the field team and at LNED Base for con-l ve rting cpm, to uCi, for the determination of radio-iodine concentra-tion in the air.

Addi-tional training in this area is need by field team #3.

M M

M M

m M

M m

M M

M m

m a

e m

e m

e

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

FEttA Evaluation of Deficiencies and Areas l'

osed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local

• E With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions I' ' "

for Correction And Detennination of Adequacy or Inadequacy EOF Dose Assessment DEFICIENCIES:

15.

Description:

No back-up communica-tions exist at the EOF, and field teams cannot be coordinated from the EOF.

Alternatives have been arranged to cover most contingencies but the field team coordina-tion and information flow is cumbersome at bast.

(NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a.,

F.1.d., 1)

Recommendation:

LNED's radio (base sta-tion) should be installed in the EOF as soon as practical in order to pro-vide fo r direct coordina-tion of field teams and a radio relay for back-up communications.

6

Deficiencies and Areas FEttA Evaluation of P

nosed y

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and I.ocal (L).

State and I ocal

,g

,g

,3 gg With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions p

De for Correction And Detennination of j

Adequacy or Inadequacy l

l Tensas Parish EOC l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS :

16.

Description:

Capability to success-fully perform Parish functions relating to Ingestion Pathway could not be demon-strated since they must implement de-cisions or recommen-dations made by State of Louisiana. (NUREG-0654, II, 1.10, I.ll,J.9, J.11, M.1)

Recommendation:

Tensas Parish must re-demonstrate Ingestion Pathway response ac-tivities within the six year cycle for ac-complishing all FEMA Objectives.

mamt una e

sus seg gas e

a me IEEE m

aus nas een ese sus num m

-3 E

E E

E E

E E

.E E

E

.E E

M

.m m

m m

FEffA Evaluation of Deficiencies and Areas P

o ed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local

"*E IJith FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions U"l Date for Correction hd Dhhlm of Adequacy or Inadequacy Media Center AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

17.

Description:

Facility used for the ope ration of Media ac-tivities is not adequate to allow successful cone duct of Media Center.

Recommendation:

Ef forts must be made to establish, and demonstrate use of a facility adequate for the successful conduct of media activities by State and Parish media of-ficials.

18.

Description:

Advance coordination be-tween all PIO's was not obtained prior to all news briefings, although some limited coordination was obtained at times.

m V

9 Deficiencies and Areas FEttA Evaluation of g,roposed g

Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and I.ocal (L)

State and Local C m W on With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions DC De for Correction And Detennination of Adequacy or Inadequacy Media Center (cont'd)

18. (cont'd)

Recommendation:

To avoid contradictory or confusing releases of information by the media, coordination should be obtained prior to all issuances of all press releases.

19.

Description:

There was no coordinated rumor control ef forts al-though this was a stated objective for the exer-cise.

Recommendation:

Established procedures for

[

Rumor Control should be l

reviewed, and determina-f tion made as to their l

t adequacy.

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

m m

m m

e m

m m

m m

m M

M M

m' W m

m M

M M

M M

M M

Deficiencies and Areas FEMA Evaluation of Proposed Actual Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local

ompletion Comnletion With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions Date Date for Correction And Detenntnation of Adequacy or Inadequacy Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Services DEFICIENCIES:

20.

Description:

Both Eme rgency Medical Services (EMS) and hos-pital personnel need necessary radiological training in the proper handling of an injured, contaminated individual, including demonstration of procedures on how to decontaminate an injured contaminated patient and how to properly set up a radiological manage-ment room (including proper demonstration of

" Hotline" and " Exit" procedures) etc.

(NUREG-0654, II, 0.)

Recommendation:

Insure that proper train-ing is received prior to remedial drill.

3 1

Deficiencies and Areas

'"^

Proposed Actual Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and t.ocal (L)

State and Local ch Comnletion With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions De Da u for Correction And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy Madison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service (cont'd)

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

21.

Description:

Proper demonstration of surveying the ambulance vehicle (including pa-tient compartment) and EMS personnel following the removal of the con-taminated patient.

Prope r security of the EMS vehi-cle should also be demon-strated along with proper disposal and security of the contaminated waste.

(NUREG-0654, II, 0.)

Recommendations:

Insure that the above training and techniques are demonstrated at the

, remedial drill.

$ W M

M M

M M

M M

M E

M m

M M

M M

m

~

Deficiencies and Areas Proposed Actual Requiring Corrective Actions State (S) and Local (L)

State and Local Comoletion g

9 With FEMA /RAC Recommendations Proposed Corrective Actions Corrective Actions De Date for Correction And Detennination of Adequacy or Inadequacy Medison Parish Hospital and Ambulance Service (cont'd) 22.

Description:

There was inadequate com-munications capabilities and coordination demon-strated between the Madi-son Civil Defense Director, EMS and hospital.

(NUREG-0654, II, F.)

Recommendation:

Proper communication be-tween all three parties should be established and coordinated before the re-medial drill is conducted.

o

I' 1

4 EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 4.1

SUMMARY

OF FEMA OBJECTIVES REMAINING TO BE MET I

Table 2 on the following pages provides listing of those FEMA objectives which according to the FEMA RAC Chairman, have not been satisfactorily met or tested and which should be incorporated into the exercise objectives on or by the sixth year of the six-year period in which all the objectives must be tested. These should be considered in the development of future exercise objectives; as well as those FEMA objectives which, although previously tested g

and satisfactorily demonstrated, must be tested and evaluated during any full g

participation exercise of offsite State and Local response capabilities.

I I

I I

I I

I I

70 I

I I

I I

r I

I TABLE 2 Sumraary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met I

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station As of February 27, 1985 i

FEMA Objectives Jurisdiction 1.

Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and State (not met) activate facilities promptly.

3.

Demonstrate ability to make decisions State (not met) and to coordinate emergency activities.

I 4.

Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and State / Local (not met) displays to support emergency operations.

5.

Demonstrate ability to communicate with State (not met)

I all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

I 7.

Demonstrate appcopriate equipment and pro-State (not met) cedures for determining ambient radiation levels.

8.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pro-State (not met) cedures for measurement of airborne radio-iodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.

9.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pro-State (partially met)

I cedures for collection, transport, analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water and milk.

11.

Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the State (not met) public via ingestion pathway exposure, based g

on field data; and to determine appropriate

, g protective measures based on PACS and other relevant f act o rs.

l 12.

Demonstrate ability to implement protective State (not met) 5 actions for ingestion pathway hazards.

Local (partially met)

I lI 71 I

I

I TABLE 2 (cont'd)

FEMA Objectives Jurisdiction I

20.

Demonstrate ability to continu-Local (not met) ously monitor and control emer-l gency worker exposure.

5 21.

Demonstrate ability to make the decision, State (not met) based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

22.

Demonstrate ability to supply and administer Local (not tested)

KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

24.

Demonstrate ability to brief the media in State / Local (not met) a clear, accurate and timely manner.

25.

Demonstrate ability to provide advance co-State / Local (not met) ordination of information released.

26.

Demonstrate ability to establish and operate State / Local (not met) rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

29.

Demonstrate adequate equipment and pro-Local (not met) g cedures for decontamination of emergency 3

workers, equipment and vehicles.

30.

Demonstrate adequacy of EMS transportation, Local (not met) personnel and procedures for handling con-taminated individuals including proper de-contamination of vehicle and equipment.

31.

Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities Local (not met) and procedures for handling contaminated g

individuals.

g 32.

Demonstrate ability to identify need for, State (partially met) request, and obtain Federal assistance.

I I

72 I

I

r I

I TABLE 2 (cont'd)

FEMA Objectives Jurisdiction I

34.

Demonstrate ability to determine and imple-State / Local (partially met) ment appropriate measures for controlled I

recovery and reentry.

36.

Demonstrate the adeqtacy, operability and State (not met)

I effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communica-tions procedures and methods.

38.

Demonstrate capability to ef fectively pro-State (not met) cess all incoming messages in a timely manner.

I I

I lI lI

,I I

g n

iI I

3 I

I 4.2 OBJECTIVES MET OR YET TO BE MET Table 3 on the following pages provides elements, December 3-4, 1985 exercise objectives, jurisdictional responsibility, exercise dates, defi-ciencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions noted during past exercises, and dates on which objectives were met.

I' I

I I

I I

I' I

I u

74 I

I I

I'

TABLE 3 FEMA OBJECTIVES TRACKINC CllART - CRAND CULF NUCLEAR STATION Jurisdictional Deficiency / Area Date NUSEC-0654 Esercise objective Requiring Correc-Objective FEMA Objectives Reference Responsibility Date of Live Action (by State Local Esercise Tracking No.)

State 14 cal Met 1.

Demonstrate ability to mobilize E.1 E.2 Demonstrate ability to mobilize X

X 12/3-4/85 staff and activate facilities (S&Ll staff and activate facilities 5

promptly.

2/27/85 2/2785 promptly (1) lobjective for dich capability 12/3/85 - #2 Not Het shovId be demonstrated during (State EOC) 12-3-85 12-3-85 each full participation exercisel 2.

Demonst rate ability to fully A.2.a.,

staff facilities and maintain A.4 I

X 4-11-84 4-11-84 staffing around the clock.

IS&L) 3.

Demonstrate ability to make A.I.d.,

Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate A. I.e.,

. decisions and to coordinate X

X 12/3-4/85 12/3/85 fil, 12 smergency activities.

A.2.a.

emergency activities (2)

Field Monitoring IS&L)

Staging Area and

.l Objective for dich capability Teams must be re-2/27/85 should be demonst rated during tested in Remedial each full participation esercieel drill

1. 6 (State EOC)

Not Het 12-3-85i 12-3-85 I

j i

1 l

i i

[

l

\\

g g

g m

m m

m M

M M

M M

M E

E L

E M

M E

E E

E O

E E

?

T A nt.F. I Gmt inued Deficiency / Area Dat e Jurisdictional acquiring Correc-Ob jec t i we NUEEC-0654 Esercise objective R es pons ibil i t y Date of Live Act ion (by wt FtJtA ob ject ives Reference State Local Esercise Tracking No.)

State t.uc a t Demonstrate adequacy of J.10. a. h.

Demonstrate adequacy of facilities X

g 12/3-4/85 Deficiencies on facilitics, equipment, maps and and displays to support emergency 11/3/81 & 1/26/83 1/26/83 displays to support caergency ope rations (3) 12/3/85 Not Het Not Het "I DEI""S-gggtg

1. 81,NED Hdqt ra.

12/3/85 12/3/85 l Objective f or which capability

1. 17 Media Center (Media) should be demonst rated during 2-27-85 each full participation esercieel 5.

Demonst rat e a bil i t y t o com-F.

Demonstrate ability to communicate 12/3-4/85 12/3/85 fl, 4 Not Het X

X municate with att appropriate (S&L) with all appropriate locations, (State EOC) 12/3/85 12/3/85 locat ions, organizations and organizations, and field personnel ill, 12 (Field field personnel.

(4)

Team Staging Area and Teamsg lobject ive for dich capability (EOF hse I

should be demonstrated during Assessment each full participation esercisel

1. 22 Madison 6.

Demonst rate ability to mobilize 1.8, Demonstrate ability to mobilize g

12/3-4/85 N/A sad deploy field monitoring

{s&Lj g and deploy field monitoring 1/26/83 tese. in a timely fashion.

teams in a timely fashion (S-5) 12/3/85 l 0b iec t i ve f or which capabilit y thestJ be demonetsted during each full participation esercisej

/

e-r-

TABl.E 3 Cont a n.ecil ineticiency/ Area Date Jurisdictional itequi r ing Cor rec-Ot, jec t i ve g

Nutti.C-065 4 Emercise Object ive Resgionsibil it y Date of aive Action (by Het State Local Esercise Tracking No.)

State Lucal FEMA Ote lec t s wes tieference Demonstrate appropriate equip-N/A 12/3/85 12-3-85 #13 7,

sk u.e.i rai c appropr iat e equip-1.8., 3.11.

ment and procedures for deter-(Field Monitoring

.wns and ps oc edures f or det er-ll.8-S&Ll mining ambient radiation Hust be Retested Not Het

.. ing a t,iena radiat sun levels.

l1.11-51 levels (S-6) in Remedial Drill 12/3/8:

N/A l us. ges t s we sur whsch capaha lit y me.oul d t,e esen.on st rat ed Juring eacle f ull pas s ocipation esercisel pfg 12/3-4/85 12-3-85 #14 8,

tie onstrase appropr iate equip-I.9.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment X

nt anJ pr ocedures sur lS) and procedures for measurement of (Field Honitoring 11/4/81 m,c a s.o r e me nt of aist orne raJiu-airborne radio-todine concentra-Teams) Hust be re-Not Het tions as low as 10~7uC1/cc in the tested in Remedial 12/3/85 N/A s.Jine concent rat ions as luu Presence of noble gases. (S-7)

Drill III i.Cile c in s he presence as of seul.le gases.

l Ot ges t ive f or whicit c a pabi l i t y St.o 3 d t.e dem.osant r ated Jur ing each f ull part icipat ion esercisel 4/A 12/3-4/85 Hust be Retested Pa rt ial ly W.

laceonsarate appropr iate equip-1.8.

Demonstrate appropriate equipsient X

in Remedial Drill 12/3/85 and pr ocrJure= f or l S&l. l and procedures for collection, since all teams tulleision, t rans por t, analysis transport, and analysis of ment did not take os samples ut soil, vegetation, samples of soil, vegetation, samples snow, water, and milk. (S-8) snow, wat er anJ. ilk.

l Ot. i. a s e we sue whish capabilit y m t. l.3 4.e.trau.eist s at ed J.es s e g e s te s ull pas s is igt ion c arec ise j

~

W W

W W

M M

M M

M M

M M

M LN M

M rw TABLE 3 Cont inued Deficiency / Area Date Jurisdictional Requiring Correc-Ob jec t i ve NUaEC-0654 Esercise Objec tive Respons i bil i t y Date of tive Action (by Het FLMA Ub ject ives Reference State Local Esercise Tracking No.)

State imcal 10.

Ih unstrate abs t e t y to project 1.10.,

3 Jo. age t o t he public via plume J.lo.

Demonstrate ability to project N/A 12/>4/85 N/A cr posur e, bancJ on plant and listo-Sl dosage to the public via plume secIJ Jata, and to determine lJ.10-1/26/83 exposure, based on plant asag

'12/3/85

.pp,opriate protective acamures S&LI X

X field data, and to determine ap-band oa PACS, available propriate protective measures os.c i t er, evacua t s on * *me based on PACS, available shel-est is.at es and all other appro-ter, evacuation time estimates praate factors.

and all other appropriate fac-tors. (S-9) l Ob jec t i ve for which capability th uld be demonstrated during each full participation esercisel ll. IA-monst rat e abilit y t o pro ject 1.10.,

Demonstrate ability to protect 3

N/A 12/3-4/85 12/2/85 Not Met N/A

.sosage t o t he public via inges-I.II.,

dosage to the public via inges-

1. 15 (State EOC) 12/3/85 e ion pat hway es posure, based on J.ll, tion pathway exposure based on

1. 9 (LNED liqtrs) ticIJ Jata; and t o eletermine (S) field data; and to determine a ppr opr i a t e protective measures appropriat.e protective measures leased on pacs and othe, based on PACS and other rele-r=Icwant tactors.

vant factors (S-10)

12. Ikaan st r a t e abilit y to i mpl e-J.9, J.II.

Demonstrate ability to imple-x x

12/3-4/85 12/3/85 Not Het Pa rtially ment pe ut ec t ive act ions f or lJ.9-S&Lg ment protective actions for in-

1. 5 (State EOC).

12/3/85 Met engestion pat hway leazards.

l J. Il-5 )

gestion pathway hazards.

1. 9(LNED Hdqtre) 12/3/85 (S-II, L-5)

1. 16(Tensas Par.)

E TAtst E 1 ContinueJ Deficiency / Area Date Jurisdictional llequiring Correc-Objective NUMEC-0654 Esercise Objec t ive Res pons ibil i t y Date of tive Action (by Met FEttA Ob ject ives Reference State Local Esercise Tracking No.)

State Local I

Demonstrate the ability to alert the N/A 12/3-4/85 N/A 1/26/83 a s.

sk=unst rat e abilit y t o alers E.6.*

public within the lo-mile EPZ and 12/3/85 t he public wi t hin t he 10-mile App. 3 disseminate an instructional message t.rZ and disseminate an inia ial lS&Ll within 15 airutes. (Ic6) s ust ructional message within IS minut es.

lOb ject ive f or which capability should be demonst rated during each full participation esercisel 14.

Dem.unstrate abilit y to formulate E.5..E.P.

x x

11/4/81 Deficiency 1/26/88 t/26/83 and Jiat r iteut e appropriat e lS&L) s ust ruc t ions t o t he public in t ia.cl y t anlaien.

a 8%.

tA-a.u.9t rat e organizat ional J.9.,

Demonstrate the organizational X

I 12/3-4/85 11/4/81 Deficiency 4/11/84 abili t y and se.ources necessary J.10.a.g.

ability and resources necessary 12/3/85 12/3/85 au aauage an orderly evacuation lS&Ll to manage an orderly evacuation ut all or part of the plume ErZ.

of all or partof the plume EPZ.

(S-12, L-7) lot,1ccaive f or which capability should te demonst rated during est h f ul1 par a ici pas ion esercisel M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

TARI.E 3. Cont inucJ Deficiency / Area Date Jurisdictional acquiring Correc-Objective NUltEC-0634 Esercine Objective st es pons ibil it y Date of sive Action (by ite t FLH A Ots jec t i ve s Beierence State Local Esercise Tracking No.)

State.

Local w

16. Demonstrase organizassonal J.lo.h.

N/A X

N/A 1/26/83 abalssy and reso rces necessary (S&L) ou deal unt h sapeJaments to evacuation, as inctement uut tier or t raf fic obst ruc-asons.

17. Demon.arate organizational J.10.j.

g abils s y a J resources neces sary lS&Ll 11/4/01 N/A

= N/A I/26/83 su sentrol access to an evacuat ed area.

18. Esceumst ras e organiz at ional J.lO.d.

g absinty and resources necessary lS&L)

N/A N/A 11/4/81 a effect an orderl y evacuat ion ut mobi li a y-e mpai red individuals u n c lai n s tie pl ue.e ErZ.

In sionsarate organizational J.9.,

19.

e

/

g abelsay and resources necessary J.10.g N/A 11/4/81 orderl y evacuat ion lS&L) to ellect an of sc e. col s un a liin al.e plue.e ErZ.

a-

--- ------- -d

~

co TAtill 1. r.m t i n..cd Deficiency / Area Date Jurisdictional Requirins Currec-Ob jec t i ve NUutC-0654 Eserci se Objec t ive Responsibility Date of Live Action (by i tJtA tb jec t i ves Reference Nt State Local Esercise Tracking No.)

State Imcal

/3.

sa==.st rat e abi li t y t o cont in-K.1.a.

Demonstrate ability to continu-12/3-4/85 Deficiency -

Pa rt ially Pa rt ially c

==usl y moni t or and cont rol b.

ously monitor and control emer-1/26/83 met met

==ergency worker espesure.

IS&Ll gency worker exposure.

12/3/85 # 21 Madi-1/26/83 1/26/83 (S-13, L-8) j ob ject i we for which capabiIiay son Hospital 2/27/85 should be deaanst rated during Not Het each f ull participation eserciset 12/3/85 12/3/85 28.

Demonst rat e at,ilit y t o make t he J.10.t.

Demonstrate ability to make the 1/A 12/3-4/85 12/3/85 -

Not Met N/A dec i s ion, based on predetermined is&Ll decision, based on predetermined

1. 7 (LNED Hdqtrs) 12/3/85 c riteria, whether to issue KI criteria whether to issue K1 to t o emergenc y workers and/or t he emergency workers and/or genet-general population.

al population. (S-14) 22.

Demunst rate abili ty t o supply J.lo.e.

Demonstrate ability to supply I

I 12/3-4/85 and adeinister Kl. once the lS&Ll and administer K1 once the

%t Tested

' decision has been made to de so.

decision has been made to 12/3/85 12/3/85 do so (S-15 L-9) 21.

Ike.onst rat e abilit y t o ef fect an J.2.

N/A N/A order l y cwacuat ion of onsit e lS&Ll N/A N/A personnel.

I t

a g

g m

e e

a m

W W

M M

M M

M M

E L

sus ses e

uma sua sus sus sus e

su m

m m

m m

TARIE 1. Cont in. set Deficiency / Area ta s e a

Jurisdictional itequiring Correc-Ob gec t i we mult EC-004 Eserci se Objective It es pons i bi l i t y Date of tive Action (by net Ftst A Ote jec t i ve s Meterence State

(_oc al Emercise Tracking No.)

State 1.uc a l 12/3-4/05 Mficiency on tiot Met Not Met 2 4. p..un st r a t e et.eIity ao terief C.3.a.,

Demonstrate ability to brief the Media

,x X

in a clear, accurate and timely ll/4/81 & 1/26/83 12/3/85 12/3/85 it.= media in a clear, accurate C.4.a.,

manner. (S-16, L-10)

L2-3 #18 a d t i.e t y aunner.

IS&Ll

[ Media Center)

II Demontrate ability to provide ad-X 12/3-4/85 Mficiency -

tiot Met 2/27/85

25. Demonst rate abilit y t o provide C.4.b.

advance coordinas ion of IS&LI [ vance coordination of inf ormation 11/4/81 12/3/85 l

g g,

_g int essmat ion reles sed.

Demonstrate ability to establish x

x 12/3-4/85 Mficiency -

tiot Het Not Het

26. Demonst rat e aW it ty to esty ssh C. L c.

and operate rumor control in a L/26/83 12/3/85 12/3/85 I

• • • '8*P*'***'"**'**"*'*I coordinated f ashion. (S-18, L-12) 12/3/85 - #19 courdinated fashiun.

(tiedia Center) 12/3-4/85 N/A Demonstrate adequacy of proced-N/A I

2 7. pen..ast rat e adequac y of pro-J.82.

ures for registration and radio-2/27/85 ceJurcs f or regostration and j $68.)

logical monitoring of evacuees.

12/3/85 radiutogical monitoring of (L-13}

e.acuees.

lOb jec t ive f or whicts capabilit y should tse demonst r ated during e acle f ull s.articipations esercieel

I m

ao TAllt.lt 3 (Cont'd)

Page 9 of 52 Deficiency / Area tea t e Jurisdictional Requiring Correc-Ob je c t i ve NUuEC-0&54 Esercise Object ive Res pons ibil i t y Date of tive Action (by Met FDIA Ob ject ives Reference State Local Esercise Tracking No.)

State local

/*

25.

Demonst rate aJequac y of f ac il i-J.lO.h r

1/26/83 e ses f or anses care of evacueen.

lS&Ll (Winnsboro) 2/27/85 (Ferriday) 11/4/81

-(Tallatish) n.

see.onst rate adequat e equisment K.5.a*

Demonstrate adequate equipment and I

12/3-4-85 12/3/85 - #20 12/3/85 2/27/85 and procedures for decons amina-b procedures for decontamination (Hadison liospital)

Ferriday tion of emerseacy workers.

lS&Ll eq ipment and veh_cles.

of emergency workers, equipment Must be Retested Recept. Ctr.

i and vehicles. (S-19, L-14) in Remedial Drill Not Het l Object ive for which capability 12-3-85 should I,e demonstrated durisig (Hadison each full participation esercisel Hospital)

Demonstrate adequacy of EMS trans-N/A 12/3-4/85 12-3-85 #21 N/A 1/26/83 l

so. laemonst rate adequac y of EMS L.4.

t ransport at ion. Per sonnel and (S&L[

portation, personnel and proced-(Hadison Hospital)

Not Het ures for handling contaminated Must be Retested 12/3/85 precedures for handling contam-anated indswaduals a ncl ead ing individuals including proper de-in Remedial Drill (Hadison g

proper deconsaminatiun et

,q,gp,,,t, (L,g3) wel.acle and equipment 10b jec t i ve f or winich capabilit y should tee demonst rat ed during each full part ecipat ion eserc s sel d

M M

M M

M m

m m

T Attl e I. s'..ns a n.

I h

la liticency/Arce gia, e e

Jurisdictsunal g, qui,s.,g Currec-or. g..c g i,e NUM EC-Odd s Eserc a oc Ob jec t a we keepone ibil it y Date of tawe Actines (by Met F DI A tbgetteven ReferestCe

""I"

i~**

0"N' State local EmerCiee Tracking neo.)

State 1.ot a l

__- l -

Demonstrate adequacy of hospital f a-N/A 12/3-4/85 Deficiency N/A 4/11/84 st.

s.<e-nost r as e adequac y at 3.oe pi t a l

t.. t.

g eaceIetees. J pr oc cJure. fur lS&Ll cilities and procedures for handling 4-11-84 (Te nsas C ntaminated individuals. (L-16) 12-3 #20 Pa rish 3.andling ca ta inated i s.J a -

weJ atm.

(Hadison Ilospital)

Hospital)

Hust Be Retested Not Het imicca swe sur nich capabilit y by Remedial Drill 12/3/85 should be Je=onst rated Juring (Hadison each f utI part icipation esercieel Ilos pt. )

12.

De=an s t ra t e abi l i t y t o identify C.I.a..

Demonstrate ability to identify need g

N/A 112/3-4/85 Not N/A need for, acq.est, and obtain b., ISg for, request, and obtain Federal Tested

, g, Federal assistance.

Demonstrate ability to estimate N/A 12/3-4/85 12/3/85 N/A pc.unstrate abilit y t o est imat e M.4.

g tutet popoletson esposore.

ISg total population exposure. (S-21) 14*

si net rate ab. s t y t o Jeter ine M.t.

Demonstrate the ability to deter-x X

12/3-4/85 12/3/85 -

Not 11/4/81

=pte ent appropriate IS&Lg mine and implement appropriate

1. 5. (State EOC)

Het Pa rtially measures for controlled recovery

1. 9. (LNED Hqtr) 12/3/85 Tested (no eas.res for s.ntratted recovery g

pg g

'"J '**"ya EOC)

Pa rtially Het 12/3/85

'i

r----------------

-' ~-

S Tant.E 1. Cont im.ed Page it at 17

-i Jurisdictional Deliciency/Aree page NUMEC-0654 Esercise Objective Requiring Correc-FutA object ives Reference Res pons ibil i t y Date of Live Act ion (by Ob gec t i ve State I.ac al Esercise Tracking No.)

State l_uc a l Het D.

Ikmonst rat e t he abilit y to C.4.

ettectively call upon and lS&Ll g

x 11-4-81 1/26/83 ua eIe se out side suppert agencies when local capabilit ies see esceeded.

is. pe unst rate t he adequacy, opera-F.I.

Demonstrate the adequacy, operability bility and effective use of IS&LI and ef fective use of emergency Consna-L2/3-4/85 12-3-85-f1,4 (State Not Het Not Het caergency communication nications procedures and methods.

EOC)

L2/3/85 12/3/85 equipment and the adequacy of (S-23, L-18) fil, 12 (Field Tm.

(Madison communications procedures and Stagirig Area and llospt.)

• • '""d**

Teams) 2-27~05

1. 15 (EOF Dose lot. ject ive for which capability Assessment) should be demonst rated during I* "

each tull participation esercisel II 8Pital) 37 Demonst rate ability to monitor o.4 Den astrate the ability to monitor 12/3-4/85 12-3-85/fl,4 1/26/83 1/26/83 Emergency Classification levels

{S&L) emergency classification levels g

g continuously and implement continuously and implement pro-(State EOC) procedures in a timely manner.

cedures in a timely manner.

fil, 12 (Field Tm.

2/27/85 (S-24, L-19)

Staging Area ir l Ot. jec t i ve for us.ich capabilit y Teams) si.vul d t.e Jee.unst rat ed during

1. 15 (EOF Dose 12/3/85 12/3/85 each full participation esercisej Assessment)

1. 22 (Madison llooptial) g g

g g

M M

M E

E E

s s

r M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

Tant.E 3. Cont inuel p,, 3y og gy W

Deficiency / Ares lis t e J=riadictional acquiring Correc-Ob jec t i ve MuaEC-0654 Esercise Objective Ecepensibility Date et give Action (by Met FtJtA Objectives Reference State Local Esercise Tracking W.)

State tocal Demonstrate capability to effec-Demonstrate the capability to ef fec-K 12/3-4-85 12/3/85 -

I tively process all incoming /out-tivelY Process all incoming messages

1. 8 (State EOC) 2/27/85

(

38.

l going messages in a timely manner.

in a timely manner. (S-25)

1. 10(LNED Headqrts)

Not Het I3 L 12/3/85 12/3/85 l

including the documenting of both actual and simulated messages.

l Demonstrate that the authority ex-N/A 12/3-4/85 N/A 1/26/83 -

39.

De=en s t r a t e t ha t authorit y A.2.a.

ists in activating a reception cen-Winnsboro; esi st s in activat ias a recep-A.3 ter (as necessary) in a timely 4/11/84 &,

12/3/85 -

aiva center (as accessary) in IS&Ll manner. (L-20) e timety menaer.

Tallulah;.

2/27/85 -

lOb ject ive tur dich capabilitF Fe rriday 12-3-85 chowld t>e demonst rated durint each f=II participation esercieel (Tallulah nacept. Ct r. )

s k--

- _ _ _ _