ML20204H722
| ML20204H722 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204H674 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8810240463 | |
| Download: ML20204H722 (2) | |
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ENCLOSURE SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS SUP.00RTING AMENDMENT NO. 90 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO, OPR-77 AND AMENDMENT NO. 79 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. CPR-79 1ENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated March 1 and July 25, 1988, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proposed Technical Specifications (TS) changes to the Operating License of Sequoyah Units 1 and 2.
The proposed amendments would revise Table 3.6-1 "Bypass Leakage Paths to the Auxiliary Building," for each unit, to add the potential leakage paths associated with the hydrogen analyzer system.
In addition, two entries for penetrations in the table for each unit are revised for clarification.
The March 1, 1988 submittal is for Unit 2 and the July 25, 1988 submittal is for Unit 1.
2.0 EVALUATION As a result of recent modifications to the hydrogen analyzer system (Reference 1 in Section 5), TVA determined that, following a postulated LOCA, there exists a potential for bypass leakage to the Auxiliary) Building inside the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE. These modifications consisted of moving the hydrogen analyzer system calibration panels from the annulus to the Auxiliary Building as well as providing four containment penetrations for the hydrogen analyzer system lines. This established an indirect release path to the Auxiliary Building and the enviror. ment through the system interface with the essential control air system.
A direct release path to the Auxiliary Building and the environment was established on the train B analyzer because its calibration panel was moved outside the ABSCE.
It is required in TS 3.6.1.2.c that the combined bypass leakage rate shall be limited to a certain value for all penetrations identified in Table 3.6-1 as secondary containment bypass leakage paths to the Auxiliary Building when pressurized to accident pressure.
At the time of the modification, the four penetrations were not included in Table 3.6-1 for the two units.
The proposed TS change would add these four penetrations to Table 3.6-1 for each unit. These penetrations are X-99 and X-100 for Train A and and X-92A and X-92B for Train B. The proposed TS change reflects current as-built conditions and is, therefore, acceptable.
Inclusion of these potential leakage paths in the table ensures that hey are adequotely tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J and TS 3.6.1.?.c.
8310240463 881014 PDR ADOCK 05000327 I
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p s Also, two entries in the table are revised for clarification. The revisions are made to table entries X-94 and X-95.
The insertion of conmas into the entries more clea-ly identifies that each penetration has three lines passing through it. Th'2 proposed TS change is strictly administrative and is acceptable.
3.0 ENYlRONMENTAL CON 510 ERA 110N This amendment involves a change to a requirement with *espect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no signif-icant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public cossnent on such finding.
Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Conunission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Resister (53 FR 13019 and 53 FR 30145) on April 20, 1988 and August 10, 19E8, respectively, and consulted with the State of Tenessee on October 12, 1988.
No public connents were received and the State of Tennessee did not have any connents.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Connission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the cornmon defense and security not to the health and safety of the public.
5.0 REFERENCE 1.
Licensee Event Report 50-327/87077 dated June 7, 1988.
Principal Contributors:
S. B. Kim and J. Donchew Dated: October 14, 1988