ML20204F909
| ML20204F909 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/20/1982 |
| From: | Alderson C, Burch R, Williamson E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204F897 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900403 NUDOCS 8305020319 | |
| Download: ML20204F909 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y8
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$2 INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 99900403/g-04
SUBJECT:
General Electric Company Nuclear Energy Business Group San Jose, California Possible Part 21 Violation DATES OF INVESTIGATION: June 28 - July 19,1982 INVESTIGATORS:
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E. L. Williamson, Regional Investigator Date S'igned Enforcement and Investigations Staff y.
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R/H. Burch, Regional Investigator Dat6 Signed Enforcement and Investigations Staff
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Carl Ef derson, Director Date Si'gned Enforcem t and Investigations Staff U
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SUMMARY
OF INVESTIGATION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY NUCLEAR ENERGY BUSINESS GROUP JUNE 28 - JULY 19,1982
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A.
REASONS FOR INVESTIGATION On May 8, 1982, a former employee of the General Electric Company (GE)
Nuclear Energy Business Group, San Jose, California corresponded with Mississippi Power and Light (MP&L), applicant for an NRC license for the Grand Golf facility which used the Mark III containment design.
In the letter the former employee stated that "there are a considerable number of unresolved issues pertaining to Mark III Containment and that "... many of these issues are safety concerns that are potentially applicable to Grand Gulf".
Subsequent meetings were held, attended by the former GE employee, and GE, MP&L, NRC personnel, and others to evaluate, discuss and clarify the containment design (CD) concerns. Following these meetings an NRC investi-gation was deemed necessary to determine whether the Mark II containment concerns were handled properly by GE relative to the reporting requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 21.
i This investigation was conducted pursuant to Section 161.c of the Atomic i
Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
B.
SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 1
This investigation was conducted after a former GE Lead Systems Engineer in i
Mark III containment design resigned his position and informed MP&L, an NRC license applicant for Grand Gulf, that there were numerous unresolved issues pertaining to the Mark III containment and that many of the issues were safety concerns potentially applicable to the Grand Gulf facility.
The former GE employee corresponded with MP&L, advising them of his concerns and expressed an interest in evaluating them as they pertain to the Grand Gulf facility.
A copy of the employee's letter was provided to NRC, Washington, DC, where, during subsequent telephone contacts, it was deter-mined the former employee was concerned that these issues would not - be properly addressed at GE due to termination of the Standard Reactor Island Design (STRIDE) Project.
The former GE employee twice presented these
- concerns before MP&L and/or officials of NRC, GE and various other contractors and utility companies. An investigation was deemed appropriate to determine whether GE evaluated and considered these concerns in light of the 10 CFR Part 21 reporting requirement.
The investigation was conducted by Region II Investigators, assisted by a Region IV Inspector from the Vendor Inspection Branch. The former employee I
was interviewed and provided a sworn statement regarding his reported concerns, stating he considered them bonafide potential safety issues which, in his opinion, were not addressed to his satisfaction. Ten current or former GE personnel were interviewed and reported that the issues raised by the former employee were addressed in detail, and design record files are I
being documented to reflect GE's effort in this regard.
Documentation provided by GE reflects all of the issues raised by the former employeo were reviewed in accordance with GE Procedure No. 70-42 which implements 10 CFR Part 21.
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a I-2 l-The investigation also included a review of GE Procedure No. 70-42 activities, organization charts, employee bulletins, project work authori-zations, engineering operation procedures, design change controls, and engineering work authorizations, as well as internal memos and corre-spondence provided by the company.
1 C.
FINDINGS 1.
The investigation disclosed through personnel interviews, documents, and record reviews that the concerns raised by the former GE employee were subjected to extensive' evaluations through numerous peer, management and containment design specialist reviews and were addressed by GE in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21.
i 2.
The insestigation disclosed that the former employee was encouraged by i
both management personnel and his peers to document his concerns as Potential Reportable Condition (PRC) reports throughout the evaluation process.
i 3.
The GE personnel were acutely aware of their responsibilities under 10 CFR Part 21 and GE has a program implemented for the purpose of identi fying, evaluating and reporting issues which represent sub-stantial safety hazards.
D.
MEETINGS WITH VENDOR l
The vendor was informed on June 29, 1982, that an investigation had been initiated by the NRC to determine how the Mark III design issues, raised by a former GE engineer, were processed by GE with regard to 10 CFR Part 21.
The vendor was advised that the investigation would include interviews uith
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various GE engineering personnel as well as appropriate document reviews.
Additionally, an inspector from the NRC's Region IV Vendor Inspection Branch j
(VIB) was present to assist the investigators with technical issues and to j
conduct an inspection.
i On July 8,1982, a preliminary exit interview was held to apprise GE manage-ment personnel that the investigation was not completed because of the need to interview two additional GE managers who were not available at the time and one retired former employee, all from the Containment Design Section.
On July 15, 1982, the investigators and inspector met with the Manager of Product and QA Operations, as well as other staff members, and related that the investigation and inspection were completed and it appeared that the concerns raised by the former employee had been addressed by GE with regard to 10 CFR Part 21, but additional evaluation would be made and a summary of the investigation would be issued to the vendor.
One additional interview was scheduled on July 19, 1982 with a GE manager who had been out of the country and, with the completion of that interview, i
no additional investigative efforts were contemplated. The QA Manager was advised of this action on July 19, 1982.
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