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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARML20211M6491997-10-0808 October 1997 Addenda 1 to Part 21 Rept Re Weldments on Opposed Piston & Coltec-Pielstick Emergency stand-by Diesel gen-set lube-oil & Jacket Water Piping Sys.Revised List of Potentially Affected Utils to Include Asterisked Utils,Submitted ML20211H7911997-09-30030 September 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Weldment Associated w/lube-oil Piping Sys on 970804 at Millstone,Unit 2.Root Cause Is Not Yet Known.Quality of Weldment Is Being Considered.Listed Util Sites Affected ML18038A8971994-09-0707 September 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Latching Mechanism of Potter & Brumfield Relay on C&D High Voltage Shut Down Alarm Assembly Printed Circuit Boards.Pull Test on Relay Reset Button Incorporated Into Receiving Insp Procedures ML20059F2631994-01-0707 January 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Air Start Distributor Cam Mfg by Fairbanks Morse.Mfg Suggests That Site Referenced in Encl App I Inspect Air Start Distributor Cam as Soon as Practical ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20095J7981992-04-29029 April 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Anchor Darling Swing Check Valve to Move Freely Through Entire Range of Motion.Caused by Insufficient Clearance Between Swing Arm & Shaft Bushings. Valve Repaired Onsite by Vendor ML20090L8801992-03-18018 March 1992 Part 21 Re Cracked Piston Castings Received from Acme Foundry,Fairbanks Morse & General Casting.Magnetic Particle Insp of All Pistons Will Be Performed.List of Affected Plants Encl ML20247M5851989-07-27027 July 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Failed Globe Valve Stem on 890405.Caused by Improper Heat Treatment of 410 Stainless Steel Alloy Used in Stem Which Increased Susceptibility to Stress Corrosion Cracking.Larger Shaft Modified by Machining Radius ML20246H5331989-02-14014 February 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Motor Mounting Bolts on Limitorque Operators & Reliance Motors.Caused by Loosening of Motor End Bell Bolts.All Normally Inaccessible Operators W/Susceptible Bolting Will Be Inspected ML20204D1911987-03-20020 March 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Existence of Design Defect in Bingham/Willamette RHR Pumps Flow Capacity.Ge Will Perform Evaluation of Conditions.Operators Will Be Alerted in Writing to Miminize Time in Min Flow Mode FVY-86-105, Part 21 Rept Re Design Defect Relating to Limitorque Motor Operators Mfg Prior to 1975.Mfg Contacted & Retrofit Kits Installed on safety-related & nonsafety-related Operators. Addl Info Encl1986-11-10010 November 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Design Defect Relating to Limitorque Motor Operators Mfg Prior to 1975.Mfg Contacted & Retrofit Kits Installed on safety-related & nonsafety-related Operators. Addl Info Encl ML20196E1171986-09-16016 September 1986 Part 21 Rept Re GE Solenoid Valve Rebuild Kits.Defect Found During Failure to Scram on 860613-28.Util Replaced All 178 Hydraulic Control Unit Scram Solenoid Internals,Plus Two Discharge Vol Solenoid Valve Internals NRC-86-3142, Part 21 Rept Re Increased Failure Probability of Coils Used in Class 1E Motor Starters & Contactors Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants by Westinghouse.Replacement Coils Mfg for All Starters & Contactors on Encl List1986-06-19019 June 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Increased Failure Probability of Coils Used in Class 1E Motor Starters & Contactors Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants by Westinghouse.Replacement Coils Mfg for All Starters & Contactors on Encl List ML20141A0881986-03-28028 March 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Contact Block Kits Supplied by Namco Controls.Initially Reported on 860227. Defective Kits Replaced.Vendor QA Program Under Reevaluation ML20154N5141986-03-10010 March 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Standby Liquid Control Sys Squib Valve to Fire.Caused by Discrepancies Identified Between Conax Corp Drawings of Trigger Assemblies & Wiring Configuration of Trigger Assemblies in Stock ML20154K3611986-03-0505 March 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Wiring Defect in Fabricated Primer Chamber Assemblies for Standby Liquid Control Valves. Initially Reported on 860214.Listed Corrective Actions Will Be Completed by 860328 ML20126C6901985-06-0505 June 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Generator Failure.Concurs W/Encl Louis Allis That Interpolar Connectors Be Removed ML20129G4401985-05-29029 May 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Inner Polar Connector Between Damper Bar Circuit on Generator Main Field.Cause of Failure Not Defined.Further Investigation Necessary ML20116K0891985-03-0505 March 1985 Followup Part 21 Rept Re Overcompression of Power Lead Gland Assembly Sealant During Factory Assembly.Procedures Revised to Specify That Only One Coat of Threaded Lubricant Will Be Applied.Proprietary Rept Encl.Rept Withheld ML20096C5761984-08-31031 August 1984 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Power Lead Gland Assemblies Qualified for Nuclear Svc.Parts 7D92-11000-01-04, 7D92-11001-01-05,N-11150-01 & N-11151-01 Showing Loss of Electrical Continuity.Customer Informed & Evaluation Begun ML20093D8711984-07-13013 July 1984 Part 21 Rept Responding to NRC Re IE Info Notice 84-30 on Bahnson Co HVAC Equipment.Units Not Supplied to Facility.Stringent QA Program Implementation Essential to Prevent & Detect Problems ML20093D1431984-06-29029 June 1984 Part 21 Rept Re Defective Uninterruptible Power Supply Batteries Supplies by Exide Corp.Util Replaced Batteries During Current 1984 Refueling Outage ML20082E7801983-11-21021 November 1983 Part 21 Rept Advising That Review of QA Program Initiated in Response to IE Bulletins 83-06 & 83-07 to Address Possible Fraudulent Actions by Suppliers ML19305F2001980-11-0303 November 1980 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Fire Penetration Seals to Pass Fire Test.Cause Undetermined.Tested Matl Will Be Analyzed 1997-09-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217L8831999-10-21021 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Alternatives to Code Requirements Described in RR-V17 & RR-V18 ML20217G2041999-10-13013 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 179 to License DPR-28 05000271/LER-1999-003, :on 990902,inadvertent Primary Containment Isolation Sys Actuation Occurred.Caused by Spurious Signal on Refuel Floor Radiation Monitor.Conducted Radiation Survey & Replaced Affected Detector.With1999-10-0404 October 1999
- on 990902,inadvertent Primary Containment Isolation Sys Actuation Occurred.Caused by Spurious Signal on Refuel Floor Radiation Monitor.Conducted Radiation Survey & Replaced Affected Detector.With
ML20212J3261999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 177 to License DPR-28 ML20212J2891999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 178 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-127, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20212H1401999-09-21021 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 176 to License DPR-28 ML20212C2551999-09-17017 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 175 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-112, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Vermont Yankee.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Vermont Yankee.With ML20211H8161999-08-30030 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 174 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-109, Ro:On 990812,stack Ng Effluent Instrumentation for PAM Was Declared Oos.Caused by Instrument Drift Due to Electronic Components Based on Insps by Instrumentation & Controls Dept.Detector & Preamplifier Will Be Replaced on 9908311999-08-19019 August 1999 Ro:On 990812,stack Ng Effluent Instrumentation for PAM Was Declared Oos.Caused by Instrument Drift Due to Electronic Components Based on Insps by Instrumentation & Controls Dept.Detector & Preamplifier Will Be Replaced on 990831 ML20210U5031999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 173 to License DPR-28 ML20210U4231999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 172 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-102, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Vermont Yankee. with1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Vermont Yankee. with ML20210A6041999-07-19019 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 171 to License DPR-28 ML20209J0081999-07-14014 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990615,diesel Driven Fire Pump Failed to Achieve Rated Flow of 2500 Gallons Per Minute.Pump Was Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days.Corrective Maint Was Performed to Reset Pump Lift Setting BVY-99-090, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196G5071999-06-23023 June 1999 Vynp Assessment of On-Site Disposal of Contaminated Soil by Land Spreading BVY-99-077, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With BVY-99-068, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Vynp.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Vynp.With ML20206E8741999-04-29029 April 1999 SER Determined That Flaw Evaluation Meets Rules of ASME Code & Assumed Crack Growth Rate Adequate for Application ML20206D9301999-04-27027 April 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 990427 Exercise Manual (Plume Portion) ML20206C8901999-04-26026 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 170 to License DPR-28 ML20205S4211999-04-16016 April 1999 Non-proprietary Version of Revised Page 4-3 of HI-981932 Technical Rept for Vermont Yankee Spent Fuel Pool Storage Expansion 05000271/LER-1999-002, :on 990316,failure to Properly Test CSP Discharge Cv Was Noted.Caused by Misunderstanding of Relationship Between TS Pump Flow Requirements & Flow Rates in Analyses.Valves Were Consistently Tested.With1999-04-15015 April 1999
- on 990316,failure to Properly Test CSP Discharge Cv Was Noted.Caused by Misunderstanding of Relationship Between TS Pump Flow Requirements & Flow Rates in Analyses.Valves Were Consistently Tested.With
ML20205K7581999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposal for Reexamination of Circumferential Welds with Detected Flaw Indications in Plant RPV BVY-99-046, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With 05000271/LER-1998-018, :on 980528,determined That VT-3 Exam Had Not Been Performed as Required by Section XI of ASME Code.Caused by Inadequate Work Control Process.Procedure Revised.With1999-03-18018 March 1999
- on 980528,determined That VT-3 Exam Had Not Been Performed as Required by Section XI of ASME Code.Caused by Inadequate Work Control Process.Procedure Revised.With
05000271/LER-1998-026, :on 981124,inadequate Equipment Control Resulted in Reduced HPCI Sys Reliability.Caused by Valve Being Out of Position.Completed Pressure Switch Calibration. with1999-03-16016 March 1999
- on 981124,inadequate Equipment Control Resulted in Reduced HPCI Sys Reliability.Caused by Valve Being Out of Position.Completed Pressure Switch Calibration. with
ML20207M9481999-03-11011 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License DPR-28 ML20205F6631999-03-0404 March 1999 Jet Pump Riser Weld Leakage Evaluation BVY-99-035, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station.With ML20205P8241999-02-28028 February 1999 Rev 2 to Vermont Yankee Cycle 20 Colr 05000271/LER-1998-022, :on 980614,CV Fast Closure & Turbine Stop Valve Closure Scram Bypass Did Not Reset When Greater 30% Thermal Power Exceeded.Caused by Ambiguous Licensing Basis.Changed Affected Pressure Switch Trip Settings.With1999-02-25025 February 1999
- on 980614,CV Fast Closure & Turbine Stop Valve Closure Scram Bypass Did Not Reset When Greater 30% Thermal Power Exceeded.Caused by Ambiguous Licensing Basis.Changed Affected Pressure Switch Trip Settings.With
ML20203H9881999-02-18018 February 1999 SER Accepting Alternative to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) Augmented Reactor Vessel Exam at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.Technical Ltr Rept Encl ML20203H8201999-02-12012 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 166 to License DPR-28 ML20203A6951999-02-0404 February 1999 Revised Rev 2,App B to Vermont Yankee Operational QA Manual (Voqam) 05000271/LER-1999-001, :on 990105,determined That Pump Curves Used in Assessing RHRSW Pump Performance Had Not Been Correctly Applied to Vynp Configuration.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Sw Task Established.With1999-02-0404 February 1999
- on 990105,determined That Pump Curves Used in Assessing RHRSW Pump Performance Had Not Been Correctly Applied to Vynp Configuration.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Sw Task Established.With
ML20199K7151999-01-21021 January 1999 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 Issued to FOL DPR-28.Pages 2 & 3 Required Correction & Clarification ML20199K6991999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Request to Use YAEC-1339, Yankee Atomic Electric Co Application of FIBWR2 Core Hydraulics Code to BWR Reload Analysis, at Vermont Yankee Acceptable 05000271/LER-1998-006, :on 980318,potential Failure of Multiple Safety Class Breakers Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Maint Procedure for Safety Class Breakers.Faulty Breaker Was Replaced.With1999-01-20020 January 1999
- on 980318,potential Failure of Multiple Safety Class Breakers Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Maint Procedure for Safety Class Breakers.Faulty Breaker Was Replaced.With
ML20199L4111999-01-19019 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 165 to License DPR-28 ML20199L5951999-01-14014 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Code Requirement,Described in Rev 2 to Pump Relief Request RR-P10 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) 05000271/LER-1998-025, :on 981211,determined That One Scram Discharge Vol Drain Valve Did Not Meet Stroke Time Requirements of IST Program.Cause Analysis in Progress.New Larger Valve Actuators Installed.With1999-01-0707 January 1999
- on 981211,determined That One Scram Discharge Vol Drain Valve Did Not Meet Stroke Time Requirements of IST Program.Cause Analysis in Progress.New Larger Valve Actuators Installed.With
ML20199E4331999-01-0505 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-071, Corp 1998 Annual Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 Corp 1998 Annual Rept. with BVY-99-001, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20198H5481998-12-23023 December 1998 Rev 2 to Vermont Operational QA Manual,Voqam 05000271/LER-1998-024, :on 981116,MSSV Lifted Below Setpoint Specified in Tech Specs.Cause Unknown.Plant Maint Dept Initiated Event Rept to Ensure Investigation Completed on Event.With1998-12-16016 December 1998
- on 981116,MSSV Lifted Below Setpoint Specified in Tech Specs.Cause Unknown.Plant Maint Dept Initiated Event Rept to Ensure Investigation Completed on Event.With
ML20196H8641998-12-0101 December 1998 Cycle 19 Operating Rept 1999-09-30
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Text
c VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION RD 5 Box 169. Ferry Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301
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ENGINEERING OFFICE 1(,71 WORCESTER ROAD FRAMINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 01701 TELEPHONE 6174724100 March 20, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection & Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attn:
Regional Administrator
References:
a)
License No. OPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)
Dear Sir:
Subject:
Notification of Potential Existence of a Design Defect in Accordance with 10CFR21.21 In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR21, Section 21, we are hereby notifying you that we have obtained information indicating that a design defect may exist with respect to Bingham /Willamette pumps.
Enclosure I to this letter dccuments the details of this evaluation.
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours, j
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POW-ORPORATION l
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J G. Weigand President and Chief Executive Officer l'
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8703250444 870320 I}
l PDR ADOCK 05000271 S
PDR
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-O' ENCLOSURE I COMPANY INFORMING Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation THE COMMISSION RD 5, Box 169
' Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 FACILITY Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Box 157 Governor Hunt Road Vernon, Vermont 05354 COMPONENT Bingham /Willamette - RHR/CS Pumps (16x18x26 1 Stage CVIC/12x16x144 1 State CVD31 FIRM SUPPLYING Bingham Willamette COMPONENT 2800 NW Front Avenue Portland, Oregon 97210 NATURE OF DEFECT Vermont Yankee's RHR/CS pumps were originally purchased from Bingham /
Willamette in accordance with GE design specifications. The specification sti-pulated a minimum flow capability of 350 gpm and Bingham /Willamette supplied the pump in accordance with the specification.
Vermont Yankee was notified by Bingham /Willamette on November 13, 1986 that the minimum flow rates for the RHR pumps should be made higher than pre-viously indicated to Vermont Yankee. Specifically, the value for continuous operation (more than two hours of operation within any 24-hour period) should be 2700 gpm_and the value for intermittent operation (less than two hours of opera-tions within a 24-hour period) should be 2075.
As a result of this notification, Vermont Yankee initiated a PRO and its subsequent review. This review determined this matter does not pose a substan-tial safety hazard for Vermont Yankee and was not reportable per 10CFR50.73, but was potentially reportable under 10CFR21 Vermont Yankee, in cooperation with Bingham /Willamette and General Electric, has concluded that a substantial safety hazard does not exist at Vermont Yankee. This conclusion is based on the following information.
Bingham /Willamette defines " intermittent cperation" as lets than two hours of operation in a 24-hour period over the 40-year design life. This translates to a value of up to a total 29,200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> of operation. Vermont Yankee has no significant accumulated time in the minimum flow operating mode to date (cther than successful pre-operational testing). Monthly surveillance testing does not utilize the minimum flow path for more than 15-30 seconds per month and there-fore is considered to be negligible with respect to the 2075 hrs allowable.
In the event of a snall break LOCA, RHR and Core Spray would be required to operate
n in the minimum flow mode fo; a maximum of four or five hours. Vermont Yankee's PRO evaluation estimated a total of 5-10 hours of operation in the minimum flow mode for the life of the plant. As can be seen, these operating durations are far below the 29,200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> of operation that Bingham /Willamette considers to be in the " intermittent" operating range, and that sufficient operating times in the minimum flow mode for either the RHR or the Core Spray pumps would not be attained for recirculation cavitation failures to develop.
However, it is determined that this matter could potentially present a significant safety hazard at another facility, depending on the application of this manufacturer's pumps and the length of time that a pump would be required to operate in the minimum flow mode.
DATE OF INCIDENT Vermont Yankee was notified by Bingham /Willamette of this condition by a letter dated November 13, 1986.
The Potential Reportable Occurrence for RHR pumps was generated on November 21, 1986 and approved as not reportable on December 6, 1986. The PRO for Core Spray was generated on December 12, 1986 and approved as not reportable on December 29, 1986.
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS Vermont Yankee has four (4) RHR and two (2) Core Spray pumps of the design previously described.
CORRECTIVE ACTION As a result of the investigation concerr.ing pump operability, Vermont Yankee requested General Electric to perform an evaluation of the conditions.
Vermont Yankee has received a draft report from GE which substantiates our ori-ginal findings.
In addition, Vermont Yankee will inspect the pump internals of the RHR pumps.
If eny degradation is found, further evaluation will be pursued.
Vermont Yankee will also make a Nuclear Network entry delineating the con-ditions of this problem.
As an added precaution, Vermont Yankee will incorporate a caution statement into the appropriate procedures to alert the operators of the need to minimize t;me in the minimum flow mode.
RELATED ADVICE Our evaluation has determined that a significant hazard does not exist at Vermont Yankee because of our application of the pumps. However, it is felt that this matter could create a substantial safety hazard at another nuclear facility.
I