ML20204B878

Summarizes Pending Retransfer of 85 Spent Fuel Assemblies from Switzerland to United Kingdom for Reprocessing.No Objections Raised to Retransfer.Comments Requested by 780901.Supporting Documentation Encl

ML20204B878
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/22/1978
From:	James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
To:
References
SECY-78-461, NUDOCS 7811020371
Download: ML20204B878 (28)

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August 22, 19B SECY-78-461 For:

COMMISStONER ACTION From:

James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs Thru:

Executive Director for Operations [

Subject:

PENDING RETRANSFER FROM SWEDEN TO THE UK FOR REPROCESSING

Purpose:

Commission review and approval of proposed Department of Energy (.00E) retransfer action.

Discussion:

DOE has reoues'ted NRC views regarding the proposed re-transfer of 85 spent fuel assemblies from the Oskarshamn I and II nuclear power reactors in Sweden to British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.

(BNFL) in the UK for reprocessing (see attached July 20 letter at Appendix A).

This case and the accompanying DOE analysis were forwarded to the Commission for its advance review on August 8 (SECY,778-429)). The Swedish authorities have requested that @4.etransfer of 24 assemblies be approved as soon as possTtrie and that the remaining 61 assemblies be approved for retransfer by this fall.

This propcsed Sw.

sh retransfer involves circumstances very sim' ar to tho e in the recent TEPC0 retransfer case (SE 78-406 In both instances the utilities have made tanrto rerack their existing storage pools but have requested permission to retransfer a limited number of assemblies to facilitate the reracking operation and also to provide a greater degree of assurance that a full core discharge capability will be maintained.

With respect to the transfer of the requested 61 assem-blies from Oskarshamn I, DOE's analysis shows that only i

29 assemblies need to be transferred in order to assure a full-core discharge capability after completion of the next scheduled reloading operation, assuming no additional space is made available by reracking.

Should the reracking work provide 29 additional spaces by April 1979 (which A

is problematical) no immediate retransfers would be essen-

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2 Discussion:

would (1) facilitate the reracking work and (2) enable (continued) a full core discharge capability to be maintained until 1983 instead of 1982.

With respect to Oskarshamn II, the matter is more urgent as the full core discharge capability will be lost in September (next scheduled restart of the reactor) unless

-- the_ transfer of 24 assemblies is approved. In contrast to Oskarshamn I and also to the TEPC0 retransfer, there is no chance that reracking could be completed before the scheduled restarting date.

DOE has indicated that if the retransfer is approved it would be subject to the follcwing conditions:

(1)

That the spent fuel will be retained by the repro-cessor until it may be reprocessed and that, there-1 after, the recovered special nuclear material will be retained by the reprocessor subject to the direction of the shipper.

(2)

That any direction by the shipper to the reprocessor for the transfer or use of the recovered special nuclear material will be subject to the prior appro-val of the United States.

This second condition is in addition to the right of the United States to prior approval for any transfer of these materials to a country outside EU,RATOM.

With respect to the second condition, the staff has en-quired into the nature of EURATOM's comitment not to retransfer or otherwise use any recovered material within EURATOM without US approval.

This appears to conflict with the general understanding that EURATOM does not control the free transfer of material within the Community. We have been informed by the Executive Branch that such con-trols on internal EURATOM disposition can be invoked in this retransfer case because the controls are in the form of a commercial contract rather then governmental assurances.

In such cases the comercial contract arrangements are binding and neither EURATOM nor the individual LJRATOM coun-tries can cause nuclear material to be transferred or other-wise disposed of in a manner contrary to that authorized by the contract (provided, of course, the contract is otherwise in confonnance with local laws).. It is thus through the contract arrangements between the supplier and BNFL that the US can effectively excrcise its veto rights over the disposition of any separated plutonium resulting from the proposed retransfer.

3 Discussion:

Sweden has begun an extensive program to rerack the (continued) storage pools at Oskarshamn and is planning to build a large (3,000 ton) central storage facility in Sweden which could store all expected power reactor discharges until 1990. The Swedish government has also adopted a policy not to approve any new transfer of spent fuel for reprocessing, pending completion of INFCE, unless required for operational reasons.

On balance the staff considers that~ approval of the proposed retransfer ~f6F both Oskarshamn I and II is warranted.

I understand that the other Executive Branch agencies are not ob-jecting to the proposal.

Recomendation:

That NRC not object to the proposed retransfer and that the Commission approve the proposed response to DOE at Appendix B.,

Coordination:

ELD has no legal objection.

sf James R. Shea, rector l

Office of International Programs I

Enclosures:

I 1.

Appendix A - Ltr dtd 7/20/78 Bengelsdorf to Shea 2.

Appendix B - Proposed letter to DOE NOTE:

Comissioners' coments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday. Seotember 1.1978 Comission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners NLT Auaust 25. 1978

, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.

If the paper is of such a

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nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION

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,( gr Department of Energy Washington, D.C. <20545 July 20,1978 Mr. James R..Shea, Director Office of International Programs Nuclear Regulatory Commission I

8103 Maryland National Bank Bldg.

Washington, D.C.

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Dear Mr. Shea:

1 REQUEST FOR SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT UNDER T'dE NNPA 0F 1978 Pursuant to Section 1.c. of Part E of the inter-a,ency procedures, enclosed is a retransfer request involving reprocessing of 851rradiated fuel assemblies together with a DOE staff analysis of the merits of the case.

We believe that a present need exists, that all applicable criteria are met and that the approval of the retransfer request is consistent with the requirements of the NNPA and the current U.S.

non-proliferation policy.

I This request also han been reviewed informally by the inter-agency ad hoc group) on nuclear export coordination and no objections were raised by that body.

Accordingly, we look forward to receiving ycur concurrence or views as provided for in Section 1.d. cf Part E of the inter-agengy procedures.

Sincerely,

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APPROVAL FOR' RETRANSFER OF'dPECIAL WUCLEAR MATERIAL

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@[$w OF UNITED STATES ORIGIN The approval of the United. States Department of Energy is hereby 3 requested to the transfer from the Government of Sweden for oskarshamn I Fi eholm Sweden Trans eror to Euratom Sun 1 A

ne for'BNFL Windscale' Works' En land

.trans eree

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of United States supplied special nuclear material ~ in the c[uant.ity meeting the specifications l describe'd below (hereinafter called "specified material") whi'ch the transferor. obtained. pursuant. to its Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Uses with the United States Government. Material was originally obtained by. transferor from USA-

~, under Contract or Oider Number UES/SW/1 SPECIFIED MATERIAL (Fi,11 in where applicable):

Identification

Marking, Total U U-235, U-233 Isotopic Pei-Fuel Type No.,etc.

(In Grams) or Pu (In Grams)

U-235 U-233 o

61 fuel 10.348705 31205 0.78 assemblies 70621 Produceci Pu o

The specified material, which is now lopated at Oskarshamn 1 upon approval hereby by the United States Department of Energy be t ferred on or about 1978-03 12-31 use at BNFL, Windscale' Works, England and will be accepted f the following specified purpose:

Reprocessing

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'n The transferorp. with the concurrence of the transferre, will notif within 30 days after the aforesaid date the United States Departmen of Energy of the actual' date and quantity o.f material transferred.

It is agreed by the transferor and transferee that as of that date the specified material will cease t.o be subj ect to the Agreement fo

. Cooperation and contract indicated above~ and will be subject to the transferee's Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Uses with the Unit States Government.

For the Government of Sweden:

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Transferee Date Mona (Sundberr Above reques ed, ransfer under Article of' transferee's Agreeme for Cooperation for Civil Uses with the United States Government approved, provided physical transfer is consumtated by

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.Q7D/S[AYo/1288 APPROVAL FOR RETRANSFER OF SPECIAL HUCLEAR MATER L

OF UNITED STATES ORIGIN The approval of the United States Department of Energy is hereby t

requested to the transfer from

~ the Government of Sweden (for Oskarshann 2, Fi _hc1m, Sweden)

.Lrans eror) to Euratom Supply

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of" United States supplied special nuclear material in the quantity izteeting.the specifications described below (hereinafter called "specified material") which the transferor obtained pursusnt to its '

Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Uses with the United States Government. Material was' ori@lly obtained by ' transferor from USA

, urider Contract or Order Number UES SV/ 1 SPECIFIED MATERIAL

.(Fill'in where applicable) '

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Identification c

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Marking, Total U U-235, U-233

' Isotopic Perc Fu.el Tyne No.,etc.

(In Grams _)

or Pu (In Grams)

U-235 U-233, o 24 fuel,

4321011 465,47 1 08 assemblies 26057 Produced Pu The specified material,' which is now located at Oskarshamn 2'

,y upon approval hereby by the United States Department of F.nergy be 't ferred on or about

' 1978-03-01--12-31 use' at BNFL, Windscale Works, England and will be accepted f the following specified purpose:

2 Reprocessing '

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_ The transferor4x with the concurrence of the transferre,. will.notif within 30 days after the aforesaid date the United. States Departmen I

of Energy of the actual date and' quantity of material transferred.

It is agreed by the' transferor and transfaree that as of that date the specified material will. cease to. be subj ect to the Agreement fo

. Cooperation and contract indicated' above and will be subject to the transferee's Agreement for Cooperation for Civil,Uses with.the Unit States Government.

For the Government'of Sweden:

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1 Above requested transfer under Article of transferca's Agreeme for Cooperation for. Civil'Uses with the United States ov.ernment._

Retransfer Request Analysis (RTD/EU(SW)-37 and 38)

Parties Transferor-Oskarshamnverkets Kraf tgrupp Akiebolage (0KG), Sweden Transferee-British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd. for UKAEA, United Kingdom Origin of Enriched Uranium Obtained by transferor from USDOE under contract UES/SW/1 Material Total V U-235 Produced Reactor Fuel Type-BWR (Grams)

(Grams)

Pu (Grams)

OKG-1 61 fuel as-10,348,705 81,205 70,621 semblies OKG-2 24 fuel as-4,321,011 46,547 26,057 semblies Present Location 61 fuel assemblies at the OKG-1 reactor site, Kalmar Lan, Sweden 24 fuel assemblies at the OKG-2 reactor site, Kalmar Lan, Sweden Proposed Loca: ion British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., Windscale Reprocessing Plant, United Kingdom (EURATOM)

Purpose Chemical reprocessing and recovery of uranium and plutonium con-tained in the 85 irradiated fuel elements.

The disposition of the recovered uranium and plutonium would be subject to the prior agree-ment of the United States and enclosed is a copy of a letter from l

DOE to the Swedish Embassy to this effect.

(Tab A).

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2 Schedule The retransfer of 24 asseablies from the OKG-2 reactor would take place as soon as possible and retransfers from the OKG-1 reactor would take place in the Fall of 1978.

The fuel will be stored at the Windscale plant for an interim period since reprocessing will not take place for about 10 years.

Need The Swedish government and utilities are acting to provide additional spent fuel storage capacity in Sweden.

The following steps have been taken:

1.

The Swedish Nuclear Fuel Company has requested government approval to build a 3000 ton facility, sufficient to store all expected power reactor discharges until 1990.

2.

Also, OKG has contracted for the construction of additional spent fuel storage capacity at the Oskarshamn Power Station.

Work will begin in Spring 1979 but may be delayed by the difficulties of re-racking the existent pools containing quantities of irradiated fuel.

However, even the planned re-racking will not eliminate the need to transfer some spent fuel off-site.

3.

The Swedish Government announced on December 22, 1977 that it would not approve any new transfer of spent fuel to reprocessors, pending the comple: on of INFCE, unless required for operational reasons.

4.

Against this background, the OKG request to transfer 85 fuel assemblies from Sweden to Great Britain for the purpose of reprocessing is being made only for compelling operational reasons.

OKG policy requires the maintenance of a full-core reserve discharge 1

capability at all times.

In order to adhere to this policy, shipment of 61 elements in the Fall of 1978 from the OKG-1 plant is necessary.

Also, 24 elements should be removed from the OKG-2 pond 1

as quickly as possible but no later than Septenber 1978.

Detailed information on the need to ship the fuel elements is contained in a letter of March 30, 1978 from International Energy Associates Limited, a consultant to OKG, to DOE (copy enclosed Tab B).

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3 Discussion This request falls under the definition of a " subsequent arrangement" in section 131 a.(2)B of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act) and requires.the concurrence of State and consultation with ACDA, NRC, D00, and Commerce. ACDA may, if it deems such action necessary, prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement.

Notice of the proposed subsequent arrangement will have to be given at least 15 days in advance in the Federal Register, together with the written determina-tion of the Secretary of Energy or his designee that this arrangement will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

Under section 131 b.(1) of the Act, this retransfer cannot be approved until the Committee on International Relations of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate have been provided with a report containing the reasons for entc*ing into the arrangement and a period of 15 days of continuous session has elapsed; provided that the Secretary of DOE (by delegation from the President under E.0.12058) can declare an emergency due to unforeseen circumstances and then the period shall be 15 calendar days.

Section 131 b.(2) of the Act provides that:

"(2) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material. in a facility which has not processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the subject of subsequent arrangement therefore prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 or for subsequent retransfer to a non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing, unless in his judgment, and that of the Secretary of State, such i

j reprocessing or retransfer will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the time that. approval is requested. Among all the factors in making this judgment, foremost consideration will be given to whether or not the reprocessing or retransfer will take place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device;"

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The BNFL facility in the past has processed power reactor fuel assemblies and has been the subject of a subsequent arrangement there-fore prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, so this paragraph is not applicable.

However, sectional b(3) of the Act provides that:

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"(3) the Secretary of Energy shall attempt to ensure, in entering into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in any facility that has processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefore prior to the data of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation the Act of 1978, or for the subsequent retransfer to any non-nuclear-weapon-state of and plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing or retransfer shall take place under conditions comparable to those which in his view, and that of the Secretary of State, satisfy the standards set forth in paragraph (2)."

This paragraph of the law is applicable in this case and the question therefore arises as to the attempt to ensure that such reprocessing shall take place under conditions which satisfy the standards set forth in paragraph (2).

This test is felt to be met since paragraph (2), in connection with timely warning of any diversion, stipulates that such a diversion should be detected ~"well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transfer the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device." The United Kingdom is a nuclear weapon state and the material will rem'ain in the United Kingdom until it is disposed of in accordance with arrangements satisfactory to the United States.

Accordingly, the threat of diversion for nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear weapon state is felt.to be minimal in this instance.

Of course, all the countries in the European Community, except the United Kingdom and France are non-nuclear-weapons states.

And, as will be discussed at greater length under criterion (4) below, prior United States approval is not required for retransfer within Euratom.

However, the United States also has been controlling retransfers within Euratom of separated special nuclear material in cases such as this by obtaining a commitment to the following conditions by the non-Euratom shipping country:

(1)

That'the spent fuel will be retained by the reprocessor until it may be reprocessed and that, thereafter, the recovered special nuclear material will be retained by the reprocessor subject to the direction of the shipper.

(2)

That any direction by the shipper to the reprocessor for the transfer or use of the recovered special nuclear material will be s

subject to the prior approval of the United States.

This second condition is in addition to the right of the United States to prior approval for any trancfer of these materials to a country l

outside Euratom.

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5 The non-EURATOM shipping country agrees to these conditions based upon the processor's contractual pledge to hold the spent fuel, reprocess it, and then use or transfer the recovered material only in accordance with the shipper's instructions.

In the instant case, it is proposed that Sweden would be required to assure the United States that it agrees to the above conditions.

Sweden is a party to the NPT.

Criteria Under the non-proliferation act the criteria used for retransfers, in addition to the foregoing requirements, are the same as those set forth for NRC licenses in section 127 of the Act.

Accordingly the word

" export" (or a variation thereof) in the criteria set forth below.

Criterion (1)

"IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced t,hrough the use thereof."

Since the United Kingdom is a nuclear weapons state, this criterion is not applicable in the UK in that IAEA safeguards are not required in the United Kingdom pursuant to the NPT.

However, the criterion is judged to be applicable in other jurisdictions and met because of the following conditions.

First, under Article V of the US-Euratom Additional Agreement for Cooperation of 1960, as amended, which incorporates Article XI, XII and Annex B of the November 8, 1958 Joint program Agreement, as amended, the Community undertakes the responsibility of establishing and implementing a safeguards and control system designed to give maximum assurance that any material supplied by the United States or generated from such supply will be used solely for peaceful purposes (" Euratom Safeguards System").

Under the tenns of the agreement the Community is bound to consult and exchange experiences with the IAEA with the objective of establishing a system reasonably compatible with that of the latter.

The Community also is responsible for establishing and maintaining a mutually (with respect to the United States) satisfactory and effective safeguards and controls system in accordance with stated principles.

Euratom safeguards are being applied to material and facilities s

j previously exported or retransferred and subject to the United States-j Euratom Cooperation Agreements and to special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

These Agreements require these i

j safeguards to be applied to such material and facilities and to the proposed export or retransfer and special nuclear material produced through its use.

6 7

i Most fortunately all of the member states of the Community, with the exception of France (a nuclear-weapons state), are parties to the NPT.

An agreement for the IAEA application of safeguards pursuant to the NPT was signed by the IAEA and Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), on April 15, 1973.

(As a nuclear-weapons state, however, the United Kingdom permits the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to the NPT under a voluntary offer which was signed on September 6,1976.

Similarly, France has agreed to application of the IAEA safeguards verification system at some of its civil facilities under a France-Euratom-IAEA trilateral approved by the IAEA's Board of Governors on February 21,1978.)

The EURATOM accountability system was adapted to that of the IAEA through the publication of Commission Regulation 332/76, which came into force during January 1977.

On February 17, 1977, the Commission of the European Communities notified the IAEA that all e the necessary steps had been taken for the IAEA-EURATOM Safeguards ve: fication Agreement pursuant to the NPT to come into force and the Agreement came into force on February 21, 1977.

Currently, EURATOM and the IAEA are negotiating the Subsidiary Arrangements and Facility Attachments which are necessary to bring IAEA verification of EURATOM safeguards into practical effect.

Pending the completion of these negotiations, the IAEA has been conducting ad hoc inspections under Article 48 and 71A of the Verification Agreement.

Through late 1977, it had conducted more than 80 such inspections at approximately 70 percent of all EURATOM-safeguarded facilities.

Criterion (2)

"No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device."

Each Non-Nuclear-Weapons States (NNWS) of the Community is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

As such, it is pledged not to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.. This pledge applies to any material, facilities and sensitive nuclear technology previously exported or retransferred to such state by the United States and subject 5

to the United States-EURATOM Agreements for Cooperation as well as to special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

Since this pledge will apply to the proposed retransfer and to any special nuclear material produced through its use, it appears that criterion (2) would be met with respect to the NNWS of the Community if any subsequent retransfers were made to a NNWS.

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7 With regard to the two Nuclear-Weapons States (NNS) of the Community, the United Kingdom and France, the proposed retransfer and any special nuclear material produced through its use will be subject to the continuing applicability of the United States-EURATOM Agreements for Cooperation.

Article XI(1) and (3) of the November 8,1958 Joint Program Agreement, as amended, which is incorporated into the Additional Agreement for Cooperation by virtue of Article V of the Additional Agreement, provide that "no material, including equipment and devices, transferred pursuant to this Agreement" and "no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of material, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this agreement...will be used for atomic weapons, or for research or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose." The United States--with the support of most other major nuclear supplier states--has taken the position that nuclear explosive devices are " atomic weapons," within the meaning of this guarantee, regardless of the intended end use of such devices. Also both the United Kingdom and France have accepted this interpretation and, as members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, have agreed as a matter of national policy to authorize the export of trigger list items "only upon formal governmental assurances from recipients explicitly excluding uses which would result in any nuclear explosive device (underlining supplied) and have notified the IAEA to this effect.

Therefore, it appears that the equivalent of criterion (2) is met with respect to this transfer.

Criterion (3)

" Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures

, provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the applicable regulations."

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has promulgated new regulations pursuant to i

section 304(d) of P.L.95-242, which requires measures equivalent to those recommended in the IAEA's INFCIRC/225/ Revision 1, "The Physical Protection of l

Nuclear Material."

Each member of the Community has established physical security measures, which, as a minimum, meet those recommendations.

8 Each member of the Community has established physical security measures, which, as a minimum, meet those recommendations.

In addition, all states in the Community (except Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg) are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and, as such, have agreed to levels of protection, consistent with INFCIRC/225/ Revision 1, to be ensured with respect to nuclear materials, which are detailed in.

transmissions of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines to the IAEA.

Therefore, it appears the criterion (3) is met.

Criterion (4)

"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, arid no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other national or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.

In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions requ' ired by this section."

Article XI(2) of the November 8,1958 Joint Program Agreement, as amended, which is incorporated in the Additional Agreement for Coopera-tion, as amended, Article V of the latter Agreement, provides that no material (including equipment and devices) may be transferred beyond the control of the EURATOM Community, unless the United States agrees.

Article 1 bis D of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, provides that special nuclear material produced through the use of United States-supplied material may'be exported to any nation outside the Community or to a group of nations, provided that such nation or group of nations has an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation with the United States or guarantees the peaceful use of the produced material under safeguards acceptable to the Community and the United States.

The European Community's interpretation of this language--as set out

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in an April 15, 1977, letter to the Department of State from Fernand Spaak, Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Com-munities--is that the European Community Supply Agency, prior to any proposed transfer, will consult with the United States to find out whether, in the view of the United States, the proposed recipient of s

such produced special nuclear material has 6n Agreement for Coopera-tion with the United States has the exclusive ability to decide whether an agreement is " appropriate." This letter states that:

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9 "It is our understanding that any transfer of recovered materials from the Community to a third country is subject, in accordance with the terms of the EURATOM-United States Agreement for Cooperation, to prior United States Authorization."

Therefore, it appears that, with regard to the proposed retransfer and special nuclear material produced through its use, criterion (4) is met.

With respect to transfers within the Community, it should be noted that the use of the words " group of nations" in criterion (4) makes clear that no retransfer consent right is required within a group of nations under this criteria.

With respect to this provision, the Senate report states:

"It should be noted that under the U.S.-EURATOM Agreements, the United States does have a right of prior approval on retransfers of certain material outside of the EURATOM Community.

It should also be noted that paragraph 4 does not require prior approval with respect to transfers within the EURATOM Community, consistent with United States policy of treating that Community as a [ single] entity."

The Congressional intent, in connection with exports, not to require United States consent rights for transfers within the Community is also clear in Section 123 a.(5) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, since it requires that the United States seek a guarantee "by the cooperating party" (which, in this case, is EURATOM as a whole).

However, the Executive Branch, before passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, took the position that, with respect to retransfers into EURATOM, it was important to keep retransfers for reprocessing limited as much as possible to control the use and transfer of the separated materials, especially plutonium.

Therefore, the need test was developed as was the procedure noted above, of control i>y ' commitment" from the non-EURATOM shipping country.

Criterion (5},

"No stich material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or codent, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration."

Euratom is expressly exempted from criterion 5 by virture of Section 126(a)(2) of the Act for a period of two years from March 10, 1978, since the Department of State notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on l

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10 July 1978, that Euratom has agreed to negotiations with the United l

States as called for in Section 404(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

However, this exemption in no way, derogates from the rights which the United States has under the United States-Euratom l

Agreements for Cooperation and under the commitments from the non-Euratom I

shipping country (Sweden).

Criterion (6)

"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology."

The proposed export does not involve sensitive nuclear technology.

Criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.

Section 128 Criterion Section 128 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act established the following additional criterion:

"As a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapons states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export."

This criterion does not apply to this case since the statutory 18/24-month time period in section 128 has not yet expired.

For the record, however, all nonnuclear-weapon states that are members of the European Atomic Energy Community are Parties to the NPT and, thus, have agreed to accept IAEA safeguards with respect to all their peaceful nuclear activities.

Also, as indicated above, all such peaceful nuclear activities are currently subject to EURATOM safeguards.

Since the United Kingdom and France are nuclear-weapon states, this criterion is not applicable to these countries.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS Safeguards Implementation The above discussion of criterion (1) of section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act reviews the current status of implementation of IAEA-EURATCM safeguards verification arrangements.

DOE oelieves the framework of commitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purposes of this retransfer.

4 11 Non-Proliferation and Other Considerations There is a long history of cooperation and strong bonds between Sweden, the member states of the Community and the United States, in the economic and security areas.

Sweden and the Community countries have worked. closely with the United States in efforts to further common non-proliferation objectives, through bilateral cooperative efforts and in such forums as the United Nations and the IAEA.

Sweden has made serious efforts to take proliferation concerns into account through their adherence to the NPT and to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines and their participation in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation.

Recommendation Taking into account the analysis outlined above, it is recommended that this transfer for reprocessing be approved.

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j WTERNATRNAL AFFAiA INTERNATIONAL I3IO N.T 30 iM 4: g ENERGY ASSOCIATES LIMITED March 30, 1978 j

Mr. Daniel J.

Shiller Department of Energy 20 Massachusetts Avenue Mail Stop 7220C Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. Shiller:

International Energy Associates Ltd. has been requested by Oskarshamnsverkets Kraftgrupp Akiebolag (OKG) to provide OKG with advice and assistance in connection with OKG's l

requests for approval to transfer spent fuel elements I

from the Oskarsharm Nuclear Power Station to the BNFL facilities at Windscale, United Kingdom.

OKG is taking vigorous action to avoid the need for transfer of spent fuel to reprocessors.

Pending completion of this action, o

limited transfers are required in order to allow continued operation of the Oskarshamn units /'within established safety guidelines.

On behalf of OKG, we are pleased to provide you with the l

enclosed memorandum which describes the spent fuel storage situation at the Oskarshamn station, as well as information on relevant spent fuel disposition policies and practices.

We hope that this information wil,1 be of use to you in your consideration of the pending requests for transfer from the Oskarshamn station.

Sincerely,.

,f John E. Gray JEG/csm Enclosure 4

2600 VIRGINIA AVENUE. N.W.

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20037 202 338 8230

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Disposition of Spent Fuel From the Oskarshamn Nuclear Power Station Introduction Approval has been requested by the Government of Sweden for the transfer to Windscale Works of British Nuclear Fuels' Ltd. (BNFL) of 158 fuel assemblies containing enriched uranium of U.S. ori'in arising.from the operation of the Oskarshamn 1 g

nuclear power plant, and for 24 assemblies from the Oskarshamn 2 unit, owned and operated by OKG, a Swedish utility consortium.

These requests were made in MB-10 forms covering the transfer of 97 assemblies from Oskarshamn 1, dated December 28, 1976, and for 61 and 24 assemblies from Units 1 and 2, respectively, received by the Department of Energy on March 8, 1978 The purpoce of this memorandum is to furnish background information on the operation of the Oskarshamn station as it relates to the need for spent fuel transfers, as well as information on rele-vant spent fuel disposition policies and practices, which the o

company hopes will be of assistance to U.S. authorities in their consideration of the proposed transfers.

Background

Oskarshamn 1 and 2 are boiling water reactors of 440 and 570 MWe, respectively, which have been providing power to the Swedish electric grid since 1972 and 1974.

During 1977, nuclear power accounted for 21% of Swedish electrical energy production.

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Thus, nuclear power is already furnishing an exceptionally im-portant share of Swedish energy needs, and the two Oskarshamn reactors make an important contribution to Sweden's nuclear power system.

Plans for the disposition of spent fuel from the Oskar-shamn reactors were consistent with Swedish Government policy and generally accepted international practice at the time the reactors were committed and built.

Each reactor is equipped with spent fuel storage ponds, capa'ble, in their designed version, of accommodating about 1 2/3 cores and 1 1/2 cores,

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respectively, for Units 1 and 2.

The basic policy was to arrange for the reprocessing of this material in facilities outside Sweden, and a contract toward this end was concluded with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (later BNFL) in November 1969.

This contract provides for the reprocessing of 140 tons of spent fuel, with the recovered products to be retained, sold, or returned by BNFL in accordance with in-structions of OKG.

Company policy, which conforms to that of other nuclear power plants in Sweden as well as in a number of other countries calls for the maintenance of a full-core reserve discharge capability at all times.

The importance of this policy is illustrated by the fact' that the entire core hat had to be discharged from Oskarshamn 1 on two occasions.

Departure from this policy would reduce safety margins and have an adverse effect on public attitudes toward operation of the station.

Swedish Spent Fuel Disposition Policy Swedish spent fuel disposition polycy is specified in the so-called Stipulations Law, adopted December 30, 1978, which requires reactor operators to have contractual arrange-

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ments for the reprocessing of spent fuel, and to demonstrate that a completely safe means is available for ultimate dis-posal of the resulting reprocessing waste.

Alternatively, operators may show that a safe means of final disposal of spent fuel elements is available.

OKG spent fuel disposition policy has necessarily been based on this legal requirement, and is met by the arrangements described above for reprocess.

ing by BNFL under a contract which calls for waste disposal by the reprocessor.

While the Swedish spent fuel disposition policy has not been legally modified, the Swedish Government announced on December 22, 1977 that no further approvals would be granted by it for the tranfer of spent fuel from Swedish nuclear power stations.to reprocessors pending the completion of INFCE, unless required for operational reasons.

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ar vein, increased emphasis has been given for some timc upent fuel storage as an alternative to immediate reprocessing in Sweden, and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Company has formally requested government approval for a centralized spent fuel storage facility in Sweden.

If approval is granted, this facility is scheduled to be completed by 1984, and will have storage capacity for 3000 tons of spent fuel, correspond-ing to the quantity expected to be discharged from all author-ized Swedish power reactors up to 1990.

However, as is true in a number of countries, site selection for this facility may l

prove to be controversial, and the schedule ~ could therefore be l

delayed.

The foregoing description of Swedish spent fuel disposition policy makes it clear that Sweden:

a) is reviewing previous policy, which, in effect, made it necessary for reactor operators to arrange for the reprocessing of spent fuel, and b) in the meantime is acting diligently to provide a prac-

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tical alternative to prompt reprocessing in the form of central-ized spent fuel storage facilities.

OKG Spent Fuel Disposition Plans For its part, OKG is conforming fully to the Swedish governments revised views on spent fuel disposition, and ha's for some time been exploring' arrangements for the expansion of spent fuel storage capacity at the Oskarshamn nuclear power stations.

This exploration culminated in the ' decision to expand storage capacity at both units through the' installation of compact racks, and a contract has been entered into with a Swedish firm to undertake this work during the Spring of 1979; The construction scheduling of this effort is extremely tight, especially in view of the fact that the work will be undertaken in pools containing substantial quantities of 1

irradiated fuel, and a significant element of uncertainty necessarily exists in the ability o'f the contractor to complete

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the work as scheduled.

This uncertainty would be considerably i

reduced through:the removal of as much spent fuel as possible 1

i from the pools prior to the construction work.

As described in-I detail in the following section, however, even the completion of feracking 'on schedule will not avoid the necessity for the transfer of spent fuel from the Oskarshamn nuclear power statios Spent Fuel Discharge Capacities and Schedules Detailed analysis of the spent fuel discharge schedules and capacities for the Oskarshamn nuclear power station is i

required to identify critical times when fuel storage capacity-will or is likely to fall below the levels permitted by OKG's full-core reserve requirements.

In addition to considerations relating directly to reactor discharge schedules and pool capacities, two other operational considerations relating to spent fuel transfers are especially relevant.

These are:

1) Ice problems at the' port of embarcation make it im-prudent to schedule shipments for the months of January, i

February, and March.

This means that fuel which must be re-moved from a storage pond by April or,May should, if at al.-

possible, bc transferred before January, since the shipmere window is otherwise very short, and safety margins are accx ae ingly reduced.

2)

Shipment cannot take place from a reactor during refueling due to personnel and equipment limitations.

Ship-ment from one unit while the other is being refueled is theor-

'etically possible, but extremelv undesirable for safety reason @

This factor further reduces the shipping window, and maxes early removal desirable to avoid operating difficulties.

3)

Fuel cannot be transferred from one pool to the other, since casks for this operation are unavailable and due to the elevated location of the pools, the transfer would entail safety hazards which would probably preclude licensing.

The spent fuel storage and discharge situation for the two units of Oskarshamn projected to 1983 are as follows:

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.j Oskarshamn I Fuel assemblies in reactor 448 Fuel positions in pool, current 7.59 Positions available for storage, current 311 Fuel positions added by reracking 210 Fuel position available for storage, af ter raracking 521 After refuelling Ready for For In Discharged shipment reinsertion Othere Time pool Reinserted i

Oct 76 36 21 139 108 31 15 l Sept 77 154 23 63 169 10 15 l May 78 194 8:

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15

! April'79 250 2

92 325 0

15

' May 80 340 0-80 405 0

15 i June 81 420 0

80 485 15 1982 500 80 565 15 1983 590 80' 645 15 Note: "Other" includes leaking rods and special assemblies l

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. The above tabulation indicates that the free storage capacity of 311 elements will be exceeded as a result of the discharge which takes place in April 1979, unless new racks are installed prior to that time.

Following the installation ~s of new racks, the new free capacity of 521 elements will not be exceeded until the discharge of April 1982, if no prior transfer has occurred.

Earlier transfer could significantly extend the time at which the Oskarshamn I pool is filled.

For example,-the transfer of 219 elements prior to 1982 would extend the storage capability at Unit 1 until the 1985 discharge, by which time it is hoped that the Swedish central storage. facility will be in operation.

Analysis of these data, together with.the operating re-strictions and pool reracking plans described above, leads to the conclusion that, for prudent operation, a fuel shipa ment should'take place in October-November 1978 in order to:

a) facilitate safe and timely accomplishment of the pool reracking operations, and p

b) ensure that the safe storage capacity of 311 ele-ments is not exceeded by the April 1979 discharge, if for any reason hool reracking is not completed by that time.

A minimum of 29 elbmen'ts would be required to mee't the

.latter minimum condition.

However, a considerably larger. dis-charge would.be needed in order to materially improve 'the 'assurm ance of timely completion of reracking.

A shipment of.59 elements would have the advantage of both assisting considerably in this regard and avoiding the 521 element limitation that would other-wise be exceeded in 1982.

Reracking after transfer of 59 ele-ments would still. entail working in a pool with nearly half a core of spent fuel' elements in storage, but it is felt that i

adequate safety can be assured by internal rearrangement of elemeg A shipment of 219' elements might be adequate to avoid any overe f,

loading prior to the completion of,the central storage

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In light of the above considerations, shipment of at least 59 elenents in the fall of 1978 is regarded as a necessary and a'ppropriate measure.

Oskarshamn II Fuel assemblies in reactor 444 Fuel positions in pool, current 704 Positions available for storage, current 260 Positions added by reracking 436 Positions available after reracking 696 After refuelling In Ready for Time pool Reinserted Discharged shipment Reinsertion Others June 77 66 50 172 24 154 10 May 78 188 50 146 170 104 10 July 79 284 54 165 335 50 10 10 Sept 80 395 50 150 485 10 100 585 81 495 10 100 685 82 595 I

83 696 10 100 785 l_

The above tabulation indicates that the current free storage capacity of Unit 2, of 260 elemen J will be exceeded by June 1978 discharge.

Accordingly, twenty four-elements should be removed from the pond as quickly as possible.

If transfer cannot be effected before the June 1978 discharge, then it should take place at the latest by Sept. 1978 before Unit-2 is recommissioned after reloading.

Transfer at this time might be desirable from the standpoint of coordination with the transfer from Unit 1.

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i Plutonium Disposition OKG is prepared to leave separated plutonium at DNFL until an alternate disposition is considered and approved by the Swedish Government, 'with the consent of the United States.

Conclusion OKG is taking positive and vigorous actions to avoid the need for transfer of spent fuel to reprocessors pending international evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle.

In the meantime, limited transfer of OKG fuel will be necessary pending completion of enlarged storage capacity in order to avoid reactor shutdowns or alternatively major departures from existing operational standards with significant adverse implications for operational safety.

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A APPENDIX'.B.

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Mr. Harold D. Bengelsdorf, Director I

Office of Nuclear Affairs International Programs U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C.

20545

Dear Mr. Bengelsdorf:

This letter will inform you that NRC has no objection to the proposed retransfer from Sweden to the UK of 85 irradiated fuel assemblies (RTD/EU(SW)-37 and 38), provided it is subject to the conditions contained in DOE's analysis of the case which accompanied your letter of July 20.

Sincerely, James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs i

APPENDIX B l

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