ML20203L207
| ML20203L207 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1986 |
| From: | Hoyt K GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203L206 | List: |
| References | |
| LRP, NUDOCS 8608250209 | |
| Download: ML20203L207 (4) | |
Text
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D 00CHETED llSNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 16
@ 21 P5:04 BEFORE THE PRESIDING BOARD hggIlNGASEpyyy'CEOf SLU1 BRANCH
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In the Matter of
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INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND
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Docket No. LRP UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA
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FALSIFICATION
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH R.
HOYT My name is Kenneth R.
Hoyt.
I reside in Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania.
I am currently employed by GPU Nuclear Corporation as a Decontamination Supervisor in Recovery Operations.
I spent nine and one-half years in the United States Navy.
I began employment with Metropolitan Edison Company in 1971 as an auxiliary operator at Unit 1.
I became a control room operator at Unit 2 in 1976 and served in that position until 1977, when I became a shift foreman.
I was a shift foreman at Unit 2 until 1981, when I attained my current position.
My essential duties as a shift foreman were to operate the plant safely, to monitor daily evolutions, to carry out the required routines for a shift and to supervise the personnel assigned to my shift.
During a typical shift, I would spend approximately one-half of my time in the control room, and the balance of my time touring and inspecting the plant.
8608250209 860821 PDR ADOCK OD000320 T
4 I never personally performed a leak rate test, although it was my responsibility to review leak rate tests run by operators on my shift.
In light of that information and the information I learned from my routine plant tours, I determined whether or not the plant was being operated in a safe manner.
As a shift foreman, I was aware that unidentified reactor coolant system leakage was not to exceed one gpm.
I was a' Iso aware that part of my responsibility as a shift foreman was to ensure that this limit was not exceeded.
During 1978 and 1979, I was aware that the method by which we measured reactor coolant system leakage was not always accurate.
The principal reason for this problem was that the computer program that ran the leak rate test was inaccurate.
At that time, however, I believed that I could ensure that unidentified leakage did not present a safety problem by checking other monitoring methods, which I used routinely.
These methods included observing makeup tank level, pressurizer level, system temperature and the sump pump.
I believed that i
despite inaccuracies in the leak rate test, I could nevertheless obtain a "ballpark estimate" as to whether we were operating within the one-gpm limit by observing the parameters described above, and by tours through the plant looking at system leaks or other problems.
I realize now that my review of these parameters did not enable me to determine precisely whether unidentified leakage exceeded one gpm.
However, my primary concern was to operate the plant safely. _
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My understanding of the action statement was that unidentified leakage had to be brought to below one gpm within several hours after a bad leak rate test or the process of plant shutdown had to commence.
Due to inaccuracies in the leak rate test, I was not atways able to determine precisely whether unidentified leakage was below one gpm.
Thus, I now recognize that there may have been instances when I should have entered the action statement but failed to do so.
I was aware that TMI-2 operating procedures required that exceptions and deficiencies be filed with invalid leak rate tests.
However, I never filed an exception or a deficiency with any leak rate test that I deemed invalid.
I estimate that I approved about one-half of the leak rate tests that were brought to my attention.
The remaining tests were discarded.
I discarded all leak rate tests showing unidentified leakage in excess of one gpm because in my judgement those tests were invalid.
If my shift ran a leak rate test showing unidentified leakage in excess of one gpm, we would run other leak rate tests until a good result was obtained.
I did not attend plan of the Day meetings, and was not informed of the results of such meetings unless that information was relevant to my shift.
I did attend meetings among the shift foremen, although I do not recall discussing j
problems with system leakage at any of these meetings....
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I maintained a log which contained entries concerning leak rate test results and other indications of system leakage.
I also maintained a list of active leaks, which I would hand over to the next shift foreman.
I logged only satisfactory leak rate test results, because it was common practice at TMI-2 to do so.
I was not aware that during December 1978 one level transmitter was very unreliable, although I am now aware of that fact.
To my knowledge, no one under my supervision deliberately used a faulty level transmitter so as to affect a leak rate test result.
I was aware that adding hydrogen to the makeup tank during a period vhen the makeup tank level instrumentation was faulty could produce a false reading.
However, I was unaware during that time that the addition of hydrogen to the makeup tank during a leak rate test could affect the result.
To my knowledge, none of the operators under my supervision attempted to manipulate leak rate tests in that way.
I was aware that it became increasingly difficult to obtain a satisfactory leak rate test result before the accident.
None of my superiors ever pressured me to violate TMI-2 technical specifications or operating procedures concerning system leakage.
I realize today that I made some mistakes in my actions but I never tried to falsify any information.
If I had it all to do over again today I definetely would be be doing things differently.
I would log all results of tests and not make any assumptions on my own.
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