ML20203H575

Forwards FEMA & Evaluation of 851106 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise for State of Il & Grundy, Will & Kankakee Counties.No Deficiencies Identified.Areas Requiring Corrective Actions by State Noted

ML20203H575
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	07/30/1986
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 8608050029
Download: ML20203H575 (2)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:..l JUL 301986 Docket No. 50-456 Docket No. 50-457 Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen: We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated April 3, 1986, and associated final exercise evaluations on the offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted on November 6, 1985. This was a full participation exercise for the State of Illinois and Grundy, Will and Kankakee Counties. Based on the performance of the offsite agencies during the exercise, FEMA did not identify any deficiencies, but there were areas requiring corrective action, and the State has supplied a schedule of adequate corrective actions. The areas requiring correction did not detract from the overall demonstrated capability to protect the health and safety of the public. We fully recognize that the recommendations to be implemented may involve actions by other parties and political institutions which are not under your direct control. Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station to be addressed by you as well as others. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. Sincerely, "Originalsignedby7.DIShafer" 8608050029 860730 PDR ADOCK 05000456 W. D. Shafer, Chief F PDR Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure:

As stated See Attached DistributionM RIII RIII 'II RII1 fj uNS r) (MO Th /6 Ploski/bls Snell rd Fer S h \\/ h l / pr y w s,ek 4 an 9 L

Commonwealth Edison Company 2 J[J[3Q1986 Distribution cc w/ enclosure: D. L. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing M. Wallace, Project Manager D. Shamblin, Construction Superintendent E. E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager P. L. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor DCS/RSB (RIDS) Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Braidwood Resident Inspector, RIII Byron Phyllis Dunton, Attorney General's Office, Environmental Control Division D. W. Cassel, Jr., Esq. J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public utilities Division H. S. Taylor, Quality Assurance Division E. Chan, ELD J. Moore, ELD G. Berry, ELD J. Stevens, NRR The Honorable Herbert Grossman, ASLB The Honorable A. Dixon Callihan, ASLB The Honorable Richard F. Cole, ASLB cc w/o enclosure: D. Matthews, OIE, EPB

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\\ Federal Emergency Management Agency I f Washington, D.C. 20472 0 0 W 3 1986 MEMORANDEM EOR: Fdward L. Jordan Director S C A - i:St" Division of Emergency Preparedness d- ,][ 4'p 7-{9 -l and Engineering Fesponse M' Office of Inspection and Enforcenent U.. Nucle Regul t ry Ccmnission git FROM: . Kr Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Prograns

SUBJECT:

Exercise Peport of the November 6,1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Dnergency Preparedness Plans for the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Attached are two copies of the Exercise Report of the November 6,1985, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Braidwood Nuclear Ibwer Station. This was a joint full participation exercise for the State of Illinois and Grundy, Will and Kankakee Counties. The report dated February 4,1986, was prepared by Region V of the Federal Onergency Management Agency (FEMA). There were no deficiencies observed at the exercise. There were inadequacies identified requiring corrective actions; however, they did not detract from the overall demonstrated capability to protect the health and safety of the public. The State has subnitted a schedule of corrective actions (copies attached) which are adequate to correct the inadequacies identified during the exercise. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Ibbert S. Wilkerson, 01ief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860. ( Attachments as stated $604100272~860403 fDR ADOCK 05000456 PnR , o4 i jr s t

4 =pe f.( - BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR PONER STATION Comnonwealth Edison Conpany Joint Exercise Facility Location: Located in the State of Illinois in Will County near the Town of Braidwood Exercise Date: November 6, 1985 Date of Report: February 4, 1986

Participants:

State of Illinois, Grundy County including the conmunities of Coal City, Mazon, Gardner, South' Wilmington and Braceville; Will County including the comnunities of Braidwood and Wilmington; Kankakee County including the conmunity of Essex and Comnonwealth Edison Company. This was a full participation exercise for all jurisdictions and the utility. Federal Emergency Management Agency Region V Natural and Technological Hazards Division 300 South Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606 M 100274 860403 ~ fDR ADOCK 05000456 PDR L

t. TABLE OF CONTENTS y-l:.. l l ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS page 1 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

State of Illinois page 3 Will County page 4 Grundy County ~ page 5 Kankakee County page 6 EXERCISE REPORT Introduction page 7 1. Exercise Background page 7 2. Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments page 7 3. List of Evaluators and Assignments page 7 I 4. Evaluation Criteria page 8 5. Exercise Objectives page 8 6. Summary of Scenario page 12 7. State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used l in the Exercise page 13 8. Exercise Findings in Past Exercises page 14 9. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved page 14 Narrative page 16 1. State of Illinois page 16 2. Will County page 23 3. Braidwood page 27 4. Wihnington page 29 5. Grundy County page 30 t 6. Coal City page 33 7. Mazon page 33 8. Gardner page 34 9. South Wilmington page 34

10. Braceville page 34

11. Kankakee County page 35

12. Essex page 38 1

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R .~' s SIM1ARY LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS page 39 State of II.1.inois __ q 1. Deficiencies page' 40 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions page 41 ~

3.. Areas Reconnended for Improveinent page 42 Will County 1.

Deficiencies page 43 i 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions page 44' 3. Areas Reconnended for Inprovement page 45 Grundy County s 4 1. Deficiencies page 46 j 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions page 47 3. Areas Reconnended for.Inprovement page 48 Kankakee County 1. Deficiencies page 49 r 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions page 50 3. Areas Reconnended for Improvement paget 51 4 l 1 i ~_ 4 I i +4 1 N y s 2.

a s EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

State of Illinois

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The State demonstrated the ability to notify the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff and begin activating the EOC following the " ALERT" classification. Around the clock staffing capability was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster. The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (IESDA) Director took charge of the situation and made decisions based on the coordinated efforts of his staff. Additional staff briefings to discuss the emergency response status would enhance operations. The State EOC is a well maintained facility and contains the necessary amenities to support the staff over an extended period of time. The primary and secondary comunication systems worked well throughout the exercise and were sufficient for contacting the appropriate organizations. Numbering the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) messages would facilitate the tracking of messages by local government officials. The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) maintained a liaison staff in the State EOC. The staff sumarized mjor recomendations from the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) for protective actions for the EOC staff. IDNS supplied appropriate dosimetry for all Radiological Assessment Field Teams (RAFT) and State agencies who deployed personnel to field activities in or near the EPZ. The availability of equipment and knowledgeable RAFT personnel provided a successful demonstration of field monitoring. Based on the potential for an iodine release, the REAC Comander simulated issuance of instructions for all ee rgency workers to take potassium iodide (KI). Field monitoring teams were mobilized at the State Forward Comand Post (FCP), located at the Mazon Dnergency Operations Facility (EOF) site, and deployed to the preplanned radionuclide sanpling points. Appropriate equipment and procedures were utilized. Traffic and access control was procedurally demonstrated by the coordinated efforts of responsible State agencies. A simulated demonstration of disrupting this control was appropriately handled by the staff. The State demonstrated their ability to contact the Federal Government for assistance. The IDNS provided total population dose estimates. Estimates were provided after a simulated evacuation was completed. The estimate included the population within the 1, 2, 5 and 10 mile radius of the nuclear power station. Rccovery and reentry considerations were demonstrated at the State EOC, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) and by the field teams. Within the State EOC discussions were limited to individual agencies rather than as an integrated staff discussion. 3

he JPIC is co-located with the utility's EOF at Mazon. The State public information staff was prepositioned for the exercise. A shift change was not demonstrated but a roster was available. The coordination between the JPIC and the IESDA and IDNS staffs in Spr'ingfield was evident throughout the exercise.- Information released at the JPIC should describe the affected areas in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries rather than by sector designations. The State primary comunications to the JPIC were demonstrated. The JPIC had one facsimile machine which was operational for the exercise. Reentry messages were coordinated by the JPIC staff with personnel in Springfield prior to release. Will County Will County demonstrated the ability to mobilize the EOC staff and to begin activating the EOC following receipt of the " ALERT" classification. The County emergency reroonse was managed by the Will County ESDA Coordinator. The staff demonstrated the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency responses. The County EOC served as the focal point of the exercise. The County EOC is outside the 10-mile EPZ of the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station and has an alternate power source and other amenities to sustain extended operations. The EOC also has the necessary mps and displays to support the emergency response. The County demonstrated the ability to comunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. Primary comunications with the State is via NARS and comercial telephones. Comercial telephone is available for comunications with the utility. The Will County officials took precautionary measures by simulating the evacuation of the incorporated areas of Braidwood and Godley. The County demonstrated through simulation, the ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions. The Sheriff's Department, in concert with the County Highway Department, simulated the establishment of traffic control points. The County Forest l Preserve Police simulated confirmation of the evacuation of County recreational areas. The County Board Chairman demonstrated the ability to brief the media in a clear and accurate manner through three press briefings. He was assisted by the County ESDA Coordinator and the IDNS representative in the County EOC. The County conducted a partial demonstration of their ability to determine and implemnt appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry. The relaxation of protective actions by the County was based on information provided to the County by IDNS. The County emergency response agencies simulated the reentry and recovery procedures. ) The emergency response demonstrated by the EOCs in Braidwood and Wilmington l was effective. The emergency staffs were involved in appropriate decisicn-making and were effectively managed by their elected officials. 4 i

l = Primary comunication for both EOCs to other locations is via comercial telephone. There is only one telephone line in the Wilmington EOC building available for use by the staff. An Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES) radio operator was dispatched to the Braidwood EOC from the Will County EOC following the " SITE AREA EMERGENCY",c:lassification to provide a backup means + of comunications. Grundy County The Grundy County EOC staff was mbilized and the facilities activated as part of the exercise. The call to activate the EOC was received from IESDA. The capability to staff the facilities for an extended period of time was demonstrated through a partial shift change and presentation of a roster. The EOC staff made decisions relative to emergency activities and comunicated with one another in making these decisions. The required facilities, displays and other amenities were available for the exercise. The County ESDA Coordinator followed the procedures as set forth in the plan and SOPS for activation of the Alert and Notification System. The public was informed of the necessary actions to take through the use of prescripted mssages which were broadcast (simulated) over the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). The EOC staff worked togetber in the discussion of how they were to handle the evacuation and inpediments on the evacuation routes. Access control was simulated by the Sheriff's Department. A media briefing was held with the ESDA Coordinator acting as the PIO. The recovery and reentry procedures were implemented in a professional manner. 'Ihe local jurisdictions of Coal City, Mazon, Gardner, Braceville and South Wilmington demonstrated their capability to inplement an emergency response and were effectively managed by elected officials. All jurisdictions had adequate volunteer staffing to fill the various emergency response positions. The facilities were adequate and equipped with the necessary amenities to respond to an emergency. Kankakee County The Sheriff's Dispatch Center is the warning point for Kankakee County. Following receipt of the " ALERT" classification, the dispatchers notified EOC staff members. The EOC was fully staffed within one hour of the decision to activate. The County Board Chairman directed operations. The County ESDA Coordinator served as Chief of Staff. Frequent staff briefings served to inform the staff and to coordinate actions. Checklists for each emergency action level were used to ensure all required actions were taken. Wenty-four hour staffing capability was evidenced by rosters. All required maps and charts were available and used. The status board was visible to all persons in the room although important information was sometims excluded. The operations room was supported by comercial telephone comunications with law enforcement radio as back-up. A datafax machine was linked to the comercial telephone system. 5

I W rough simulation, the EOC staff demonstrated their capability to effect an evacuation of areas within the County and provide care for evacuees from other Counties as well as their own. _The staff members used SOPS and checklists to ensure all recovery ac'tib'ns' were considered and all agencies, as well as the public, were informed of recovery actions. A protective action was ordered to place milk animals within two miles of the plant on stored feed. The County Board Chairman called the EBS station and gave a codeword to simulate transmission of a prescripted message followed by simulated sounding of the sirens. When conditions had changed to " GENERAL EMERGENCY" and protective actions changed, the sirens were again sounded and EBS was notified. Areas to be sheltered and evacuated were described using familiar boundary descriptions. 'It is necessary for Kankakee County to take its lead from the governor, coordinate their decision with the other two Counties and in accordance with procedure, reserve the use of sirens and EBS for notification of protective actions for the general public. We County Board Chairman was interviewed by a press representative twice during the exercise. These interviews were conducted outside the designated briefing room. Additional assistance and training is required to prepare the EOC staff to assist the County Board Chairman in preparing information to be presented to media representatives. The Kankakee County Sheriff's dispatchers notified the Village of Essex Fire Department of emergency action levels. Essex activated their EOC in response to the exercise situation through implementation of their emergency plan. The Chief of Police is designated in charge and provided concise up-dates and full information to the staff as events occurred. A status board was kept current through the day. All required maps and charts were available. 6

9 s EXERCISE REPORT Introduction

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1. Exercise Background This was the first joint exercise for the State of Illinois, Will County, Grundy County and Kankakee County resulting from a sinulated accident at the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station. 2. Participating and Non-participating State and Local Governments The 10-mile plume exposure EPZ of the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station inpacts primarily on Will County. It also inpacts on Grundy and Kankakee Counties. The State of Illinois and all three Counties participated in the exercise. In addition, eight municipalities within the three Counties participated. These municipalities were Braceville, Gardner, South Wilmington, Coal City, Mazon, Essex, Wilmington and Braidwood. 3. List of Evaluators For this exercise there was a total of nineteen Federal evaluators observing off-site exercise activities. On-site activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission (NRC). Of the off-site evaluators, seven, including the off-site Exercise Director, were Federal Emergency Managenent Agency (FEMA) Region V staff. The balance of the team was conposed of a representative from the Department of Energy (DOE), one from the Department of Agriculture (USDA), one from the NRC, one from the American Red Cross (ARC / FEMA), two frcrn the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), one from the Department of Transportation (DOT), one from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and four contract evaluators from the Argonne Natio al Laboratory (ANL). The evaluator assignments were as follows: Off-site Exercise Director Gordon Wenger, FEMA State of Illinois Evaluation Team l Robert Shapiro, Team Leader, FEMA, State EOC (Springfield) Sue Ann Curtis, ANL, State EOC (Springfield) Anna Hart, USDA, State EOC (Springfield) Steve Kouba, DOE, REAC (Springfield) Marsha Smith, NRC, State Forward Conunnd Post (Mazon) Jim Kraeger, FDA, State Radiological Mobile Lab (Mazon) Pete Tedeschi, EPA, RAFT (Mazon) Les Johnson, EPA, RAFT (Mazon) Ray Kellogg, FEMA, JPIC (Mazon) 3 Will County Evaluation Team Woodie Curtis, Team Leader, FEMA, County EOC (Plainfield) Wiley Howell, FEMA, County EOC (Plainfield) Bill Gasper, ANL, Braidwood and Wilmington EOCs 7

r .j + Grundy County Evaluation Team Ed_ Robinson, Team Leader, FDjA, County EOC (Morris) Don Hulet, ANL, County EOCJ(Morris) Ed Tanzman, ANL, Coal City and Mazon EOCs plus EBS station Norm Stoner, DOT, Braceville, Gardner and South Wilmington EOCs Kankakee County Evaluation Team i - Rick Anthony, Team Leader, FEMA, Coun!y EOC (Kankakee) Walter O'Keefe, ARC / FEMA, County EOC (Kankakee) and Essex EOC t 4. Evaluation Criteria ~ 'Ihe plans that were evaluated by this exercise were developed using the. " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Dnergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/EEMA REP-1, Revision 1). Therefore, these criteria and the modules based on these criteria entitled, " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Dnergency Preparedness Exercire Observations and Evaluation," dated June 1983, were used for exercise t valuation. 5. Exercise Objectives i Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the FEMA thirty-five (35) standard objectives listed in Tab "M" of the " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations," dated June 1983. The objective numbers listed below correlate to Tab "M". The State of Illinois selected the following eighteen objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise: 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities pronptly. 2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. 1 4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. 5. Demonstrate ability to connunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. 6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. 7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels. 8 _._~~._,.- _,-.

+ 1 10. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective (neasures based on PAGs, available shelters, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate-fac' tors.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. 21. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population. 24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner. 25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released. 32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance. 34. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and inplement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Will County selected the following thirteen objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise: 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. 2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. 4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. 5. Demonstrate ability to comunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

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14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage and orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with inpediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner. 25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released. 35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry. Grundy County selected the following thirteen objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise: 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. 2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate ennrgency activities. 4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. 5. Demonstrate ability to conmunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

13. Denonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage and orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions. 17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area. 10

24. Demonstrate a'..ility to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

..-r 25. Demonstrate ability to providea'dvance coordination of information released.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Kankakee County selected the following thirteen objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise: 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities pronptly. 2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. 4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. 5. Demonstrate ability to cornunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage and orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclenunt weather or traffic obstructions.

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and inplement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

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6. Sumary of Scenario The Braidwood Nuclear Power Station radiological emergency preparedness exercise objectives and scenario for the' November 6, 1985, joint full participation exercise were developed by exercise planners of the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, IESDA, IDNS and IMPEL, a contractor for the State of Illinois. The exercise planners served as controllers during the exercise and protected the scenario from the participants of the exercise so they would not be aware of the scenario events. FEMA Region V attended a meeting with the utility and State planners in July 1985 to select the objectives and determine the scope of the exercise. Review of previous exercise deficiencies was not necessary as this was the first exercise involving this nuclear power station. The scenario was to eriphasize the alerting, mobilization and activation of staff and not to errphasize the recovery and reentry portion of the exercise. The scenario provided additional experience and training for field monitoring personnel. The scenario also provided for a demonstration of comunications with the State Forward Comand Post. Submission of the scenario was according to guidelines outlined in NRC and FEMA guidance. Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Incorporated, reviewed the onsite and off-site scenario for FEMA so evaluation of the objectives selected by the State of Illinois as well as the three Counties could be accurately assessed. The exercise scenario was sufficant to initiate the emergency response by the State of Illinois and all three Counties. The scenario did allow for the demonstration and evaluation of the objectives selected for the November 6, 1985 exercise of the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station. Plant status, as an initial condition of the exercise, showed unit 1 in operation at 100% power with a norm l full power electrical lineup with the exception of the IB Diesel Generator. Unit 2 was shutdown in Mode 5 with major steam generator maintenance in progress. Shutdown occurred within the previous 96 hours following greater than 180 full power days of operations. Secondary plant maintenance is in progress on the feedwater system and the turbine auxiliary systems. The diesel generator 1B for unit one has been out of service for 65 hours for turbocharger bearing changeout. It is estimated that three hours remain to restore it to service. Two coal powered stations on the grid have gone off the line for emergency maintenance within the past 24 hours and the Load Dispatcher has advised that maximum power should be maintained on Unit 1. At 0715, an electrical fire develops in a non-safety cable tray which is located in the Unit 1 pump room. Heavy smoke is carried through the system and ultimately causes main board annunciation. The fire is classified as not requiring offsite assistance. This is the " UNUSUAL EVENT" and notification is required. At 0800, a stressed weld in a bypass line cracks, allowing a leak of approxim tely 55 gpm to develop suddenly. This loss of primary coolant results in declaration of " ALERT" at 0815. 12

t At 0900 the two inch cold leg bypass pipe shears with an instant load rate of 1500 gpm. The break flow is much greater than the charging pumps capacity and the Positive Displacement Punp will not start if attenpted. Safety Injection may be initeated manually, or at some time later, automatica1,1y. This break causes the. declaration of a " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" at 0915. General radiation survey of contaminment indicates levels inside in excess of 4,000 R/hr. Coolant grab sanple results delivered; (greater than 300 micro curies per gram). EAL 24 Loss of Fission Product Barriers causing the declaration of " GENERAL D4ERGENCY" at 1030. One containment purge path valve is already open. Indication of mid-position is seen for the second valve. At 1130 release path open via the remaining purge valve failing. Containment begins venting to the atmosphere through the path outlined above, an open exhaust danper and out the plant vent stack. At 1345 one purge valve returns to its shut position, thus terminationg the release. At 1430 a 24 hour time jump occurs. The plant condition is deemed stable, with sufficient subcooling and containment conditions under control. No further indications of fire in the electrical system are found and radiation levels in containment have stabilized. The actual events followed the pre-exercise scenario. The " UNUSUAL EVENT" was declared at 0715, the " ALERT" at 0815, the " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" at 0915 and the " GENERAL EMERGENCY" at 1028. At 0934 it was reconmended by the utility to place all milk producing animals located in the 0-2 mile radius on stored feed. IDNS concured with the recomnendation. At 1034 it was reconunnded to put milk producing animals on stored feed in the downwind sectors out to 10 miles and instruct the public to shelter 2-5 miles in the three downwind sectors and evacuate all sectors 0-2 miles. At 1102 it was recomnended the sheltering be increased out to 10 miles in the three downwind sectors and at 1154 evacuate 2-5 miles in the three downwind sectors. There was a 24 hour tinn jump prior to recovery and reentry activity being initiated at 1455. 7. State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise The State of Illinois planned to staff and demonstrate response activity at the State EOC in Springfield; the State Forward Comnand Post, the JPIC and the utility's EOF, collocated in Mazon; the State comnunications van, the IDNS REAC and RAFT (including environs teams); and the Illinois State Police van. Will County planned to demonstrate its EOC with full emergency staff participating. The County also chose to demonstrate its capability (simulated) to activate the Pronpt Alert and Notification System, the Emergency Broadcast System and access control. Evacuation of the plume EPZ was to be simulated. The municipalities of Braidwood and Wilmington activated their EOC in support of the County. 13

O Grundy County planned to demonstrate its DOC with full emergency staff participating. The County also chose to demonstrate its capability (simulated) to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification Systens, the Fhergency Broadcast System and access control. Evacuation of the plume EPZ was to be simulated. The municipalities of Braceville, Gardner, South Wilmington, Coal City and Mazon actiUated their EOCs in support of he County. Kankakee County planned to demonstrate its EOC with full emergency staff participating. The County also chose to demonstrate its capability (simulated) to activate the prompt alert and notification system, the energency broadcast system and access control. Evacuation of the plume EPZ was to be simulated. The Village of Essex in Kankakee County also activated its EOC in support of the County. 8. Exercise Findings in Past Exercises As this was the first exercise for the Braidwood site, there were no previous exercise findings which would require corrective actions to be demonstrated during this exercise. 9. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved The State of Illinois did not conpletely demonstrate the following objective: 24. Demonstrate ability to brief the nedia in a clear, accurate and timely manner. Will County did not completely demonstrate the following objective: 35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry. Grundy County completely demonstrated all of the objectives that were selected for this exercise. Kankakee County did not completely denonstrate the following three objectives: 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. 4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. 24. Demonstrate ability to brief the nodia in a clear, accurate and timely nunner. Appropriate corrective actions will be required from the execise participants and the above noted objectives must be demonstrated during the next biennial exercise. The following sixteen exercise objectives were not selected for this exercise and have not yet been demonstrated in the current exercise cycle. 14 i

? 8. Demonstrate appropriate equipent and procedures for measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10 to the minus 7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases. (State of Illinois) 9. Demonstrate appropiate equipman,t_and procedures for collection, transport and analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water and milk. (State of Illinois)

11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs and other relevant factors. (State of Illinois)

12. Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (State of Illinois)

18. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-inpaired individuals within the plume EPZ. (Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties) 19.

Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ. (Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties) 20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emrgency worker exposure. (Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties) 22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so. (State of Illinois and Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties) 23. Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel. (Will County)

26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion. (State of Illinois and Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties)

27. Dcsnonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees. (State of Illinois and Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties) 28.

Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees. (Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties)

29. Demnstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles. (State of Illinois and Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties)

30. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals. (Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties)

31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals. (Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties)

33. Demonstrate ability to relocate to and operate the alternate EOC.

(Will, Grundy and Kankakee Counties as appropriate) 15 i

Narrative 1. State of Illinois Activation.and Staffing The IESDA office nnintains an around the clock monitoring of the comunication network with all organizations providing support during emergencies. At 0715, IESDA was advised by the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station that an " UNUSUAL EVmT" had occurred. The situation escalated to an " ALERT" at 0815 and appropriate calls were made to verify the declaration and to activate the EOC. Notice of " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" was received at 0934. " GENERAL EMERGENCY" was received at 1035. The EOC staff promptly reported to the EOC and made contact with the organizations intended to provide support to the response. The staff demonstrated their responsiblities to respond to the emergency. Each organization provided a list of names of those individuals who would be available to maintain a continuous operational capability. REAC staff were activated by the use of " pocket pagers". Key personnel are assigned pagers with "all-call" capabilities. The IDNS dispatcher has a call list which he can use to notify those personnel who are not assigned pagers. Internal IDNS procedures are such that anyone assigned a pager who must be tenporarily away from a telephone is required to notify the dispatcher. The State REAC was fully activated within 20 minutes of the staff being notified. The ability to staff the REAC on a 24-hour basis was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster. All positions have backup. IDNS has a " personnel pool" available to fill in for any of the positions. A telephone call from the State EOC was received by the IESDA Forward Comand Post (ECP) Director at 0922. The Director had been pre-positioned at the FCP and this call was to initiate activation of the facility. Normally, the Director would report to the State EOC and be dispatched by the State EOC Director to the FCP at the " ALERT" classification if plant conditions warranted. After a thorough initial staff briefing by the State Police, IDOT, IDNS and the National Guard the NP was declared ready for operation. The ability to maintain around the clock operations at the ECP was demonstrated by all agencies represented through double staffing. Demonstration of mobilization of the RAFT from Springfield was not an objective of the exercise. The RAFT was prepositioned at the FCP and field monitoring teams were dispatched from this point. Emergency Operations Management 'Ihe IESDA Director was in charge of the ennrgency response. He was supported by his operations Officer as well as other members of his staff. Organization and prior training was evidenced by the nunner in which the staff fulfilled their responsibilities. 16

s The State IESDA advised FEMA Region V of the situation and requested that liaison officials report to the State EOC so that offective coordination j with other Federal agencies could be, maintained. AREA REC 0fttENDED FOR IMPROVDiENT: It is recomended that more frequent staff briefings be conducted in the State EOC with all members of the staff participating. i The REAC Comander was clearly in charge of the facility. This was demonstrated by periodic briefings, participation in decision making and i involvement with key staff in analyzing information. 1 The State REAC staff also demonstrated a request for Federal assistance. ~ j REAC personnel were familiar with specific resources available from the DOE I as evidenced by their request for field teams, mobile laboratories and aerial monitoring capabilities. 1 'Ihe State FCP was managed by the IESDA FCP Director, the person designated in the plan. He demonstrated thorough knowledge of the operational procedures of the FCP and also good management skills. One formi briefing was conducted before activation. All agencies in the FCP informally exchanged informtion throughout the exercise. They worked closely together and coordinated actions during the entire exercise. Copies of plans, SOPS, checklists, maps and logs were available and utilized throughout the j exercise. j The NARS messages relayed to the FCP were received by radio or through the l State Police. The hard copy of the NARS messages took an average of 45 l minutes to reach the FCP. However, this did not adversely affect the l overall operations. There was a communications exchange between the IESDA ECP Director and the RAFT Conmander. The RAFT Comander updated his staff every 15 to 20 l minutes. The RAFT maintains copies of IPRA and used the SOPS continuously. The RAFT maintained a chronology of events and action items. l Facilities The State EOC has been evaluated many times and found to have sufficient amenities to support the staff. Over the years, IESDA has made numerous inprovements to their facility as well as operational procedures within the EOC. The EOC has all the necessary posted maps which can be easily referred to by the staff. A special facilities map is posted which displays the location of industries, motels, recreation facilities or any other special 3 facility which may require special attention during an emergency. f Furniture designed with ergonomic considerations has been ordered for the recently redesigned REAC. Lighting has been designed to result in minimum eye strain. 'No separate telephone systems are available to facilitate internal and external comunication needs. Computers for data analylsis, i retrival and storage of utility (reactor) parameters and near site environmental monitoring levels and graphic displays are state of the art. i 17 i ~ s ., ~ - - -.,,. - - -. - -.. ,,.,,._c, -,,,..--,._.._-._-,,,---,..-----,_,,,,___,_e_---,, _n..----.-.--.,_,.__.,,..-.

9 'Ihis exercise was the first activation of the ECP at this particular site, replacing the mobile vans utilized in the past at other sites. The space, furniture, lighting and telephones were sufficient. Backup power is available through generators provided by'the National Guard. Status boards were clearly visible and maps showing the evacuation routes, relocation centers, road blocks and population by sector were posted. Emergency classifications were prominently posted and maintained throughout the exercise. The State ECP provides sufficient space for the RAFT personnel. Three telephones were maintained for connunications between REAC and RAFT. RAFT personnel continuously used maps displaying monitoring points throughout the exercise. Comunications Comunications were well organized and controlled. The EOC comunications room was equipped with the following systems: Primary Backup Location NARS Telephone / Fax State EOC NARS Telephone / Fax Local / County EOCs Telephone Fax Contiguous States NARS Telephone Utility NARS Telephone / Fax EOF FENATS Telephone FEMA Telephone Teletype JPIC 'Nenty-four hour staffing is maintained providing capability for continuous operations. Conference call capability was available. The comunications system personnel effectively performed their functions demonstrating their knowledge, skills and ability to successfully maintain comunications with appropriate locations. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: It is recomended that NARS messages being transmitted from IESDA to the recipients be identified by a message number. This is important so that recipients can readily identify a missing massage. Primary and secondary comnunication links between the REAC and the Utility's EOF, County EOCs, the State EOC, the JPIC and the RAFT (commnd vehicle for State field monitoring teams) were available and demonstrated. Facsimile capability was also demonstrated. The ECP maintained radio comunications with the State and County EOCs. Radio comunication was utilized as the primary comunications link. Comercial telephone was demonstrated as backup for this exercise. ID(yr used only comercial telephone. Each agency had a dedicated line for their own use. The National Guard and State Police demnstrated their comunications van capabilities. The vans capability would allow for comnunication under adverse conditions. 18

'7 The RAFT received NARS hard copy via telefax. Corm 1unication between REAC and RAFT was accomplished via telephone and between RAFT conmand and the field monitoring teams via radio. The RAFT comunicated with medical facilities by telephone. These methods were effective. r~.L.. Dose Assessment and Protective Acti6n Recomendations The IDNS field monitoring teams were equipped, briefed on the accident status and dispatched to predetermined field monitoring points from the RAFT at the State ECP. The time interval between the teams being dispatched and the first reported field measurm ents was approximately forty minutes. The plume verification officer and the field team dispatcher, through radio comunications, were able to rapidly redirect the teams to various locations to define the plum, to verify radiation measurements and to provide radiation exposure control guidance to other emergency workers. Field treasurements were pro @tly reported. The vehicle utilized by one field monitoring team is a large van accomodating the team and equipment for expected terrain and weather. It has a GM counter and an ionization chamber rate meter, both with satisfactory range of coverage. The air sagling equipment was operated on vehicle supplied power. The air pum was calibrated and was equipped with a particulate filter and a charcoal cartridge. An air sample was taken to be read out for noble gas activity on a jelly counter. The team members made competent readings of both ground and air sample readings with both the GM counter and the ionization chamber rate meter and took an air sample. Both members of the team were well versed in equipment operation. The map of the sampling locations was faded and it was hard to make out details. Environmental sam le collection was not an exercise objective and therefore was simulated. The team had all the necessary gear to collect, package and label the samples. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The faded map used by the accident assessment team should be replaced with one that is easier to read. 'Ihe field team dispatcher was able to monitor IESDA radio comunications to identify potential travel impedirrents to the environs teams like road closures and railroad traffic problems. Field monitoring data was recorded by three different RAFT personnel to insure accuracy and provide depth in reviewing data. This data was promptly reported to REAC for use in developing protective action guidance. Equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels were demonstrated by State field monitoring teams. In addition, the State has installed 16 Rueter-Stokes High Pressure Ionization Chambers approximately 1-3 miles from the reactor in each of the 16 co mass headings described in NUREG-0654. A system to " poll" detectors periodically and display the radiation levels to REAC personnel was demonstrated. The REAC had computer modeling available to predict the potential dosage to the public based on plant conditions and field monitoring data. The system included graphics which defined the plume and isodose lines within the plume. 19

Based on the potential for an iodine release, the REAC comander issued instuctions recomending all emergency workers take KI. Based on release quantitites, duration and predetermined population distribution, the REAC estimated a total population dose. .. c The IDNS maintained liaison representatiives in the State EOC. These representatives transmitted the recomendations and field monitoring results from the REAC to the EOC staff. All connunications were logged. Monitoring data was recorded on an EPZ map. Major recomendations and emergency events 3 were sumarized and provided to the EOC staff during periodic briefings. Technical information was presented in an easily understood format. IDNS Liaison staff effectively performed their responsibilities. Agricultural advisories placing lactating animals on stored feed were issued at 0945 for animals in all sectors 0-2 miles and 'at 1045 for all sectors out to 10 miles. 'Ihe protective action recomendation to evacuate 0-2 miles in all sectors and shelter in place 2-5 miles in sectors J,K, and L was issued at 1100. Advise to extend sheltering 5-10 miles in sectors J, K and L was issued at 1130 while the evacuation recomendation for sectors J, K and L for 2-5 miles was issued at 1150. Public Alerting and Instruction i The IESDA successfully denonstrated the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion. Evacuation procedures and operations were controlled and well-organized. The IESDA staff was professional and knowledgeable of their responsibilities. Appropriate personnel irrplemented SOPS and distributed clear and concise emergency public instructions. All messages including protective actions were described in familiar terms, provided guidance on inplementation and distributed at appropriate times. Protective Action 4 The State EOC staff assisted the Counties in controlling access to the affected sectors in the 10-mile EPZ. These efforts were coordinated by several agencies and involved the coordination of several operational districts within agencies. The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) coordinated road blockade activities with the staffing of eight traffic control points by the State Police. Supplemental staff and equipment were on stand-by with the National Guard. Traffic control points were relocated 1 in response to the changing emergency situation. Traffic control points were ordered activated at the " SITE AREA EMERGENCY". Traffic volume and personnel necessary to manage the evacuation process were discussed. Rail traffic was controlled through a request to the State EOC to contact the Illinois Comerce Comission. State and local personnel and vehicles are in sufficent numbers to cover initial access control. Long term conditions would require assistance from the National Guard. Discussions regarding this were conducted and a simulated request was made for National Guard resources. The combined resources of the IDOT, State Police and National Guard to keep evacuation routes clear were procedurally demonstrated. l 20

'Ihe IDOT also notified the Federal Aviation Administration to control air traffic over the EPZ while the Illinois Camerce Comission notified the railroads to reroute trains through this area. Water traffic in recreational areas and the Kankakee# River was controlled by the joint efforts of the Illinois Department of Conservation and the U. S. Coast Guard. Radiological Exposure Control Appropriate direct reading and permanent recording dosimetry was issued to RAFT personnel. IDNS has previously supplied personal dosimetry to other State agency emergency workers. RAFT comand maintains approximtely 150 dosimetery packets for other workers. KI is included in all dosimetry packets. The field monitoring teams were equipped with protective clothing. Exposure control for the field assessment teams was very good. The use of the thyroid blocking agent was ordered at 1247 hours. RAFT comand was aware of the relocation sites and possible decontamination centers. The Environs Team Coordinator was prepared to adjust the field team cortposition in order to create decontamination teams if requested by REAC. RAFT comand personnel are knowledgeable of criteria and procedures for KI authorization, decontamination and exposure control methods. Emergency worker radiation exposure was continuously recorded and evaluated by RAFT comand personnel. KI use was simulated as recomended by PEAC based on plant status and engineering projections of further plant degradation. Media Relations The State did prepare a room in the State EOC to receive the media. Some media did appear at the EOC and were nfforded a briefing of the EOC functions. However, the majority of the State's media relations occurred at the JPIC. The State of Illinois was represented in the JPIC by staff from IESDA and IDNS. The otility also had spokespersons at the JPIC. County governments do not routinely send representatives to the JPIC. The State of Illinois information center staff were prepositioned near the JPIC location. The State staff arrived at the JPIC at 0955. Neither IESDA nor IDNS demonstrated a shift change but around the clock staffing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. The media briefing area is in a connected garage area and could accomodate about 100 media people with their electronic equipment. The Utility uses this area for a JPIC for Dresden, LaSalle, arv3 Braidwood and is "always" set up and maintained as a media briefing center. Its non-emergency use is that of a classroom / training center. The utility EOF security desk is set up in the hallway between the JPIC and the EOF operations room. This caused traffic congestion when people were checking in with security and briefers were trying to reach the briefing room. 21

We primary means for comunications with the State EOC in Springfield and with the County EOC's is the telephone. A fax capability for hard copy is available and.was demonstrated during_the execise. Only one fax machine /line was utilized, however other fax machines are available which would permit sinultaneous sending and receiving of material. 1 'Ihirteen news briefings were conducted during the course of the exercise. The first at 1008 announced " SITE AREA EMERENCY". The last briefing was at 1525 and announced unlimited movement in sheltered areas and unrestricted reentry into evacuated areas. This announcement also removed all protective actions for lactating animals. Even though releases were coordinated before each briefing some briefings were not joint State / utility briefings. Hard c.opy of releases were available at the tim of the briefings or shortly thereaf ter. On several occasions State and utility briefers were unable to answer questions from their audience. Answers were obtained for these questions and presented at later briefings. Releases received by the JPIC staff from the State EOC described areas recomended for protective actions in terms of distances from the reactor and sectors, even though the EOC staff had the SOPS containing the area descriptions in terms of familiar landmarks and geo-political boundaries. As a result the first several messages received at the JPIC were read and distributed to the madia as received using distances from the reactor and Releases transmitted to the JPIC from Springfield also contained sectors. the generic listing for the EBS station although the State staff has the specific identification for the area station. While public instruction is not a function of the JPIC the County messages are read and made available to the nella represetatives at the JPIC. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: E.7 Although sector descriptions provide an easy effective means for the internal transmission of protective action recomendations, these sector descriptions should be converted to familiar geopolitical descriptions (per the SOP's) prior to release at the JPIC. Information that references the use of the EBS station should contain the call letters of the EBS station and be consistant with the listing in the public information brochure. Even though rumor control was not an exercise objective, the JPIC staff was l responsive to rumors as they occurred. They discussed and clarified l inaccurate repotts during media briefings. The reentry message was prepared by the JPIC staff. It was based on recomendations from the IDNS. Because of the nature of the release, noble i gases, safety precautions were not required in this message. They were excluded only after extensive discussion between the JPIC staff, the REAC and the State EOC staff in Springfield. 22 i

Recovery and Reentry % e State emergency response personnel demonstrated an ability to identify - requirements, programs and resources available to iglement recovery and reentry procedues. The discussion did:not include agency interaction and decision-making procedures. Agency > int'eraction provides an environment conducive to each agency identifying primary role responsibilities and possible support services and assistance. AREA REC 0lHENDED FOR IMPROVD1ENT: The next scenario should include provisions for a more complete discussion by the State EOC staff of unique problems which may be experienced during the recovery and reentry phase of an emergency. We discussion should involve all members of the staff. REAC staff participated in reentry decisions as demonstrated by their efforts to rescind a press release that gave instructions to wash foodstuffs in the plume prior to eating. REAC's decision was based on the absence of any particulate release (and therefore subsequent deposition) from the reactor. REAC's reentry decisions were coordinated with measurements made by State field teams to confirm the absence of radiation readings above background level in the plume area. REAC requested the RAFT Comnander to provide field monitoring data for use in recovery and reentry decision-making. The REAC reconnendation to relax protective actions was made on the basis of simulated monitoring data indicating safe level of radioactivity. The KP remained activated until notification from all County EOCs, as well as the State EOC, that all reentry was cog leted. ID M staff did not remain at the KP throughout the : ecovery and reentry activity. Road blocks were removed at the notification of unrestricted reentry and State Police presence remained until reentry was cowleted. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: IDOT staff should remain at the K P until it is certain that they no longer have a role in the recovery and reentry procedures. 2. Will County Activation and Staffing The Will County EOC, currently located in Plainfield, was activated following the receipt of the " ALERT" notification over the NARS at 0832. Alerting of the emergency staff and mobilization procedures were demonstrated. An up to date written call list was used to cowlete staffing of the EOC at " SITE AREA EMERGENCY". The Plainfield Police Department's dispatch center receives the NARS messages. The dispatch center is staffed 24 hours by the Plainfield Police Department personnel. Verification of NARS messges is over comnercial telephone, as specified in the plan. W e EOC was fully staffed and operational with the required personnel by 0959. The capability for a continuous operation at the County EOC was demonstrated by a partial shift change of some agencies and the presentation of a roster for the others. Both first and second shift personnel displayed training and knowledge in their respective roles. Incoming personnel wer? briefed on the current status and activities. 23

o O. Dnergency Operations Management Emergency operations were of fectively__ managed by the Will County ESDA Coordinator. Periodic briefings were conducted including status reports by appropriate agency representatives. The staff was involved in decision making as directed by the ESDA Coordinator. Written procedures were used; message logs were kept; messages were reproduced and distributed to EOC staff. The EOC was notified of the " ALERT" at 0832, the " SITE AREA D4ERGENCY" at 0934 and the " GENERAL INERGENCY" at 1034. Appropriate protective action reconmendations were received by the County. The recomendation to place milk producing cows within 2 miles of the station on stored feed was received at 0943. At 1034, simulated evacuation of a two mile radius and sheltering in sectors J, K and L downwind 2-5 miles was reconmended and inplemented. At 1102, simulated shelter reccanmndations were extended out to 10 miles for sectors J, K and L along with the continuing 2 mile radius evacuation. At 1154, the simulated evacuation was increased to include the 2-5 mile portions of sectors J, K and L with simulated shelter reconmendation remaining for 5-10 miles in sectors J, K and L. Facilities The facilities available at the Will County EOC were sufficient for the County's operations. The operations area was somewhat limited in space due to the number of agencies represented. The facility has the capability to provide for extended operations through the use of a kitchen and sleeping area. The EOC is to be moved to a newly remodeled building in the business district of Joliet. The move is expected in 1986. All required maps and displays were posted for use by the emergency staff (i.e. plume EPZ with sectors, evaucation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points and population distribution by evacuation area). Emergency classification levels were posted and changed as necessary throughout the exercise. A status board was maintained with current significant events. Connunications 'Ihe ability to conmunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel was demonstrated by the Will County EOC staff. Primary conmunications with the State is via the NARS and conmercial telephone lines. A toll free number over conmercial land lines is available for connunications with the utility. Comnercial telephones were used to notify the Towns of Braidwood and Wilmington of changes in emergency classification levels and protective action reconmendations (i.e. NARS messages). Conmercial telephones with radio as inckup are used to conmunicate with other appropriate locations. The mutual aid fire radio net is the primary link to support hospitals and ambulances. A data fax nuchine provides hard copy capability between the EOCs, the E0P and the JPIC. 24

= _ _ - _. _ - - _ _. i (' j Will County has a conm2nications van that has the ability to coninunicate with all agencies required for operation of the EOC. The van is self d contained..It has two cellular telephones for contact with agencies not having radios. The van can duplicate all dispatch centers in Will County, i, 1.e. Sheriff's Dept, County Road, Fire Dept. etc. The van has a bank of batteries that will allow for up to eight hours continuous operation even if there is a failure of the self contained generator. The van has radio j coverage for all frequencies from the CB range up to UHF for contact with i aircraft on emergency frequencies. The van can have up to 15 hard line telephone lines dropped by the telephone conpany so that coninercial j telephones would be available for emergency operation. l Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recomnendations I j These activities are objectives for the State of Illinois only. Public Alerting and Instruction j Will County officials ordered the precautionary evacuation of the Towns of Braidwood and Godley at 1059, after receiving notification of the " GENERAL EMERGENCY" at the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station from IESDA at 1034. The Towns of Braidwood and Gadley would be the only Will County incorporated l areas inpacted by the " GENERAL EMERGENCY" sheltering and evacution order. I The evacuation of the two cannunities via school buses and contractol buses was termed precautionary because of the report of two fires in an auxillary j building at the Station. The IESDA reported there had been no radioactive release from the utility but the decision was mde by the County to evacuate. ) The County activated the siren system in Will County at 1945 af ter receiving notification of a " GENERAL EMERGENCY" from the IESDA at 1034. The EBS (WJOL-AM 1340 and WLLI-FM 96.7) was activated at 1046 to issue public alerting and instructions. The County used modified prescripted messages and real time messages received from the State for dissemination of public 1 instructions. Protective Action l The County EOC staff from the County Sheriff's Department and the Ccunty j liighway Department sinulated the manning of check points for ingress and j egress of the evacuated areas. The County Sheriff's, assisted by municipal police departments, would man the checkpoints and the County liighway a Department would in responsible to provide barricades for the closing of l designated roads pet the County SOP. Emergency worker personnel would be } permitted as necost1ry into areas once they are evacuated. A determination of which emergency workers would be allowed into the area would be 1 determined on an individual basis through the County EOC in consultation with the respective nunicipal police departnunts and the County Sheriff's Departm nt. The Sheriff's representative, in cooperation with the County liighway Departmnt, simulated the establishment of traf fic control points to facilitate the evacuation. Traffic and access control points were established by State iblice at Interstate 55 (Northbound) and route 47; the i intersection of Route 113 (eastbound) and route 47; Interstate 55 ] 25 ) t n.

(Southbound) and Interstate 80 and Interstate 55 (Southbound) and Route 6. Traffic and access control points established by the County Sheriff were at County Line and Essex Roads; Smiley and Essex Road; Coal City and Novy Road, and Coal City Road and North Central Avenue. The Will County Forest Preserve Police and County Highway Departments were reportedly assisting in the evacuation. The County Highway Department had simulated the dispatch of County Highway personnel with trucks and barricades for assisting with setting up roadblocks and the removal of stalled vehicles blocking the evacuation routes. The Forest Preserve Police was ensuring the evacuation of the recreation areas. The County initiated activation of a reception center at the Joliet Junior College in a timely fashion (1050). The Center was simulated to be manned by the Red Cross, an ESDA shelter manager, ham and citizens band radio operators and other personnel per the County SOP. The EOC starf had access to a listing of individuals in Will County that are mobility impaired. The listing included information as to the particular special needs of each individual listed. The Will County ESDA Coordinator contacted the ESDA Coordinators in Braidwood, Wilmington and Godley for notification and evacuation of the mobility inpaired individuals needirj assistance per the County SOP. As part of the " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" notification from the IESDA at 0934, the County was advised that IDNS recomnended as a precautionary measure that all milk producing livestock within a two mile radius of the Station should be placed on stored feed. The EOC staff coordinated with the IDNS representative in the EOC for updates and the progress of the State's notification of farmers in Will County. At 1236, the County was notified of a release of radioactive gas which began at 1223 at the Station. The areas in Will County affected by the release (all sectors 0-2 miles, 2-5 and 5-10 miles downwind sectors J, K and L) had already been evacuated or sheltered as a precautionary measure. Tha County simulated reconnending County emrgency workers take KI based upon the recomnendation from IDNS. The message indicated that IDNS was monitoring the release and that no contamination was expected but that taking KI was precautionary. Radiological Exposure Control Although not an exercise objective for Will County, two County personnel were issued high range dosimeters (0-200R), sinulated TLDs, record keeping cards and KI. The two personnel were dispatched from the EOC by the County Desimetry Control officer with verbal instructions on the recording of information an the dose record cards, telephone and/or radio call-back to the EOC regarding dosages and instructions on the use of KI. The two workers inititated calls back to the EOC giving the Dosimetry contol Officer readings from the dosimeters. The dosimeter readings were entered on a dosimetry emtrol log by the Dosimetry Centrol officer. There was also simulated distribution of dosimetry, KI, and record keeping cards to personnel of th County Sheriff's Department, the Highway Department and the Will County F.cest Preserve Police. 26

Media Relations There were three press briefings held for the media by the County. The County Boardroom is the area designated for press briefings. Other EOC personnel acted as media representatiyes for press briefings provided by the County Board Chairman in concert with the'Will County ESDA Coordinator and the IDNS representative. The press briefings were accurate and complete and consisted of information provided to the County by the State ESDA, information released to the EBS, and County information that was provided to the State FCP and the JPIC at Mazon. Recovery and Reentry The relaxation of protective actions by the County was based on information provided to the County by IDNS. The County was notified by the IDNS that the radioactive gas release from the Braidwood Station had terminated effective at 1418 hours and the " GENERAL EMERGENCY" classification remained in effect. The County's news release to the EOF and JPIC erroneously stated that residents in the City of Wilmington had been directed to evacuate when, in fact, it should have been Braidwood. The error was recognized at the JPIC and the information was not released to the media. Reentry decisions were discussed by the EOC staff and relayed to participating emergency response organizations by their respective EOC staff representatives. The agencies simulated the reentry and recovery procedures being inplemented by their respective organizations. There was no discussion of arrangentnents to provide the public with information on safety precautions, possible health effects of low level radiation exposure and the availability of compensation for the financial losses sustained. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: M.1 Reentry and recovery should be more fully demonstrated by the County during the next exercise to include arrangments to provide the public with information on safety precautions, posible health effects of low level radiation exposure and the availability of compensation for financial losses. Local Government Response The emergency response function of Braidwood and Wilmington within Will County is under the responsibility of the County. Weir emergency response enhances the County's program. There are improvements which could be made. While they are not singled out for specific action, it is Will County's responsibility to work with both jurisdictions to resolve the problems cited below to ensure a unified and effective emergency response. 3. Braidwood Notification of an incident at the Braidwood plant is received from the Will County EOC by the Town of Braidwood Police Department's dispatcher in the Police Station. The dispatch center is manned 24 hours a day by police personnel. Upon receipt of notification, the dispatcher initiates a call down procedure using a written list with work and home telephone numbers of emergency staff. Some phone numbers were incorrect but corrections were rapidly nudo. Verification of calls from Will County was difficult to obtain. The Will County EOC phone was either busy or no one answered. This led to delays of up to 15 minutes. 27

Mobilization of the emergency staff was demonstrated with personnel reporting to the EOC in "real" time. We EOC was fully staffed and operational at 1044, following the " SITE AREA DiERGENCY" notification. The notification of " UNUSUAL EVENT" was not received at the Braidwood dispatch center. W e first message from Will County came at the " ALERT" declaration at 0840. f%- The Braidwood EOC was effectively managed by the ESDA Coordinator. Periodic briefings were conducted and the staff was involved in approprite decision making. Internal message handling was effective with each staff mcnnber receiving hard copy of appropriate messages. Logs of incoming and outgoing messages were maintained. We Braidwood EOC is in the Fire Department Building. There is anple space j and amenities to support an emergency response. Displays and maps (excluding population distribution) were used and updated following each significant activity. An additional clerical person to assist in the posting and updating of the status board would be helpful. This would relieve the EOC Director of this duty. At 1056, the Will County EOC recomended that Braidwood EOC relocate their operations to Wilmington. This activity was simulated. The relocation site would be separate from the Wilmington DOC. j Primary comunications for all EOC contacts (excluding Police and Fire) are over comercial telephone. There is no back-up system available at the EC. An ARES operator was deployed from the County following the declaration of " SITE AEA EMERGENCY" and was set up to provide back-up i comunications. Comunication with ambulances and fire and police personnel is via radio. Comercial telephones are used to contact schools and hospitals. The Braidwood EOC is responsible for supplemental public alerting and provision of instructions to the incorporated public through route alerting and notification of schools. These items were demonstrated through ' simulation and discussion. There are resources available to support these functions. The Braidwood Police Department is responsible for the traffic and access control duties within the incorporated area. There are resources in terms i of equipment and manpower available to support traffic control activities. The State Police is also available to assist if needed. The control points l were activated (simulated) following the recomendation for the evacuation i of Braidwood. l The locations and special requirements of mobility inpaired under the jurisdiction of the Braidwood staff are known by officials. Proper steps were followed to provide assistance to these individuals. There are sufficient dosimeters, 0-200 R and TLDs available for the EOC i staff. EOC personnel have been trained in dosimetry use. KI is stockpiled in the EOC and procedures for its distribution and use are known by the ESDA Director. 28 i i

,o a 4. Wilmington Activation and initial staffing procedures demonstrated at the Wilmington EOC were not observed. A full complement of staff (according to the plan) was at the EOC. The call list used to alert the emergency staff contained inaccurate telephone numbers. The wrong' telephone numbers were quickly identified and rectified. Plan and call list should be revised to reflect this. Twenty four hour staffing was demonstrated by the presentation of a duty All responding organizations represented at the EOC have backup roster. personnel available. l The Mayor of Wilmington was the official in charge of the EOC. He effectively managed the emergency staff and coordinated discussions and decision making between agency representatives. Periodic briefings were held among the EOC staff and the staff was kept up to date on significant events. Copies of plans and written procedures were available for reference. Written logs were maintained for messages and response activities. A security guard was posted at the entrance to the EOC to control access. Overall emergency operations management demonstrated a timely and efficient response by the EOC staff. All agencies participating were involved in the EOC activities (i.e. briefings, decision making, tabletop dicussions, etc.) The facilities used by the Wilmington EOC staff were sufficient in providing the required resources to perform their expected duties. The area utilized during this exercise has not been evaluated before. Ample room, lighting and furniture are available. One telephone line with four extensions was set up in the EOC operations room. This one telephone line had to be shared by everyone. This was the primary neans of comuncations with other (outside) responding emergency teams. Additional lines have been ordered. The only back-up system to the telephones is an ARES operator who was dispatched to the EOC following the " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" declaration. He was able to establish comunications with the Will County EOC ARES operator. With the exception of population distribution by sectors, all required maps and displays were posted in the EOC operations room. It is suggested that a population distribution map be obtained and posted. A status board was mintained with current updates being posted promptly. Energency classification levels were displayed. There was a sufficient supply of dosinntry equipment available at the EOC. Dosimeters and TLDs were issued prior to arrival of the evaluator. KI was available for distribution, if warranted, by the EOC Director in Wilmington. Recovery and reentry activities demonstrated in Wilmington were tabletop only. The staf f discussed their responsibilities and possible requirements which could result during recovery and reentry. 29

O e 5. Grundy Countyx Activation and Staffing We County has the capability via NARS to comunicate directly with the Braidwood Station and the line is monitored around the clock. The call ^ informing the County the accident was upgraded to " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" was received by the County dispatcher at 0934 from IESDA. The dispatcher took the appropriate action per the dispatcher SOPS and made the calls to the municipalities and the emergency workers. We dispatcher worked from a written call list which was up to date. The EOC was activated by 1020. A roster was presented with the names of the people assigned to the second shift. There was also a partial shift change. The Coroner did not participate in this exercise due to other pressing business. Dnergency Operations Management W e management of the EOC was demonstrated by the County ESDA coordinator. Briefings were held periodically. They were informative and timely. The staff was effectively used during the exercise and all agencies had written procedures. Messages were handled effectively and logs for messages were kept. Special police were stationed at the door of the EOC to check ids before entry was permitted. Exercise controllers were observed coaching exercise participants. At future exercises controllers should be instructed to limit their remarks to participants to controller functions only and not coach the participants. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: N.l.a Controllers should take care so as not to become a part of the participant emergency response-through coaching. (State of Illinois) Facilities . fIhe County EOC included working spacei comunications, equipment, maps and visual aids and a status board. Maps included plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points and population distribution. A status board was clear!y visible and-emergency classifications were posted at the top 0I tile board. Conmunications The primary comunications system with the State and utility is the NARS. Comercial telephone, radio and data fax are the primary comunications used to contact other areas within the EPZ. I There is the capability to contact sherif f squad cars, municipal fire departments, hospitals and ambulances by radio. This capability was demonstrated by the County ESDA Coordinator. i l. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recomendations l These activities are objectives for the State of Illinois only. 30 l

+ Public Alerting and Instruction The County ESDA Coordinator issued the instructions to the Sheriff dispatcher to activate the alert and notification system at 1046, which was 12 minutes after receiving the initiating call from IESDA. The EBS station was contacted at 1044.The County ESDA Coordinator informed the EBS station of the incident at the Braidwood Station. The EBS stations for the Braidwood ten mile Emergency Planning Zone, WJOL-AM and WLLI-FM, demonstrated that they are capable of receiving and broadcasting EBS messages to the affected comunities. Since both stations are collocated and operated together, broadcasts of EBS messages can take place simultaneously. A person trained in EBS procedures and aware of the particular responsibilities in the Braidwood emergency plan is present at all times. The receipt of several simulated EBS messages at the stations was observed during the exercise. The message that corresponded to the recomendation to place animals on stored feed was received from Kankakee County at 0946. The message that corresponded to the declaration of " GENERAL DiERGENCY" was received at 1046 from Grundy and Kankakee Counties, at 1047 from Will County, and at 1951 from the State. In all cases, the proper code word was used by the caller. Subsequent sinulated EBS messages were received between 1111 and 1118 and betwen 1201 and 1206 from the various EOCs particiating in the exercise. The CBS Station Manager demonstrated a keen interest in the responsiblities of the stations under the Braidwood Enurgency Plan. He had a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding between the stations and ESDA and knew its contents. He considered how to handle various contingencies, such as the receipt of a call to activate the EBS system from one County, but not the State or other Counties. He explained the array of equipment that would be used to record and air the EBS messages, concluding that the EBS messages of several jurisdicitions could be recorded simultaneously given enough people to answer the telephones, and that a message could be broadcast within about a minute and a half after it was recorded. However, no general training of station personnel about the Braidwood Emergency Plan has been conducted. During the exercise, a number of questions were asked by the station manager which suggests that training of station personnel would inprove their familiarity with the procedures, and that some discussions with station management would answer their questions about how the EBS is to be activated under various anomalous circumstances which do not appear to them to be covered under the Memorandum of Understanding. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEVENT: The IESDA should consider familiarization training and the dissemination of information for the EBS station staff on the Braidwood Emergency Plan and Procedures. The Memorandum of Understanding could be discussed and modified by the IESDA, the Counties and the EBS station. 31

'Ihe alert and notification system consists of sirens as the primary means of alerting the public to tune to the local EBS radio station listed in the public information brochure. There are tone alert radios in institutions, factories and schools. The County also has in place a backup system of route alerting, whereby they use pol, ice vehicles to alert the population. Protective Action Traffic control points were promptly established by the Sheriff's Deputies and the County Highway Department. Inpediments to the normal flow of traffic, snow or vehicle breakdown on highways could be handled effectively by the Highway Department. Actions were simulated by both departments. As part of the " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" notification from the IESDA at 0934, the County was advised that IDNS recomended as a precautionary measure that all milk producing livestock within a two mile _ radius of the Station should be placed on stored feed. The EOC staff coordinated with the IDNS representative in the EOC for updates and the progress of the State's notification of farmers in Grundy County. At 1236, the County was notified of a release of radioactive gas which began at 1223 at the Station. The areas in Grundy County affected by the release (all sectors 0-2 miles, 2-5 and 5-10 miles downwind sectors J, K and L) had already been evacuated or sheltered as a precautionary measure. The County simulated recomending County emergency workers take KI based upon the recommendation from IDNS. The message indicated that IDNS was monitoring the release and that no contamination was expected but that taking KI was precautionary. Radiological Exposure Control Not an objective for Grundy County during this exercise. Media Relations The County Boardroom on the first floor of the County Building was used as the news media center. The room is large enough to accommodate the local news media. If other than local news media were seeking information, they would be directed to the JPIC at Mazon. The County ESDA Coordinator served as the PIO. Also present for the briefings were the County Board Chairman and Sheriff's Department representative. The briefings were to the point and covered the necessary areas of interest to the general public. The PIO was knowledgeable of the content of the public information brochure. Recovery and Reentry The County simulated recovery and reentry procedures. Recovery and reentry decisions and inplementation guidance were provided by the State EDC and IDNS. Restrictions that were in place during the exercise were removed and instructions were given to returning evacuees. Road blocks were removed and evacuation centers closed. IDNS field monitoring teams surveyed evacuated areas before reentry was permitted. 32 __-____m_--___m________-_____________-________-__.__________m___..:.__.___.

o Local Government Respo% e The emergency responE function of Coal City, Mazon, Gardner South Wilmington and Braceviile within Grundy County is under the responsibility of the County. Their emergency response, enhances the County's program. There are inprovements which could 'be"made. While they are not singled-out for specific action, it is Grundy County's responsibility to work with all jurisdictions to resolve the problems cited below to ensure a unified and effective emergency response. 6. Coal City The Coal City EOC staff demonstrated a capability to protect the citizens of Coal City in the event of an accident at the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station. The EOC staff was activated, as planned, from the police dispatch office when the " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" was declared. They reported to the EOC at the " fire barn". The EOC is a facility with spacious accomodations for extended operations. It has a full complement of maps, backup power, and a status board. Both the Mayor and the Assistant Mayor were present at the EOC to direct the emergency response. A number of volunteers took time off from their regular employment to participate in the exercise. Each EOC staff person was provided with a set of procedures tailored to their responsibilities. A list of the mobility-inpaired was available and the staff was aware of its significance. They planned for the centingency of evacuating 1500 students from various schools in Coal City. The Police Chief was aware of his responsibility to participate in traffic control, and discussed the deployment of a squad car to the traffic control point for which he is responsible, as well as the placement of barricades by the Street Department. The problems that would be posed by a snowstorm or other traffic obstruction were discussed, and the Street Department representative planned how he would respond. Two problems were observed. Most inportant, the EOC only has one telephone line available for staff use. Some additional two-way radio frequencies could be made available at the COC. A portable radio could be brought in to serve as a base station for the buses that would be used to evacuate school children. The lack of sufficient telephones for the EOC staff could be a handicap. It is recomended that a telephone line and an instrument be procured for each EOC staff person. 7. Mazon The Mazon EOC staff demonstrated a capability to protect the citizens oi Mazon in the event of an accident at the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station. The EOC is well suited to its purpose. Located in the Mazon Fire Station, it has sufficient accomodations for an extended operation, a full complement of maps, backup power, a status board and a telephone for each staff person. The entire EOC staff, including the President of the Village Board and a number of volunteers, participated in the exercise. Each staff person was l provided with a set of procedures tailored to their responsibilities. A list of the mobility-inpaired was available and the staff was aware of its significance. The ECC staff planned for the contingency of evacuating tha entire Village, including its schools. 1 33 \\

9 8. Gardner 'IM NARS notification of " SITE AREA EMt2GENCY" declaratwn'was received in Gardner at 0956. By 1020, most of the EOC staff had arrived and the facilities.were in final preparation..qUpon the Mayor's arrival at 1035 the EOC was fully staffed and declared Yully operational. The County EOC was so advised. The EOC staff was effectively led by the Mayor, who methodically conducted staff briefings and discussions of their responsive actions. As protective action recomendations were received the EOC staff discussed the various facets of their respense actions which included: notification of mobility impaired, mobilization of Municipal and Township workers, dispensing dosimetry equipment, notification of industries (who may need extra time for orderly shutdown), dispatching of mobile PA units to advise the public of protective action, and notification of school administrators. The EOC staff anticipated contingencies and possible developments of the nuclear accident. The EOC facilities were sufficiently equipped with telephones, wall-maps, status board and classification signs. 9. South Wilmington The NARS notification, upgrading the " GENERAL EMERGENCY" to include the recomendation to simulate evt.cuation of the South Wilmington area, was received at 1213. At that time the EOC was fully staffed and operational. Upon receipt of the recomendation to evacuate the EOC, staff initiated action to simulate evacuating the general public, the school population, and the mobility inpaired. The staff discussed appropriate evacuation routes, relocation centers, and local traffic control measures. The EOC staff was directed by the Acting Mayor of South Wilmington. The EOC staff activity was suplemented by free play problems inserted by the State Controller which gave the staff some real world complications with which to cope. Upon evacuation of the general population the EOC staff contacted the County EOC for instructions and were advised to evacuate the staff. The EOC facilities were sufficiently equipped with telephones, wall maps, status board and classification signs. 10. Braceville Upon receipt of the NARS notification of " UNUSUAL EVENT" at 0804, the EOC staff was notified. The staff began arriving at the EOC at 0822. The EOC was staffed and operational by 0915. The County EOC at Morris was advised that the Braceville EOC was opeational at 0925. The EOC staff is familiar with the plan and used it for clarification when questions arose. The EOC facilities were sufficiently equipped with telephones, wall maps, status board and classification level signs. Presently, the dispatcher has to go to the opposite end of the Comunity IIall to make copies. This causes a delay and causes the dispatcher to be away from the comunication lines. Plans are underway to put a copier at the dispatcher's desk. Because of the exercise scenario the EOC was taken out of play (evacuated) early. 34 )

c.* 11. Kankakee County Activation and Staffing The Sheriff's Dispatch is located in,the basement of the County Sheriff's Building in downtown Kankakee. The'Kankakee County EOC is located in the County Office Building next door to the Sheriff's Department Building. Notification of the " UNUSUAL EVENT" and, later, changes in status were received by the Sheriff's Dispatcher over the NARS line from the State EOC in Springfield. The Dispatcher was able to verify the calls through call back procedure within one to two minutes after receipt. The dispatchers referred to prepared call lists and initiated calls indicated for each Emergency Action Level classification. The EOC staff members were notified following receipt of the " ALERT" classification at 0836. The EOC was fully staffed at 0920. Most positions were double or triple staffed. Twenty four hour capability was demonstrated by this multiple staffing or by presentation of rosters. Emergency Operations Management The County Board Chairman directed operations. He was assisted by the County ESDA Coordinator, who served.as Chief of Staff. Staff briefings were conducted at intervals ranging from 15 minutes to 35 minutes during the initial hours. This interval was extended during the later hours of the exercise when events also slowed. The staff members participated in the briefings to advise others of the status of emergency activities. A copy of the current plan and individual checklists were used throughout the day. The checklists were designed for each classification level and were used at the appropriate times. Message logs were kept by the administrative staff. Messages were copied and distributed to all staff mWoers. Changes in emergency classification were " ALERT" as of 0832, " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" as of 0934 and " GENERAL EMERGENCY" as of 1040. Protective actions were inplemented at 0945,1040, and 1202. Facilities A sign-in-and-out station was setup near the entrance to the operations room in a hallway. The station was operated by Sheriff's Officers and Auxiliary Police. The operations roan is approximately 14' by 24'. A central table with 19 chairs provided work space for 21 staff members and 4 observers (including the FEMA evaluators). Movement around the room was limited to an aisle approximately 30 inches wide around the periphery. This aisle was restricted on one side by the datafax machine. A cable was dropped from the ceiling to provide connection for 19 telephones that were taken from a locker within the room. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The County should consider locating a larger area for the operations room or relocating some functions, such as nessage control and the datafax machine, into the adjacent room within the secure area. 35 r--

All required maps and charts were available and were used to post information. The status board at the rear of the room was visible to everyone in the room. Significant events ocurring throughout the day were posted on the board. Frequent briefings kept the staff abreast of events but there was little information writte,n down for later referral. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: H.3 The status board should be used to display key information such as actions taken by the County and the Town of Essex in addition to changes in emergency classification levels. Cormunications The County comnunications system gives priority to support of the emergency . operations. Telephone is the primary means of connunications with Police and Fire radios as the back-up system. The main ~connunication center is the County Sheriff Radio Room in the County Building. The operations room is supported by comnercial telephone and law enforcement radio. A datafax machine was linked to comnercial telephone. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Reconnendations The activities are objectives for the State of Illinois only. Public Alerting and Instruction At 0934, the County was notified by the State EOC that plant conditons had changed to " SITE AREA EMERGENCY". A protective action was ordered to place milk animals within two miles of the plant on stored feed. The County Board Chairman called the EBS station at 0945 and gave a codeword to simalate transmission of a prescripted message. Sirens were simulated sounded at 0947. At 1043, when conditions had changed to " GENERAL EMERGENCY" and protective actions changed, the sirens were again sounded and EBS was notified. The sirens were sounded again at 1202 when protective actions changed. Each notification to the EBS included simulated reading of

.prescripted messages taken from the plan SOPS, concerning school children, location of shelters, and preparations individuals should make prior to evacuating. Areas to take shelter and be evacuated were described using familiac boundary descriptions. These instructional type messages were periodically repeated between changes to protective actions.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: E.6 The sounding of sirens in conjunction with agricultural protective actions is highly conservative. It is necessary for Kankakee County to take its lead from the governor, coordinate their decision with the other two Counties and in, accordance with procedure, reserve the use of sirens and EBS for notification of protective actions for the general public. Protective Action The evacuation to two miles of the plant at 1040 did not affect Kankakee County. Traffic control points were plotted on the basis of the protective action order and in anticiption that further evacuation could occur. At 1012, Sherif f's Officers and State Police were dispatched (simulated). At 36

e De 1154, evacuation to five miles in sectu s J, K, and L was ordered and traffic control was established by 1215. Discussions among EOC staff indicated sufficient resources were available to control traffic and access. Snow _emoval equipment and wreckers were available to remove inpediments..tt traffic flow. The IESDA representative was requested to divert rail haffic from the line going through Essex. Air traffic and recreational boating was diverted by the State EOC. At 0957, the American Red Cross representative alerted reception center staff to standby for possible activation. The center at Pontiac High School was simulated activated at 1945 to support evacuation from Will County. Law enforcement, the School representative and the County Highway Department representative discussed management of traffic in the area of schools in the event evacuation became necessary. The EOC staff was directed to review actions required in the event of a wind change necessitating alteration of the evacuation areas. Radiological Exposure Control Although not an objective of this exercise, there were discussions regarding issuance of dosimetry and TLDs to emergency workers. The order to issue KI to emergency workers was relayed to personnel in the field. Media Relations A media briefing room separate from the operations room is reserved for use. The County Board Chairman was interviewed by a press representative twice during the exercise. These interviews were conducted outside the designated briefing room. The first interview, at 1129, was reported to the JPIC at 1140. The second interview, at 1350, was coordinated with the JPIC at 1355. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: G.4.a Additional assistance and training is required to prepare the EOC staff to assist the County Board Chairman in preparing information to be presented to media representatives. It is necessary that the information be coordinated with the JPIC prior to release. There is need for visual aids to support the briefings. Recovery and Reentry When the order was received, the County ESDA Director and County Board Chairman conferred, checked the written instruction and requested from each participant organization a resume of what their procedure would be and how they would handle recovery and reentry. Local Government Response The emergency response function of Essex within Kankakee County is under the responsibility of the County. Its emergency response enhances the County's program. There are inprovements which could be made. While they are not singled-out for specific action, it is Kankakee County's responsibility to work with the comunity to resolve the problems cited below to ensure a unified and effective emergency response. 37

12. Essex f The Kankakee County Sheriff's dispatcher notified the Village of Essex Fire Department of emergency classifications. Essex activated their EOC in response to the exercise situation through implementation of their emergency plan. The Chief of Police was desitjnatied in charge during the exercise and provided concise updates and full information to the staff as events occurred. A status board was kept current through the day. All required maps and charts were available. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: N.l.a The Illinois ESDA Controller was pronpting the staff throughout the exercise. His enthusiasm provided subtle assistance that sometines preceeded demonstration and may have unnecessarily precluded the initiative of the EOC staff. (State of Illinois) 'Ihe procedures for alerting and instructing the public are also used in the event of inpending bad weather, hazardous materials accidents and other dangers to the public health and property. The EOC staff acted upon instructions from the State and Kankakee County. Conniercial telephone with police radio backup provided the connonications links. Planned actions were coordinated with the County. Procedures for handling news media contacts were described by the Chief of Police. The Essex EOC staff exhibited knowledge of their functions and of the procedures to carry out their assigned tasks. 38

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, 9 1' *.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS 39

l i' 4* 6 5 l 8 ae 9 ut 1 t a cD )e A 6 ta r D e ( .e . b s iw de 'l l o ue N dtea hD c S i 4 no i s t g a n t i S dn r i n e F o w i o e t P s s c i e Ad r c i e a r c es e e n vo l x e ip c E i t o u c cr 0 N f i eP 4 o f r d e r o g D o o n C w i d t i s 1 a i r L B y r Y a T n I m L u I S TU tney mc en t e ai t c Si f ee e vD n i o tf N ao rra N )y s ) s t i e i i o t o n n a n u i t i n G m Em l S l l ( l o Re I I I C Ut NI ( l llllll1 ( l 1il i

-3 UTILITI: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Suntnary Listing of Exercise Findings 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Illinois November 6, 1985 (State) (Date) Illinois (Coninunity) NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date E.7 Sector descriptions should be converted to familiar geopolitical descriptions prior to release at the JPIC. Call letters of the EBS station should be consistent with 'i the listing in the public t, information brochure. N.l.a Controllers should refrain from becoming a part of the participant emergency response through coaching. 4* 41 1

I l UTILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station l Sunnery Listing of Exercise Findings 3. Areas Reconnended For Inprovement Nover5ber 6,1985 Illinois (Date) (State) i Illinois (Ccumunity) l l. More frequent staff briefings be conducted in the State EOC with all members of the staff participating 1 2. NARS messages being transmitted from IESDA be identified by a message number. 3. The faded map used by the accident assessment team be replaced with one that is easier to read. S 4. IDOT staff should remain at the ECP until it is certain that they no longer have a role in the recovery;4and reentry procedures. I i 42 e 6 ~ ' .g

w UTILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Exercise Findings 1. Deficiencies November 6, 1985 Illinois (Date) (State) Will County (Comnunity) NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date _ Date None s., I

• py I

i r t* l 43

UTILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Suntnary Listing of Exercise Findings 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action November 6, 1985 Illinois (Date) (State) Will County (Conununity) NUREG Narrative Statein?nt Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Date Date Item of Weakness Proposed M1 Recovery and reentry should be more fully denonstrated during the next b, exercise to inclu<1e arrangments to provide the public with information on safety precautions, possible health effects of low level radiation exposure and the availability of compensation for financial 1 losses. l I; t 44 e O t e

w, ITfILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Sumnary Listing of Exercise Findings 3. Areas Recui.. ended For Inprovement . November 6, 1985 Illinois (Date) (State) Will County (Comnunity) None

• ,.,a

.e i 4 45

UPILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Stamary Listing of Exercise Findings l. Deficiencies November 6, 1985 Illinois (Date) (State) Grundy County (Comnunity) NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled-Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date 'Date None S I )? e I

• j i

t I i f I t-46 , a.. _

UTILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Sununary Listing of Exercise Findings 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Illinois November 6, 1985 (State) (Date) Grundy County (Community) NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date None s., I

• I

.=; i l l t 47

m UTILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station SunYnary Listing of Exercise Findings 3. Areas Reconinended For Inprovement Illinois November 6, 1985 (State) (Date) Grundy County (Comnunity) lo Personnel at the EBS station requested familiarization with the conplete Braidwood plan. The memorarylan of unierstanding could be discussed and modified as part of this action. ) n f i t t 48 e g e

e., e. IRILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Sunnary Listing of Exercise Findings 1. Deficiencies Illinois Novembe'r' 6, 1985 (State) (Date) e Kankakee County (Connonity) NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date None ) '..y 1 t 49

UTILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Sununary Listing of Exercise Findings 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Illinois November 6, 1985 (State) ,(Date) Kankakee County (Comnunity) NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date E.6 'Ihe sounding of sirens in conjunction with agricultural protective actions is highly conservative. It is necessary for Kankakee County to take its lead y from the governor, coordinate their i decision with the other two Counties and b in accordance with procedure, reserve 's the use of sirens and EBS for notification of protective actions for the general public, i i G.4.a Additional assistance and training is required to prepare the EOC staff to assist the County Board Chairman in preparing information to be presents 1 to media representatives. It is necessary for the information be coordinated with the JPIC prior to release. There is need for visual aids to support the briefings. H.3 The status board should be used to display key information such as actions taken by the County and the Town of Essex in addition to changes in emergency classification levels. 50 GO

g. UTILITY: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Sununary Listing of Exercise Findings 3. Areas Reconmended For Inprovement Illinois November 6, 1985 (State) (Date) I Kankakee County (Community) 1. The County should consider locating a larger area for the operations room or relocating some functions, such as message control wil the datafax machine, into the adjacent room within the secure area. l l .g h 'M 's t t 51

3 lilinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency 110 East Adams Street, Springfield, Illinois C2706 March 7, 1986 Mr. Wallace Weaver Chief, Technological Hazards Branch Region V Federal Emergency Management Agency 300 S. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606

Dear Mr. Weaver:

This letter is in response to your letter of February 6,1986 and the accompanying Report of the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station exercise conducted on November 6, 1985. Attached is our Proposed Corrective Action Response which indicates the schedule for correcting the deficiencies, as you requested in your letter. Sincerely, W ana S. Fairow Radiological Emergency Planning Supervisor JSF/jk Enclosure cc: Gordon Wenger i

UTILITY: Braidwood Nuc1:ar Power Station ) Summary Listing of Ex;rcise Findings o November 6.1986 'i' Illinois 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (Date) (State) Illinois (Community) 1EG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual em of Deficiency Proposed Date Date 7 Se'ctor descriptions should be converted The county EBS messages are made Next offsite to familiar geopolitical descriptions available to State E0C and JPIC Braidwood prior to release at the JPIC. personnel. These messages contain

exercise, the geopolitical descriptions of October 14, the EPZ sectors which will be in-1987.

corporated into news releases pre-pared at the State E0C and issued from the JPIC. Call letters of the EBS station should The State agrees that the EBS Next offsite be consistant with the listing in the stations designated for the Braidwood public information brochure. Braidwood Station EPZ should be

exercise, identified in news releases in-October I4, stead of the generic EBS station 1987.

listing. During the next offsite Braidwood exercise, news releases will contain the call letters and frequencies of the designated local EBS stations. >1.a. Controllers should refrain from becoming Controllers will be instructed to Prior to the a part of the participant emergency refrain from coaching exercise next offsite response through coaching. participants. Braidwood

exercise, October 14, 1987.

UTILITY: Braidwood Nucitar Power Statica Summary Listing of Exarcis2 Findings .[j November 6. 1985, -7 Illinois 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (Date) Will Ccunty (Community) IREG Marrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual

em of Deficiency Proposed

.Date Date 1 Recovery and re-entry should be more Re-entry will be emphasized by Will Next offsite fully demonstrated during the next County during the next offsite Braid-Braidwood exercise to include arrangements to wood exercise. Discussions will include

exercise, provide the public with information the provision of information to the October 14, on safety precautions, possible health public regarding safety precautions,

1987, effects of low level radiation exposure possible health effects of low level and the availability of compensation radiation exposure and the availability for financial losses, of compensation for financial losses.

4 UTILITY: Braidwood NuclCar Power Stati:n \\, Summary Listing of Excrcism Findings o Noyember 6,1985['yl Illinois 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (Date) (Stata) 4 Kankakee County (Community) Corrective Action Scheduled Actual JREG Narrative Statement Date Date Proposed tem of Deficiency .6 Th~e sounding of sirens in conjunction with Training will be provided to the Kankakee Next training agricultural protective actions is highly County EOC staff regarding the sounding sessions con-conservative. It is necessary for Kankakee of sirens and EBS activation for public ducted for the notification and will include discussions Braidwood EPZ, County to take its lead from the Governor, about the Governor's decision making role, October or coordinate their decision with the other two Counties and in accordance with proce-use of information on the NARS form and November, 1986. dure, reserve the use of sirens and EBS for coordination with the other Counties. notification of protective actions for the general public. B.4.a Additional assistance and training is re-Training will be provided to the Kankakee Next training quired to prepare the EOC staff to assist County EOC staff regarding preparation sessions con-ducted for the the County Board Chairman in preparing in-for press briefings. Braidwood EPZ, formation to be presented to media repre-October or sentatives. November, 1986. It is necessary for the information to be The Kankakee County Board Chairman /ESDA Next offsite coordinated with the JPIC prior to release. Coordinator will coordinate with the JPIC Braidwood

exercise, There is need for visual aids to support prior to issuing press releases and wi' -

October 14, utilize visual aids to support the bri the briefings. ings during the next offsite Braidwood

1987, exercise.

H.3 The status board should be used to display Training will be provided to the Kankakee Next training key information such as actions taken by County EOC staff regarding more effective sessions con-the County and the Town of Essex in addi-use of the status board. ducted for the Braidwood EPZ, tion to changes in emergency classification October or l e ve.l s. November, 1986. -.}}