ML20203F786

Requests Exemption from 10CFR70.24(a), Criticality Accident Requirements, for Cooper Nuclear Station

ML20203F786
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	02/23/1998
From:	Horn J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
IEIN-97-077, IEIN-97-77, NLS980034, NUDOCS 9803020043
Download: ML20203F786 (17)

Text

. _..-

A Nebraska Public Power District Nebraska's Tnergy Leader G.R.Ilorn Senior Yke l' resident, l'.ncrgy Supply NLS980034 February 23,1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 0001 Gentlemra

Subject:

Request for fixemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a), Criticality Accident Requiremcets Cooper Nuclear Station, NRC Docket 50 298, DPR 46

References:

1. NRC information Notice 97 77 dated October 10,199'/," Exemptions From the Requirements of Section 70.24 of Title 10 of The Code of Federal Reculations"

2. NPPD Letter from Jay M. Pilant to R.11. Chitwood, United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) dated August 17,1973," Nebraska Public Power Didrict Special Nuclear Matenal License No.1277"

3. USAEC Letter from L. C, Rouse to NPPD dated August 24,1973.

4. 62 Federal Register 63825 and 63911, December 3,1997, As promulgated to the industry in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ('NRC)

Information Notice (IN) 97 77 Reference 1, the NRC infonned licensees of their enforcement policy for failure to meet 10 CFR 70.24 requirements.

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d) and 10 CFR 70.14(a), Nebraska Public Power District (District) requests pennanent exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a), " Criticality Accident Requirements" for Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS).10 CFR 70.24(a) requires that in each area where special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored, a monitoring system be 9003020043 980223 4 ('RN PDR ADOCK 05000290

/

)

P PDR

();',(.,U U J G[NERAl, oFFK!

14hf 75th Street / Po 804 SM/ edumt% Nf f,StW 0#D ll l

l llll' l ll l $

relephone:(4W) %4 8%1/ fon:(4W) %3 %51 ll l.

l llll l

ll 18 OR i

i a 6 i 8

• m%

\\

4LS980034 i

,1 ebrudry 23,1998 l

Fage 2 of 4 I

maintained which will energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs, in addition, emergency procedures must be maintained for each of these areas which address evacuath.n plans and drills, designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the i

alarm, and placement of accessible radiation survey instruments for use in such an er e :ncy.

Furthermore, records of procedures must be maintained for these areas for the enth r...e SNM is in these areas, and superseded revisions must be maintained for 3 years.

Speclne exemptions from 10 CFR 70.24 were previously granted to the District in the construction phase by Special Nuclear Material (SNM) license 1277 (References 2 and 3).

Ilowever, the exemptions were not explicitly renewed when the 10 CFR Fart 30 operating licen,e was issued. The District believes the exemption is technically appropriate for the same reasons the NRC granted the exemptions in connection with the construction phase SNM license.

A criticality accident monitoring system was and is not necessary at Cooper Nuclear Station.

1 The attachment to this letter contains the exemption request which the District believes per 10 CFR 70.24 (d) will demonstrate " good cause" for granting such e:;emption, and per 10 CFR 70.14 (a) will demonstrate that such an exemption is " authorized by law,""will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security," and is "otherwise in the public interest."

in addition to the aforementioned, the District recognizes the concurrent proposed rule and direct Onal rulemaking of 10 CFR 50.68 and 70.24, with an effective date of February 17,1998, "unless significant adverse comments are received..."(Reference 4), which in part relieves licensees of the requirement to request exemptions from 10 CFR 70.24 provided the provisions of 50.68 are met. Until such time, however, pursuant to the existing enforcement guidance of Reference I, the District is proceeding with an exemption request. In addition, should new fuel be received prior to the cirective date of 10 CFit 50.68 and an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 has not yet been granted to CNS, the District will er.sure that appropriate monitoring during the use, handling, and storage of new fuel will be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 70.24. Should 10 CFR 50.68 be approved prior to the receipt of new fuel, the District will comply with either 10 CFR 50.68 or 10 CFR 70.24.

Therefore, the District resrectfully submits that, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.14(a) and 70.24(d), the NRC should grant the requested exemption from the requirements of 10CFR 70.24(a) prior to the next fuel receipt (currently scheduled for Summer 1998 in support of a Fall Refueling Outage) in the event that the provisions of Reference 4 are not efTective before such time.

This request involves no change to radiation monitoring instrumentation, emergency procedures, limergency Plan or Security Flan presently utilized at Cooper Nuclear Station.

1 1

NI,5980034

, February 23,1998 Page 3 of 4 l

i Should you have any questions concerning this rnatter, please contact me.

Sincerely, i

i

.6orn

~

Scrit ice President

' i Of Energy Supply i

/Ird Attachment t

ec: Regional Administrator l

USNRC RegionIV t

Senior Project Manager USNRC NRR Project Directorate 1%l t

Senior Resident inspector i

USNRC NPO )istribution i

i

+

r 2

6 6

6 y

N f-4-

y-

%g' e-S-gE-1 y-g w

e y

1*yDrer-w se tasT r'OMip,-ry 7

is aqs---g

i

' - NLS980034

, February 23,1998 l

Page 4 of 4 i

i 4

STATl! OF NEllRASKA

)

)

PLATTl! COUNTY

)

O. R. Ilorn, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an authorized representative of the i

Nebraska Public Power District, a public corporation and political subdivision of the State of Nebraska; that he is duly authorized to submit this correspondence on behalf of Nebraska Pubile Power District and that the statements contained herein are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

l c-G.R.Ilorn d

Subscribed in my presence and swom to before me this 25 day of 9ebut,1998, U

NWut wtwhoWmen, AllA L. PFLAst(R(R Pl t d 4 % W NOTARY PLMILIC

Attxhmem 1

.to N1,$980034 PageIof12 ATTACllMl!NT 1 Cooper Nuclear Station Request for lixemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Requirements i

1.

INTRODUCTIO,N Pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d) and 70.14(a), Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) hereby regests a permanent exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)," Criticality Accident Requirements." 'lhis request will demonstrate that per 10 CFR 70.14(a) an cxemption is " authorized by law,""will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security," and is "otherwise in the public interest." Furthennore, this request will demonstrate that pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24 (d)" good cause" exists for requesting an exemption.

This request is an administrauw i:iatter and involves no change to radiation monitoring instrumentation, emergency procedures, and Security Plan or limergency Plan presently utilized at CNS.

11.

RiiOUI ATORY Rl!OUIRl!MI!NTS 10 CFR 70.24(a) requires licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material in amounts specified in 70.24(a) to maintain a monitoring system and emergency procedures for the purpose of detecting and responding to accidental criticality. These requirements are applicable to CNS. Specifically, section 70.24(a) requires the following oflicensecs:

A.

Maintain in each area in which such licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored, a monitoring system meeting the requirements of either paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2),

as appropriate, and using gamma or neutron sensitive radiation detectors which energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs.

11.

Maintain emergency procedures for each area in which licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored to ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon sounding of the alarm. These procedures must include the conduct of drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and designation of responsible individuals for detennining the cause of the alarm, and placement of radiation survey instru'nents in accessible locations for use in such an emergency.

C.

Retain a copy of current procedures for each area as a record for as long as licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored in the area. The licensee shall retain superseded portions of the procedures for three years aller the portion is superseded.

7 y

g,9.

e.-7cm.,

.-.y g,.v.-.e

.y

t Attachment I i

to NLS980034 Page 2 of12

.i 111.

JUSTIFICATION FOR GRANTING THE EXEMPTION REOUEST 10 CFR 70.24 (d) anticipates that relief from these requirements is appropriate in some circumstances and allows lleensees to apply for an exemp6on from section 70.24 if good cause is shown. The District believes good cause exists based om i

A.

Accidental criticality is precluded through fuel storage design, geometric spacing, and administrative controls. In addition, there are administrative controls on the quantity of forms of SNM, other than nuclear fuel, such that accidental criticality

(

is precluded. Since criticality is precluded, there is no need for a criticality accident monitoring system.

f II.

The exemption meets the requirements for exemption, as specified in 10 CFR 70.14 (a). Compliance with section 70.24(a) would not serve the underlying purpose of the regulation, y

C.

Exemptions from 70.24 requirements were granted to CNS on 11/4/71, and as amended 8/24/73,in the construction phase SNM license (SNM 1277). Ilowever, the exemption was not carried forward when the Part 50 CNS operating license was issued. CNS believes the exemption is technically appropriate for the same J

reasons the NRC granted the exemption in connection with SNM 1277 A criticality accident monhoring system was and is not necessary at CNS.

4 The following analysis demonstrates justi0 cation for the granting of an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24(a).

l AUTilORl7.l!D llY 1.AW The Commission's authority to grant the requested exemption from the requirements of 1

Pan 70 is codified in 10 CFR 70.14. In addition,10 CFR 70.24(d) clearly states that the NRC has specine and express authority to exempt licensees from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. Therefore, granting the exemption is explicitly authorized under NRC regulations.

0

- Wil.L NOT ENDANGER I lFE OR PROPERTY OR Tile COMMON DEFF;JfE

SECURITY, An exemption request will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security if the request meets the statutory standard of adequate protection to the health and safety of the public, To ensure protection of the health and safety of the public, the exemption request must demonstrate that accidental criticality is precluded. To further ensure the common defense and security are not endangered, the request must also demonstrate that the loss or diversion of SNM is precluded.

P

==.

+

'Y-T C

-a y

v-q

-9m-r-er--Om-veeW WW

--Ph-+-*v--wp p =y yry

+y y

w em

-wc ar wey y

+y-y-+--.9e-em g-r-

arm-up-sy-4 g-M

1 i

. to N!.S%0034 j

Page 3 of 12 i

There are two categories of SNh1 used, stored. or handled at CNS: sources and nuclear fuel. To prevent accidental criticality of SNhi other than nuclear fuel (l.c., sour es), the

~

total quantity and design of sources must be less than that required to obtain a critical mass. Accidental criticality is precluded in the use of nuclear fuel by means of procedural controls, compliance with CNS Technical Specifications, and design characteristics. As described belov, and in subsequent sections of this Attachment, CNS provides adequate prote tlon to the health and safety of the public by precluding accidental criticality during use, storage, and handling of SNht, in addition, as described i

below, CNS also provides adequate protection by precluding the loss or diversion of SNht.

A.

Use of Snesial. Nuclear hinterial At CNS, SNhi is primarily in the form of nucient f uel. However, SNh1 also is used (and stored)in the fbnn of sources for reactor start up instru nentation, radiation mc.nitoring equipment calibration, and fission detectors or as SNhi used 1 -

Ibr sample analysis, instrmuent calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus / components. The quantity of SNh1 specified fbr a critical mass is identified in Section 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 10.3," Guide ihr the Preparation of Applications lbr Special Nuclear hinterial Licenses of1.ess than Critical hiass Quantities." The total quantity and design of the SNht sourceu at CNS is insuf ficient to obtain a critical mass, so accidental criticality is precluded.

Consequently,in accordance with 10 CFR 70.24(c), CNS is exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(b) and therefbre the remainder of the discussion will be directed toward irradiated and unirradiated nuclear fuel.

Nuclear fuel is used at CNS in the reactor vessel. Accidental criticality is precluded through compliance with the CNS Technical Specifications, including reactivity requirements (e.g., shutdown margins, limits on control rod movement, etc.), instrumentation requirements (i.e., reactor power and radiation monitors),

and controls on refueling operations (i.e., refueling equipment interlocks), in i

addition, procedural controls provide that plant operators check instruments used Ibr monitoring behavior of the nuclear fuel in the reactor to assure that the facility 1

is operated in such a manner as to preclude accidental criticality. Access to the fuel in the reactor vessel while in use is not physically possible and is procedurally controlled during refueling, eliminating any concerns with loss or diversion of the fuel.

Since accidental criticality, and loss or diversion, is precluded, the requirements of 10 CFR 70 24(a) r,re not necessary for fuel used in the reactor vessel.

R.

Storage of Special Nuclear Material Nuc! car fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool, on the refuel floor, and in areas speciiically authorized by the Reactor Engineering Supervisor.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ -

.to NLS980034 Page 4 of 12 1.

Spent Furl pool Storage As di scribed in CNS I'SAR Chapter X, Sections 3.3 and 3.5, the spent fuel storage racks are designed to maintain, wher, fully Isaded with fuel assemblies, a suberitical conGguration having a k effective (k,n) s 0.95 for all normal and abnormal con 0gurations.

Compliance with the CNS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and Technical Speci0 cations (TS) ensures criticality is precluded. Procedural controls require strict review of fuel reactivity limits prier to placement of fuel in the spent fuel pool to ensure that TS and USAR compliance is met.

Consequently, accidental criticality is precluded for storage in the spent fuel pool.

2.

Refuel Floor Storage or Storage Area Specifically Authorized by the Reactor Engineering Supervisor New fuel is temporarily stored on the refuel Coor or area specincally aathorized by the Reactor Engineering Supervisor prior to being inspected and stored in the spent fuel storage pool. New fuel is stored in accordance with the fuel manufacturer's wcommendations. CNS procedures utilize fuel manufacturer requirements and criticality evaluations to support new fuel storage controls outside the spent fuel pool that will preclude criticality under optimum moderator conditions.

Since accidental criticality is precluded, the requirements of 13 CFR 70.24(a) are not necessary for fuel storage at CNS.

C.

llandline of Special Nuclear Material Handling of new fuel and irradiated fuel is carefully controlled and performed in accordance with the fuel manufacturer's recommendations. CNS procedures utilize fuel manufacturer requirements and criticality evaluations to support new fuel handling controls which will preelede criticality under optimum moderator conditions. CNS procedures for handling nuclear fuel strictly limit the number of fuel tundles which can be out of approved storage locations at any given time, Fuel handling operations within the spent fuel pool, between the sper.t fuel pool and reactor vessel, and within the reactor vessel are restricted by design and TS

-limitations to preclude accidental criticality, in addition, the safety analysis in the USAR (Chapter X, Secr on 3) demonstrates that even in a fuel handling accident o,,, a dropped fuel assembly), criticality would be precluded.

= - - -

.~

.ta NLS980034 Page 5 of 12 CNS precludes loss or diversion of SNM by procedural centrols which maintain source and fuel inventories and limit access to authorized personnel only. The absence of an accidental critkality monitoring system would not affect the capability of CNS to ensure SNM is safeguarded.

Since accidental criticality is precluded, the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a) are not necessary for fuel handling at CNS.

IN PU91,1C INTEREST The NRC had not provided specific detailed guidance on how to apply the "public interest" standsrd.ander section 70.14(a). Ilowever, in a 1985 amendment to section 50.12(a), the NRC deleted the "public interest" standard in favor of defining the "special circumstances" that justify requesting an exemption from NRC regulations (50 Federal Register 50764, Decemb :r 12,1985). At the same time, the NRC implied that section 70.14(a) wr1 not revised to be consistent with sect!on 50.12(a) only because the NRC did not envision frequent use of section 70.14(a). It seems reasonable to accept that the NRC intends the "special circumstances" in section 50.12(a) to serve the same purpose as the "public interest" criterion of section 70.14(a) and that an exemption request which satisfies the special circumstances of 50.12(a) also satisfies the public interest element of 70.14(a).

Among the several special circumstances identified in section 50.12(a)(2), the following two are relevant to this exemption request:

(a)(2)(li)

Application of the regulatica in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule; or (a)(2)(iii)

Compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated...

The basis for granting an exemption that would be in the public interest utilizes thes:

two special circumstances, and is described as follows:

1.

WOULD NOT SERVE AND IS NOT NECESSARY TO Acil EVE Tile UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF T111S REQUIREMENT The explicit language of section 70.24 does not identify the purpose (s) for requiring an accidental criticality monitoring system and the associated emergency procedures, llowever, the regulatory history underlying this requirement indicates that:

L:

Attachment i

.to NLS980034 Page 6 of 12 The following amendments li.e., section 70.24] to these regulations li.e., Part 70J is [ sic] designed to assure that all licensees who are authorized to possess special nuclear material in amounts nhigh may oroduce conditions of accidental criticality have in operation adequate alann systems and emergency plans to evacuate personnel (23 Federal Register 8747 November 11,1958

[ Emphasis added]).

liased on this language, the NRC apparently promulgated section 70.24 to ensure licensees are aware of, and take appropriate response to, conditions of accidental criticality.

This language implies that where design and/or procedural safeguards ensure against conditions of accic: ental criticality in the first place, accidental criticality monitors would not be necessary. 'lhe NRC cchoes support for this interpretation in its regulatory position contained in Section C.1 of Regulatory Guide 8.12

" Criticality Accident Alann Systems," Revision 2, October 1988. as follows:

"Section 70.24 of 10 CFR Part 70 requires alarm coverage 'in each nica in which such licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored...' whereas paragraph 4.2.1 of the standard states that the need for criticality alarms must be evaluated for such areas, if such an evaluation does not determine that a ootential for criticality exists, as for example where the quantities or fonn of special nuclear material make criticality practically impossible or where geometric spacing is used to preclude criticality, such as in some storage spaces for unirradiated nuclear plant fuel,ith aporopriate to reouest an exemption frem 70.24." [ Emphasis added.]

As described in the preceding discussion, and Section IV below, design characteristics, safety analyses, TS, and administrative controls ensure that accidental criticality is prechided. Therefore, the application of section 10 CFR 70.24(a) to CNS would not serve and is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of this requirement.

2.

COMPLIANCE RESULTS IN UNDUE liARDSillP AND IN EXCESS OF OTilERS SIMILARLY SITUATED A criticality accident monitoring system requires a considerable expenditure of resources, including the design and installation of the system, the development and implementation of any associated emergency procedures, and the operation and maintenance of the system fonhe life of the plant. Accordingly, compliance with section 70.24(a) would result in an undue hardship and other costs that are i

. = _ _-_ -..

4 Attachment !

, to NI,S980034 Page 7 of12 significantly in excess of those likely contemplated when this regulation was adopted.

in addition, various other nuclear facilities across the nation have already received exemptions from 10 CFR 70.24 (a) because they likewise have shown that accidental criticality is unlikely to occur. Consequently, compliance with 10 CFR 70.24 (a) would result in costs significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.

IV.

CRITERIA AS OUTI,1NI!D IN NRC IN_f0RhlATION NOTICH 97 77 AND PROPQED RUI ING 10 CFR 50.68.

in October 1997, the NRC published information Notice 97 77, containing seven criteria against with the NRC staff would evaluate 70.24(a) exemption requests. These seven criteria, which are discussed below, have been incorporated into direct final rulemaking on Criticality Accident Requirements,10 CPR Parts 50.68 and 70.24 (Reference 62 Federal Register 63825 and 6391l).

I.

Plant procedures do not permit more than three newfuel assemblies to be in transit between their associated shipping cask and dry storage rack at one time.

New fuel bundles are received on site and transported to the Reactor Building in the approved shipping containers from General Electric (Gli). The package of the fuel (both the metal inner container and wooden outer container) ensures that a geometrical criticality safe configuration is maintained during transpart, handling, and storage. Each container holds two fuel assemblies. Each inner metal container is removed, one at a time, from its wooden shipping container and hoisted to the refuel floor to an approved storage location where all the metal containers are stacked in an geometrically safe configuration to prevent accidental criticality, New fuel shipments are temporarily stored on the refuel floor in the metal shipping conhiners until the bundles are inspected and placed in the spent fuel pool. Inspection involves transferring a metal shipping container from the fuel storage location to the metal shipping container vertical support area, the cover is removed, and each fuel bundle is removed using the overhead crane and placed in the new fuel inspection stand; while the inspection proceeds the empty contairer is moved to a designated storage area and the next container is prepared. Strict limits are in place for the maximum number of fuel bundles allowed out of approved storage locations at any given time l ypically no more than two fuel bundles are out of the approved storage location on the refuel floor at any given time; CNS procedures strictly prohibit a fuel array of four or more fuel bundles outside normal storage areas or shipping containers CNS procedures also allow no more than three fuel bundles to be out of metal shipping containers, Spent Fuel Storage Pool, spent fuel shipping cask, or reactor vessel at any one time.

,to NLS980034 Page 8 of 12 The District believes this procedural limitation is consistent with the above criteria of no more than three bundles to be in transit between their associated shipping cask and storage location.

2.

The k efRctive of thefreshfitelstorage racksfilled withfuel of the maximwn permissible U 235 enrichment andflooded with pure water does not exceed 0.95, at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level.

The maximum design basis k effective (k,n) for the new fuel storage vault (NFSV) with a fully loaded array is 5 0.90 under nonnal (dry) coaditions (k n 5 0.95 in the flooded condition) as specified in Chapter X, Section 23 of the USAR and TS.

As described in Question (1) above, new fu:1 is transported in approved metal shipping containers in wooden crates. While in this packaging configuration, the fuel is not subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a) since it is configured for transportation and is therefore subject to the regulations for transportation of radioactive material,10 CFR 71.

The CNS NFSV is not currently used. New fuel shipacuts are stored on the refuel floor in the metal shipping containers until the bundles are inspected and placed in the spent fuel pool. This is a more convenient means for temporary storage of the new fuel bundles prior to their inspection and placement in the spent fuel pool, llandling from the truck bay to the refuel floor is controlled by CNS procedures and conducted such that a geametrically safe configuration is maintained at all times to prevent accidental criticality.

GE has performed analyses for the shipping and storage crates used and their arrangement, in order to prevent accidental criticality, it has been demonstrated th.,t the fuel may be stacked in their metal shipping containers no more than four (4) boxes high with an inner array size of no more than 260 containers. This analysis takes into account the possibility of a moderator and thus is sufficient to demonstrate that accidemal criticality is precluded.

CNS procedures also require area radiation monitor IWA RA 2 to be operable and within 120 feet of the new fuel during handling, using, or storing on the refuel floor. Administrative controls exist to ensure that the entire controlled path and laydown area are within 120 feet of this monitor.

1

Attachment I to NLS980034 Page 9 of 12 3.

Ifoptinnun moderation offuelin thefreshfuelstorage racks occurs when the freshfuel storage racks are notflooded. the k dfective corresponding to this optimurn moderation does not exceed 0.98, at a 93 percent probability, 95 percent cortfldence level.

As discussed above, the design basis fbr the NFSV is based on a OE analysis and is included in the CNS licensing basis (USAlt Chapter X, Section 2.0). Ilowever, this description does not include the requirements for a hypothesized optimum moderator configuration analysis.

'l be NFSV, as discus:cd previously, is not currently in use at CNS since it is more convenient to store new fuel on the refuel floor prior to inspection and movement to the spent fuel pool storage racks, in addition, administrative controls currently prevent the use of the NFSV.

Ilowever, to preserve flexibility for future activities, the NFSV is included in the scope of this exemption request. Prior to its use, it will be necessary to evaluate the NFSV with respect to optimum moderator configuration and make the appropriate administrative changes to support and control the use of the NFSV.

CNS does not, however, intend to pursue this evaluation at this time since use of the NFSV is considered a contingency option and there is no current need for using this location.

I.

The k etlective ofspentfitel storage racksfilled withfitel ofthe maximum permissible (1235 enrichment andfilled with pure water does not exceed 0.95, a; a 95 percent probability, 95 percent cortfidence level.

The design basis fbr the spent fuel pool is described in Chapter X, Section 3.0 of the USAlt. In addition, TS impose limits on the k,n of the spent fuel storage racks. The spent fuel storage racks are designed to maintain, when fully loaded with fuel assemblies, a suberitical configuration having a k,n s 0.95 with the storage pool filled with unborated water, for all normal and abnormal configurations (including fuel handling accidents).

Iloltec Iteport 111971783," Criticality Safety Evaluation of the Spent Fuel Storage Itacks in the Cooper Nuclear Station For Maximum Enrichment Capability," defines the criteria for acceptable storage of fuel with maximum average enrichments up to 4.6 wt% U 235 such that the k,, limit is satistled (i.e.,

k,y 5 0.95). The analysis utilizes the CASMO 3 analytical model, verified by KEN 05a and MCNP codes, considers normal and abnormal configurations, and includes calculation uncertainties and reactivity uncertainties associated with the manufacturing tolerances as well as all fuel types currently in use or might possibly be planned for use at CNS. The results of the analysis demonstrate that the spent fuel storage pool k,n s 0.95 is maintained with 95% probability,95%

confidence level.

Attachment I

. to NLS980034 Page 10 of 12 3.

The quantity offbrms ofspecial rmclear material, other than insclearfuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than the quantity necessaryfor a critical Mhl%s.

1he quantity of SNM sufficient for a critical mass is identified in Section 1.1 of Ihgulatory Guide 10.3," Guide for the Preparation of Applications for Special Nuclear Material Licenses of Less than Critical Mass Quantitles." Quantitles s 350 grams contained U 235,200 grams of U 233,200 grams of Pu (other than Pu Ile neutron sources), or that the sum of such ratios for all kinds of SNM in i

comtunation does not exceed unity, are insuflicient to fbnn a critical mass. The net total quantity and design of the SNM sources at CNS is far below that described in Regulatory Guide 10.3 above, and therefore insuflicient to obtain a critical mass.1he geometry of the SNM lbrms (small quantitles in individual sources / detectors)is also not conducive to support the formation of a critical configuration.

The largest single amount of non fuel SNM stored in the same location is approximately 1.1 gram Pu 238 (Pu Ile source). Other fonns of SNM are the Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs), Local Power Range Monitors (LPRMs),

r and Source Range Monitors ($RMs). The approximate quantity of fissionable material (br each of these sources is listed below:

IRMs:

< 0.8 mg per detector LPRMs:

< 2 mg per string SRMs:

approx. 3 mg per detector Currently five IRMs, one LPRM, and five SRMs are stored outside the reactor core or spent fuel pool. Considering the quantities of fissionable material contained within each monitor, it can be seen that the total quantity of SNM remains well below the limits of Regulatory Guide 10.3. In addition to the IRMs, LPRMs, and SRMs, CNS maintains Pu sources on site, each of which contain significantly less than I gram fissionable material. With the exception of nuclear fuel, all individual components containing special nuclear material currently stored or used at CNS are significantly below the limits specified in Regulatory Guide 10.3 to form a critical mass, 6.

Radiation monitors, as required by GDC 63, are provided infuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive radiation levels and 'o initiate appropriate safety actions.

GDC 63 requires that " appropriate systems shall be provided in fuel storage and radioactive waste systems and associated handling areas (1) to detect conditions that may resu!; in loss of residual heat removal capability and excessive radiation levels and (2) to initiate appropriate safety actions."

,1o NLS980034 Pal,e!Iof12 As described in the CNS USAR, Chapter i Section 6.4.4, area radiation monitors (ARhis) are provided to monitor for abnonnal radiation at various locations in the reactor building, turbine, radwaste, and main control buildings. The monitors annunciate when abnormal radiation levels are detected. Radiation monitors are also provided on var;ous lines to monitor either for radioactivity materials released to the environs via process liquids and gases or for process system malfunctions.

The objective of the ARhi systems is to warn of abnormal gamma radiation levels in areas where radioactive material may be handled or inadvertently introduced.

The monitors provide operating personnel with a permanent record and indication F

in the Control Room of gamma levels. In the event excessive radiation is detected, ARMS sound alarms locally and in the Control Room.

in addition to the ARMS, constant air monitoring units (CAhis) are operated at selected locations within the plant to continuously monitor levels of airborne activity and to alann in the event selected set point values are exceeded.

The function of the ARMS and CAMS are included in radiation worker training, and employees are instructed to immediately evacuate the vicinity upon ARM or CAM alarms. Site procedures also provide direction for personnel to evacuate the area when ARMS or CAMS alarm on abnormal radiation or airborne radionctivity levels, as well as other operator actions to place the plant in a safe condition and prevent the release of radioactivity. This includes entry into emergency operating procedures providing for personnel evacuation and operator actions as necessary.

During fuel handling operations or other core alterations, personnel admitted to the refueling floor are administratively required to be familiar with ARMS and evacuation procedure used if an alarm is received.

The Reactor fluilding Ventilation radiation monitoring system provides clear indication to operations personnel whenever abnormal amounts of radioactivity exist in the reactor building.

During planned operation other than refueling, the radiation monitoring system simply acts as a process. safety system in monitoring the reactor building atmosphere for abnormal radioactivity. During fuel handling operations (including criticality tests with the reactor vessel head off), the refueling zone monitoring system acts as an engineered safeguard against tne consequences of a refueling accident. The system design consists of four gamma detectors (two channels per division) mounted such that they can monitor the flow of gas through the reactor building plenum. The primary purpose of the monitors is to isolate the reactor building and initiate SGT system when excessive levels of radiation are detected; indication is also provided in the control room. Each of the four channels has two trips, the upscale indicating excessive radiation and the y

downscale indicating instrump trouble. One upscale trip (or one downscale trip)

r Attachment i

~

to NLS980034 Page 12 of12 will trip the division, and if both divisions are tripped then the Reactnr Ilullding is isolated, the SGT system is started, the various primary containment purge and exhaust valves are closed. The redundancy and arrangement of channels is l

sufficient to ensure that no single active component failure can prevent isolation when required.

Therefore, the District believes these monitors eatisfy the requirements of GDC 63

[

j at CNS in that they provide a means to detect excess e radiation and result in

}

appropriate operational or personnel response.

- }

l 7.

The maximum nominal U ?)$ enrichment is $ wt percent, j

l-The CNS Technical Specifications do not limit U 235 enrichment. linrichment is adjusted to meet power generation needs of the plant while keeping thermal limits within approved limits. The maximum lattice enrichment currently loaded into the CNS spent fuel pool is 3.91%, and the maximum bundle average enrichment is 3.50%. The maximum enrichment currently licensed by our fuel supplier, Gli,is 5.0% U 235.

Therefore, the maximum nominal enrichment of new fuel assemblies at CNS is less than 5 wt% U-235.

i VI.

CONCI,US10N 4

llecause exemptions from the requirements of to CFR 70.24(a) for CNS are authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, is in the public interest due to the presence of special circumstances, and is requested for good cause, CNS respectfully submits that, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.14(a) and 70.24(d), the NRC should grant the requested exemption from the requirements of 10CFR 70.24(a).

f' y--

,y,.

,.,.-...mv..

.. _, - - -.. ~

-m.m. m.-m

.-,....w..-n

l ATTAClIMENT 3 LIST OF NRC COMMITMENT

• l Coriespondence No: 11LS990034 The following table identifies those actions connitted to by the District in this document.

Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the District.

They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.

Please notify the 1.icensing Manager at Cooper Nuclear 8tation of any questions regarding this document or any associated regula. tory commitments.

COMMITTED DATE COMMITMENT OR OUTAGE CNS will put in place provisions to perform monitoring 1.A.W. 10CFR70.24 in the event that a) 10CFR$0.68 is not effective and b) an exemption from 70.24 has not beon gggg received prior to receipt of new fuel. In the event that 10 CPR 50.6B becomes effective, prior to the receipt of new fuel, the District will comply with either 50.68 or 70.24(a).

Prior to using the NFSV, an analysis wi.'.1 be performed N/A such that t he requirements of 10CFR$0.68 OR 10CFR70.24 (prior to use of are met.

NFSV) l PROCEDURE NUMBER 0.42 l

REVISION NUMBER 5 l

PAGE 8 OF 9 I

.