ML20203E452
| ML20203E452 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1986 |
| From: | William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| LIC-86-145, NUDOCS 8607240153 | |
| Download: ML20203E452 (3) | |
Text
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- e Omaha Public Power District tmnam c. Jones Vu e Presulent 1623 Harney Omaha. Nebraska 68102 402/536 4000 April 11,1986 L IC-86-145 m@MDW2 %
[jM Mr. R. D. Martin, Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ld
@ l j l986 Region IV L W 'L__
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,uu 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 L
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Dear Mr. Martin:
Re:
Fort Calhoun Station 1986 Emergency Preparedness Exercise The Commission requested Omaha Public Power District, by February 9,1984 correspondence, to provide the description of the scope of the annual emer-gency exercise and the objectives to be fulfilled by this exercise approxi-mately 75 days prior to the exercise.
Accordingly, the subject information is provided in Enclosures 1 and 2 for the upcoming Fort Calhoun Station's 1986 emergency exercise. Copies of this information are also being provided to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and to the Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response.
Si ncerely, N. C. Jpne&
s Vice Pr{e' ident s
Enclosures cc:
Mr. John Coleman Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VII Old Federal Office Building, Room 300 911 Walnut Street Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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1986 EMERGENCY EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1.
Ensure the activation of the OPPD emergency organization including the Operations Support Center (0SC), Technical Support Center (TSC),
and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) to test the capability of the Initial Response Organization and Emergency Recovery Organization.
2.
Ensure that notification to state, local and regulatory agencies and offsite support groups are performed to test the communication net-works and the effectiveness of interface between these agencies.
3.
Test the emergency response capabilities of OPPD, state, and local authorities and agencies, as appropriate for partial participation.
4.
Test the public notification system and procedure used to make pro-tective action recommendations and require protective actions to be taken for the plume exposure and ingestion pathways. They may include evacuation (simulated or actual) of offsite areas.
5.
Exercise the capability to provide periodic public information releases.
6.
Test the emergency response capabilities of designated offsite emergency medical facilities and ambulance services.
7.
Test the adequacy and content of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP's).
8.
Test the abilities of operating personnel and emergency response personnel to properly classify emergencies, complete forms, and make timely notifications.
9.
Test the protective actions for onsite personnel.
10.
Test the capability of the initial response organization to correctly perform dose assessment actions.
11.
Test the ability of TSC personnel posting status boards to maintain them correctly and promptly.
12.
Test the ability of Technical Support Group to quickly and accurately analyze problems and make recommended corrective actions.
13.
Test the ability of first aid teams to properly respond to an injured person, provide properly medical treatment and demonstrate proficiency in use of first aid equipment.
7, 4
l
SUMMARY
OF 1986 EXERCISE SCENARIO l
At about 0540, while operating at a nominal 100% power, the plant will ex-perience a seismic shock of a magnitude to register on the seismometer and to be felt by the operators. A corresponding minor electrical transient will also occur. Upon investigation with system dispatchers, it will be determined that Nebraska City has tripped as well as several other plants r
from the southern grid area.
Demand for Fort Calhoun's power is high. The
{
plant issues Notification of Unusual Event based upon the seismic activity l
event. The plant continues at 100%.
At about 0635, an operator notes that containment pressure has decreased from 1.5 psig to O psig. Also, the strip recorders for RM-061/062 show a slight increase in activity.
Investigation will lead them to identify that valves PCV-742A/B appear to be leaking by, resulting in loss of a fission product barrier. Thus, an Alert classification will be declared (loss of i
one fuel barrier); the TSC and limited parts of the EOF will be activated.
l System dispatchers will call the shift supervisor at about this time to re-emphasize the need for Fort Calhoun Station to be kept on line because of grid instabilities and high daily peak expectation.
i
}
Investigation of the PCV-742 valves will reveal that the outboard valve actuator is broken, allowing the disc to swing freely. The in-board valve 4
(inside containment) is off its seals; thus, maintenance technicians will l
be sent in to realign the seals. This evaluation will continue with a j
maintenance technician being sent inside the ducting to perform the seal i
adjustments (with valves tagged open) and to repair the outboard valve stem.
At 0901, a second (more severe) seismic shock occurs. All offsite power i
is lost; the reactor trips on loss of load. On demand, diesel generator D-1 fails to start. Within a minute, the high containment radiation alarm i
is initiated.
High humidity in containment is indicated. A leakage rate i
of about 35-37 gpm is initially calculated (leak may be determined to be from leaking block valve).
Concurrently, a report is received that the technician working on the PCV-742 valves has sustained a head injury, is unconscious, and is presumed to be contaminated (to be confirmed later).
l The backup technician is on the way in to pull him free from ducting.
l Both valves are fully open, and RM-061/062/063 are all showing increasing l
activities.
Site Area Emergency is declared.
l The leak continues at 35 gpm for approximately 40 minutes, at which time the l
1eak rate increases rapidly to 300 gpm. Diesel generator D
- is still out of commission with no firm estimate of when it will be available. At about l
1005, a General Emergency is declared with fuel failure imminent. The leak is confirmed to be downstream of block valve HCV-150; attempts to close the 4
valve fail. Containment pressure remains at about 3-4 psig; attempts to close PCV-742A valve also fails. Conditions towards 20-30% fuel failure continue unabated.
At about 1109, D-1 is restored and loaded. HCV-150 is shut giving positive indication that RCS leakage has stopped. Containment pressure drops to 1 psig, at which time PCV-742A goes shut.
Leakage past the valve is stopped.
De-escalation, recovery, and re-entry proceed from this point in time.
I
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