ML20203D259
| ML20203D259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/11/1977 |
| From: | Karen Chapman, Rusche B NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-77-141, SECY-77-141-R, NUDOCS 9902160114 | |
| Download: ML20203D259 (47) | |
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5 Merch 11. 1977 M L3 SECY-77-141 uman mas Nt8 CLEAR RFiltlLAlt1HY COMMISSION POLICY SESSION ITEM RELEASEDTOTHE PDR Nb_j f
A For:
The Commissioners see Intne From:
Kenneth R. Chapman, Director
- "*********eceJ Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Benard C. Rusche, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Thru:
Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
PROPOSED RULE TO REQUIRE LICENSEE SAFEGUAR S CONTINGENCY PLANS
Purpose:
To recommend publication Or public comment of a proposed rule that would require licensees subject to the physical protection requirements of 10 CFR 55 73.30(a), 73.50, 73.55,* and/or 73.60 to develop and implement safeguards contingency plans.
Discussion:
Safeguards measures hre designed to deter, prevent, or respond to (1) the unauthorized possession or use of significant quanti-ties of nuclear materials through theft or diversion; and (2) sabotage of nuclear facilities.
The safeguards program has as its objective achieving a level of protection aCainst such acts to assure against significant increase in the overall risk of death, injury, or property damage to the public from causes beyond the control of the individual.
In many safeguards contingencies, responses will be expected from more than one person or organization.
At the Federal level, responses may involve not only the NRC but also, among others, the Federal Bureau of Investigstion, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and various organizations within
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- 10 CFR 5 73.55 is a proposed regulation establishing requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against industrial sabotage.
Until that regulation is adopted, it may be assumed that these proposed amendments will apply to licensed nuclear power reactors '
designed primarily for the production of electricity or steam as well as to those activities covered in 10 CFR 55 73.30(a), 73.50, and 73.60.
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Contact:
T. F. Carter, J r.
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427-4191 120005 6
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The Comissioners,
1 the Department of Defense.
An important element of safeguards contingency planning by the Comission is the coordination of these various responses.
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The responsibilities assigned to the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards by the Congressional mandate of Section 204(b)(2)(B) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 are being addressed by developing safeguards contingency plans at the Federal level.
At the same time, the Comission recognizes the importance of safeguards actions by those persons who possess special nuclear material and operate certain facilf ?.ies.
Inw deed, licensees would have the primary role in many safeguards contingencies because of their intimate connection with the materials and facilities at risk.
The Comission further recognizes the necessity for assuring coordinated responses to all safeguards contingencies, including responses by li-censees.
To provide and maintain adequate safeguards, there-fore, the Comission must ensure that each licensee having important safeguards responsibility develops and follows a
" licensee safeguards contingency plan," which will be developed in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guides to be published at the same time as the rule is issued in effective form.
The Comission has a responsibility to ensure that the Federal level plan, as developed by NRC staff, complements the licensee safeguards contingency plan.
It should be noted that the NRC Federal level plan will be an internal working document not intended for public use.
The Contingency Planning Branch staff within the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS), in coordination with the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, is addressing the national perspective, and has begun preliminary negotiations regarding Interagency Agreements with other Federal agencies to provide for coordinated responses by all pertinent agencies.
The important perspective of safeguards contingency responses by those persons who possess special nuclear material and operate nuclear facilities is also being addressed.
These licensees would have the primary role in many safeguards con-tingencies because of their inseparable connection with the materials and facilities at risk.
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A prototype contingency plan has been developed by the Contingency Planning Branch within NMSS for a licensee plant that handles plutonium, with the cooperation of the licensee.
Another plan was developed for a typical transportation route, l
again with the cooperation of the transporter.
The resulting plans have been evaluated, and are being used as a basis for I
the Regulatory Guides that can be used by other licensees in i
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preparing site-specific safeguards contingency plans. A conference was held with -the major fuelacycle licensees to explain'the safeguards contingency planning concepts and to solicit industry comments.
The response to the conference on the part of licensees was most favorable, and no change was indicated in the approach being taken.
Similar efforts have begun within the Office of Nuclear Rarctor Regulation, and a close working liaison has been estat shed between the two offices.
Fulfillment of the mandate for the development of contingency l
plans requires that the response continuum of local, state, and Federal entities be completed.
It will be completed if the Comission promulgates a regulation that requires. licen-sees to develop and implement contingency plans for their licensed material and facilities. The proposed rule in Enclosure "A" of this paper is based upon our accumulated ex-perience in developing the prototype plans and in correlating the development of these plans with cooperating licensees.
In accordance with the provisions of National Security Decision Memorandum 347, certain portions of the Safeguards Contingency Plans for fuel-cycle licensees will be classified.
These licensees and their agents will be required to hold appropriate security clearances in order to use these plans.
Recommendation:
That the Comission approve publication for public comment of the proposed amendments of 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 73 in Enclosure "A" of:this paper and of the Negative Declaration in Enclosure "B."
Note:
1.
Interested members of the public would be given sixty days after publication in the Federal Register to provide comments on the proposed amendments; 2.
The Joint Comittee on Atomic Energy and the House Comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs will be informed;
- 3.. A public announcement such as Enclosure "C" will be issued when the amendments are filed with the Office of Federal Register;
- 4.. Since the proposed amendments are insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, pursuant to the criteria l
of 10 CFR Part 51 and guidelines of the Council on Environ-i mental Quality, an Environmental Impact Statement should not be prepared; J
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'The Commissioners 5.
An Environmental Impact Appraisal, intended to support a Negative Declaration, attached as Enclosure "D," will be placed in the Public Document Room when the proposed rule is published;.
6.
Regulatory Guides, " Standard Format and Content of Fuel-l Cycle Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans," " Standard Format i
and Content of Licensee Transportation Safeguards Contingency Plans," and " Standard Format and Content of Nuclear Reactor Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans" will be prepared and will be available when the rule is published in effective form.
Coordination:
The Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal i
objection to the publication of the proposed rule.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement and the Office of Standards Development concur.
The Office of Public Affairs prepared the draft public announcement.
Comments from OGC and OPE are i
responded to at Enclosure E.
j Scheduling:
To be considered at an early policy session.
Sunshine Act I
Recommendation:
It is recommended that this paper be considered in an open meeting.
The Executive Director for Operations concurs in this recommendation.
0GC and OPE also concur.
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- d.,,.'h R. Chapman, Director ennet Office of Nuclear Material Safety i
i and Safeguards h
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Benard C. Rusche, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatua
Enclosures:
"A" - Proposed Amendments To 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, 73 "B" - Negative Declaration "C" - Draf t Public Announcement DISTRIBUTION:
"D" - Environmental Impact Appraisal Comissicners "E" - Response to Coments From OGC and OPE Commission Staff Offices "F" - Comments Received from OGC Exec. Dir. for Opers.
"G" - Comments Received from OPE Secre';ariat
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ENCLOSURE A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[10 CFR PARTS 50, 70, and 73]'
LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES; SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL; PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans
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Agency:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Action:
Proposed Rule Summary:
Under the proposed rule, licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than cer-tain research and test reactors) and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium or uranium-235 would be required to develop and implement acceptable plans for re-sponding to threats, thefts, and sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities.
Dates:
Comments must be received on or before (sixty days after date of oublication).
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Address:
Secretary of the Commission l '
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
. Washington, D. C.
20555 Attention:
Docketing and Service Section l
l For further information, contact:
Thomas F. Carter, Jr., 301-492-7854 i
l Supplementary information:
The Office of Nuclear Material Safety. and Safe-guards within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
was' charged by Congress, in the Energy Reorgani-I zation Act of 1974, with the development of l
safeguards contingency plans for dealing with
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threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to licen-l sed special nuclear material and nuclear facili-ties. -In many safeguards contingencies, responses will be expected from more than one person or organization.
Fulfillment of the Congressional mandate requires that the response continuum be completed.
The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards is already adressing contingency plans at the Federal level.
The Commission is now proposing to complete the continuum by requiring l
l safeguards contingency ans of those licensees s
having materials and facilities of greatest safe-guards importance.
See discussion below, i
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, i The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has under consideration amendments to I
j its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, " Licensing of Production and Utiliza-l tion Facilities," 10 CFR Part 70, "Special Nuclear Material," and 10 CFR Part 73,
" Physical Protection'of Plants and Materials," which, in the interest of the common defense and security and public health and safety, j
I would require certain licensees to develop and follow licensee safeguards
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contingency plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear material and nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act 'or 1954, as amended.
The proposed amendments would apply to those licensees subject to the physical protection requirements for transportation and fixed sites contained in 10 CFR 55 73 30(a), 73 50,
- 73 55,' and/or 73 60.
For the purposes of this rule making proceeding, " sabotage" as used in il 50 34(d) and 70.22 means " industrial sabotage" as defined.in 5 73 2(p) of 10 CFR Part 73 A contingency is a situation, regarded as remotely possible in the I
future, that develops unexpectedly and recuires prompt attention.
In a practical sense, a safeguards contingency may be regarded as an extraordinary situation that requires the % ution of security plans
- 10 CFR 5 73 55 is a proposed regulation establishing requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against industrial sabotage.
Until that regulation is adopted, it may i
be assumed that these proposed amendments will apply to licensed nuclear power reactors designed primarily for the production of electricity l
or steam as well as to those activities covered '.n 10 CFR 55 73 30(a),
L 73 50, and 73 60.
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and procedures not normally performed on a day-to-day basis.
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situations may or may not occur; they are planned for under assumed con-ditions of occurrence in order to deal with them effectively if they 1
l should occur.
In many safeguards contingencies, responses will be expected from more I
than.one person or organization.
At the Federal level, responses may t
involve not only the NRC but also, among others, the Federal Bureau of i
Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and various organizations within the Department of Defense.
An important i
element of safeguards contingency planning by the Commission is the I
coordination of these various responses.
The responsibilities assigned to the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards by the Congressional mandate of Section 204(b)(2)(B) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 are being addressed by developing l
safeguards contingency plans at the Federal level.
At the same time, the Commission recognizes the importance of safeguards actions by those persons who possess special nuclear material and operate certain facilities.
Indeed, licensees would have the primary role in many safeguards contin-gencies because of their intimate connection with the materials' and facilities at risk.
The Commission further recognizes the necessity for assuring coordinated responses to all safeguards contingencies, including i
l responses by licensees.
To provide and maintain adequate safeguards, therefore, the Commission must ensure that each licensee having important I
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safeguards responsibility develops and follows a " licensee safeguards contin-gency plan" that is compatible with the Federal level plans for responding l
to safeguards contingencies.
t The proposed rule would define a licensee safeguards contingency plan as
- a. documented plan to give guidance to licensee personnel in order to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nucl-ear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
The plan would l
contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy the stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and gechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and {3) a specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action.
The plan is not intended to l
include actions under any emergency plans that deal with the hazards to public health and safety that are the consequence of nuclear accidents or releases of nuclear materials--even though those accidents or releases might l
result from acts of threats, thefts, or sabotage--other than steps to initiate the implementation of such emergency plans.
Accordingly, the licensee I
. contingency plans that would be required by the proposed amendments l
would be complementary to radiological emergency plans including those developed. for all nuclear power reactors pursuant to Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50 and for fuel-cycle facilities developed pursuant to proposed l
l Section 70.22(1) of 10 CFR Part 70 (see Notice of Proposed Rule Making in 40 FR 27260, June 27, 1975).
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l The goals of licensee safeguards contingency plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage are (i) to organize the response effort at the licensee level, (ii) to' provide predetermined structured ' responses by licensees to i
safeguards contingencies, (iii) to integrate the licensee response with the responses by other entities, and (iv) to achieve a measurable performance in response capability.. Licensee safeguards contingency planning would result' in organizing the licensee's responding resources in such a way that the parti-
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cipants would be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and the responses coordinated.
Because they would be predetermined, the responses are more likely to be structured and orderly rather than executed impulsively.
It is anticipated that the responses would thus be effected in a timely manner and would be consistent among themselves and with Federal responses.
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i To the extent that requisite data and criteria were predetermined, the response capability of the participants could be predicted and assessed.
A methodology for developir3g licensee safeguards contingency plans has j
been devised and evaluated, and typical plans have been drawn up for fuel-l t
cycle plants, nuclear reactors, and road transportation of special nuclear material.
Licensees will receive the benefit of this experience by means of Regulatory Guides to be issued by the time the rule is issued in effective Corm.
c In accordance with the provisions of National Security Decision Memorandum 347, certain portions of the Safeguards Contingency Plans for fuel-cycle licensees will be classified.
These licensees and their agents will be re-l quired to hold appropriate security clearances in order to use these plans.
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i If the Commission adopts the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 73, each affected licensee would be given a period of 120 days following publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER of the rule in effective form to submit a licensee safeguards contingency plan.
In addition, each licensee would i
be given until 300 days after publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER or 30 e
days.after the submitted plan is approved, whichever is later, to be in a position to follow his plan.
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The Commission has determined under Council of Environmental Quality guide-l lines and the criteria in 10 CFR Part 51 not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 3
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- 73. ; Concurrently with the publication of this notice of proposed rule i
maki g the Commission is making available in its Public Document Room at 1717:H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., an " Environmental Impact Appraisal of Amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 73, Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans," intended to support a negative declaration.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorgani-zation Act of 1974, as amended, and section 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments I
to Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 50, 70, and 73 is contemplated.
All interested persons who wish to submit written i
comments or suggestions for consideration in connection with the proposed amendments should send them to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear l
Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:
Docketing and r
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s Service Section by [60 days af ter publication).
Copies of comments 1
l-on the proposed amendments may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
4 1.
Section 50 34 of 10 CFR'Part 50 is amended by adding a new l
paragraph (d) to read as follows:
5 50 34 Contents of applications:
Technical information.
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(d) Safeguards contingency plan.
Each application for a license to I
operate a production or utilization facility that shall be subject to il 7).50, 73.55,* or 73 60 shall include a licensee safeguards contingency planjfor dealing with threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage, as defined i
in Pkrt 73 of this chapter, relating to the special nuclear material and uclear facilities licensed under this chapter and in the applicant's i
possession and control.
Appendix C to Part 73 of this chapter sets forth the criteria to be followed in developing such plans.
l 2.
Paragraph 50.54(p) of 10 CFR Part 50 is amended to read as 1
follows:##
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'10 CFR 5 73 55 is a proposed regulation establishing requirements for L
physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors
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against industrial sabotage.
Until that regulation is adopted, it may be assumed _ that these proposed amendments will apply to licensed nuclear power reactors designed primarily for the production of electricity or steam as well as to those activities covered in 10 CFR SS 73 30(a),
73 50, and 73.60.
- Comparative text.
Additions are underlind and deletions are lined through.
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i 5 50 54 ' Conditions of licenses.
Whether stated therein or not, the following shall be deemed conditions in every license issued:
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n (p) The' licensee shall make no change which would decrease the effectiveness of a security plan prepared pursuant to 5 50 34(c) sr. JMr113 2f. this chapter. paragpaph (q) et thke seet&en at a licensee safeguards I
contingency P.lRD. creoared oursuant ig,j, 50.14(d ) sr. fatt 1.L. 32. acolicable.
without the prior approval of the Commission.
A licensee desiring to make such a change shall submit an application i
See a ehange &n the teohnical spee&fieat& ens ineopperated &n his
' &keense op for an amendment to his license pursuant to Section 50.90.
as appFopp& ate, The licensee shall maintain records of changes to the l
- plang made without prior Commission approval for a period of two years i
from the date of the change, and shall furnish to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
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20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix D of Part 20 of this chapter, a report containing a description
- of each change within two months after the change is made.
3 In 5 70.22 of 10 CFR Part 70, paragraph (g) is amended and a new paragraph (j) is added to read as follows:
5 70.22 Contents of applications.I e
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' (g) Each application for a license that would authorize the trans-port or delivery to a carrier for transport of special nuclear material in an amount specified in 5 731(b)(2) of this chapter shall include ill a description of the plan for physical protection of special nuclear material in transit in accordance with 55 73 30 through 73 36 and 73 70(g) of this chapter, including a plan for the selection, qualification and training of armed escorts, or the specification and design of a specially designed truck or trailer as appropriatez anil21 g, licensee safeguards contingency plan, f_qt dealine w11h., threats. thefts, and sabotage [ relating
- 12..tdl2. special nuclear material ID. transit.
Appendix _Q,,1g. fant:,23 sf_
ibig, chapter 22.tdl forth the criteria 19.A2.followed in,develooine licensee safeguards contingency olans.
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n (j) Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the uranium-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more cocputed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium) other than a license for possession or use of such material in the operation of a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, shall include a licensee safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats,
! Sabotare as used in,this section has the same neaning ag in,1 73.2(o) gf this chaoter except that the deliberate asfjt are oostulated 1stoccur during transoortation rather than at 3, fixed site.
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i thefts, and industrial sabotage, as defined in Part 73, relating to the
^v special nuclear material and nuclear facilities licensed under Parts 50 or 70 of this chapter and in his possession and control.
Appendix C to Part 73 of this chapter sets forth the criteria to be followed in developing such plans.
4.
Section 70 32 of 10 CFR Part 70 is amended by adding a new i
paragraph (g) to read as follows:
5 70 32 Conditions of licenses.
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(g) The licensee shall make no change that would decrease the l
r safeguards effectiveness of any licensee safeguards contingency plan prepared pursuant to 55 70.22(g), 70.22(j), 73 30(g), or 73 40(b) of A licensee this! chapter without the prior approval of the Commission.
desiring to make such a change shall submit an application for an amend-ment to his license pursuant to 55 59.90 or 70 34 of this chapter, as The licensee may make changes to the licensee safeguards appropriate.
i contingency plan without prior Commission approval if the changes do The licensee not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan.
shal' maintain records of changes to any such plan made without prior appreval for a period of two years from the date of the change and shall furnish to the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter, a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change is made.
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Paragraph 73 30(g) of 10 CFR Part 73 is revised to read as follows:
j 5 73 30 General requirements.
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n (g) P&Pagpaphs (bdy 494y 44)y and (S) GS th&S Seet&GR SP9 esteet&ve Maroh 6y 1974, fy., f RQ day _s. after publication pf,211 ry11 s
1D. effective forml. gasb, licensee subiect h 2 1 reauirements pf_ oararraoh l.3)_SL 2 11 section shall submit h the Commission fp.r,aooroval a licensee safeguards contingency pl.gg f_qr. dealing wl.t_h threats, thefts 331 sabotare h
relating h the. transoort pf_ Mg special nuclear material in hig possession gni pontrol. Ihg plan shall ki imolemented and followed Iwhen acoropriate) ky, tile licensee within.3.Q day 1 after aooroval hy_ the _Q.p.gnission pf_
32Q after feffective data sf. Big amendmentl. whichever 11 later.
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6.
Section 73 40 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to read as follows:
57340 Physical Protection:
General requirements at fixed sites.
Each licensee shall provide physical protection against industrial sabotage and against theft of special nuclear material at the fixed sites where licensed activities are conducted. Seeup&ty plane subm&tted to the Aten&e Energy Gemm&SS&en Sep appPeWal Shell be SGM 9Wed by the &&oenSee aFeep Mapeh 6, 1974, Iht. orovisions 2f_ A licensee 's security p.1.gg ga aooroved by. Mg, Commisssion shall. hg followed hy. D.g licensee, fy. fl.2.Q Agy.g. after publication p[ this Igli in effective forn] gash, licensee subiect M D2. recuirements pf_ JJ ;.50. 7'4.55.* and/or 71 6Q shall submit eSee footnote at 5 50 34(d).
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M the Commission fgr approval a licensee safeguards contingency ph 1p_ accordance wiM). the criteria set forth in Anoendix C 19. ib.11 part fgn dealing wLth threats. thefts. ani industrial sabotage relating 12 the special nuclear material AIgl nuclear facilities licensed under Parts 52.on.7_Q.qf.t.hia chanter ADA. in hia possession ng centrol. h plan h
shall pe imolemented ap.1 followed (when approcriate) b.y.thg licensee e
within 32 dall after. aooroval by, the _Commiss12.0. 2n 322 day.m. after refreetive dati 2f. Allis amendment 1. whichever 13, later.
7.
A new Appendix C is added to 10 CFR Part 73 to read as follows:
APPENDIX C
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LICENSEE SAGEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS INTRODUCTION Certain licensees and license applicants are required to prepare licensee safeguards contingency plans pursuant to 55 50 34(d), 70.22(g), 70.22(j),
73 30(g), or 73 40 of this chapter.
A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan to give guidance to licensee personnel in order to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
The plan shall contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and
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..s.4 (3) a specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action.
The safeguards contingency plan shall not include actions under any emergency plans that deal with the hazards 'to public health and safety that are the consequence of nuclear accidents or releases of nuclear materials--even though those accidents or releases may result from acts of threats, thefts, or sabotage--other than steps to initiate the implementation of such emergency plans.
Accordingly, the licensee safeguards contingency plans are complementary to any emergency plans developed pursuant to Appendix E of Part 50 of this chapter and to proposed 5 70.22(i) of Part 70 of this chapter.
The ' goals of licensee safeguards contingency plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage are (1) to organize the response effort at the licensee level, (2) to provide predetermined, structured responses by licensees to safeguards contingencies, (3) to integrate the licensee response with the responses by other entities, and (4) to achieve a measurable performance in response capability.
Licensee safeguards contingency planning should result in organizing the licensee's response resources in such a way that the participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and the responses coordinated.
The responses should be timely, internally consistent among themselves, and compatible with Federal responses.
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CONTENTS OF THE PLAN Each licensee safeguards contingency plan shall include five categories of information:
===1.
Background===
2.
Generic Planning Base i
3 Licensee Planning Base 4.
Responsibility Matrix 4
5 Procedures t
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- Backaround.
Under.the' following topics, this category of information' ou.
shall identify and define the perceived dangers and incidents with which l
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a.
Perceived Danger - A statement of.the perceived danger to the security l
of special nuclear material, licensee personnel, and licensee property, i
including covert diversion of special nuclear material, sabotage, and overt ~
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attacks.
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b.
Purpose of the Plan - A discussion of the general aims and opera-l tional concepts underlying implementation of the plan.
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c.
Scope of the Plan - A delineation of the types of incidents covered I
and not covered in the plan.
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Definitions - A: list of terms and their definitions used in describing operational and technical aspects of the plan.
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~ 2. - Generic Planning Base.
Under the following topics, this category of information shall define the criteria for initiation and termination-of i
responses to safeguards contingencies together with the specific decisions, actions, and supporting information needed to bring about such responses:
a.
Identification of those events that will be used for signaling the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency according to how they are perceived initially. by licensee's personnel.
Such events may include alarms or other indications signaling penetration of a protected area,,
vital area, or saterial access area; material control or material accounting indications of material missing or unaccounted for; or threat indications--
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either verbal, such as telephoned threats, or implied, such as escalating civil disturbances.
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. Definition of the specific objective to be accomplished relative b.
i to each identified event.
The objective may be to obtain a level of awareness about the nature and seve.*ity of the safeguards contingency in order to prepare for further responses; to establish a level of response preparedness; or to successfully nullify or reduce any adve'rse safeguards consequences arising from the contingency.
3 Licensee Planning Base.
Under the following topics, this category of information shall include the factors affecting contingency planning that are specific for each facility or means of transportation:
Licensee's Organizational Structure - A delineation of the organi-a.
=ation's chain of command and delegation of authority as these apply to e
safe, guards contingencies.
Physical Layout - (i) Fixed Sites - A description of the physical b.
structures and their location on the site, and a description of the site in relation to nearby towns, roads, and other important environmental features.
- (ii) Transportation - A description of the vehicles, shipping routes, and related features that would affect contingency responses.
Safeguards Systems Hardware - A description of the physical security c.
and accounting system hardware that influences how the licensee will respond Examples of systems to be discussed are communications, alarms, to an event.
locks, seals, area access, armaments and surveillance.
Law Enforcement Assistance - A listing of available local law enforce-d.
ment sgencies ano a description of their response capabilities and their
,c.
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-ey criteria'for response; and a discussion of working agreements or
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arrangements for communicating with these agencies.
Policy Constraints and Assumptions - A discussion of State laws, e.
local ordinances and company policies and practices that govern licensee response to incidents.
Examples that may be discussed include:
use of deadly force use of employee property use of off-duty employees site security jurisdictional boundaries Administrative and Logistical Considerations - Descriptions of licen-f.
see practices that may have an influence on the response to safeguards contingency events. The descriptions shall include provisions for ensuring I
that; all equipment needed to effect a successful response to a safeguards contingency will be easily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient 4
supp)1ytoprovideredundancyincaseofequipmentfailure.
4.- Resoonsibility Matrix. This category of information consists of detailed identification of the organizational entities responsible for each decision and action associated with specific responses to safeguards contingencies.
This identification shall be done by means of a matrix composed of an array of cells for each event, each cell correlating a decision or action with a member or unit of the organization and containing a laak, i.e., a detailed l
description of how a decision is to be made or an action is to be taken.
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Procedures. In order to aid implementation of the detailed plan as developed in the matrix, this category of information shall summarize the actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each member or unit of the
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organization as planned in the matrix.
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1 DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE PLAN
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'When submitting a licensee safeguards contingency plan to the Commission for approval, each license applicant and licensee shall also submit a l
description of the steps that he has taken.or will take to ensure that:
(:1) Safeguards. contingency responsibilities are-assigned in a manner that precludes conflicts in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency; j
(2) Adequate resources are available at all times for carrying out f
i the plan;
(.3) The plan will be reviewed and updated periodically to take due
~
4 account of changing conditions; and t
. ([4)
Periodic drills or tests will be made to. ensure that safeguards contingency csponses follow those set forth in the plan.
(Sec.1611, Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. ' 948; secs. 201, 204(b)(1), Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat. 1d43,1245 (42 U.S.C. 2201, 5841, 5844))
l Dated at this day of j
i 1976.
j FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
Samuel J. Chilk j
Secretary of the Commission i
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ID A
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! ~%f ENCLOSURE _2 4
NEGATIVE DECLARATION
_ PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF 10 CFR e
P ARTS 50. 70. AND 73 TO REQUIRE S
LICENSEE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN __
idering The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (The Commission) is cons licensee safeguards amendment of 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 73 to require contingency plans.
ds, The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Division of Safeguar osed amendments.
has prepared an environmental impact appraisal for the prop d d that the On the basis of this appraisal, the Commission has conclu e would not be l
hange environmental impact created by the proposed ru e c f an environmental significant and does not warrant the preparation o t a negative impact statement, and accordingly it has been determined tha The environmental impact appraisal LUREG-0142 declaration is appropriate.
Public Document is available for'public inspection at the Commission s A copy may be obtained Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Commission, j
upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Director, Division of Safeguards.
Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:
_____,1977
_ day of _
Dated at Bethesda, Fbryland, this _
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM Thomas F. Carter, Jr., Chief Contingency Planning Branch Division of Safeguards
(N L "I2
'<weA1 y
L i
f ENCLOSURE C l
HRC PROPOSES AMENDMENTS TO REQUIRE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR MEETING THREATS TO COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND MATERIALS i
i The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed amendments to its j
regulations which would require its licensees to develop' contingency plans for responding to threats, attempted sabotage of a nuclear facility, or l
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t theft of nuclear materials.
Each licensee affected by the proposed amendments already is re-quired to have an NRC-approved plan covering in-place physical security systems. The contingency plan would augment existing physical security procedures by outlining data needed and criteria to be followed in reaching i
decisions on what action to take in the event of a threat to facilities or materials. The individuals, groups and organizational units respontible for each decision and subsequent action also would be identified.
-i Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,' the NRC is responsible I
l for nuclear contingency planning-at the Federal level. This covers coordination of responses by various Federal agencies, including the NRC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Department of Defense to threats against commercial nuclear activities.
Licensee contingency plans would be integrated and coordinated with the Federal planning effort. Those responsible for responding to a l
specific threat situation, and the scope of that responsibility, would L
be identified.
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Licensees covered by the proposed amendments are involved in the processing,-handling, and transporting of strategic quantities of nuclear materials or in the operation of nuclear reactors--primarily those used in the production of electricity.
The licensee safeguards contingency plans would be designed to:
--organize the response effort at the licensee level;
--provide structured responses by licensees to safeguards contingencies;
--integrate a licensees' response with responses of government agencies; and l
--achieve a measurable performance in. response capabilities.
I If the Commission adopts the proposed amendments, which are to Parts 50, j
70 and:73, each affected licensee would have 120 days to submit safeguards emergency plans to the NRC for approval.
Within 30 days of approval, or 300 days from adoption of the amendments, whichever is latest, the licensees would be required to implement the plan.
Persons wishing to comment on the proposed amendments should send their comments to the Secretary of the Commission, NRC, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Section, no later than t
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--,44 4
ENCLOSURE D
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
[10 CFR PARTS 50, 70, AND 73]
LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES i
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL; PHYSICAL PROTECTION-OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Enviror. mental Impact Appraisal For Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans j
I.
INTRODUCTION Amendments to NRC regulations in 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 73 that would im-i t
pose a requirement for licensee safeguards contingency plans are under con-sideration.for adoption. These rules would require those fuel-cycle and
^
facility' licensees who are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 55 73 30(a),
73 50, 73 55,* and/or 73 60 to develop and follow licensee safeguards con-f tingency plans for their licensed activities.
1 This Environmental Impact Appraisal has been prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 5 51.7 to support the Negative Declaration that an Environmental Impact Statement should not be prepared for the rule making to require certain licensees to develop and follow licensee safeguards contingency plans.
'10 CFR 5'73 55 is a proposed regulation establishing requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against' industrial sabotage.
Until.that regulation is adopted, it' may
'be assumed that these proposed amendments will apply to licensed nuclear l.
power reactors designed primarily for the production of electricity or f
steam as well' as' to those activities covered in 10 CFR 55 73 30(a),
73 50, and.73.60.
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A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan to give guid-
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i ance to licensee personnel in order to accomplish specif1c objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material and nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of i
1954, as amended.
A licensee safeguards contingency plan contains a description of the purpose and scope of the plan and a definition of I
l terms a description of the licensee planning base (staff organization, facility layout, command and control functions, and other data specific to the licensee's operation); a generic planning base that describes the decisions and actions required for responding to safeguards contingency j
events with the needed data, criteria, and mechanisms for making the deci-sions. and taking the actions; a designation of responsibility for each i
decision and action; and a procedures summary for each organizational entity involved in carrying out the decisions and actions.
A licensee safeguards contingency plan does not include emergency plans for dealing with hazards to public health and safety that are the consequences of nuclear accidents, even though those actions may result from acts of threats, thefts, or sabotage.
However, licensee safeguards contingency plans may provide for the initiation of such emergency plans.
II.
DISCUSSION Uranium-235 in quantities of 5000 grams or more (if contained in uranium l
enriched more than twenty per cent in that isotope) and plutonium and uranium-233 in quantities of 2000 grams or more, alone or in combination, are quantities of special nuclear material subject to certain physical protection requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 Nineteen fuel-cycle licensees l
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are now subject to these requirements.
Also, some sixty nuclear power i
reactors and several other major reseach and test reactors having operating licenses are also subject to certain provisions of 10 CFR Part 73 These l
licensees must submit to the NRC for review and approval physical pro-l l
tection plans that outline the methods to be used by the licensee for i
l 9
meeting the physical protection requirements to which they are subject.
I Physical Protection at Licensed Fuel-cycle Plants Each fuel-cycle licensee subject to the provisions of 10 CFR Part 73 must t
maintain a physical security organization, includin6 armed guards, to pro-tect his facility against industrial sabotage and the special nuclear material in his possession against theft.
At least one supervisor of the i
I security. organization must be onsite at all times. The licensee must i
establish, maintain, and follow written security procedures that document
)
the structure of the security organization and that detail the duties of guards, watchmen, and. other individuals responsible for. security.
All
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guards or watchmen must' be properly trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified at least annually.
All " vital equipment," which is defined as any equipment, system, device, or material whose failure, destruction, or release could directly or in-directly endanger public health and safety, must be located within a sepa-rate structure or barrier designated as a " vital area."
All vital areas l
l and material access areas must be located within a larger protected area 1
l that is surrounded by a physical barrier.
t.n isolation zone is required l
l around the outer physical barrier and it must be dept clear of obstructions, i
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illuminated and monitored to detect the presence of individuals or vehicles attempting to gain entry to the protected area, and allow response by armed members of cthe facility security organization to suspicious activity or to l
I the breaching of any' physical barrier.
Special nuclear material not in process must be stored in a vault or in a "ault type room equipped with an
' intrusion alarm.
Etah vault or vault type room is to be controlled as a l
separate material access area. Enriched uranium scrap in the form of chips, small pieces, cuttings, solutions, etc., in 30-gallon or larger containers i
and with a uranium-235 content of less than 0.25 grams per liter may be i
stored within a locked, separately fenced area located within a protected area and no closer than 25 feet to the perimeter of that protected area.
When unoccupied, this storage area must be protected by a guard or watchman i
who must patrol at intervals not to exceed four hours, or by intrusion alarms.
Personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, material access area, or vital area-must be controll'ed.
A picture badge identification syst'em must be used, and visitors must be registered and escorted.
Individuals and packages entering the protected area are required to be searched.
Admittance to a vital area or material access area must be controlled and access limited to those persons who require such access to perform their duties.
Methods to observe individuals within a material access area to assure that special nuclear material is not being diverted must be provided and used on a con-i tinuing basis.
All individuals, packages, or vehicles must be searched for concealed nuclear material before exiting from a material access area.
l Keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment are required to be con-l trolled to minimize the possibility of compromise.
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All emergency exits in the protected area, vital areas, and material r
access areas must be alarmed..Each unoccupied material access area must Le locked and alarmed.
All alarms must annunciate in a continuously manned t
E central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station.
All alarms must be self-checking and I
tamper-indicating, and inspected and tested for operability and required
]
functional performance at specified intervals not to exceed seven days.
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l Each guard or watchman on duty must be capable of maintaining continuous communications with an individual in a continuously manned central alarm l
l station within the protected area, who must be capable of calling for assis-L tance ' from other guards and from local law enforcement authorities. To pro-l vide !the capability of continuous communication with local law enforcement i
authorities, two-way radio voice communications must be available in addi-tion to conventional telephone service.
All communications equipment must remain operable from independent power sources in the event of loss of primary power and must be tested for operability and performance at least once at the beginning of each security ~ personnel work shift.
Licensees must' establish liaison with local law enforcement authorities
' and be pr'epared to take immediate action to neutralize threats to the faci-lity by appropriate direct action, calling for assistance from local law enforcement authorities, or both.
Security records must be maintained of all individuals authorized access to vital and material access areas, including visitors, vendors, and others not employed by the licensee.
Routine security tours, and all of h
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' fij w4 the tests, inspections, and maintenance on security-related equipment and structures must be' documented.
A record must be maintained on each alarm, false alarm, alarm check, intrusion indication, or other security incident, to include the details of the response by facility guards.-
Suspected thefts, unlawful diversions, and/or industrial sabotage must be reported immediately to NRC, followed by a written detailed report within 15 days.
fhysical Protection at Licensed Nuclear Power Reactors Nuclear power reactor licensees are encouraged to provide a level of protection as described in American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
Standard N18.17, " Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants." The principal features of this protection are a combination of physical
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systems and barriers to prevent and deter overt intrusions by unauthorized persons, administrative control mechanisms to permit access by authorized persons and to deny access to unauthor'ized persons, background screening 1
of persons assigned to work at the plant on a regular basis, general security surveillance by a trained security force, and a response capa-bility to any forced intrusion provided by armed guards supplemented by local law enforcement response force.
Physical Protection at Licensed Research Reactors The degree of physical protection required of non-electric-power-producing research reactor licensees varies with the quantity, enrichment, and j
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radiation level of the reactor fuel.
All of the 84 licensed non-power-reactor facilities are required to comply with 10 CFR 73.40.
Three of 4
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--4 those are also subject to the same requirements as those described above for licensed fuel-cycle facilities:
10 CFR 73 30 and 73.60.
Four other facilities, which are not required to provide protection in accordance with 5 73 50 because the fuel has been irradiated, are re-quired to meet the provisions of 5 73.60 because reactor fuel radiation levels are below those which would qualify for the exemption criterion of 10 CFR 5 73.6.
Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in Transit For shipments that must be protected under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 73, if a common or contract carrier is used, the special nuclear material must be transported under the established procedures of the carrier that provides a system for the physical protection of valuable material in transit and requires a hand-to-hand receipt at origin and destination and at all points en route where there is a transfer of custody. Transit times of all shipments must be minimized and routes selected to avoid areas of natural disaster or civil disorders. Special nuclear meterial must be shipped in containers that are sealed by tamper-indicatin6 type seals. The outer container or vehicle is required to be locked and sealed.
No container weighing 500 pounds or less nay be shipped on open vehicles, such as open trucks or railway flatcars.
All shipments by road must be made without any scheduled intermediate stops to transfer special nuclear material or other cargo between the point of origin and destination.
All motor vehicles are required to be equipped with a radiotelephone.
Calls nust be made at predetermined
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intervals, normally not to exceed two hours, and if calls are not re-ceived when planned, the licensee or his agent must immediately notify an appropriate law enforcement authority and the NRC.
Shipments by road i
must.be accompanied by at least two people in the transport vehicle.
At least two armed guards must accompany the shipment in a separate escort l
vehicle equipped with a radiotelephone and citizen-band radio.
The escort i
vehicle must be so positioned in relation to the transport vehicle that a single act cannot disable both vehicles.
The escort guards must have successfully completed a. prescribed 45-hour training program, and all drivers
. and guards must have received a special training course in escort tactics.
i No shipm'ents of plutonium by air will be licensed by the
,(except f
for ? individual medical application) until the Nuclear Regu atory Commission has certified to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress as required by law that a safe container has been developed and tested which will not rupture under crash and blast-testing equiva-lent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft.
Shipments in excess of 350 grams of uranium-235 (enriched to 20% or more in the isotope uranium-235) are prohibited on passenger aircraft.
Shipments of uranium-235 on cargo aircraft are required to be arranged so as to minimize the number of scheduled transfers, and such transfers, when necessary, must be monitored by an armed guard.
l Rail shipments must be escorted by two armed guards in the shipment car
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or in an escort car.. Continuous on-board radiotelephone communications 1
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-w o g capability must be provided with conventional telephone backup.
Periodic calls to the licensee or his agent are required at the same time intervals as for road shipments.
Shipments by sea must be made on vessels making the minimum ports of call.
Transfer at domestic ports from other modes of transportation must be monitored by a guard.
Shipments must be placed in a secure com-partment that is locked and sealed.
Export shipments must be escorted by an authorized individual, who may be a crew member from the last port in the U.S.,
until it is unloaded in a foreign port.
Ship-to-shore communications must be made every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to relay position infor-mation and the status of the shipment as determined by daily inspections.
A licensee who makes a shipment must notify the consignee of the ship-ment schedule and details, including the estimated time of arrival of the shipment.
A licensee who receives a shipment must immediately notify the shipper.
Shipments that fail to arrive at the destination on time must be traced.
Unaccounted-for shipments must be reported immediately to NRC, followed by a detailed written report within 15 days.
Relation of Licensee Physical Protection Plans to Licensee Safetaands Contineency Plans The requirements described in the preceding paragraphs are aimed at establishing an institutional structure by the licensee or applicant for routine procedures and methods to protect against events that are
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considered highly improbable.
However,~ within the institutional struc-
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ture, detailed plans of action are also required to ensure an adequate u*
and timely response at any time to any attempt at sabotage involving q
hazardous nuclear materials, thefts of such materials, or threats related l
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to such. acts.
Such attempts would be out of the ordinary, and effective i
response requires predetermined nonroutine actions by guards and others.
(
A licensee safeguards contingency plan contains predetermined responses by a licensee to sudden, unexpected events of the type just described that' demand immediate actions and that are regarded as remotely possible I
in the future.
The responses are structured and orderly. The parti-cipants are identified, their responsibilities are specified, and the actions by various respondents are coordinated.
The. development of licensee safeguards contingency plans is an evalua-tional effort.
Putting them into practice is largely procedural.
Re-sources used are expected to be largely those already in hand for physi-cal protection.
Little or no capital investment should be needed for a i
facility that is adequately protected.
And continuing application of l
such plans should require little more than occasional retraining and i
i practice drills.
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III. EVALUATION A.
Environmental Impact 1.
Direct Impact The direct impact of implementation of the subjet amendments is the f
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requirement that licensees and applicants develop and submit contingency t
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plans to NRC for review and approval, and that licensees follow the I
l approved plans.
Development'of the plans should have no impact on the l
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environment.
Putting the plans into effect would have an_ impact only I
in those instances where the. licensee safeguards contingency plans demonstrated that additional security measures- (such sa more guards) j I
were needed beyond those already in place to meet the requirements of i
1 10 CFR Part 73 Since we'have no reason to believe that additional i
security measures would be needed for the effecting of licensee safe-guards contingency plans, we conclude that no significant direct impact on the human environment will result from the implementation of the I
proposed regulations.
Nonetheless, at the time that individual licensee contingency plans are proposed, the staff will review the potential for impact to the environment on a site-specific basis.
2.
Indirect Impact l
The purpose of these amendments is to improve the protection afforded by J
NRC licensees to nuclear materials and facilities.
Therefore, whatever
. potential environmental impact may result from safeguards problems in the nuclear industry should be decreased by implementation of these l
requirements.
The decrease should come about in two ways:
(1) With
~ licensee safeguards contingency plans in effect, the response to any threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material and licensed nuclear facilities should be more timely and better coordinated.
1
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. Thus, the adverse effects of such events should be diminished.
(2)
Public knowledge of effective licensee safeguards contingency plans may serve to deter persons from attempting such threats, thefts, or sabotage.
B.
Alternatives
-The alternative to adopting the subject amendments is to not publish such rules.
However, this alternative would fail to provide for effective responses to out-of-the-ordinary attempts at nuclear threats, thefts, or sabotage.
Further, it would not fulfill the responsibility of the NRC for providing and maintaining safeguards against such extraordinary events, as required by Section 204(b)(1) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.
C.
Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided No adverse environmental effects of any consequence have been identified.
D.
Relationship Between Short-term Uses of the Environment and Long-term Productivity The objective of the amendments is to protect the common defense and security and public health and safety by allowing for a timely and coordinated response in the remotely possible future event that an attempt would be made at the theft or sabotage of licensed nuclear materials or facilities.
It follows from the nature of these regulations that their effect is to minimize danger' to the environment potentially posed by theft of special nuclear material or other potential threats.
Implementation of i
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the procedural mechanisms developed from these regulations will have f
insignificant impact adverse to the human environment.
)
i E.
Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Natural Resources Since promulgation of these regulations will result largely in estab-j lishing new procedures, no natural resources are involved. Some time and money will' be ' expended in developing the new procedures, but the expenditure wil be minimal compared'with the total operation.
i F. ' Cost-Benefit Analysis l
The proposed amendments do not permit a cost-benefit analysis. Since the. environmental impact-is insignificant, the cost-benefit question i
is essentially mooted.
IV.
CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing evaluation, the Commission's Regulations in l
I 10 CFR Part'51, and the Guidelines of the Council of Environmental Quality, the NRC staff has decided not to prepare an environmental impact statement.
This Environmental Impact Appraisal has been prepared pursuant to 10 CFR S 51.7 to support the Negative Declaration that an Environmental Impact Statement should not be prepared for the rule making to require certain licensees to develop and follow licensee safeguards contingency plans.
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"""N ENCLOSURE E RESPONSE TO COMMENTS FROM OGC AND GPE
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The Commission paper and its enclosures "A" through "D" were forwarded from the office of the EDO on January 5,1977.
Comments elicited from OGC and OPE are contained in Enclosures "F" and "G," respectively.
This Enclesure addresses the manner in which these comments were resolved to l
arrive at the present version of the paper.
All comments from OGC were responded to in the manner suggested except for a portion of Comment (5), for which an adequate response would have been more, lengthy than seems reasonable.
Detailed responses to OGC comments foll,ow.
, (1) p.1 of the Commission paper:
Change "made effec-tive" to " adopted" in the footnote.
i Change made, i
i (2)
- p. 4:
While we have construed 1611 to support a reactor employee clearance rule -- where the concern is essentially sabotage -- I do not read it to " regulate exolicitiv for protection against sabotage...." Perhaps NMSS could clear this up and indicate what they rely on.
The Commission has authority to regulate in the interest of the common defense and security under Section 1611 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. This authority is continued in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Section 204(b)(1) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which l
explicitly provides for the "(p)rincipal licensing and regulation involving t
I all facilities and materials, licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, associated with the processing, transport, and handling of j
nuclear materials, including the provision and maintenance of safeguards
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against threats, thefts, and sabotage of such licensed facilities, and ma terials. "
(Emphasis added.)
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W1 (3)
- p. 1 of Statement of Considerations:
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include "public. health and safety" with " common l
defense and security";
Change made.
i
" adopted" again in the footnote as per comment (1).
Change made.
(4)
- p. 3, fifth line from bottom, change "would not" to "is not intended to."
Change made.
(5)
- p. 4: There should be a sentence or two about emergency plans so that one is not left with the impression that there are none.
5 Text clarified.
Also, 4th line, add " proposed" before "Section", and in next line delete first 7 words.
i Change'made.
Also, as to last sentence on the page, add a brief explanation as to why it l
is so " appropriate. "
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Change made.
The last sentence on page 4 was a repetition of the thought in the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 3 It i
was added on page 4 to complete the paragraph.
We have revised the paragraph in a manner that we believe is more satisfactory.
I It might be worthwhile to describe' a little more the activity set out in the first sentence of the last paragraph.
It is, I gather, the basis for our judgment on the. content of the proposed rule and required plans.
Inclusion of a meaningful description would expand the Statement of Consideration beyond reason.
Affected fuel-cycle licensees and their l=
transportation agents received this information in depth in the three-day workshop mentioned at the top of page 3 of the Commission paper, i
and briefings are planned for reactor licensees.
We are prepared to brief the Commission on this subject if they desire it.
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(6) Jp. 6:
" Adopted" for "made effective" as
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p per comment (1).
Change made, j
(7)
- p. 8:
Footnote 3, line two, after " acts" insert i
"are postulated to" I
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. Change made.
(8)
- p. 12:1 Line 8, add " proposed" after "to."
Change made.
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(9) Will these " contingency plans" be classified l
or. treated as proprietary data? Might something be said about that in the Statement of Considera-tions?
j We have added a paragraph to the Statement of. Considerations on this subject.
(10) p.'l of Enclosure D:
" adopted" for "made l
effective" as per comment (1).
Change made.
I (11) p. 7-8:
The discussion on transportation of SSNM
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might be reviewed to be sure that it includes all j
changes brought'about by the May 1976 license l
conditions, viz., all shipments are escorted by at least two' armed guards, CB radios are being used, etc.
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- Change'made.
(12) p.ll:
At the end of the sentence that finishes on line 5, it might be helpful to note that in-dividual cases can be evaluated when each licensee
. proposes its plans.
Change made.
(13) p. 12:
Line 6, after " security," add "and public health and safety."
Change made.
I 1
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- Also, "E" does not
(.
strike me. as - very strong.
Time and money will be spent on the new procedures and will be l
taken from other avenues.
l Although we do not consider time and money to-be natural resources, we l
have nevertheless made a. change to reflect the content of this comment.
l Our responses to OPE comments follow:
l l
1.
The Statement of Considerations should address the potential
' conflict which could arise between safeguards contingency plans l
and emergency plans,for radiological incidents. The point made j
on the top of page four, Enclosure A, that contingency plans would be complementary to emergency plans should be expanded to j
l eliminate potential conflicts and require coordination of both' plans.
An example of such a conflict would be deliberate
'" staging" of a radiological incident in order to divert attention and cause evacuation.
This might result in decreased safe-
]
guards protection (e.g., emergency exists are opened).
.]
This topic is addressed in the Rule itself (see first item under "De-i velopmentLand Maintenance of the Plan" in new Appendix C to Part 73). We therefore do not consider it necessary to address the issue in the State-ment of Considerations.
2.
Throughout the proposed rule and Statement of Considerations the word
" thefts" is used, but no mention is made of covert diversions.
This wording is taken from the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Section l-204(b)(2)(B) of that Act requires the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards to develop " contingency plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage..." In reciting these words in our proposed rule, w3 have pre-l sumed that it was the intention of Congress to include covert diversions within " thefts." In the Regulatory Guide that sets forth Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans for Fuel-Cycle Plants we re-quire responses to covert diversion as well as to overt and covert thefts.
3 The staff paper should address the issue of whether these contin-gency plans will be protected information--either as proprietary or classified.
In particular the information called for in paragraph three, on page 15 of Enclosure A is sensitive by describing facility
- vulnerabili ties.
Change made in staff paper..
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.4.
The staff paper 'should addres.s in more detail, the SD position that Part 73 covers only theft, net., sabotage of.SNM in-transit.. Sheuld l
modifications be made to Part 73, or is this problem addressed by j
other means?
Upon further consideration, SD has modified its position on.this issue. and j
now concurs without reservation.
5 Correct the reference to plutonium shipments by air given'on page l
-eight, Enclosure D.
l i
Change made.
4 t
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i
a--a ny...
1.g,, [ j, Mg oog*p,*g ENCLOSURE F UNITED STATES "O
N
,,p p NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20565 e
January 24, 1977 NOTE TO:
T. A. Rehm, Assistant to the EDO FROM:
C.
W.
Reamer, Attorney, OGC j
SUBJECT.
PROPOSED RULE TO REQUIRE LICENSEE f
SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS Jim Kelley has asked me to pass on these comments:
(1) p.1 of the Commission paper:
Change "made effec-tivd' to " adopted" in the footnote.
-(2)
- p. 4:
While we have construed 1611 to support a reactor employee clearance rule -- where the concern is essentially sabotage -- I do not read it to " regulate explicitly for protection t
against sabotage...."
Perhaps NMSS could clear this up and indicate what they rely on.
(3)
- p. 1 of Statement of Considerations: I would include "public health and safety" with " common i
defense and security"; " adopted" again in the footnote as per comment (1).
(4) p.
3, fifth line from bottom, change "would not" to "is not intended to."
(5)
- p. 4:
There should be a sentence or two about emergency plans so that one is not left with the impression that there are none.
Also, 4th line, add " proposed" before "Section", and in next line delete first 7 words.
Also, as to last sentence on the page, add a brief explanation as to why it is so " appropriate."
It might be worthynile to describe a little more the activity set out in the first sentence of the last paragraph.
It is, I gather, the basis for our judgment on the content of the proposed rule and required plans.
l (6)
- p. 6:
" Adopted" for "made effective" as per comment (1).
l l
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sq
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2 (7) p.
8:
Footnote 3, line two, after " acts" insert "are postulated to" l
(8)
- p. 12:
Line 8, add " proposed" after "to."
(9)- Will these " contingency plans" be classified or treated as proprietary data?
Might something be said about that in the Statement of Considera-tions?
(10) p. l'of Enclosure D:
" adopted" for "made' effective" as per comment. (1).
I (11)
- p. 7-8:
The discussion on transportation of SSNM I
might be reviewed to be sure that it includes all changes brought about by the May 1976 license conditions, viz., all shipments are escorte$ by at least two armed guards, CB radios are being used, etc.
(12)
- p. 11:
At the end of the sentence that finishes on line 5, it might be helpful to note that in-dividual cases can be evaluated when each licensee proposes its plans.
(13)
- p. 12:
Line 6, after " security," add "and public health and safety."
- Also, "E"
does not strike me as very strong.
Time and money will be spent on the new procedures and will be taken from other avenues.
i I
i i
i l
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. f "'4:
' "j j,
4 UNITED STATES
_y
.,l Q-41 N0 CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION "4
j' WASHINGTON. D. c. 2M55 e
k,g
- s e s
- gjf January 19, 1977 l
MEMORANDUM FOR: Tom Rehm FROM:
Ben Huberma
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED RULE TO REQUIRE LICENSEE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS As transmitted by your January 6 memorandum, I concur with the staff recommendation to the Commission that a public rulemaking proceeding be initiated to require licensees to prepare safeguards contingency. plans.
The following comments are provided for your consideration in finalizing the draft paper on this subject:
1.
The Statement of Considerations should address the potential conflict which could arise between safeguards contingency plans and emergency plans for radiological incidents.
The point made on the top of page four, Enclosure A, that contingency plans would be complementary to emergency plans should be expanded to eliminate potential conflicts and require coordination of both plans. An example of such a conflict would be deliberate " staging"of a radiological incident in order to divert attention and cause evacuation.
This might result in decreased safeguards protection (e.g., emergency exists are opened).
2.
Throughout the proposed rule and Statement of Considerations the word
" thefts" is used, but no mention is made of covert diversions.
3.
The staff paper should address the issue of whether these contingency plans will be protected information--either as proprietary or classified.
In particu.lar the information called for in paragraph three, on page 15 of Enclosure A is sensitive by describing facility vulnerabilities.
I 4.
The staff paper should address in more detail, the SD position that Part 73 covers only theft, not sabotage of SNM in-transit.
Should modifications be made to Part 73, or is this problem addressed by other means?-
)
5.
Correct the reference to plutonium shipments by air given on page j
eight, Enclosure D.
cc: ' Peter Strauss Sam Chilk CONTACT:
Bernie Snyder (OPE) 634-1541 4
-~
L J