ML20203B977
| ML20203B977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07003008 |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1986 |
| From: | Crow W, Ketzlach N NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203B934 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8604180309 | |
| Download: ML20203B977 (13) | |
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APR 9 1996 DOCKET N0. 70-3008 .
APPLICANTS: Duquesne Light Company (DLC)
Ohio Edison Company The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company l The Toledo Edison Company FACILITY: Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), Unit 2
SUBJECT:
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - REVIEW 0F APPLICATICN DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1984, ITS REVISION DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 1985, AND ITS SUPPLEMENT DATED OCTOBER 9, 1985, AND FEBRUARY 10, 1986, FOR A SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS LICENSE I. INTRODUCTION A. General By application dated September 28, 1984, its revision dated September 13, 1985, and its supplements dated October 9,1985, and February 10, 1986, DLC acting on its own behalf and as agent for the applicants listed above, requested authorization to receive, inspect, possess, and store enriched uranium contained in fresh fuel assemblies. In addition, DLC requested authorization to receive, inspect, possess, and use other radioactive materials in the form of flux mapping moveable incore detectors, neutron detector systems, primary source rods, and various detectors and monitors and their related calibration and check sources. The materials are for eventual use in BVPS, Unit 2.
The materials license was requested to allow early receipt of the fuel for the purpose of inspection and preparation of the fuel for reactor loading. The materials license will automatically terminate upon issuance of the Part 50 license. ,
1 B. Fuel Assembly Design The finished fuel assemblies for BVPS, Unit 2, will be supplied by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Each fuel assembly contains 264 fuel rods, 24 Zircaloy-4 control rod guide thimbles, and 1 Zircaloy-4 instru-mentation thimble. The fuel rods, guide thimbles, and instrumentation thimble are spaced in a 17 x 17 array and supported by 8 inconel grid assemblies located along the length of the fuel assembly. Table 1 gives general fuel parameters that describe the fuel which will eventually be used in BVPS, Unit 2.
8604180309 860409 PDR ADOCK 07003008 C PDR
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-s Duquesne Light Company 2 APR 9 1986
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i TABLE 1 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT 2 General Fuel Data Fuel-Assembly Data Inches
~ 0verall Length 160 Nominal Active Fuel Length 144.0 Fuel Rod Pitch 0.496 Rod Array 17 x 17 Rods Per Assembly 264 Fuel Rod Data Fuel Pellet Material U0
.0utside Diameter 0.374 Cladding Thickness 0.0225
' Cladding Inside Diameter. 0.329 Fuel Pellet Immersion Density (% theoretical) 95.0 Fuel Pellet Diameter 0.3225 C. Location Description The BVPS, Unit 2, is a PWR located in Shippingport Borough, Beaver County, Pennsylvania. The construction permit, CPPR-105, was issued b Energy Commission (AEC, now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)y.the on May 3, Atomic 1974.
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II. AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES A. Enriched Uranium Fuel Assemblies !
This license will authorize the receipt, possession, inspection, and storage of 157 finished fuel assemblies with a maximum enrichment of 3.15 I w/o in U-235. Fuel assemblies will be stored in their. shipping containers, new fuel racks, and spent fuel racks.
DLC also requests authorization to repackage any assembly, if necessary, for delivery to a carrier. It should be noted that the license does not
' authorize insertion of a fuel assembly into the reactor vessel.
B. Neutron Detectors j The license will authorize the receipt, possession, inspection, and use of 10 flux mapping moveable incore detectors. The total quantity of U-235 in each detector.is approximately 0.0041 grams. In addition, the i DLC requests authorization for the receipt, possession, inspection, '
and use of an additional 84 grams of enriched U-235 for installation in a Neutron Detector System.
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Duquesne Light Company 3 Apg g C. Primary Source Rods The license will authorize the receipt, possession, inspection, and use of two primary source rods, each containing Paladium-Californium 0xide as source material. A maximum of 100 uCi's is present in each sealed source.
D. Calibration and Check Sources The license will authorize the receipt, possession, inspection, and use of the following calibration and check sources (sealed) and monitors:
- a. Various detector calibration and check sources, in exempt quantity (each with less than 10 microcuries Cs-137 or C136).
- b. One Wide Range Gas Monitor containing two sources, each with 100 microcuries Cs-137
- c. For calibrating area monitor detectors:
- 1. Two, each with 10 millicuries Cs-137
- 2. Two, each with 100 millicuries Cs-137
- 3. Four liquid monitors, each with 100 microcuries Cs-137
- d. For calibrating process monitor detectors:
- 1. Two, each with 0.4 microcuries Ba-133
- 2. Two, each with 110 microcuries Cs-137
- 3. Three, each with 10 microcuries Cs-137
- 4. One check source containing 100 microcuries Cs-137
- 5. One Steam Line Monitor with three check sources containing less than 10, 50, and 100 microcuries Cs-137, respectively
- e. One area monitor with 200 microcuries Cs-137
- f. Two area monitors, each with 0.11 mg U-234 and 0.58 mg U-238 check sources III. SCOPE OF REVIEW The staff's safety review of the DLC request for a materials license included an evaluation of the BVPS organization, administration, nuclear criticality safety, radiation protection, and fire protection programs.
During the course of the review, discussions were held with the NRR Project Manager, the Senior Resident Inspector,'and DLC staff members.
The evaluation of the "Cuquesne Light Company, Beaver Valley Power Station Physical Security Plan" was made by the Power Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nutre.. Material Safety and Safeguards.
1 IV. POSSESSION LIMITS l l
Conditions 6, 7, and 8 of this license will specify the type, form, and quantity i of material that DLC may possess under this license and shall read as follows: I
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APR 9 1o86
~Duquesne Light Company 4
in U-235 isotope fuel assemblies uranium enriched to no more than 3.15 w/o
- U-235 B. Uranium enriched B. Neutron detectors B. 85 g of U-235 in
'in U-235 isotope uranium at any enrichment C. ~ Californium C. Primary source rods C. -200 uCi of Cf-252.,
maximum 100.uCi per rod
. D. Cs-137 D. Various calibration D. 300 millicuries of-and check sources Cs-137,-maximum.of 100 ,
millicuries per source
" and monitors d I E.. Ba-133 E. Calibration source E. 2 microcuries-of Ba-133, maximum ~of 1 microcurie per source F.r-Cl-36 F. Various calibration F. 10 microcuries L' -
and check sources G. _U-234, U-238 G. Area monitors with G. 1 mg U-234, and-check sources 2 mg U-238 V. ORGANIZATION A. Nuclear Criticality Safety and Radiation Protection Responsibilities
- 1. Plant Manager The Plant Manager exercises overall managerial and supervisory responsibilities for the custody and physical control of nuclear materials at BVPS, Unit 2, and for the implementation and enforcement of the nuclear material and accounting system.
- 2. 0,)erations Quality Control Inspector I The Operations Quality Control Inspector is responsible for the inspection and acceptance of every fuel assembly onsite. >
r 3. Refueling Supervisor
! The Refueling Supervisor is responsible for administrative controls which I
govern the safe handling and storage of fuel. He ensures that all movement of fuel is in accordance with approved plant procedures.
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- Duquesne Light Company 5 App g . 799
- 4. Radiological Operations. Coordinator The Radiological Operations Coordinator directs the radiation control program at BVPS, Unit 2. His responsibilities include implementing the ALARA and Radwaste Management Programs; advising and assisting the Station Superintendent on matters concerning radiological safety of station personnel; and the safe, controlled release of radioactive ,
s materials to the~ environment. ,
.B. Minimum Qualifications DLC did not commit to the minimum qualifications for those positions responsible for nuclear criticality and radiation safety. Therefore, the staff recommends that the following conditions be added to the license 4to clearly specify the minimum qualifications for the above positions.
- Condition 11. The minimum technical qualifications for-the Plant Manager shall be in accordance with Section 4.2.1, " Plant Manager," ANSI N18.1-1971.
Condition 12. The minimum technical qualifications for the Operations Quality Control Inspector shall be in accordance with Section 4.4.5, " Quality Assurance," ANSI /ANS-3.1-1981.
Condition 13. The minimum technical qualifications for the Refueling Supervisor shall be in accordance with Section 4.3.2,
" Supervisors Not Requiring AEC Licenses," ANSI N18.1-1971.
Condition 14. The minimum technical qualifications for the Radiological Operations Coordinator shall be in accordance with the requirements for " Radiation Protection Manager," Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975.
C. Training Training is conducted to ensure that all operations personnel are familiar with the designed features, engineered safeguards, and fuel handling procedures. Because the training requirements were not clearly defined in the application submitted by DLC, the staff recommends that Condition 15 be added to highlight the required training program.
Condition 15. The following training shall be completed prior to receipt of fuel onsite:
- a. All radiation safety personnel involved in fuel handling operations shall be trained in radiation safety and DLC radiation protection procedures related to fuel assembly handling.
- b. All operations personnel involved in fuel handling operations shall receive training in proper fuel !
handling procedures, including health and safety l aspects of the activities. i l
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, , Duquesne Light Company- 6 APR 9 tagg; The staff has' concluded that based on these added conditions and the applicant's-radiation safety and fuel handling training programs, DLC can.-
responsibly carryout the activities for which the license is requested.
- D. Administrative Procedures
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Administrative procedures for the control and handling of nuclear fuel are reviewed and approved by the Onsite Safety Committee (OSC). The responsibilities and qualifications of OSC members are described in Chapter 13.4.1 of BVPS, Unit 2 FSAR.
VI. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY DLC requests authorization to store fuel assemblies in their shipping containers and in new fuel racks and spent fuel racks located in the fuel Building.
'A. Fuel Handling In order to ensure that all fuel handling equipment is ready to safely handle the fresh fuel assemblies, DLC has stated that all required fuel handling equipment and storage facilities will be inspected and preoperationally tested prior to receipt of new fuel.
DLC's application did not state the maximum number of assemblies out of shipping containers or designated storage location at one time. Calcula-tions have indicated that two assemblies could be made critical at optimum-conditions of water moderation and reflection; however, one assembly separated from another assembly by _ 12 inches of spacing cannot be made critical under any. conditions. Therefore, the staff recommends the following license condition limiting the number of fuel assemblies out of storage and the minimum distance from all other fuel:
Condition 16a. No more than two fuel assemblies shall be out of approved shipping containers or fuel assembly storage racks at any one time,
- b. The minimum edge-to-edge distance between the above two fuel assemblies, the shipping container array, and the storage rack arrays shall be 12 inches.
B. Shipping Containers DLC has indicated that the fresh fuel assemblies may be temporarily stored in shipping containers in the fuel receiving area of the Fuel
-Building. The shipping containers are authorized for use in accordance with Certificate of Compliance No. 5450. The Certificate of Compliance authorizes the shipment of as many as 60 containers filled with unirradiated fuel assemblies in a single Class III shipment independent of spacing or the degree of water moderation and reflection. DLC proposes to stack shipping containers no more than 2 high and in groups of not more than 60. The NRC staff finds there is no criticality safety hazard under such a storage arrangement.
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' APR 9 Duquesne Light Company 7 1986 C. New Fuel Storage Racks The new fuel storage racks have a capacity for 70 fuel assemblies arranged-in a 5 x 14 array. The fuel assemblies are stored in storage cells (formed by steel tubing) with inner dimensions of 8.906-inches square and walls which are 1/8-inch thick. Each cell will hold only one fuel assembly. Each storage cell is separated from an adjacent cell by 21
. inches center-to-center spacing. The racks are engineered so that it is not possible to insert new fuel assemblies in other than their designated locations.
In performing the criticality analysis of the new fuel storage racks, DLC made the following assumptions: the fuel was a uniform 3.6 percent U-235 enrichment, no credit was taken for burnable poisons, and the analyses were performed assuming unborated water at varying densities (.0001 gm/cc to 1.0 gm/cc). Using KEN 0 IV code for reactivity determination, DLC reported a k-effective of less than 0.98 under optimum moderation conditions. An independent nuclear criticality analysis by the NRC staff confirmed that the 5 x 14 array of new fuel storage racks is critically safe for unirradiated fuel at an unifonn 3.15 U-235 enrichment (maximum enrichment requested) and at all water densities.
To protect them from the environment, the fresh fuel assemblies will be stored with their plastic covering. If the covers were sealed at their bottoms, the assemblies could become internally moderated with water while the spaces between assemblies will be occupied by air. This could occur if the bottoms were closed, the storage area flooded and drained, and water retained in the covers. Large arrays under these conditions may become critical. DLC has stated that procedures require that the bottom be open to prevent the postulated accident from occurring. This added precaution taken by DLC to prevent such a situation will be represented in Condition 17 for emphasis.
Condition 17. Fuel assemblies shall be stored in such a manner that water would drain freely from the assemblies in the event of flooding and subsequent draining of the fuel storage area.
D. Spent Fuel Storage Racks The fuel assemblies in the spent fuel racks are spaced on 10 7/16-inch centers. The storage cells are 8 15/16-inches square and are made of 0.090-inch thick stainless steel. Subcriticality of the racks is maintained by the presence of neutron poison sheets (Boroflex) securely positioned on all four sides of each cell. The staff has reviewed DLC's quality assurance program to ensure that the neutron poisons meet design specifications and is encapsulated securely to each storage cell. The quality assurance program was found to be adequate.
DLC conducted a criticality safety analysis for the spent fuel storage racks based on the following conditions: the fuel assemblies contain
g APR 9 1933 Duquesne Light Company 8 unirradiated fuel at a uniform 3.60 U-235 enrichment, the array of storage racks is infinite in the x and y direction, there are no burnable poisons present, and full water density. Based on these conditions and using 218 energy group cross-section library and KEN 0 IV code for reactivity determination, DLC determined that fresh fuel stored in the spent fuel racks would have a maximum k-effective of less than 0.95.
An independent nuclear criticality safety analysis by the staff indicates the k-effective of an infinite array of fuel assemblies at an enrichment
.of 3.15 w/o U-235 is 0.87 at full water density (optimum moderation).
Therefore, the storage of fresh fuel in the spent fuel stroage racks is critically safe.
E. Exemption from Criticality Alam Requiremen_ts DLC has requested, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d), an exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR 70.24. Because the fuel assemblies are handled as discrete items, stored with engineered controlled spacing under dry con-ditions, and the inherent features asociated with unirradiated fuel containing uranium enriched to less than 5 percent in the U-235 isotope when no fuel processing activities are to be performed, the possibility of accidental criticality during fuel handling and storage activities is remote. Therefore, the staff hereby determines that granting such an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest.
This exemption is authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14. It is recommended that the exemption be identified as Condition 18.
Condition 18. DLC is hereby exempted from the provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 insofar as this section applies to materials held under this license.
VII. RADIATION SAFETY Since all radioactive material, including fresh fuel assemblies, are sealed sources, the principal exposure pathway to an individual ir via external radiation. For a low-enriched uranium fuel bundle ( 4% U 235 enrichment),
the exposure rate at 1 foot from the surface is normally less than 1 mr/hr; therefore, it is estimated that the exposure level to workers from these sources would be less than 25 percent of the maximum pemissible exposure specified in 10 CFR 20. All other special nuclear material requested by the licensee will also present no threat to plant personnel or to the environment because of the small quantities of radioactive material involved.
DLC is committed to establishing a program to maintain occupational and general public exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The Radiological Operations Coordinator is responsible for maintenance of safe radiological conditions and implementation of the BVPS, Unit 2, radiation protection program.
Personnel who are expected to have access to radiological control areas of BVPS, Unit 2, will be assigned thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD). TLD data L
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APR S 1993 Duquesne Light Company 9 will provide an accurate measure of radiation exposure and will normally be used L as permanent recorded external radiation measurements. TLDs are normally
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processed and the dose determined at least quarterly.
Radiation and contamination monitoring will be performed prior to the initial handling and storage of new fuel. Swipes or smears will be taken of the fuel to determine the amount of surface contamination present. If the amount of contamination exceeds allowable limits ( 0.005 microcuries of removable contamination per assembly), appropriate decontamination steps will be taken.
- Storage of other radioactive materials (other than new fuel) will be in a locked, controlled storage area. Access and use of other special nuclear
! materials will require authorization bf the General Manager, Nuclear Service
! Unit.
Annex A, " License Condition for Leak Testing Sealed Byproduct Material Sources,"
dated November 1979 has been adopted as a Branch Technical Position and will be incorporated as License Condition 19. Accordingly, Condition 19 shall read as follows:
Condition 19. DLC shall comply with the provisions of Annex A, " License Condition for Leak Testing Sealed Byproduct Material Sources," dated November 1979 Because of the low radiation exposure levels associated with the requested materials and activities and DLC's radiation protection procedures, the staff has conclude that the requested operation can be carried out with adequate protection of the operating personnel.
VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION The NRC has prepared an Environmental Assessment related to the proposed 10 CFR Part 70 Fuel Storage License for BVPS, Unit 2. Based on this Assessment, a Finding of No Significant Impact has been issued and approved pursuant to 10 CFR Part 51. This Finding was published in the Fedaral Register on November 4, 1985.
IX. FIRE SAFETY The materials used in the construction fuel handling and storage areas are steel and concrete. Administrative controls limit the combustible material in the storage areas. Therefore, the combustible loading of the fuel storage areas is minimal.
Fire detection and suppression in the fuel storage areas consists of ionization detectors, hose stations, and portable extinguishers. A complete description of DLC's fire protection systems is presented in the BVPS, Unit 2, FSAR Section 9.5.1.2. DLC states that the fire protection program for the fuel handling building will be operational before receipt of fuel onsite. The staff finds the fire portection system adequate as applicable to the 10 CFR Part 70 license.
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Duquesne Light Company 10 1986 F.
X. PHYSICAL PROTECTION The Division 'of Safeguards, NMSS, has reviewed DLC's Physical Plan and has .
determined that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67. To ensure that the ~
Physical Security Plan shall be fully implemented and remain in effect whenever fresh fuel is stored onsite, the staff recomends' Condition 20 be added to the license. .
Condition 20. The licensee shall maintain and fully implement all provisions of the Comission approved Physical Security
. Plan, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 70.32(e). The approved Physical Security Plan consists of " Plan to Control the BVPS-2 Fuel Building for Temporary Storage of Fuel," transmitted by letter dated February 26, 1986. The Physical Security Plan shall be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d).
XI. CONCLUSION
- 1. After reviewing the application, its revision, and its supplement,
.the staff finds that:
- a. DLC meets the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and of the regulations of the Comission,
- b. Issuance of the license would not be inimical to the comon defense and security, and
- c. Issuance of the license would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public.
- 2. With the recomended license conditions the NRC staff finds that:
- a. DLC is qualified by reason of training and experience to use the material for the purpose requested in accordance with regulations in 10 CFR 70.
-b. DLC's proposed equipment and facilities are adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life or property.
- c. DLC's proposed procedures to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property are adequate.
XII. RECOMMENDATIONS The staff recomends approval of the application, its revision, and its supplement subject to the following conditions which the staff finds are appropriate to protect or to minimize danger to life or property.
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Duquesne Light Company 11 pgg Condition 11. The minimum technical qualifications for the Plant Manager' shall be in accordance with Section 4.2.1, " Plant Manager," ANSI N18.1-1971.
Condition 12.. The minimum technical qualifications for the Operations
-Quality Control Inspector shall be in accordance with -
Section 4.4.5, " Quality Assurance," ANSI /ANS-3.1-1981.
Condition 13. The minimum technical qualifications for the Refueling
-Supervisor shall be in accordance with Section 4.3.2,
" Supervisors Not Requiring AEC Licenses," ANSI N18.1-1971.
Condition 14. The minimum technical qualifications for the Radiological Operations Coordinator shall be in accordance with the requirements for " Radiation Protection Manager," Regulatory Guide 1.8, September-1975.
Condition 15. The following training shall be completed prior to receipt
-of fuel onsite:
- a. All radiation safety personnel involved in fuel handling operations shall be trained in radiation safety and DLC radiation protection procedures related to fuel assembly handling.
- b. All operations personnel invoiced in fuel handling operations shall receive training in proper fuel handling procedures, including health and safety aspects of the activities.
Condition 16a. No more than two fuel assemblies shall be out of approved shipping containers or fuel assembly storage racks at any one time.
- b. The minimum edge-to-edge distance between the above two fuel assemblies, the shipping container array, and the storage rack arrays shall be 12 inches.
Condition 17. Fuel assemblies shall be stored in such a manner that water would drain freely from the assemblies in the event of flooding and subsequent draining of the fuel storage area.
Condition.18. DLC is hereby exempted from the provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 insofar as this section applies to materials held under this license.
Condition 19. DLC shall comply with the provisions of Annex A, " License Condition for Leak Testing Sealed Byproduct Material Sources,"
dated November 1979.
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, Duquesne Light Company- 12 Condition 20. The licensee shall maintain and fully implement all provisions
<< of the Commission approved Physical Security-Flan, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 70.32(e). The approved Physical Security Plan consists of " Plan to Control the BVPS-2 Fuel Building for Temporary Storage of Fuel," transmitted by. letter dated February 26, 1986. The Physical Security Plan:: .
shall be withheld from public disclosure pursuant.to 10 CFR' 2.790(d).
Original Signed by N. Ketzlach .
Norman Ketzlach Uranium Process Licensing Section-Uranium Fuel' Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and
. Material Safety, NMSS Original signed by:
- r. T. cro, Approved by:
W. T. Crow, Section Leader
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