ML20202E604

Forwards Request for Addl Info or Corrections Re Rev 3 of AP600 Certified Design Matl Including ITAAC

ML20202E604
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	09/16/1997
From:	Joshua Wilson NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Liparulo N WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9712080090
Download: ML20202E604 (10)

Text

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September 16, 1997 Mr. Nicholas J. !!paruto, Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230

SUBJECT:

AP600 INSPECTIONS, TES'; A ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (ITAAC)

Dear Mr. Liparulo:

The enclosure to this letter contains requests for additionalinfomiation or corrections conceming Revision 3 of the AP600 Certified Design Materialincluding the ITAAC. You have requested that portions of the informati% submitted in the June 1992, application for design certification be exempt from mandatory public disclosure. While the staff has not completed its review of your request in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 2.790, that portion of the submitted information is being withheld from public disclosure pending the staffs final determination. The staff concludes that these followon questions do.not contain those portions of the information for which exemption is sought. However, the staff will withold this letter from public disclosure for 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to allow Westinghouse the opportunity to verify the staff s conclusions. If, after that time, you do not request that all or portions of the information in the enclosures be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, this letter will be placed in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Document Room.

if you have any questions regarding this matter, you may phone me at (301) 415-3145.

Sincerely, original signed by:

Jerry N. Wiison, Senior Policy Analyst Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation hf3 g u u.Jd::M 29]

pj p pp"~CP Docket No.52-003 WM

Enclosure:

As stated f

cc wIencl: See next page D3

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DISTRIBUTION:

See next page lllillli,IlllllJij ll DOCUMENT NAME: A:\\ECGB,,, PIP.JNW-To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy.

with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE PA:PDST:DRPM - l D:PDST:DRPM NAME JNWilson:snQ TRQuay-f):tV DATE 09/lff97 "7 P 09/1197 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY j

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l Mr. Nicholas J. Liparuto Docket No.52-003 Westinghouse Electric Corporation AP600 cc:

Mr. B. A. McIntyre Ms. Cindy L. Haag Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Westinghouse Electric Corporation Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Business Unit Energy Systems Business Unit P.O. Box 355 Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. S. M. Modro Nuclear Systems Analysis Technologies Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company Post Office Box 1625 Idaho Falls,ID 83415 Enclosure to be distributed to the following addressaes after the result of the proprietary evaluation is received from Westinghouse:

Mr. Russ Bell Ms. Lynn Connor Senior Project Manager, Programs DOC-Search Associates Nuclear Energy Institute Post Office Box 34 1776 Eye Street, N.W.

Cabin John, MD 20818 Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006 3706 Mr. Pobert H. Buchholz GE Nuclear Energy Mr. James E. Quinn, Projects Manager 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 LMR and SBWR Programs San Jose, CA 95125 GE Nuclear Energy 175 Curtner Avenue, M/C 165 Mr. Sterling Franks San Jose, CA 95125 U.S. Department of Energy NE 50 Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.

19901 Ge mantown Road Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott Germantown, MD 20874 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer AP600 Cenification Mr. Frank A. Ross NE 50 U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 19901 Germantown Road Office of LWR Safety and Technology Germantown, MD 20874 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager PWR Design Certification Electric Power Research Institute 3412 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94303 s.

RAls for AP600 ITAAC 640.80 2.6.1 - Main AC Power System g

Revise item 2.6.1.4.a to also include Class 1E loads along with the nonsafety -related loads which will be powered from onsite sources (ZOS).

640.81' 2.6.1 - Main AC Power System item 2.6.1.4.b states: "The 4160 Vac circuit breakers in switchgear ECS-ES1 and ECS-ES 2 open after receiving a signal fmm the onsite standby power system." Clarify what type of signalis referred to in 2.6.1.4.b. What component of the onsite standby power system originates this signal?

640.82 2.6.1 - Main AC Power System item 2.6.1.4.c states: "Each standby diesel generator 4160 Vac circuit breaker closes after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power system." Clarify what type of signalis referred to in 2.6.1.4.c. What component of the onsite standby power system originates this signal?

640 83 2.6.1 - Main AC Power System Revise item Nos. 4.b) and 4.c) in Table 2.6.1-4 (ITAAC) to reflect the changes which will be made in RAI Nos. 640.81 and 640.82.

640.64 2.6.2 - Non-Class 1E de and interruptible power supply system item No. 2.6.2.2.b) states "Each EDS load group 1,2, and 3 battery suoplies the corresponding de switchboard bus load for a period of 1.h2E without recharging."

This contradicts the statement given in SSAR Section 8.3.2.1.2, which states that the batteries are sized to supply the system loads for a period of at least two hours.

- This was an Action item in our review of Pilot ITAAC for the AP600 design and the Westinghouse response to this item was unacceptable. Revise ITAAC 2.6.2 to incorporate the commitment made in the SSAR.

640.85 Correct item #6.c) in Table 3.3 5 to read that: Separation is maintained... as identified m Table 3.3-3 and not Table 3.3 4. Also, correct Table # for item #7 in Table 3.3-5.

640.86 Clarify the next-to-last ITA in ITAAC Table 3.3-5 Item # 6.d)

• Separation distancas less than those specified above are based those specified above are based on analysis." Correct this statement.

640.87 Clarify the last paragraph in the Acceptance Criteria in ITAAC Table 3.3-5 hem # 6.d)"

t Non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed meets the requirements listed above." Correct this statement.

Enclosure

2-640.88 Revise the ITA in ITAAC Table 2.6.3 2, item Nos. 4.c),4.d) and 4e) to clso include the following:

"The tests of each Class 1E battery will be conducted which envelope the analyzed battery design duty cycle."

640.89 Revise the Acceptance Criteria in ITAAC Table 2.6.3 2 Item # 4.f) to include that the input to each EDS is at 105 Vde, i.e. the battery is at the and of design duty cycle.

640.90 Rr;Se the Acceptance Criteria in ITAAC Table 2.6.3-2 Item # 4.1) to include that the batwry at the end of design duty cycle, i.e. at 105 Vdc.

640.91 Add Design Description including the ITAAC for the following:

The Class 1E de battery and battery charger circuit breakers, and de d stribution panels, MCC, and their circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to supply their load requirements.

640.92 Add Design Description including the ITAAC for the following:

The Class 1E battery, battery chargers, and de distribution panels, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its source.

640.93 Add Design Description including the ITAAC for the following:

Circuit breakers and fuses in Class 1E battery, battery chargers, de distribution panel, and MCC circuits are related to interrupt fault currents.

640.94 Add Design Description including the ITAAC for the following:

Class 1E de electrical distnbution system cables are sized to supply their load require-ments.

640.95 Add Design Description including the ITAAC for the following:

Ciass 1E de electrical distribution system cables are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

640.96 Add Design Description including the ITAAC for the following:

Retrievable safety-related displays are id:ntified in Table 2.6.3-1 which lists only voltage for divisions A, B, C, and D switchboards. The following Class 1E de power supply alarms and displays in the main control room should also be added to the ITAAC:

(1) Alarm for battery ground detection (2) Parameter displays battery current, battery charger output current.

(3) Status indication for battery circuit breaker / disconnect position.

. (4) Indication and alarm for overvoltage from the battery charger p

(5) Battery high discharge rate alarm (6) Battery charger trouble alarm 640.97 Your response to question 640.47 is unacceptable. CDM 3.7, " Design Reliability Assurance Program," (DRAP) should be revised to include the same commitments provided in the Tier 1 DRAP for the ABWR or System 30+ design, in addition, Tables 3.7-1 and 3.7-2 should be deleted. Future changes by Westinghouse or a combined license applicant to the probabilistic, deterministric, or other methods for determining risk signifiance could change the list of risk significant structures, systems, or components (SSC) for the AP600 design. Therefore, it is not appropriate to set forth the list of risk significant SSCs in Tier 1. Also, SSAR Section 16.2 should be moved to Section 17.3. This is the appropriate location for a description of the reliability assurance program.

640.98 Revise the second paragraph of CDM 3.2,

• Human Factors Engineering," to resolve the following inconsistencies between " visual alerts" and

• alarms" (as used in the SSAR in the minimum inventory list);

a. visual alerts are those safety-related displays used in the MCR (see note in CDM, Table 2.5.2 5).

b. visual alerts are those non-safety-related displays used in the RSW to identify challenges to CSFs (see CDM, note 1, table 2.5.4-1).

c. therefore, visual alerts are displays.

d. If a visual alert is a subset of the alarm system (per telecon on 8/25/97), how can a visual alert also be a display (per a and b above)?

e. CDM, Revision 0, p.2.5.2-13-if a visual slert is defined as a display (per a and b above), then design description #8a is incorrect because it says that, 'the PMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts (which are also displays), and fixed position controls...", There now appears to be a redundancy in this ITAAC description.

f.

Westinghouse should cleariy define /dictinguish among visual alert; alarm; and display and make all the necessary changes to the appropriate ITAAC and SSAR sections that are effected.

640.99 Westinghouse should clearly define / distinguish between " plant information system" and " display

• and make all the necessary changes to the appropriate ITAAC and SSAR sections that are effected.

640.100 The response to question 640.21 regarding the Design Descriptions (DD) is not.

teceptable. The DD are presently a duplicate of the design commitment given in the ITAAC table. The DD should address the safety-significant aspects of each.;ystem

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and be derived from the detailed design information contained in Tier 2. The level of 7

detail in Tier 1 is govemed by a graded approach to the sinactures, systems and l

components (SSCs) of the oesign and is based upon the safety significance of the functions that the SSC perform.

The DD should include a narrative and simplified schematic figures in Tier 1. The narrative should state the system purpose, significant performance characteristics and safety funchons, whether it is safety-related or not, system location, key design features, seismic and ASME code c,lassifications, description of system operation, major controls and displays, logic circuits, interlocks, Class 1E power sources and divisions, equipment to be qualified for harsh environments, and interface require-monts, as applicable. Numeric performance values and key parameters in safety analyses sipuid be specified in the DD based on their safety signifx:ance.

Figures should be provided for most systems, with the amount of informat!on depicted

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based on the safety significance of the SSCs. Where figures are not used, generally for simple non safety significant systems, the narrative should be sufficient to describe the system. The figures are intended to depict functional arrangement of the signifi-cant SSCs of the design. Also, a legend for the figures should be provided to ensure common understanding of requirements, syt, tem boundaries, piping code breaks, electrical configurations, etc.

This is a generic comment that applies to all ITAAC.

640.101 ' important parameters, such as valve opening times assumed in the accident analyses, should be verified by the ITAAC. This is a generic comment that applies to ITAAC. All valve opening times and ADS minimum valve flow areas specified in SSAR Tables 15.0-4b and 15.6.511 should be verified by ITAAC.

2.1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 640.102-The steam generator, shown in Figure 2.1.2-1, is sversimplified. Add to the steam generetor figure showing the connected systems, as shown in the System 80+ ITAAC.

The Steam generator is a major component in a PWR.

640.103 The ADS valve capacities, first stage-4 inch valves, second and third stages-8 inch

. and fourth stage-10 inch squib valves, should be verified by ITAAC (Ref:

SSAR 5.4.6.2).

640.104 RCP flywheel test at overspeed conditions should be in the ITAAC.

- 640.105 ' Add pressurizer heater function because credit is taken for the "off" function in the SGTR analyses.

640.106 The Stearr Gerwrator System does not include the steamline flow restrictors in the Design Desenption and the ITAAC. These now restrictors, which are installed in the outlet nozzle as an integral part of steam generators, limit the steam flow rate during a steamline break and are credited in SSAR 15.1.5 steam line break analysis. They should be included in the design desc iption, in Figure 2.1.2-1, and in the ITAAC table.

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640.107 in ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, the acceptance criterion for item ga for the reactor coolant system flow rate post fuel load is listed as 18g,600 gpm, which is the vessel thermal design flo'v rate indicated in SSAR Table 4.41. This ITAAC acceptance c?srion is inccasistent with the vessel minimum measured flow rate of 1g3,000 gpm specified in technical specification LCO 3.4.1 and SR 3.4.1.3. A clarificatio'n should be made in ITAAC to ensure that the ITAAC analysis to determine the post fuel load RCS flow takes into account appropriate allowance for flow measurement uncertainties.

640.108 ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, the acceptance cnterion for hem #g(b) is given as 166 KW.

Identify the SSAR Section from where this value is taken. If this value is not in the SSAR, include this value in the SSAR.

640.10g in Table 2.1.2-1, change equipment names from ' sensor" to " transmitter' for all flow, pressure, and level instruments since the specified listed equipment consists of j

transmitters.

640.110 In Table 2.1.2-4, item #8(c), ADS piping flow resistance values given in the accep-tance criterion cannot be found la the SSAR.

2.1.3 REACTOR SYSTEM 640.111 The reactor vessel material specimens taken from the actual material from which the vessel was fabricated are inserted in capsules and the number of capsules shall be specified in ITAAC.

640.112 Each direct vesselinjection nozzle cross sectiorkal area is limited and should be added to the ITAAC, 2.2.3 PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM 640.113 The following significant features of the application upon which the staffis relying to reach its safety conclusion should be included in the ITAAC:

/

(a) For events not involving LOCA, the systern is designed to cool the reactor coolant system to 420 degrees F within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> with or without RCP operation. This i

should be included in the ITAAC. A report / analysis should be prepared as part of design commitment to verify this.

(b) The pessive RHR HX and IRWST are designed to delay significant steam release to the containment for at least one hour. This should be verified in the ITAAC. A report / analysis should be prepared as part of the design commitment to verify this.

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(c) Each sparger is sized to discharge at a flow rate that supports ADS performance, which in tum, allows adequate passive core cooling system injection. This should be included in the ITAAC.

640.114 The purpose c:.ancticn of the system is not described completely. In addition to the function listed in item # 8, the system is also used as a back-up to Normal RHR system. Include all the functions of the sysicm in ITAAC.

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6 640.115 L System operation and key design features of the system such as the heat exchanger, p

accumulators, inside containment refueling water storage tank, core makeup tanks r

should be described in the Design Description.

640.116 Add the fellowing to the oesign commitmort "The two mechuaical divisions of the PXS system are physically separated."

640.117 The orifices RO1B and R028 are used to ests,Wsh the required flow rates assumed in the CMT tanks and the accumulators design. They should be shown in the Figure and their sizes should be verifed by ITAAC.

640.118 Add accumulator discharge valves MOV27A and 8 to Table 2.2.3-1 (p2.2.3-5).

640.119 Add IRWST injechon velves MOV 121A and B to Table 2.2.3-1, Page 2.2.3-6.

640.120 The CMT level sensors (PXS-011, 012, 013, 016, 017, 018) onTable 2.2.2-1, Page 2.2.3 7,8 are not shown in SSAR Figuos 6.3-1,2. Also containment flood-up level sensors (PXS-050,051,052) are not shown in SSAR Figure 6.3-1,2. Since all the information given in Tier 1 should also be in Tier 2, revise the SSAR Figures to show the CMT level sensors and containment flood-up level sensors.

640.121 Add IRWST injection line number PXb-L123A and B to Tabit: 2.2.3 2 (p. 2.2.3-9).

640.122 Valves PZS PL VO22A and B are rel;sf valves, therefore they should not be in Table 2.2.3 3, Page 2.2.3-10, Add valves VO27A and B to the table. Valves V116A and B can not be found in SSAR Figure 6.31,2. The correct valves are V117A and B and they should be added to the table, 640.123 Accumulator level sensors PXS-021, 022, 023, and 024 (Table 2.2.3-3, Page 2.2.3-11) are not shown in SSAR Figure 6.3-1,2. Because all of the information provided in Tier i should also be in Tier 2, revise the SSAR Figure to show the accumulator level

- sensors.

640.124 The calculated flow resistance values given for CMTs, accumulators and the IRWST in the acceptance criteria (Table 2.2.3.4, Page 2.2.3-15, items #8.c and #9) can not be found in the SSAR. Identify the section in SSAR where ihese values exist or include these values in the BSAR.

640.125 CMT inlet isolation valves are identified as VO13A and B [ Figure 2.2.3-1 (sheet 2 of 2).

Page 2.2.3 20). The figure must be corrected to show the correct valve numbers (VO-002A and B). Also show accumulator discharge valves MOV VO27A and B and IRWST injection line MOVs V121A and B in the figure.

3.3.7 NORMAL RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM 640.126 Add the following non-safety-related functions to item #g: Previde coc'ing for the in-containment refueling water storage tank, provide reactor coolant system and refueling cavity purification flow to the chemical and volume control tystem during refueling operations, and provide beaup for cooing the spent fuel pool.

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7 640.127 The following design features adoressing mid-loop ope,stion should be verified in the ITAAC:

(a) Loop piping effect, reactor coolant system hot legs and cold legs are vertically offset.

(b) Step-nozzle connection, system employs a step-nozzle connection to the reactor coolant system hot leg.

(c) Self-vent!ng suction line, pump suction line is sloped continuously upward from the pump to the reactor coolrnt system hot leg with no local high points.

640.128 The following design features addressing intersystem LOCA should be in ITAAC:

(a) The design pressure of the system is 900 psig.

(b).he reactor coolant system isolation valves are interlocked to prevent their opening at reactor cocht system pressures above 450 psig.

640.129 Since the Normal RHR system is a RTNSS system, the following should be added to ITAAC:

(a) RNS pumps can be tested at design flow during normal operation.

(b) RNS pump minimum flow lines should be shown in the figure.

(c) RNS pumps' NPSH requirements should be specified to state that the available NPSilis greater than required NPSH. Actual NPSH values need not be specified, since they depend upon the pump type which will be specified in the future.

640.130 RNS heat exchanger B channel head drain valve RNS-PL-VO48 and RNS-PL-VO29 connecting valve to CVS letdown HX [ Table 2.3.6-1, Page 2.3.6-5) should be added to the table.

640.131 Line numbers LOO 3A,B, LOO 8A,B and LO21 [ Table 2.3.6-2, Page 2.3.6-6] should be added to the table.

640.132 Table 2,3.6-3, Page 2.3.6-8 is incomplete. Add the following: RNS-TE013A and B.

TE014A and B, and PT012A and B.

640.133 It is not clear how item #1 of Table 2.3.6-4, Page 2.3.6-11, satisfies the acceptance criteria for item #8(b), flow path for long term, post-accident makeup to the RCS.

640.134 The LTOP relief valve capacity and opening pressure [ Table 2.3.6-4, Page 2.3.6-12, item # 9 (a)) is already finalized and given in the SSAR. Therefore, these values l

should be given in the acceptance criteria.

640.135 The cross connections to spent fuel pool system and CVS letdewn HX with valve V029 should be shown in Figure 2.3.6-1, Page 2.3.6-14.

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A DISTRIBUTION: Letter to Nicholas J. Liparulo. Dated: September 16. 1997

• Docket File

• Enclosure to be held for 30 days

• PUBLIC PDST R/F TQuay JNWilson TKenyon BHuffman JSebrosky DScaletti ACRS (11)

WDean, O-5 E23

-JMoore,0-15 B18 TCheng,0-7 H15 GThomas,0-8 E23 MChiramal,0-G H3 DThatcher 0-7 E4 HWalker,0-8 D1

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JLyons,0-8 D1 REmch,010 D4 JBongarra,0-9 H15 JPeralta,0-9 A1 EThrom,0-8 H7 MSnodderly,0-8 H7 DTerao,0-7 E23 JBrammer,0-7 H15 GGeorgiev,0-7 H15

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