ML20202C583
| ML20202C583 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1998 |
| From: | Barron H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-369-97-19, 50-370-97-19, NUDOCS 9802120283 | |
| Download: ML20202C583 (9) | |
Text
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t Duke Power Company A waeva py en McGuire Nudeer Santion Af* ket e MG0lVp 12700 llagers f erry Rd.
lluntersviu. NC 28078 9340 l
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1%e hesident, McGuire
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Nudent Genevntwn ikpvrment
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Pebruary 2,1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A*ITN: Document Control Desk WashinFton. D.C.
20535 Attached is a Reply to a Notice of Violation contained in mspection report 50-369/9719 and 50-370/97-19 regarding noti 0 cation requiremer.ts under 10 CFR Part 73 Appendix 0.
This reply is submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. This reply does not contain safeguards, privacy or proprietary infonnation.
Duke Energy acknowledges that the failure to make a one hour noti 0 cation was a violation of regulatory requirements. llowever. Duke requests that this violation be reviewed against the criteria for a Non-Cited Violation as described in NUREO MOO
- General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Action". Duke bases this request on the low safety significance and regulatory significance of the violation. In addition, Duke has previously provided the NRC with Special Report 370/97 04(S) filed in LER format. This report describes circumstancer surrounding the security event including issues related to reportability and the corrective actions Duke has undertaken. Details supporting the basis for the requested exercise of discretion are provided in the reply. Duke believes the NRC and licensees would be better served with respect to resource utilitation if non cited violations are used in enforcement cases such as this case.
'!here are no regulatory commitments in this correspondence or the attachment to this correspondence.
Please,9ntact Mike Cash (704) 875-4117 for questions regarding this response.
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H.D. Barron Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation 9002120283 900202 PDR ADOCK 05000369
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H.B. Barron, being duly sworn, states that he is a Vice President of Duke Energy Corporation; that he is authorind on the part of said company Ao file. and sign with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission this' Reply to a Notice of Vi,lation for McGuis. ;4uclear Station; and, that all statements and matters set forth.
-i therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.
M Nww H.B, Barron, McGuire Site Vice President Duke Energy Corporation Sul, scribed 'and sworn to before me this date-i by '
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L.A. Re,ves Regional Administrator Region 11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission S.M. Shaffer Senior Resident inspector McGuire Nucl. nr Station Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. Lieberman -
Director Office of Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission A.T. Boland Diw: tor of Enforcement Region !!
Nuclear Regulatory Commission l-
bCC; M.S. Killan Catawba Nuclear Station J.E. Burchfield Oconee Nuclear Station L.A. Keller Nuclear Regulatory Affairs P.R. Newton Legal g
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l Reply to a Notice of Violation
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I. Reme for Violadon and basis for c'---Weden as EQ,X 1
I(A) Restatement of Violatbn "This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement Ill) 10 CFR 73.71 (b) requires licensees subject to the provisions of
- 3.55 to notify the NRC
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Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I(a)(2) ofAppendix G to Part 73.
Appendix G to Part 73, paragraph I (a) (2), requires that any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause significant physical damage to a power reactor or its equipment to be reported within one hour ofdiscovery.
Contrary to the above, an event occurred in which a person or persons made a credible threat to commit or cause significant physical itmage to a power reactor or its equipment and it was not reported within one hour of discovery to the NRC Operations Center. "
Duke agrees that this is a violation of regulatory requirements and agrees with the facts as stated in the notice of violation. Duke requests that the NRC review this violation for exercise of discretion to categorize the violation as a non-cited violation. Duke believes this violation is not of a severity level.
consistent with a level IV cited violation; I (B) Review of Events (Reference NRC Inspection Reports 50 369/9719,50-370/9719 and No. 50-369/9718 and 50 370/9718) r-12/04/97 8:15 a.m.
Site Vice President informs NRC Senior Resident Inspector ofcondition 12St/97 8:30 a.m.
. Site management determines that condition constitutes tampering I
12/04/97 9:05 a.m.
Operations review'of Reportability
'1261/97 9:15 a.m.
Security review of Reportability 12/04/97 3:00 p.m.
Conference Call between NRC Region 11 and NRC Headquarters Reportability determination discussed during call 12/04/91 6:00 p.m.
Teleconference between NRC Region 11 management and McGuire maaagement regarding reportability of similar events.
124t/97,
6:48 p.m.
NRC Operations center notificatior.
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1 (C) Informal Notification made to the NRC The Senior Resident inspector was notified of the condition concurrently with the determination that there was a tampering event.
The Senior Resident notified Region 11 NRC management shortly after the licensees contact. This demonstrates that Duke management was aware of the regulatory significance of tampering events and the importance of informing the NRC. In addition, this notifica* ion allowed NRC Region 11 management to evaluate the situation with the resident inspectors and make a determination with regards to additional inspection resources. The resident inspectors were afforded the opportunity to go quickly into the field to independently evaluate the condition of the damaged seals. The resident inspectors were able to quickly move into the field to assess the status of ether plant equipment with respect to potential tampering. The management and staff of NRC Region 11 had the same relevant information that would likely have been provided by a formal report under Appendix G of Part 73. The information was supplied in a timely manner to the resident inspectors and in less time than required by regulation.
Duke's informal notification had the practical effect of having made a formal notification under Appendix G of Part 73.
I(D) Timing Requirements of Notifications l
The potential that seal damage was due to a deliberate act was first discussed according to the security inspection repcc at 4:00 p.m. on 12/03/97. On 12/(M/97 at 8:10 a.m. security management was advised that engineering had discovered a potential tampering cc.Jition. The determination that a tampering event had occurred was made at 8:30 a.m.
Operations and security immediately began a review of reporting requirements. Based on a review of the facts and the reporting requiiements a determination was made within one hour that the occurrence was not reportable.
Appendix G of Part 73 states in part, "I. Events to be reported within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report within 30 days.
(a) Any event in which there is reason to celieve that a person has committed or caused.
or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause:
(l) A theft or unlaufuldiversion ofspecial nurlar material; or (2) Signtficant physical damage to a power reactor or anyfacility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclearfuel or spent nuclearfuel. or to the nuclearfue! or spent nuclearfuel afacility or carrier possesses; "
The reportability clock of one ' ar is based on time of discovery.
This refers to the discovery of tampering. Discovery of the uwlition is that point where appiopriate site staff and managenx.nt have determined based on the collected facts that a condition exists. For example, a determination that.i component is inoperable is the discovery of a condition. In this case, discovery was the 8:30 a.m.
determination that the cut seals were a result of tampering as opposed to incidental contact with mirror insulation.
Therefore, the one hour clock for the tampwring event began at 8:30 a.m. on 12/(M/1997. The NRC Security Inspection Report notes that operations and security staff made this reportability determination within the one hour timeframe required by the regulation. This demonstrates that McGuire staff was aware of the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 Anpendix G.
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I(E) Interpretation of 10 CFR Part 73 Appendix G I
Site staff and management reviewed the section of Part 73 cited in this Notice of Violation as part of the initial reportability determination. Of particular importance to this initial determination of reportability is the phrase,
"...Significant physical damage to a power reactor or anyfacility possessing SSNM or its equipment..,"
In the opinion of the <nuividuals involved in the original determination of reportability the damage to the seals was not significant physical damage. This determination was based on a review of the nuclear safety consequences of the damage. The logic was that signincance of damage was to be judged by effect of the damaged equipment on plant nuclear safety. The seals were not in service at the time and the reactor was in no MODE condition, therefore the seats were not providing a nuclear safety function. In addition, the seals s
would be tested prior to restart which would guarantee the discovery of the damaged seals prior to them being placed in service. Therefore, the damaged scals did not represent a conditio6. adverse to nuclear safety and this served as the basis for concluding the damage was not significant.
Further review and research by Duke Faulatory Compliance staff found the following definition for significant physical damage in Regulatory Guide 5.62,
".. Damage to the extent that thefacility, equipment, transport, orfuel cannot perform its normalfunction.. "
The damaged seals were cut thru-wall in some locations, this would prevent them from pressurizing as required by design. This damage would most likely have prevented the seals from performing their intended function in this condition. Based on this regulatory guidance Dake made a determination that the damage to the seals would constitute signiGcant physical damage and therefore would be reportable. It should be noted that a Regulatory Guide does not constitute a regulatory requirement but specifies one acceptable method to meet regulatory requirements.
The original determination on reportability was a reasonable interpretation although further esearch uncovered regulatory guidance that contradicts that determination. Duke's current position is that this condition was reportable using the guidance for signincant physical damage provided in Regulatory Guide 5.62.
I(F) Review of Enforcement Policy From the discussion above it can be concluded that Duke, O Mad < 1 reasonable reportability determination within one hour 0 Not;Ged the NRC resident inspectors simultaneous with the determination that a tampering event had occurred at McGuire.
O Was aware of the regulatory significance of tampering 0 Reviewed the reporta3ility determination and independently found speciGe regulatory guidance regarding reportat ility of significant physical darnage.
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I The NRC Enforcement Policy siweified in NUREO 1600 " Ger;<at staternent of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Action' states in part that, "lV. Severity of Violations"
"... Severity LevelIV violations are less serious but are of more than minor concern; i.e.,
yleft uncorrected, they could lead to a more serious concern.
"...The Commission recogni:es that there are other violations of minor safety or environmental concern which are below the level of significance of Severity Level IV violations. These minor violations are not the subject offormal enforcement action and are not usually described in inspection repons. To the extent such violations are described, they are noted as Non. Cited Violations....."
"...Vil. Etercise of Discretion The ability to esercise discretion is preserved with the revised policy. Discretion is provided to deviatefrom the normal appwnch to either increase or decrease sanctions where necessary to ensure that the sanction reflects the significance of the circumstances and conveys the appropriate regulatory message... "
"...Supplementlil Safeguards D. Severity LevelIV-Violations involvingfor example:
- 1. A failure or inability to control access such that an unauthori:ed individual (i.e.,
authori:ed to protected area but not to vital area) could easily gain undetected access into a vital areafrom inside the protected area or into a controlled access area:
- 2. A failure to respond to a suspected event in either a timely manner or with an adequate responseforce:
- 3. A failure to implement 10 CFR Parts 25 and 95 with respect to the information addressed under Section 142 of the Act, and the NRC approved security plan relevant to those parts:
- 4. A failure to make, maintain, or provide log entries in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 (c) and (d), where the omitted information (i) is not otherwise available in easily retrievable records, and (ii) sigmficantly contributes to the ability of either the NRC or the licensee to idente), a programmatic breakdown:
S. Afailure to conduct a proper search at the access controlpoint:
- 6. A failure to properly secure or protect classufied or safeguards information inside the protected area which could assist an individual in an act of radiological sabotage or thef) ofstrategic SNM where the information was not removedJrom the protected area:
- 7. A failure to control access such that an opportunity exists that could allow unauthorized and undetected access into the protected area but which was neither easily or likely to be exploitable:
- 8. A failure to conduct an adequate search at the exitfrom a material access area:
- 9. A theft or loss of Shi oflow strategic sigmficance that was not detected within the time period specified in the security plan, other relevant document, or regulation: or
- 10. Other violations that have more than minor safeguards significance.. "
The above sections of the enforcement policy demonstrate that the NRC can exercise discretion to categorize low safety or regulatory significant violat ons as non-cited violations.
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1(G) Summary Duke request the NRC review this violation and consider exercising disemion to categorize this violation as a Non-Cited Violation.. Duke respectfully asserts that the facts of this case demonstrate low safety or regulatory significance associated with this violation.. In particular, the NRC was made aware of the situation in a timely manner, the NRC was able to take action in a timely manner based on this notification, Duke made a reasonable notification determination within one hour.
Duke has demonstrated an
- understanding of the regulatory significance of tampering as well as timely reporting. At no time did a condition adverse to nuclear safety exist or was further tampering discovered at McGuire, in addition, McGuire has made follow-up notification under 10 CFR 73 Appendix G and submitted a 30 day followup report. Further corrective action by Duke and NRC review of corrective actions is not warranted considering the low regulatory and safety significance of this issue l
Review of Supplement til of the enforcement policy reveals that Level IV safeguards violations typically involve some notential challenge to the security of the plant, No such pot (ntial existed in this case.
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II. Corrective dens that have been taken and results achieved
- 1. NoCfication via Emergency Notification System under 10 CFR 73 Appendix G
- 2. Special Report 370/97-04(S) filed in LER format to the NRC and associated corrective actions.
111. Corrective stens that will be taken to avoid further violatiens None h ee when full comoliance will be achieved McGuire Nuclear Station is currently in full compliance 5
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