ML20199J311

Final Response to FOIA Request.App D Documents Re Failure of Fire Protection Deluge Valves Placed in PDR

ML20199J311
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/25/1986
From:	Grimsley D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:	Murphy S NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE
References
FOIA-86-262 NUDOCS 8607080314
Download: ML20199J311 (2)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5

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JUN ? 5198b Ms. Stephanie Murphy Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1616 P Street, NW, Suite 160 IN RESPONSE REFER Washington, DC 20036 TO F0IA-86-262

Dear Ms. Murphy:

This is in regard to your request, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, to which the NRC assigned the above number.

This is a partial response to your request. We will notify you upon completion of search for and review of any additional records subject to your request.

X The staff has completed the search for and review of records subject to your request, and this is the final response to your request.

The NRC has no records subject to your request.

Records subject to your request are available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room (PDR),

1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555, as noted on the enclosure (s). The PDR utession number is identified beside each record description.

X Records subject to your request are being made available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room l

_(PDR),.1717. H. Street, NW,, Washington, DC 20555, in the PDR file folder under the above number and your name. These records are listed on the enclosure.

We are enclosing a notice that provides information about charges and procedures for obtaining records from the PDR.

1 Si ncer,ely,

f Donnie H. Grimsley, Director Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration Enclosure (s): As stated B607080314 860625 PDR FOIA l

MURPHY 86-262 PDR l

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Re:

F01A-86-262 Appendix D 1.

12/30/83 Letter from Dale to O'Reilly, subject: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Update Report - Division 1 Diesel Generator Fire, Failure of Fire Protection Deluge Valve to Open - 8 pages 2.

03/08/84 Letter from Dale to O'Reilly, subject:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Update Report - Division 1 Diesel Generator Fire, Failure of Fire Protection Deluge Valve tv Open - 8 pages 3.

04/06/84 Letter form McGaughy to O'Reilly, subject: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Final Report for Unit 1, Interim Report for Unit 2, Failure of ASC0A Deluge Valves - 5 pages 4.

05/31/84 Letter from McGaughy to 0'Reilly, subject: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Interim Report No. 2 for Unit 2, Failure of ASC0A Deluge Valve - 2 pages 5.

08/09/84 Letter from Verrelli to Dale, subject:

Report No.

80-416/84 6 pages 6.

Undated Handwritten Note - 1 page

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Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 160, Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-0002 April.8, 1986 Director Division of Rules and Records FREE. DOM OF lttFORMATt0N US NRC ACT REQUEST

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Washington, DC 20555 FOIA REQUEST

Dear Sir,

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act, as amended, for all documents pertaining to the following:

(1) correspondence between the NRC and Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America (ASCOP) about the operability of 6-inch deluge and pre-action fire protection water control valves; (2) licensees notified by ASCOA about the valves, licensees affected by the inoperability of the valves; (3) ASCOA instructions for both temporary and permanent solutions to problems associated with the operability of the valves for use by licensees; (4) NRC ef forts to assure licensee compliance with requirement for operable sprinkler system i.e.

enforcement efforts, follow up, i,nvestiga.tions.

The information being requested will be used by interested mem-bers of the public and will be brought to the attention of nembers of Congress, NRC Commissioners and other state and local officials.

Because no personal financial benefit will ensue, I hereby request waiver of the search and copy costs.

I look forward to your early response.

Sincerely, I

Imust Aluif9 Ste hanie Murphy W) ? AfL G

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Update Report - Previous Report Date 10/20/83

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[TTil II D/G fuel line ruptured resulting in a fire near the left bank turbo-j l o lol icharcer. The encine was secured and an unusual event was declared from l

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[W-) 6t i on of the deluge valve failure is continuing.

The cause is bel'ieved I

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Attachment to AECM-83/0800 Page 2 of 6 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO LER 83-126/01 X-2 Mississippi Power & Light Company Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit i Docket No. 50-416 Technical Specification Involved: N/A Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.1 Event Narrative:

On September 4, 1983, at 0610 hours0.00706 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.32105e-4 months <br />, Diesel Generator 11 was started for maintenance operation. The engine was manually stopped at 1436 hours0.0166 days <br />0.399 hours <br />0.00237 weeks <br />5.46398e-4 months <br /> and the outside fresh air fans were secured when a fire was reported at the engine.

Approximately 8 personnel were inside the room when the fire occurred. The room was evacuated and the fire brigade was assembled. The fire brigade responded to the scene with water hoses and necessary. equipment.

It was noted that the automatic fire water deluge valve had not opened. The manual release was pulled to no avail. A mechanic was able to open the valve by removing the actuator enclosure box cover and striking the top of the weight. The fire was reported to be extinguished at 1501 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.711305e-4 months <br />.

An unusual event was declared and remained in effect from 1447 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.505835e-4 months <br /> until 1559 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00258 weeks <br />5.931995e-4 months <br />. The diesel failure is considered invalid in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e(3) of Regulatory Guide 1.108.

Diesel Generator Investigation:

The initial inspection of the diesel engine revealed that the main fuel supply tubing which delivers fuel oil from the Engine Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump to the left and right bank fuel headers had separated at a tee connection.

The separation resulted in fuel oil spraying on a hot exhaus't manifold entering the left bank turbocharger and igniting. The fuel oil flow continued to feed the fire until the engine reached a complete stop. The separation was caused by a crack in the tubing that occurred at the ferrule of the fitting used to connect the tubing to the header tee.

?

A metallurgical evaluation of the failed tubing indicates that the failure resulted from very high cycle fatigue. The high cycle fatigue resulted

(_.becauseavendorsuppliedtubingsupport, immediately downstream of the fitting, was not installed.

Representatives from Middle South Services and MP&L Plant Staff performed a thorough examination of the area affected by the fire to delineate the fire affected areas. The examination revealed three fire affected areas.

1.

Under the left bank turbocharger.

2.

The top of the lube oil tank under the left bank turbocharger, and 3.

Under the lube oil cooler, approximately in the middle of the cooler.

Attsch'.snt to AECM-83/0800 Page 3 of 6 The metal parts of the engine and pressure vessel exposed to the highest heat were visually examined. No areas of discolored metal, indicating excessive heat, were found. Based on this finding, it was determined that the pressure vessels and engine parts exposed to the highest heat were acceptable for further service. The engine and skid mounted equipment located in the fire areas received varying amounts of damage, depending on the amount of exposure to heat, smoke, and water. The wiring, instruments and tubing located on the front of the engine also experienced heat, smoke, and water damage in varying amounts.

Action Taken:

A support bracket was added to the Division 1 Diesel Generator fuel oil

/4#) header.

A support bracket is scheduled to be installed on the Division 2

(%'" #'

Diesel Generator prior to January 30, 1984 Components which were located in

'7' the fire area were replaced since the ability to carry out their design function was in question. Other components which may have been subjected to heat or water damage were inspected and either replaced or reworked, depending on the as found condition. Any item whose condition could not be accurately evaluated was replaced. Maintenance Work Orders were generated to perform all work or replacement of the diesel generator equipment. Appendix "A" to this report lists the items which were replaced. When rework or replacement of the affected items was completed, the diesel generator was subjected to a maintenance run to verify all components were functioning normally.

After all work had been completed, the diesel generator was subjected to a

" maintenance" run. This type of engine operation allowed monitoring of engine operating parameters at differene power levels, and uncovered items which warranted further attention. During the maintenance run, the engine was instrumented for vibratory analysis. The preliminary results of the vibratory analysis revealed that the engine exhibited vibrations that were well within the acceptable limits for this type of mach,1,nery. therefbre, no additional',

vibration related failures are anticipated.

After the successful completion of the maintenance run, the unit was turned over to Operations for operational testing.

Following the operational retesting, the unit successfully completed a seven cay reliability run.

It may be concluded from the testing performed subsequent to the engine rework that the unit has been returned to a satisfactory operating condition.

Deluge Valve Investigation:

The failed fire water deluge valve was a 6 inch Model C, serial number S10774, manufactured by Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America. Although a trip signal was received from the local control panel, the valve failed to open.

The valve and the release mechanism were tested and components were removed and examined. No significant abnormal conditions were noted. Some excessive friction was noted between the weight and weight guide rod, however, the valve operated properly during subsequent testing.

However, examination revealed the following:

1.

Buckling was discovered in the weight guide rod, maximum deflection was 0.005 inches.

A.

4

Attachment to AECM-83/0800 Page 4 of 6 2.

Evidence of scoring was found on the rod surface in two distinct locations.

3.

The weight's upper guide collar had an inside diameter of 0.637 inches rather than the 0.647 inch minimum recommended by the manufacturer.

4.

Scoring was noted on the enclosing box along the path the weight guide bushing traces during actuation.

Actions Taken:

Corrective actions were:

1.

The guide rod was trued and sanded.

2.

The weight's upper collar guide was reworked to an inside diameter of 0.640 inches with a tolerance of.005 inches.

3.

The rod, latch hinge pin, and clapper hinge pins were lubricated.-

The enclosed box along the path of the weight guide bushings was also lubricated.

4 The testing frequency for Division 1, 2, and 3 diesel generator room deluge valves has been temporarily increased to establish i

reliability data.

l S.

The surveillance pro ^cedure has been revised to visually-verify that the clapper has lifted and locked open following the test under normal system pressure.

. Investigation Update and Future Actions:

On December 5, 1983, deluge valve N1P64F77U which protects Diesel Generator 12 failed to open during performance of a scheduled test.

The valve was inspected and exceptional roughness was found on the mating surfaces where the valve's latch and clapper meet.

The surfaces were sanded and refinished until smooth. The valve was then reassembled and tested satisfactorily.

Division 1 and 3 valves will be removed, tested, inspected and refinished likewise. It is suspected that this'was the cause of the Division i valve failure but no conclusions can be reached until further investigation.

The next update is expected to be submitted by January 30, 1984 J

Attachment to AECM-83/0800 Page 5 of 6 APPENDIX A The items listed below were replaced after the diesel generator fire. These items either experienced fire or water damage, or were considered suspect since their condition could not be accurately evaluated.

Those considered suspect were replaced to support the current schedule.

I.

Engine Mounted Equipment Left Bank Air Intake Butterfly Valve Front Left Bank Air Start Solenoid Valve

1. 1, #2, #3 LB Crankcase Relief Valves Right Bank Turbecharger Right Bank Exhaust Adapter Right Bank Exhaust Expansion Joint Right Bank Intake Adapter Left Bank Turbocharger Left Bank Exhaust Adapter Left Bank Exhaust Expansion Joint Left Bank Intake Adapter Left Bank Intercooler Left Bank Intercooler Inlet Adapter Left Bank Intercooler Outlet Adapter Engine Governor Engine Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump Overspeed Trip Device

1. 1, #2 LB Air Start Manifold Elbows E

Various Fuel Oil Piping Various Lube Oil Piping Control System Tubing

1. 1 LB Air Intake Manifold Elbow

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Shutdown Cylinder -

Fuel Oil Svitching Valve Fuel Oil Filter Fuel Oil Strainer

1. 1, #2 LB High Pressure Fuel Injection Lines Fuel Oil Return Lines on #5 LB and #1 RB Engine Oil Sump to Lube Oil Tank Connector

1. 1 LB, #2 LB, #8 LB, #1 RB Fuel Injection Pumps Lube Oil Check Valves F059, F094, F045, F080 Lube Oil Thermostatic Control Valve tube Oil Filter Elements II.

Engine Mounted Instrumentation Engine tachometer sensor N073A Engine tachometer sensor N073C Lube Oil Sump Tank Level Switch N026A Engine Vibration Switch N164A Shutdown Cylinder Control Air 3-way Valve Lube Oil Temperature Element N027A Lube Oil Temperature Switch N163A Control Air Pressure Regulator Overspeed Trip Control Air 3-way Valve Shutdown Cylinder Shuttle Valve

Attcchment to AECM-83/0800 Page 6 of 6 Engine Mounted Instrumentation (Continued)

Air Start System Timer Control Control Air Tubing Crankcase Pressure Switch N160A Crankcase Pressure Switch N160B Crankcase Pressure Switch N160C Lube Oil Pump Pressure Switch N076A Turbocharger Lube 011 Pressure Switch N168C Jacket Water Temperature Switch N162A Turbocharger Lube Oil Pressure Switch N168A Fuel Oil Strainer Differential Pressure Switch N027A Turbocharger Vibration Switch N165A Lube Oil Outlet Temperature Thermocouple NO29A Lube Oil Pump Pressure Switch N075A Fuel Oil Pump Pressure Switch N019A III. Engine Mounted Electrical Equipment Flex Conduit on C007A Lube Oil Pump Motor on C009A Lube Oil Heater Pump Governor to Terminal Box Wiring Magnetic Pick-Up to Terminal Box Wiring Sealtight from Terminal Box #4 to Condulet S.O. Cord from Terminal Box #4 to Governor Conduit and Sealtight from F507B to Terminal Box #1 Sealtight from Terminal Box #2 to N073A and N073C All Sealtight Straps

~,

Sealtight and wiring from Lube Oil Level switch to Terminal Box Sealtight and wiring from Lube Oil pressure switches to Terminal Box Sealtight and wiring from crankcase pressure switches' to Terminal Box Bearing on Right Bank Crackcase. fan motor.

Generator Brushes Lube Oil Heater IV.

Miscellaneous Items Fire Damper Fuseable Links HVAC & Piping Insulation Engine Lubrication Oil Division I D/G Room Sprinkler Heads Gauges on Valve P71F543 Temperature Switch X77N010 Aftercooler Temperature Switch N011A Fire Detectors in Division I D/G Room Fire Detector 802A and 802E Sealtight on C013A Air Compressor Bus Bar on X31E001A Overhead Crane Overhead Lighting Energency Lighting Intake Air Filter 011 Lubrication Oil in Air Compressors

hl MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi P. O. B O X 16 4 0 J A C K S O N. MISSISSIPPI 39205 December 30, 1983 i

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Region II 101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Attention:

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-13 File 0260/L-835.0 Update Report - Division 1 Diesel Generator Fire, Failure of Fire Protection Deluge Valve to Open LER 83-126/01 X-2 AECM-83/0800 This letter submits an update.to previous reports submitted on September 16, 1983, and October 20, 1983. The event for which the report was submitted occurred on September 4, 1983, when a Division 1 Diesel Generator fuel line ruptured resulting in a fire near the lef t bank turbocharger. The engine was secured and an unusual event was declared from 1447 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.505835e-4 months <br /> to 1559 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00258 weeks <br />5.931995e-4 months <br />.

Personnel responding to the fire noted that the fire protection deluge valve failed to open. The valve was manually opened. The fire was extinguished approximately 25 minutes after starting. The event was reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.1.

Our investigation into the cause of the fuel line failure and corrective action associated with the Division 1 Diesel Generator is complete. A support bracket for the Division 2 Diesel Generator fuel oil header is scheduled to be installed prior to January 30, 1984., Exceptional roughness found on the mating surfaces where the deluge valve's latch and clapper meet is suspected as the cause of deluge valve failure.

Further investigations are being conducted to support this conclusion. The next update is expected to be submitted by January 30, 1984 Attached is interim LER 83-126/01 X-2 with Supplementary Information.

Yours truly, L. F. Dale Manager of Nuclear Services EBS/SHH: sap Attachment

/

cc:

(See Next Page)

Memhoe Middle Anoch litilitime Rvstem

A AECM-83/0800 MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Page 2 cc:

Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)

Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/o)

)

Mr. T. B. Conner (w/o)

Mr. G. B. Taylor (w/o)

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (w/a)

Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

Washington, D. C.

20555 Document Control Desk (w/a)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 4

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AttschmInt to AECM-84/0137 Page 2 of 6 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO LER 83-126/01 X-3 Mississippi Power & Light Company Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 Technical Specification Involved: N/A Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.1 Event Narrative:

On September 4, 1983, at 0610 hours0.00706 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.32105e-4 months <br />, Diesel Generator 11 was started for maintenance operation. The engine was manually stopped at 1436 hours0.0166 days <br />0.399 hours <br />0.00237 weeks <br />5.46398e-4 months <br /> and the outside fresh air fans were secured when a fire was reported at the engine.

Approximately 8 personnel were inside the room when the fire occurred. The room was evacuated and the fire brigade was assembled. The fire brigade responded to the scene with water hoses and necessary equipment.

It was noted that the automatic fire water deluge valve had not opened. The manual release was pulled to no avail. A mechanic was able to open the valve by removing the actuator enclosure box cover and striking the top of the weight. The fire was reported to be extinguished at 1501 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.711305e-4 months <br />. An unusual event was declared and remained in effect from 1447 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.505835e-4 months <br /> until 1559 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00258 weeks <br />5.931995e-4 months <br />. The diesel failure is considered invalid in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e(3) of Regulatory Guide 1.108.

I.

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Line Failure A.

Diesel Generator Investigation:

The initial inspection of the diesel engine revealed that the main fuel supply tubing which delivers fuel oil from the Engine Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump to the lef t a'nd right bank' fuel headers had separated at a tee connection. The separation resulted in fuel oil spraying on a hot exhaust manifold entering the left bank turbo-charger and igniting. The fuel oil flow continued to feed the fire until the engine reached a complete stop. The separation was caused by a crack in the tubing that occurred at the ferrule of the fitting used to connect the tubing to the header tee.

A metallurgical evaluation of the failed tubing indicates that the failure resulted from very high cycle fatigue. The high cycle fatigue resulted because a vendor supplied tubing support, immedi-ately downstream of the fitting, was not installed.

Representatives from Middle South Services and MP&L Plant Staf f performed a thorough examination of the area affected by the fire to delineate the fire affected areas. The examination revealed three fire affected areas.

1.

Under the left bank. turbocharger, 2.

The top of the lube oil tank under the left bank turbocharger, and 3.

Under the lube oil cooler, approximately in the middle of the cooler.

Q1rgi

Attcchtsnt to AECM-84/0137 Page 3 of 6 The metal parts of the engine and pressure vessel exposed to the highest heat were visually examined. No areas of discolored metal, indicating excessive heat, were found. Based on this finding, it was determined that the pressure vessels and engine parts exposed to the highest heat were acceptable for further service. The engine and skid mounted equipment located in the fire areas received varying amounts of damage, depending on the amount of exposure to heat, smoke, and water. The wiring, instruments and tubing located on the front of the engine also experienced heat, smoke, and water damage in varying amounts.

B.

Action Taken:

A support bracket was added to the Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator fuel oil headers. Components which were located in the fire area were replaced since the ability to carry out their design function was in question. Other components which may have been subjected to heat or water damage were inspected and either replaced or reworked, depending on the as found condition. Any item whose condition could not be accurately evaluated was replaced. Maintenance Work Orders were generated to perform all work or replacement of the diesel generator equipment. Appendix "A" to this report lists the items which were replaced. When rework or replacement of the affected items was completed, the diesel generator was subjected to a maintenance run to verify all components were functioning normally.

Af ter all work had been completed, the diesel generator was subjected to a " maintenance" run. This type of engine operation allowed monitoring of engine operating parameters at different power levels, and uncovered items which warranted further attention. During the

~

maintenance run, the engine was instrumented for vibratory analysis.

The preliminary results of the vibratory analysis revealed that the

- - engine exhibited vibrations that werc rell within the acceptable limits for this type of machinery, therefore, no additional vibrat' ion related failures are anticipated.

After the successful completion of the maintenance run, the unit was turned over to Operations for operational testing. Following the operational retesting, the unit successfully completed a seven day reliability run.

II.

Deluge Valve Failure A.

Deluge Valve Investigation:

l The failed fire water deluge valve was a 6 inch Model C, serial number S10774, manufactured by Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of i

America. Although a trip signal was received from the local control panel, the valve failed to open. The valve and the release mechanism were tested and components were removed and examined. No significant l

abnormal conditions were noted. Some excessive friction was noted i

between the weight and weight guide rod, however, the valve operated i

properly during subsequent testing.

I i

l Q1rg2 I

Attachnsnt to AECM-84/0137 Page 4 of 6 Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America (ASCOA) conducted laboratory tests on a six inch Model C deluge valve and produced a similar failure which was attributed to poor surface finish on the mating surfaces between the clapper nose and latch.

Once the mating surfaces were smoothed with 220 grit sandpaper and crocus cloth, a major improvement in the valves' performance was noted.

On December 5,1983, deluge valve N1P64F77U, which protects Diesel Generator 12, failed to open during performance of a scheduled test.

The valve was inspected and exceptional roughness found on the faces was sanded and refinished until smooth in accordance with ASC0A's recommendations. The valve was then reassembled and tested satisfactorily under normal operating pressure.

Based upon further investigation and research data, it is concluded that the failures of September 4 and December 5 were due to the condition of the mating surfaces between the clapper nose and latch.

B.

Corrective Actions Taken:

1.

The Model C deluge valves protecting the three emergency diesel generators were corrected using crocus cloth and sandpaper per ASC0A's recommendations. The valves were tested under operating pressure and were found to trip with much more sensitivity.

2.

All other Model C deluge valves were refinished and tested satisfactorily under normal operating pressure.

3.

The surveillance procedure was revised to visually verify that the clapper has lifted and locked open following the test under normal system pressure.

4 The testing frequency for Division 1, 2 and 3 Diesel Generator Room deluge valves has been temporarily increased to establish reliability data.

5.

ASC0A revised their technical information bulletins to address the condition of the mating surfaces and to ensure functional tests are performed with pressure on the clapper.

This is submitted as a final report on the Diesel Generator fuel line failure and on the deluge valve failure. The fuel line failure was also reported under 10 CFR 21 as PRD 83/17.

4 Q1rg3

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Attrchment to AECM-84/0137 Page 5 of 6 APPENDIX A' The items listed below were replaced after the diesel generator fire. These items either experienced fire or water damage, or were considered suspect since their condition could not_be accurately evaluated. Those considered suspect were replaced to support the current schedule.

I.

Engine Mounted Equipment Left Bank Air Intake Butterfly Valve Front Left Bank Air Start Solenoid Valve

1. 1, #2, #3 LB Crankcase Relief Valves Right Bank Turbocharger Right Bank Exhaust Adapter Right Bank Exhaust Expansion Joint Right Bank Intake Adapter Left Bank Turbocharger Left Bank Exhaust Adapter Left Bank Exhaust Expansion Joint Left Bank Intake Adapter Left Bank Intercooler Left Bank Intercooler Inlet Adapter Left Bank Intercooler Outlet Adapter Engine Governor Engine Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump Overspeed Trip Device

1. 1, #2 LB Air Start Manifold Elbows Various Fuel Oil Piping Various Lube Oil Piping g

Control System Tubing

1. 1 LB Air Intake Manifold Elbow Shutdown Cylinder Fue11011 Switching Valve

~

Fuel Oil Filter Fuel Oil Strainer

1. 1, #2 LB High Pressure Fuel Injection Lines Fuel Oil Return Lines on #5 LB and #1 RB Engine Oil Sump to Lube Oil Tank Connector

1. 1 LB, #2 LB, #8 LB, #1 RB Fuel Injection Pumps Lube Oil Check Valves F059, F094, F045, F080 Lube Oil Thermostatic Control Valve Lube Oil Filter Elements II.

Engine Mounted Instrumentation Engine tachometer sensor N073A Engine tachometer sensor N073C Lube Oil Sump Tank Level Switch N026A Engine Vibration Switch N164A Shutdown Cylinder Control Air 3-way Valve Lube Oil Temperature Element N027A Lube Oil Temperature Switch N163A Control Air Pressure Regulator Overspeed Trip Control Air 3-way Valve Shutdown Cylinder Shuttle Valve Qlrg4 e

Attachs nt to AECM-84/0137 Pcg2 6 of 6 Engine Mounted Instrumentation (Continued)

Air Start System Timer Control Control Air Tubing Crankcase Pressure Switch N160A Crankcase Pressure Switch N160B Crankcase Pressure Switch N160C Lube Oil Pump Pressure Switch N076A Turbocharger Lube Oil Pressure Switch N168C Jacket Water Temperature Switch N162A Turbocharger Lube Oil Pressure Switch N168A Fuel Oil Strainer Differential Pressure Switch N027A Turbocharger Vibration Switch N165A Lube Oil Outlet Temperature Thermocouple N029A Lube Oil Pump Pressure Switch N075A Fuel Oil Pump Pressure Switch N019A III. Engine Mounted Electrical Equipment Flex Conduit on C007A Lube Oil Pump Motor on C009A Lube Oil Heater Pump Governor to Terminal Box Wiring Magnetic Pick-Up to Terminal Box Wiring Sealtight from Terminal Box #4 to Condulet S.O. Cord from Terminal Box #4 to Governor Conduit and Sealtight from F507B to Terminal Box #1 Sealtight from Terminal Box #2 to N073A and N073C All Sealtight Straps Sealtight and wiring from Lube Oil Level switch to Terminal Box Sealtight and wiring from Lube Oil pressure switches to Terminal Box

^

Sealtight and wiring from crankcase pressure switches to Terminal Box Bearing on Right Bank Crankcase fan motor Generator Brushes Lube Oil Heater IV.

Miscellaneous Items Fire Damper Fuseable Links HVAC & Piping Insulation Engine Lubrication Oil Division I D/G Room Sprinkler Heads Gauges on Valve P71F543 Temperature Switch X77N010 Aftercooler Temperature Switch N011A Fire Detectors in Division I D/G Room Fire Detector 802A and 802E Sealtight on C013A Air Compressor Bus Bar on X31E001A Overhead Crane Overhead Lighting Emergency Lighting Intake Air Filter Oil Lubrication Oil in Air Compressors Q1rg5

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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi P. O. B 1

J ACKSON. MISSISSIPPI 39205 g4 rch 8, 1984 f1 d

{/iq d' NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Region 11 gg 101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900 g

n Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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Attention:

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-13 File 0260/L-835.0 Update Report - Division 1 Diesel Generator Fire, Failure of Fire Protection Deluge Valve to Open LER 83-126/01 X-3 AECM-84/0137 This letter submits an update to previous reports submitted on September 16, 1983, October 20, 1983, and December 30, 1983. The event for which the report was submitted occurred on September 4,1983, sten a Division 1 Diesel Generator fuel line ruptured resulting in a fire near the lef t bank turbocharger. The engine was secured and an unusual event was declared from 1447 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.505835e-4 months <br /> to 1559 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00258 weeks <br />5.931995e-4 months <br />.

Pe.rsonnel responding to the fire noted that the fire protection deluge valve failed to open. The valve was manually opened.

The fire was extinguished approximately 25 minutes after starting. The event was reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.1.

Our investigation into the cause of the fuel line failure and corrective action associated with the Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generators is complete.

Our investigation into the cause of the deluge valve failure and corrective action associated with the deluge valves protecting the three emergency diesel generators is complete. This is a final report. Attached is LER 83-126/01 X-3 with Supplementary Information.

Yours truly, L. F. Dale Manager of Nuclear Services 2

',,' f(L. IIG EBS/SHH: sad Attachment cc:

(See Next Page)

Member Middle South Utilities System b5

N AECM-84/0137 Ml!OISSIPPI POWER O LIGHT COMPANY Patga 2 cc:

Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)

Mr. R. B..McGehee (w/o)

Mr. T. B. Conner (w/o)

Mr. G. B. Taylor (w/o) 4-Mr. Richard C. DeYoung. Director (w/a)

Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Document Control Desk (w/a)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1

Washington, D. C. 20555 2

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.o j j MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY g n Helping B u old Mos s rssippo EdMMMMdB P. O.

8 O X 16 4 O. J A C K S O N. MISSISSIPPI 39205

- ]. 'b O JAMES P McGAUGHY. JR April 6, 1984

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I-

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f Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Attention:

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-416/417 License No. NPF-13 E le,0260/15525/15526/16694.4 trau ow ug Final Report for Unit 1 Interim Report No. I for Unit 2, Failure of ASCOA Deluge Valves AECM-84/0212 On March 19, 1984, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. P.

Fredrickson, of your of fice, of a Reportable Deficiency at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS). The deficiency concerns the failure of two Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America ( ASCOA) deluge valves to open upon receipt of an actuation signal.

Although the fire protection system deluge valves were procured and installed as non-safety related equipment, the fire protection system for the diesel generator building is included in the MP&L Operational Quality Assurance Program. Due to the possible effect on safety related equipment in the diesel generator rooms, MP&L has concluded that the failure of the diesel generator room deluge valves is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21 for Unit 1.

Determination of reportability for this deficiency for Unit 2 is still under way at this time.

We expect to submit a Final Report on Unit 2 by May 31, 1984.

This report was originally due on March 23, 1984, but a two week extension until April 6, 1984, was granted on that day by Mr. R. Carroll.

Yours truly, 5.T g J. P. McCaughy, r.

s Y

f KDS :dr ATTACHME T cc:

See page 2 Member Middle South Utihties System pg 6- ' &

.g Mr. J. P. O' Re i l ly' AECM-84/0212 NRC Page 2 cc: Mr. J. B. Richard Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T.

B. Conner Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement 1

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 i

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At t ac hment to AECM-84/0212 Ptge 1 of 3 INTERIM REPORT NO. I FOR PRD-84/04 1.

Name and address of the individual informing the commission:

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

Vice-President, Nuclear P.O.

Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 2.

Identification of the facility... which... contains a deficiency:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (CGNS) Unit 1 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Determination of reportability for Unit 2 is continuing at this time.

3.

Identification of the firm... supplying the basic component wh ich...

contains a deficiency:

The 6 inch Model C deluge valves were manufactured by Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America ( ASCOA) of Cleveland, Ohio, and supplied to Grand Gulf by Bechtel Power Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland.

4.

Nature of the deficiency... and the safety hazard which... could be creat'ed by such a de fic iency... :

A.

Description of the Deficiency s

The deficiency involves a condition on the Unit 1 Division I and II diesel genfrator rooms automatic pre-actio'n's'p'rEnkler sys'tems. The normally pressurized 6 inch Model C deluge valves failed to operate upon receipt of an actuation signal.

Investigation of the failures and testing was performed by Middle South Services (MSS) and ASCOA to determine the cause of the failures. To simulate the GCNS firewater system operating pressure, the testing by ASC0A and MSS was performed with approximately 140 psig on the deluge valves.

From the test results, the failures were attributed to the rough surf ace finish of the mating surfaces between the clapper nose and latch.

B.

Analysis of Safety Laplications i

GGNS Unit I has eleven normally pressurized 6 inch Model C ASCOA deluge valves.

Eight of the eleven are used for deluge systems on the main and balance of plant (BOP) trans formers. The other three valves are used in the automatic pre-action sprinkler systems in the diesel generator rooms.

If a fire occurred in the area of the fuel oil day tank, the failure of the deluge valve to open could result in the fire spreading to the diesel generator and prevent the diesel generator from performing its design function in the event of a loss of offsite power.

AttCcharnt to AECM-84/0212 Page 2 o f 3 5.

The date on which the information of such de ficiency... was obtained.

Mississippi Power and Light received information of the deficiency on September 4, 1983.

This deficiency was reported to the NRC by MP&L as a liscensee event in LER 50-416/83-126 on September 16, 1983.

An evaluation for reportability under 10CFR21 for Unit I was completed and the deficiency reported to Mr. P. Fr ed ric kson, of your of fice, as a reportable deficiency on March 19,1984. The MP&L " Responsible Of ficer" Mr. J. P. McGaughy, Jr. will be notified when he returns to his of fice.

6.

In the case of the basic component... the number and location of all such components.

There are eleven (11) normally pressurized 6 inch ASCOA Model C deluge valves on Unit I at Grand Gulf.

We do not have knowledge of the location of other defective equipment.

7.

The corrective action which has been taken... the name of the individual...

responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been... taken to complete the action.

A.

Corrective Actions Taken 1.

The clapper and latch mating surf ace were smoothed with sandpaper

' and crocus cloth.

This action, which was recommended by the manufacturer, has been completed for the eleven 6 inch Model C deluge valves on Unit 1.

2.

The ASCOA technical information bulletins were revised by ASCOA to addre,ss the. condition of the mating surfaces and to ensure that functional tests are performed with pressure on the clapper.

3.

The reportability of this deficiency for Unit 2 has not been determined at this time.

However, our Architect / Engineer has issued QAR F-451 to track the concern.

B.

Responsible Individual Unit 1 J. E. Cross Plant Manager Mississippi Power & Light Co.

C.

Length of Time to Complete Actions 1.

All corrective actions for the eleven (11) Unit 1, 6 inch Model C deluge valves are complete.

l

At t cchment to AECM-84/0212 Pege 3 of 3 8.

Any advice related to the deficiency... that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

As the deficiency did not originate with MP&L, we have no advice to of fer.

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., ;. 1 At l} l a g ucAJ MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippo g#

• N B OX 16 4 0. J A C K S ON. MIS S JAusse uccAvom.a May 31, 1984 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Attention:

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 2 Docket No. 50-417 License No. NPF-13 File 0260/15525/15526/16694.4 PRD-84/04', Interim Report No.

2 for Unit 2, Failure of ASCOA Deluge Valves Re fe rence:

AECM-84/0212, 4/6/84 AECM-84/2-0009 On March 19, 1984, Mississippi Power & Light Fredrickson, of your office, of a Reportable Defi iCompany notified Mr. P.

Nuclear Station (GGNS).-

c ency at the Grand Gulf Sprinkler Corporation of America (ASCOA) deluge vThe deficiency concer an actuation signal.

c alves to open upon receipt of -

installed as non safety related equipmentAlthough the fire protec were procured and diesel generator building is included

, the fire protection system for the Due to the possible ef fect on safety related equiin Assurance Program.

the diesel generator rooms, MP&L has concluded th pment in generator room deluge valves is reportable under the the failure of the diesel at Unit 1.

provisions of 10CFR21 for Determination of reportability for this deficien under way at this time. We expect cy for Unit 2 is still 14, 1985.

to submit a Final Report on Unit 2 by June No ASCOA deluge valves have been received Architect / Engineer has requested Automatic Sprinklfor use on Unit 2.

Our inspect all Grand Gulf Unit 2 deluge valves er Corporation of America to shipping.

once the valves arrive on site for use on UnitAlso, an inspection wi ect/ Engineer a safety evaluation will be performed at If any deficiency is found, 2.

that time.

j gber Middle South Utilities System f)/

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• o. 1L' Mr. J. P. O' Re illy '

AECM-84/2-0009 NRC Page 2 Our previous report on Unit I stated that QAR-F-451 would track the deficiency on Unit 2.

This document has been clored and the deficiency is now being tracked by Deficiency Report (DR) 2578.

Yours truly, 57,ve' J. P.

McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr cc:

Mr. J. B. Richard Mr. R.

B. McGehee Mr. Nicholas S. Re ynold s, Esq.

Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynold s 1200 Seventeenth Street, N. W.

Suite 700 Washington, D. C. 20036 Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G.

B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 i

______,...____._m._,

y[p alig 'q, UNITED STATES k[

NUCLEAR REGULAT!RY COMMISSION 3

c E2 TON 11

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t 101 M ARIETTA STREET. N.W.

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ATLANTA CEORGIA 30303 AuG 3 1984 Mississippi Power and Light Company ATTN:

Mr. L. F. Dale, Director

- hM91 W Nuclear Licensing & Safety P. O. Box 23054 t

Jackson, MS 39205 s

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

REPORT NO. 50-416/84-27 On July 24-27, 1984, NRC inspected activities authorized by NRC Operating License No. NPF-13 for your Grand Gulf facility.

At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection report.

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.

Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office by telephone within 10 days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within 30 days of the date nf this letter.

Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1).

S.hould you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely, wY)

.i tu De id M.

errelli, Chief Reactor rojects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 50-416/84-27 cc w/ encl:

J. E. Cross, General Manager Ralph T. Lally, Manager of Quality Middle South Services, Inc.

Robert B. McGehee, Esquire Wise, Carter, Child, Steen and Caraway N. S. Reynolds, Esquire Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell

& Reynolds R. W. Jackson, Project Engineer q-n.

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NUCLE AR CEGULATC".Y COMMISSION UNITED STATES U

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Report No.:

50-416/84-27 Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Compaay Jackson, MS 39205-Docket No.:

50-416 License No.:

NPF-13 Facility Name:

Grand Gulf 1 Inspection Dates: July 24-27, 1984 Inspection at Grand Gulf site near Fact Gibson, Mi sissippi

[- 6 ~ 8Y Inspecto er m,_

G. R. Wiseman Date Signed Apyroved N

[ T. E. Conlon, Section Chief Oate Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Areas Inspected n

This routine unannounced inspection involved 24 inspector-hours on site in the areas of fire protection.

Results Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

5,#f 9 !$ QN$2Y@

l REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator

• M. Wright, Acting Project Manager, Operations

• L. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent

• J. Summers, Compliance

• J. Vincelli, Radiation Control Supervisor

• D. Lowman, Nuclear Support

• V. Holmberg, Fire Protection Coordinator S. Hutchins, Principal Electrical Engineer (Appendix R Coordinator)

Other Organizations T. Enright, Lead G. E. Startup Engineer

• H. D. Castles, Risk Control Specialist, Middle South Services, Inc.

NRC Resident Inspectors A. Wagner J. Caldwell

• Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 27, 1984, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.

3.

Licensee Action of Previous Enforcement Matters a.

(Closed) Deviation (416/83-26-01), Failure to Provide Skid-mounted Air Compressor for Breathing Air Application:

The licensee's response of August 26, 1983, to this deviation and the following corrective actions were reviewed and found to be acceptable:

Amendment 57 to the FSAR dated 11/83 revised Section 6.4.2 and FSAR Question 013.17 response to clarify the recharging capabil-ities of the existing six cascading air systems to provide the required 6-hour supply of reserve air.

b.

(Closed) Violation (416/83-26-02), Failure to Conduct Semi-Annual Weight and Pressure Verification of the PGCC Halon Fire Suppression Systems: The licensee response of August 26, 1983, to this violation and the following supporting documentation were reviewed to verify that corrective actions had been completed:

2 9

(1) Surveillance Procedure 06-ME-SP64-SA 0002 has been issued estab-lishing the activities for the semi-annual inspection and testing of the PGCC Halon Fire Suppression Systems.

(2) The inspector reviewed the following surveillance data sheets for Procedure 06-ME-SP64-SA 0002 and verified that the weight and pressure verifications of the PGCC Halon system bottles were being conducted on at least a semi-annual basis:

Task #

Completion Dates 3598 May 12, 1983; October 14, 1983; and April 14, 1984 3616 June 22, 1983; December 20, 1983; and June 20, 1984

.c.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (416/82-56-02), Inadequate Fire Protection Surveillance Inspection and Test Procedures:

The licensee has issued Procedure 06-EL-SP65-SA-1001, Plant Fire Detectors Supervisory Panels Function Tests, Revision 22, dated 4/4/84 and Procedure 06-ME-SP64-R-0046, Fire Rated Assembly Visual Inspection, Revision 20, dated 7/23/83 to provide the criteria for the inspection of fire barriers and detection systems. These procedures were reviewed and no discrepancies were identified.

d.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (416/82-56-06), Temporary Structures Within the Auxiliary Building Should be Removed or Equipped with Appropriate Fire Protection Features: All temporary structures have been removed from the Auxiliary Building with the exception of the Nu-Tech Test Shack located in Area 1A 301 of Elevation 139' corridor. The licensee stated that this structure is required to provide an environmental and temperature controlled space for electrical monitoring equipment to be used during 100% power testing.

The licensee has provided the following fire prevention / protection features for the structure:

(1) Shack construction is of fire retardant NCX plywood.

(2) Automatic fire detection is provided throughout Area 1A 301.

(3) Automatic sprinkler protection is provided over the structure.

(4) Hourly fire watch service is provided for the area.

The inspector verified that the above features were in place. In addition, the licensee has verified that no redundant safe shutdown cables are located in close proximity of the structure.

The General Electric (GE) Startup Organization has commited to revise procedure 1-000-SU-99-FP, Plateau Procedure Full Power, to identify the removal of this structure after completion of the testing.

The inspector evaluated the licensee's additional fire protection features provided for this structure and these l

l

3 appear acceptable to minimize the potential for fire exposure to safety-related shutdown functions.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Licensee Identified Items a.

(Closed) Item 416CDR 83-23 " Smoke Detectors Covered During Welding Activities" ('O CFR 50.55(e)).

The final report was submitted on May 17, 1983.

The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.

The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representatives and reviewed supporting documentation to verify that the corrective actions identified in the report have been completed.

The detectors were uncovered, cleared with the shift supervisor and systems restored to service on June 11, 1983.

b.

(Closed) Item 416COR 83-51 " Fire Protection Systems Removed From Service" (10 CFR 50.55(e)).

The final report, SR 83-051/0, AECM 83/0378 has been submitted.

The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.

The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representatives arid viewed supporting documentation, to verify that the corrective actions identified in the report have been completed.

The Halon systems were removed from service for modifications required by NCR 423-83.

Limiting Condition of Operation No. 83-0388 had been issued and a continuous fire watch with portable fire extinguishers was established until the work was completed and the systems restored to service on 9/12/83.

(Closec) Item 416/CDR 84-04 " Failure of ASCOA Deluge Valves" (10 CFR c.

50.55(e)).

The final report was submitted on April 6, 1984.

The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.

The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representatives and reviewed supporting docementation to verify that the corrective actions identified in the report have been completed.

Surveillance Procedure 06-0P-SP64-0-0019, Revision 20, dated 5/30/84, was revised to provide a requirement to polish the mating serfaces of the deluge valve latch and clapper with crocus cloth to reduce roughness; and to visually verify that the clapper has lifted and locked opun.

6.

Inspector Identified Items a.

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (416/82-56-01), Automatic Sprinkler Protection to be Provided for Area 1A 424 Prior to First Refueling Outage.

The licensee has issued Design Change Request No. 83/03 Unit 1, to provide the required sprinkler system prior to first refueling outage. This item will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.

4

4 b.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (416/82-56-03), Automatic Sprinkler Systems for Safety-Related Areas of Auxiliary and Control Buildings are Not Included in the Technical Specifications:

Amendment No. 9 to the Technical Specifications, Section 3.7'.6.2, added sprinkler system Nos.

N1 P640154, N1P640155, and N1P64 0140.

These were reviewed and found acceptable.

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