ML20199D663
| ML20199D663 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/20/1995 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199D649 | List: |
| References | |
| SSD, NUDOCS 9901200167 | |
| Download: ML20199D663 (2) | |
Text
f RECEIVED AUS 2 9
~
1997 M
REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2
JULY 20, 1995 l#** #
Licensee / Facility:
Notification:
(General License - 10 Cfr 31.5)
MR Number: 2-95-0063 Thiokol Date: 07/20/95 Kennedy Space Center,F.1.orida Subiect:
MISSING EXIT SIGNS CONTAINING TRITIUM Reportable Event Nn=her: N/A
~
Discussion:
On July 19, 1995, representatives of NASA, missing from Building RPSF No. K6-495 at Kennedy Spa This_
building is occupied by Thiokol, a resident NASA contractor.
signs were possessed by Thiokol under the general license in 10 CFR 31.5.
The exit The items were discovered as missing during a routine survey conducted on or about June 27, 1995.
NASA respresentatives reported that searches to locate the exit signs have been unsuccessful, and that Thiokol has initially determined that the signs may have fallen from their mounting during a rocket launch and been replaced by exit signs that do not contain tritium.
The State of Florida has been informed. Region II will continue to monitor NASA and Thiokol's efforts to locate the signs.
Contact:
E.
Wright (404)331-5617 l
l l
l l
l 2g167950721 R
SSD i
4lt ill iJ'h t c REGION NORNING REPORT PAGE 3
JULY 20, 1995 MR Number.E-95-0110 l
HEADQUARTERS Facility: BRAIDWOOD Subiect: CONTAIMMENT BYPASS PATPI The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on July 18, 1995, c15ssified the containment bypass path that existed at Braidwood', Unit 2, from November 1994 to February 1995, as a Significant Event. The classification was based upon a degradation of reactor coolant system containment.
On November 9, 1994, the licensee completed a containment integrated leak rate test (ILRT). For this test, the 1/4 inch containment penetration hydrogen sensing lines for both trains were disconnected and a balloon placed on the end to identify any leakage. The procedure did not specify whether to disconnect the sensing line inside the hydrogen monitor cabinet or outside. The operators who lined up the test disconnected the lines inside the cabinet. The licensee's investigation concluded that when other operators restored the system from the test, they observed the exterior sensing lines were connected and assumed that the internal lines were reconnected. Therefore, the sensing lines remained disconnected inside the cabinet. On January 31, 1995, the operations department wrote a problem identification report to identify a growing difference in the H2 readings on the A and B trains which are taken on a shiftly basis. On February 15, 1995, during troubleshooting, the A train internal lines were found to be disconnected, approximately three months after being disconnected. Surveillance tests performed on December 11, 1994, and January 13, 1995, provided opportunities to detect the deficiency with the A train but were missed. It could not be conclusively determined when the B train was restored. Two maintenance workers had a recollection of discovering balloons on the sensing lines in a hydrogen monitoring cabinet in late 1994. Maintenance records indicate these individuals worked on the B train on December 19, 1995. However, computer and operator logs for the B train appear to have been accurately reading containment hydrogen following the ILRT.
The H2 monitors are normally isolated. However, during a loss of coolant accident, the Emergency Operating Procedures direct the operators to put them in service to monitor containment hydrogen concentration. This would create an unfiltered release path from the containment to the auxiliary building. The licensee calculated that 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines would be exceeded within three hours with both monitors disconnected and within five hours with only one monitor disconnected. There are area radiation monitors near the H2 monitors and radiation monitors in the auxiliary building exhaust that would assist the operators in identifying that a leak was present. Escalated enforcement was exercised on this issue and the licensee was assessed a $100,000 civil penalty.
Thus, the significance of the degradation of the containment, the length of time it existed, and the repetitive opportunities the utility had to discover this condition, provided the basis for the panel to determine that this was a significant event.
CONTACT:
John Tappert, NRR/DOPS/OECB (301) 415-1167,'
_ - - - -. -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _