ML20199C823

Responds to to Chairman Jackson Requesting Info & Expressing Concerns Re Alleged Employment of C Drega at Seabrook Station

ML20199C823
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	11/17/1997
From:	Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Cushing R NEW HAMPSHIRE, STATE OF
References
NUDOCS 9711200156
Download: ML20199C823 (5)

Text

r s

SD-W3

'pu k

UNITED S7ATES f

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006-0001

[

November 17, 1997 n.

,~

The Honorable R9bert Renny Cushing -

New Hampshire House of Representatives 395 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, New Hampshke 03842

Dear Mr. Cushing:

I am responding to your letter of September 3,1997, to C: 7N q Jackson of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatcry Commission (NRC)in which you reques normation and express concems regarding alleged employment of Mr. Carl C. Drega at the Seabrook Station.

The information presented in this letter is based upon information contained in the Seabrook Station personnel records system, plant visitor logs, and the station security system data tapes. The information was obtained by the Project Manager assigned by my office to the Seabrook Station. The Project Manager arranged a special visit to the station to examine records and interview members of the station security staff.

The security system tapes provide, among other data, information regarding the identity of allindividuals entering the protected area of the station, the time of entry and egress, and each individual's movement about the protected area. Persons who have not been granted unescorted access to the protected area must be accompanied by an authorized escort, and the keycard issued to them allows access to the protected area and to various locations within the protected area only when used in conjunction with the escort's keycard.

Personr.d records show that in early April 1994, Mr. Drega did apply for employment at the Seabrook Station to perform millwright services for a contractor durin0 the refueling outage ihat was about to start, and the access authorization process was started. On April 5, 1994, Mr. Drega was given site oi itation and other training required of s,Il persons to be granted unescorted access into the plant protected area. Also, on April 5, Mr. Drega took and passed a psychological evaluation test and an alcohol and drug test. Plant visitor logs and security records indicate that Mr. Drega was allowed intr he protected area for about s

half a work shift on April 6 and for full work shifts on April 7 ano 8. For these days, Mr.

Drega did not have unescorted access to the protected area of the plant; instead, Mr.

.D:r Drega was considered a visitor and was under the continuous control and observation of C7) an authorized escort. Data recorded on security system tapes indicate that Mr. Drega was mg allowed access into the Turbine Building only, a non-vital area of the plant, anri was jb accompanied by the required escort. The exact dutier performed by Mr. Drega are M1 unknown, but likely involved pre-job preparation and familiarization for work to be g

performed later during the outage The station was operating at power while Mr. Drega Ng was at the site, and power generreon continued until April 9.

EI2

=4 The security system tapes for the times of each refueling outage were searched for h

information about Mr. Drega. Multiple search criteria included Mr. Drega's name, date of birth, and social security number to minimize the possibility that relevant data was missed h because of erroneous data entry such as misspelling. From this review, we have y

confirmed that the only period of time mat Mr. Drega had access to the protected area of g

the site is April 6 - 8,1994.

971'12OOl56 971117 E

' ll'll-lllll lll"ll ' ll lli PDR ADOCK 05000443

\\

l P

PDR

4

% T s-(e

_ \\

The Honorable Robert Ronny Cushing.

2-1 While Mr. Droga was at the Seabrook Station in 1994, he had parked his pickup truck.

- camper in a company employee parking lot and had planned to live in the camper while working at the station.: When this was discovered, he was told that the company did not permit this. A written report prepared on April 7,1994, by the security guard who talked to Mr. Droga at his camper indicates that Mr. Droga was " cooperative and congenial," and i

that he permitted the officer to search his camper. The search revealed no firearms, j

drugs, alcohol, explosives, or other prohibited items except several shotgun shells.

The limited background check that is required before temporary unescorted access can be granted was completed on April 8,1994. However, before a site badge was issued, Mr.-

Droga had decided not to continue working at Seabrook. 'According to the licensee, Mr.

Droga probably would have been granted unescorted access on the basis of the Information supplied by Mr. Droga on his employment application and the information developed by the limited background check. The full background investigation, including information from the FBI, was completed on June 8,1994. At that time, any information about prior arrests and convictions reported by the FBI would have prompted Public Service Company of Ww Hampshire to reevaluate Mr. Droga's employment at Seabrook.

NRC requirements for the physical protection of plants and materials are identified in Part 73 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Raoulations. The objectives of these regulations are to prevent the theft of special nuclear material and to protect against acts of radiological sabotage. They do not apply during construction of a facility. The Seabrook Station access authorization system was instituted in April 1986.

With regard to Mr. Drega possibly having been employed at Seabrook prior io 1986, the 4

NRC staff has been informed that Public Service Company of New Hampshire has no

record of his employment at Seabrook Station either by the company itself or by the major contractors. Although it is possible that he may have been employed at Seabrook by one of the many smaller contractors involved, the NRC physical protectior.,Jaquirements did not 4

apply at Seabrook before 1986, As you know, Mr. Drega was employed at three other nuclear power stations: Vermont e

Yankee in Vermont (1992 and 1995), Pilgrim in Massachusetts (1997), and Indian Point in New York (1997). For your information, the NRC has conducted special inspections of the access authorization programs at these facilities to determine if the licensees had any -

Information that should have led them to deny granting unescorted access. The NRC has concluded that the programs met NRC requirements. The NRC did not identify any information used by the licensees at these facilities that should have precluded the licensees from granting Mr. Droga unescorted access to the protected areas of the facilities.' The reports of these inspections are enclosed.

The access authorization program is intended to provide high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public. However, it is not relied upon -

solely to assure facility security. Allindividuals entering the protected area of a facility must pass _ metal and explosive detectors, and all hand carried items are x-rayed before

- being allowed into the protected araa., Any individual also may be subjected to a " pat e

p,

7,

w c

.v-

,--., - ~

t-r

="+v i

• -**-t

" ~ * -

e

'"----""--'^

l g

s.

The Honorable Robert Renny Cushing protected areas of a facility are subject to behavior observation by licensee supervisors trained to be aware of and be sensitive to any a erse change in an employee's behavior.

Additional controls are applied to restrict acc c to vital areas of the facility.

I trust that the i 'ormation I have provi in this letter addresses many of the questions you have regarding the circumstanc of Mr. Drega's presence at Seat rook. The NRC believes that the process for gran ' g unescorted access of personnel to nuclear power plants in conjunction with other ysical security systems and procedures and the administrative practices and ant programs in place to ensure quality and operational safety provide a high degr. of assurance that the objectives of Part 73 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regul ons are met.

/

Sincerely, Odgtnalsignedby SamuelJ. Collins Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

As stated DISTRIBUTION See next page DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DeAgazio\\970642. mkt

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE Ta receive e copy of this docunwnt, indicate in the box: *C* = Copy without enclosures

• E" = Copy with enclosures *N" = No copy 0FFICE PDI-3/PM ng/ LTECH F3*

PDI-I/LA

(..)D: PDI -3. /

D:DRPE*

o NAME ADeAgaziqf4F BCalure 1 Slittle p f REaton /

BBoger'T<

DATE 10/J /97 10/09/97 f10/#/97 g10//97 2.9 197 0FFICE ADPR/NRR*

bRPM*

D/N NAME RPZimmerman LNicholson JRoe dp$ol'T1Tif LJCallan DATE 10/16/97 10/14/97 10/10/97 10/75 /9 M 10/8 //97 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

/U t43 OCM SJackson 1)/12/97

p

- (.

i, j

i-The Honorable Robert Renny Cushing down' search by a member of the guard force if deemed necessary. Individuals within the protected areas of a facility are subject to behavioral observation by licensee supervisors -

trained to be aware of and be sensitive to any adverse change in an employee's behavior, Additional controls are applied to restrict access to vital areas of the facility, I trust that the information I have provided in this letter addresses many of the questions

- you have regarding the circumstances of Mr. Droga's presence at Seabrook. The NRC believes that the process for granting unescorted access of personnel to nuclear power plants in conjunction with other physical security systems and procedures and the administrative practices and plant programs in place to ensure quality and operational safety provide a high degree of assurance that the objectives of Part 73 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations are met.

Sincerely, i

a or Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Encbsures: As stated (3)

7

~

1 6

-e' s

p3 -

4.

j p

I*

Distribution-CDocket FM (M3 WodgM).9 e

t / ;.

EDO #G97064' ""'

~

,I

~ UBLIC (whncoming)

P L Callan I

i 4

~~

?J. Blaha' 1

r H. Thompson

- J' 'A. Thadani

.jl.. -

P/ Norry -

3 S. Collins /F.Miraglia R. Zimmerman i

B. Boger

' PDI-3 Rdg. w/ine.

M. Thadani

- OGC R. Eaton M. Boyle (e-mail only MLB4)

OPA-OCA SECY (CRC-97-0899) '

H Miller, RI NRR Mailroom (EDO#G970642 w/inc O-12 G-18

. S. Burns, OGC N. Olson C. Norsworthy A. DeAgazlo S. Little -

C. Hehl -

L. Nicholson, RI

. G. Caputo J. Lieberman K. Cyr, OGC

..J. Roe E. Halman B. Sheron W. Travers EDO r/f di I

E

.g k? fe 's' c?

• /

r

-~.,

• q > >

• y

.l;

~.

a September 4,1997 E. Thomas Boulette, PhD.

Senior Vice Prosident - Nuclear 0

Boston Edison Company.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Niil Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 5599

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50 293/97 09

Dear Dr. Boulette:

This letter transtr.its the report of the NRC's specialinspection of your Access Authorization Program conducted by Messrs. G. C. Smith of this office and R. Rosano of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on

- August 27 28, 1997. Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the enclosed report. The inspection consisted of interviews and examination of selected procedures and representative records. Our findings were discussed with Mr. W. Riggs and other members of your staff by Mr. Smith by telephone on September 3,1997.

The inspectors determined that your access authorization program meets the applicable regulatory requirements.

in,ccordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter erw cts enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-293

Enclosure:

NRC Region Iinspection Report No. 50-293/97 09

[

t 1

~~

l

• s l

s i

E. Thomas Boulette, PhD 2

cc w/ encl:

L. Olivier, Vice President - Nuclear and Station Director T. Sullivan, Plant Department Manager N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations D. Tarantino, Nuclear Information Manager R. Hallisey, Department of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts The Honorable Therese Murray The Honorable Joseph Gallitano B. Abbanat Department of Public Utilities Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee Plymouth Civil Defense Director P. Gromer, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources J. Miller, Senior issues Manager J. Fleming A. Nogee, MASSPIRG Offv4 ef the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Chairman, Citizens Urging Responsible Energy Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee 4

- E. Thomas Boulette, PhD 3

4 Distribution w/ encl:

3 Region 1 Docket Room (with concurrences)

PUBUC Nuclear Safety information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident inspector R. Conte, DRP M. Conner, DRP C. O'Daniell, DRP W. Axelson, DRA J. Wiggins, DRS L. Nicholson, DRS C. Miskey, DRS (2)

Distribution w/ encl (VIA E MAIL):

R. Eaton, NRR A. Wang, NRR W. Dean, OEDO R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR DOCDESK Inspection Program Branch, NRA (IPAS)

L. Cunningham, NRR D. Screnci, PAO i

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\EP&SB\\ SMITH \\PIL9709. INS v.

,.e enw - e. we c. c, m. men.n.au.ne r. c, =m m. m.

OFFICE Rl/DRM g RI/DRP Rl/DRS q 8(

HQ/NRQg,l f

NAME GSmith ' X/

RConte ejQ MModes M g RRosarq@

DATE 09/04/9;7 09/4/87 4'

09/ V/97 m 09/q /97 hbW 09/ /97 OFFICIAL RECIPRD COPY 1

I l

l l

s U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No:

50 293 Report No:

50 293/97 09 Licensee:

Boston Edison Company Facility:

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Location:

Plymouth, MA Dates:

August 27 28,1997 Inspectors:

G. C. Smith, Sr. Security Specialist R. Rosano, Sr. Program Manager Approved by:

Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety e

PDR-

r y

's EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire end Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at tiis individual's residence.

Because the individual had been granted access to three nuclear power plants, special NRC inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization programs, as implemented, identified information that should have precluded the individual from belt:g granted unescorted access.

The licensee's access authorization program was inspected August 27 and 28,1997, and determined to meet the regulatory requirements. The NRC did not identify any information, used by the licent~e in processing the individual for access authorization, that should have precluded the licsn,ee from granting the individual unescorted access to the secured portions of their plant.

l i

i

,g Reoort Details S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues s

S8.1 General On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in New Hampshire. Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to three nuclear power plants, specialinspections were initiated at each of the plants to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs ',n order to determine if they met the regulatory requirements and the licensee's physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual being granted unescorted access.

The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and 1995 and to Pilgrim in 1997 based on completion of all components of the access authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to Indian Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and an update of his activities for the approximate 2-month period between the time he left Pilgrim and began wod at IP 3, as provided for in the AA requirements. The NRC inspection in:;luded a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and IP 3.

SB.2 secess Authorization Procram and Procedures a.

Insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed the licensee's security plans and access authorization procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's access authorization program.

b.

Observations and Findinas The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA procedures disclosed that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66, " Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with 1

personnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedures.

c.

Conclusions The inspectors' review disciosed that the licensee's AA program, b. :mplemented, met all regulatory requirements.

.t 2

S8.3f Backaround Investloation (BI) Elemeng a.-

Inanection Seone The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the adequacy of the program in determining the true identity of the individual and to develop information concerning employment hirtory, educationd history, credit history, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to granting unescorted access, b.

Observation and Findinos

.The inspectors reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI) and determined that the scope and depth of the B1 met the licensee's program commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments on which to base a determination f 3r access authorizaticn. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating criminal history checks on individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all information received trom the U.S. Attomey General. One licensee (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995). In both cases, prior arrests were identified. The inspectors determined that the information had been properly evaluated and adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access, in addition, Boston Edison submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check in December 1996. The information re:eived back from the criminal history check Indicated no prior arrest data. The N'E is pursuing this issue with the FBI to determine why the prior arrest data wn not identified during the 1996 criminal history check, c.

Conclusion Although the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prior arrests, the inspectors cmcluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either licensee to initiate the criminal history checks.

S8.4 Paveholooical Evaluations a.

Insoection Scone 4

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to insure they met applicable requirements, b.

Observations. Findinos and Conclusions The licensee contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for a clinical interview was indicated,

~. -, -,...,, -..

a

• /

3 the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996.

The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinicalinterview and the psychologist conducting the interview recommended, after conducting the interview, that site access by granted.

The inspectors determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was being implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.

S8.5 Behavior Observation Prooram (BOP) a.

Insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and lesson plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the licensees' programs, b.

Observations and Findinas The programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in cornmon with, the licensees' Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson plans indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of the individuals' past supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program requirements and they demonstrated an awareness and sensitivity to detect and report adverse changes in behavior.

c.

Conclusign The inspecton concluded that the BDP was being effectively implemented.

S8.6 Temocrarv Accus Authorization a.

Insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted access authorization, as permitted by the rule.

b.

Observations Findinas and Conclusions The records of the abbreviated scope investigations were determined to contain adequate information (character and reputation from a developed reference, past year's employment history, and a credit check) on which to base temporary access authorization. The inspectors noted that,in these records of abbreviated scope investigation, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access authorization following receipt of the full 5 vear investigation.

.g

• l' 3

4 58.7 Andta a.

Inanection Scone The inspectors reviewed the most recent audits of the contractors used by each licensee to conduct Bl.

b.

Observations and Findinas The inspectors' review disclosed that the audits were comprehensive in scope and depth. The audit findings were administrative in nature and no programmatic deficiencies were identified.

S8.8 Esarch Eauloment a.

Insnection Scone The inspectors reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing personnel and package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and observed licensee testing of the search equipment to assess its effectiveness.

b.

Observations and Findinas Test procedures were adequate to properly evaluate the search equipment performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment determined that it was operable.

c.

Conclusion The inspectors determined that the personnel and package search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan requirements and was capable of performing its intended functions.

X1 Exit interview exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that tit., the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary firsiings were presented. The licensees acknowledged the preliminary inspection fit Jings.

l

• s at e.

,t.-

5 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTAC1ED Licenseg J. Neal, Protection Services Department Manager N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations Manager E. Neary, Security Operations Supervisor W. Riggs, Nuclear Services Group Manager T. Campbell, Security Services Supervisor Contractor R. Wheat, Project Manager, Protection Technology N. Medcalf, Administrator, Protection Technology C. Stanley, Security Specialist, Protection Technology All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.

l w

t..

4 4.-

s.*

September 4,1997 Mr. Donald A. Reid Senior Vice President, Operations -

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50 271/97-07

Dear Mr. Reid:

This letter transmits the report of the NRC's specialinspection of your Access Authorization Program conducted by Messrs. G. C. Smith of this office and R. Rosano of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station on Augus; 26,1997. Areas examined during the inspection are !9ntified in the enclosed report. The inspection consisted of interviews and examination of selected procedures and representative records. Our findings were discussed with Mr. R. Wanczyk and other members of your staff by Mr.' Smith by telephone on September 3,1997.

The inspectors determh.ed that your access authorization program meets the applicable regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and S Div8sion of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50 271

Enclosure:

NRC Region i Inspection Report No. 50-271/97-07 lE%%ll%N

!G3003 9709160044 970904 r c)L PDR ADOCK.05000271 O

P DR

Mr. Donald A. Reid 2

cc w/ encl:

R. McCullough, Operating Experience Coordinator Vermont Yankee R. Wancryk, Director, Safety and Regulatory Affairs G. Maret, Plant Manager J. Duffy, Licensing Engineer, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation J. Gilroy, Director, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Inc.

D. Tofft, Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Maasschusetts D. Lewis, Esquire G. Bisbee, Esquire T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety State of New Hampshire, SLO Designes State of Vermont, SLO Designee

. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) e

l

.l.

Mr. Donald A. Reid 3

Distribution w/ encl:

Region 1 Docket Room (with concurrences)

PUBLIC Nuclear Safety information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident inspector H. Miller, RA W. Axelson, DRA G. Morris, DRS C. Cowgill, DRP D. Boarde, DRP J. Wiggins, DRS L. Nicholson, DRS C. Miskey, DRS (2)

Distribution w/enci (VIA E MAIL):

W. Dean, OEDO K. Jabbour, NRR S. Bajwa, NRR.

. R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)

-DOCDESK D. Serenci, PAO DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\EP&SB\\SMITHWY9707. INS u

.,e.c w.

c.c

. - ~

r.

OFFICE Al/DRSQg. l Rl/DRPf;yp 7 Rl/DRS ) ' [/

p HQ/NQQg'T l

NAME GSmith 1%

RGeate CQ ell MModes J4 RRosaMvelg DATE 09/04/972 09/e/ /97 09/Q/97 09/ /97 JYD 09/ /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

a

,O*

e U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 3

Docket No:

50 271 Report No:

50 271/9747 J

Ucensee:

Vermont Yankee Nuclec Power Corporation Facility:

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Location:

Vernon, Vermont Dates:

August 26,1997 Inspectors:

G. C. Smith, Sr. Security Specialist R. Rosano, Sr. Program Manager Approved by:

Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Sr.feguards Branch i

Division of Reactor Safety s

9709160048 970904 PDR ADOCK 05000271 g

G PDR

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence.

Because the individual had been granted access to three nuclear power plants, special NRC inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization programs, as implemented, identified information that should have precluded the individual f.am being granted unescorted access.

The licensee's access authorization program was inspected August 27 and 28,1997, and determined to meet the regulatory requirements. The NRC did not identify any information, used by the licensee in processing the individual for access authorization, that should have precluded the licensee from granting the individual unescorted access to the secured portions of their plant.

9 li j

1'

.o,

Reor,rt Details SS Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 Ganar,al On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. ' The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in New Hampshire. Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to-three nuclear power plants, specialinspections were initiated at each of the plants to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs in order to deter.nine if they met the regulatory requirements and the licensee's physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual being granted unescorted access.

i t

The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and 1995 and to Pilgrim in 1997 based on completion of all components of the access authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to indian Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and an update of his activities for the approximate 2-month period between the time he left Pilgrim and began work at IP 3, as provided for in the AA requirements. The NRC inspection included a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and IP 3.

S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedures a.

insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed the licensee's security plans and access authorization procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's accgss authorization program.

b.

Q,htrvations and Findinas The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA procedures disclosed that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66, " Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with personnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedures.

c.

Conclusions The inspectors' review disclosed that the licensee's AA program, as implemented,

?

' met all regulatory requirements.

4 e

-.m

2 S8.3 Backaround investination (Bli Elements -

1 s.

Insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determ..se the adequacy of the program in determining the true identity of the individual and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to granting unescorted access.

b.

Observation and Findinon '

I The inspectors reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI) and determined that the scope and depth of the 81 met the licensee's program commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments on which to base a determination for access authorization. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating criminal history checks on individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all information received from the U.S. Attorney General. One licensee (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995). In both cases, prior arrests were identified. The inspectors determined that tne information had been properly avaluated and adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access. Another licensee, ssston Edison, submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history cnock in December 1996. The information received back from the criminal history check indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuing this issue with the FBI to determine why the prior arrest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal history check.

c.

Conclusion Although the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prio'r arrests, the inspectors concluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either licenses to initiate the criminal history checks.

S8.4 Psveholoaical Evaluations s.

Insonetion Seone The inspectors reviewed the licensee's p chological testing program procedures to insure they met applicable requirements.

b.

Observations. Findinas and Conclusions The_ licensee contracted witt licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for s'clinicalinterview was indicated, i

)

,i l

3 the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996.

The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinical interview and the psychologist conducting the interview recommended, after conducting the interview, that site access be granted.

The inspectors determined that the licensevs' psychological evaluation program was being implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.

S8.5 Behavior Observation Prooram (BOP) a.

Inspection Seone The inspectors reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and lesson plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the licensees' programs.

b.

Observations and rindE121 The programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the licensees' Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson p!ans indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of the individuals' past supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program requirements and they demonstrated an awareness and sensitivity to detect and report adverse changes in behavior, c.

Conclusion The inspectorr concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemented.

S8.6 Temoorerv Access Authorization a.

insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted access authorization, as permitted by the rule.

b.

Observations. Findinos and Conclusions The records of the abbreviated scope investigations were determined to contain odequate information (character and reputation from a developed reference, past year's employment history, and a credit check) on which to base temporary access authorization. The inspectors noted that, in these records of abbreviated scope investigation, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access authori.ation following receipt of the full 5 year investigation.

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' ~ - - -

l c.;

, e*

4:

(.

4

.88.7 Audits

+

s.

Inanectior) Scone The inspectors reviewed the most recent audits of the contractors used by each licensee to conduct Bl.

b.

Observations and Findinas The inspectors' review disclosed that the audits were comprehensive in scope and depth. The audit findings were administrative in nature and no programmatic deficiencies were identified.

+

S8.8 Search Eautoment a.

Innoaction Scoom 1

The inspectors reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing personnel and package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and observed licenses testing of the search equipment to assess its effectiveness, b.

Observations and Findinas Test procedures were adequate to properly evaluate the search equipment performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment determined that it was operable.

I t

c.

Conclusion The inspectors determined that the personnel and package search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan requirements and was capable of performing its intended functions.

X1 Exit interview An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that time, the purpose arid scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary findings were presented. The licensees acknowledged the preliminary inspection tindings.

l 4

_.e e,,-,%

e yge"

+-

-v

+

,----v

h I

5 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED Licensee R. Wancryk, Director of Regulatory Affairs and Safety G. Morgan, Security Manager D. McElway, Liaison Engineer J. Moriarty, Security Operations Specialist State of Vermont W. Sherman, Nuclear Engineer All of the above licensee personn l were present at the exit meeting conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.

t l

i l

)

.I s

September 4,1997 Mr. Robert J. Barrett Site Executive Officer New York Power Authority indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Post Office Box 215 Suchanan, NY 10511

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50 286/97 08 4

Dear Mr. Barrett:

This letter transmits the report of the NRC's specia! inspection of your Access Authorization Program conducted by Mr. E. B. King of this office at the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant on August 29,1997. Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the enclosed report. The inspection consisted of interviews and examination of selected procedures and representative records. Our findings were discussed with Mr. D. Quinn and other members of your staff by Mr. King by telephone on September 3, 1997.

The inspector determined that your access authorization pru.ca 1 meets the applicable regulatory requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

1 Sincerely, ORIGIKiL SIGE BY:

Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch -

Division of Reactor Safnty Docket No,' 50-286

)

Enclosure:

NRC Region I inspection Report No. 50 286/97-08

/

se m n

,,o.

PTA 18ik, o,,9oooa 6 O

PM

. ~.

Mr. Robert J. Barrett 2

~

cc w/ encl:

C. D. Rappleyes, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer R. Schoenberger, President and Chief Operating Officer J. Knubel, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President H. P. Salmon, Jr., Vice President of Nuclear Operations W. Josiger, Vice President - Engineering and Project Management J. Kelly, Director - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Director - Nuclear Engineering R. Deasy, Vice President - Appraisal and Compliance Services R. Patch, Director - Quality Assurance G. C. Goldstein, Assistant General Counsel C. D. Falson, Director, Nuclear Licensir g, NYPA K. Peters, Licensing Manager A. Donahue, Mayor, Village of Buchanca C. W. Jackson, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager (Con Ed)

C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistan; Attorney General, New York Department of Law Chairman, Standing Committee on Energy, NYS Assembly Chairman, Standing Committee on Environmental Conservation, NYS Assembly T. Morra, Executive Chair, Four County Nuclear Safety Committee Chairman, Committee on Corporations, Authorities, and Commissions The Honorable Sandra Galef, NYS Assembly P. D. Eddy, Director, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York G. T. Goering, Consultant, New York Power Authority J. E. Gegliardo, Consultant, New York Power Authority E. S. Beckjord, Consultant, New York Power Authority F. William Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

- - ' - - ~ '

g.

4 l

Mr. Robert J. Berrett 3

Distribution w/ encl:

s H. Miller, RA W. Axelson, DRA Region i Docket Room (with :oncurrences)

Nuclear Safety information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC NRC Residant inspector J. Rogge, DRP R. Darkley, DRP R. Junod, DRP J. Wiggine, DRS L. Nicholson, DRS C. Miskey, DRS (2)

Distribution w/enci (VlA E MAIL):

W. Dean. 500 Coordinator A. Dromerick, NRR G. Wweder, NRR J. Harold, NRR M. Campion, RI Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)

R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR L. Cunningham, NRR DDCDESK D. Serenci, PAO DOCUMENT NAMF: G:\\EP&SB\\ KING \\lP39708. INS t.e.,.e em t w wo c c4{ -r$u mewee,. r. c,

w. = e v OFFICE Rl/DRS Rl/DRP ///ff Rl/DRS l,,7

[

NAME Eking W JRoggej(ffry MModes ((U V DATE 09/04/97 09/449p' 09/ Uf97 '

09/ /97 09/ /9{_

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION l i

Docket No:

50 286 Report No:

50 286/9748 i

Licensee:

New York Power Authority Facility:

Indian Point Station, Unit 3 Location:

Buchanan, New York Dates:

August 29,1997 Irispector:

Edward B. King, Physical Secur;.y inspector Approved by:

Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety 4

1

. = - _-

,s.

l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The irrvidual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence.

Because the individual had been granted access to three nuclear power plants, special NRC inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization programs, as implemented, identified information that should have precluded the individual from being granted unescorted access.

The licensee's access authorlaation program was inspected August 29,1997,n'nd determined to meet the regulatory requirements. The NRC did not identify any information, used by the licensee in processing the Individual for access authorization, that should have precluded the licensee from granting the individual unescorted access to the secured port!ons of their plant, i

f li

,4 Renort Details 88 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues

$8.1 General On Aug$st 19,1997, an Individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confron'ation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement auti. wit!ss later found bomb making materials stored at th6 Individual's residence in New Hampshire. Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to three nuclear power plants, specialinspections were initiated at each of the plants to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorisation (AA) programs in order to determine if they met the regulawy requirements and the licensee's physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual being granted unescorted access.

The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 ane 195 and to Pilgrim in 1997 based on completion of all cornponents of the access authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to indian Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilprim and an update of his activities for the approximate 2 month per+of etween the time he left Pilgrim and began work at IP 3, as provided for in the AA rwquiremNs The NRC inspection included a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and IP 3.

S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedures i

a.

Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed the licensee's security plan and access authorization procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's access authorization program.

b.

Observations and Findinas The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA procedures disclosed that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Raquirements for Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guldance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66, " Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with personnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedures.

c.

Conclusions The Inspector's review disclosed that the licensee's AA program, as implemented, met all regulatory requirements.

l

'~

~~~~~ '

~~

g.'

I 2

I 58.3 tackaround invaattention fall zier.;.ma s.

Inanection Senna The inspector reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the adequacy of the proprem in determining the true identity of the individual and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to granting unescorted access.

b.

Observation and Findinas f

1 The inspector reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI) and determined that the scope and depth of the 81 met the licensee's program j

commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments on which to base a determination for access authorization. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating criminal history checks on individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all information received from the U.S. Attorney General. One licensee (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the i

criminal history check twice (once in 19g2 and once in 1995). In both cases, prior arrests were identified. The inspector determined that the information had been properly evaluated ar.d adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access. Another.

licensee, Boston Edison, cubmitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check in December 1998. The information received back from the criminal history check indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuing this issue with the FBI to determine why the prior strest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal history check, c.

Conclualon i

Although the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prior arrests, the inspector concluded that there were no de'iciencies in the processes used by either.

licensee to initiate the criminal history checks.

S8.4 Paveholonient Evaluations a.

Inanecilon Scone The inspector reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to insure they met applicable requirements, b.-

Observations. Findinas and Conclealana The licensee contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the

- psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for a clinicalinterview was indicated,

...,e-...=ew.

wg w g.

-.,.---,--e

..-,w,

-,.,. - -mr=,,,w--,-%.

a.,,,-%-,,_-w...,..,,---<.e.-,,-e-...,,--._,,..,-,.-pw,--.,,

w.,#.,-e-.

-4

...... -,c

e,,,

3 the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996, The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinlealinterview and the psychologist i

conducting the interview recommented, after conducting the interview, that site access be granted.

8 The inspector determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was being implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements, i

58.5 Behavior Observation Pronram (BOP) e, inanection Econe The inspector reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and lesson plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the licensees' programs.

b.

Observations and Findinna The programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the licensees' Fitness for. Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson plans indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of the individuals' past supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program requirements and they demonstrated an awareness and sensitivity to detect and repon adverse changes in behavior, c.

Conclusion The inspector concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemented.

58.6 Iemocrarv Access Authorization a.

Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted access authorization, as permitted by the rule.

b.

Observations Findinos and Conclualona The records of the abbreviated scope investigations were determined to contain adequate information (character and reputation from a developed reference, past year's employment histe;y, and a credit check) on which to base temporary access authorization. The inspector noted that, in these records of abbreviated scope investigation, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access authorization following receipt of the full 5. year investigation.

q_.

i

,j-

+ * * +.

.o, l

i 4

S8.7 Search fantament I

a.

lnanection Senne The inspector reviewed the licensees

• procedures for testing personnel and package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and observed licenses testing of the search equipment to assess its effectiveness.

i b.

Obaarvations and Findinna Test procedures were adequate to property evaluate the search equipment performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment determined that h was operable.

I c.

Conclusion The inspector determined that the personnel and package search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan requirements and was capable of performing its intended functions.

X1 Exit interview An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary findings were presented. The licensees acknowledged the preliminary inspection findings.

i k

a h

9 6

l

- ~. -.,,. - -...... -.,.,,, -. - - - -

-,.. -,.. - ~.. - - -. -. - - -.. -

-. -.. - -... ~. -.. -.. -. -

. ~.

I

s

.....j re, 5

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED Ucensas D. Oulnn, General Meneger Support Services J. Hahn, Director Security T. Weber, (Acting) Security Meneger J. Mosher, Senior investigator C. Falson, (Acting) Ucensing Maneger t

t' All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.

9 4

e

g..;;

E

~

ACTl0N EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM DUE: 09/18/97 EDO CONTROL: G970642 DOC DT 09/03/97 FINAL REPLY:

R:prcsontative Robert Renny Cushing TO:

Chairman Jackson FOR SIGNATURE OF :

• • PRI CRC NO: 97-0899 Chairman DESC:

ROUTING:

ALLEGEL SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AT THE SEABROOK Callan NUCLEAR PLANT (CARL DREGA)

Thadani Thompson Norry Blaha Burns DATE: 09/09/97 Miller, RI Caputo, OI ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT:

Lieberman, OE Halman, ADM NRR Collins Cyr, OGC SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

NRR RECEIVED:

SEPTEMBER 10, 1997 NRR ACTION:

DRPE:B0GER NRR ROUTING:

COLLINS MIRAGLIA ZIMMERMAN SHERON ACTION ROE yggs DUE To i RR DIRECTOR'S OFFl^E,

BY

/g '97

.g

• \\o OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY Y

CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER HUMBER:

CRC-97-0899 LOGGING DATE: Sep 8 97 ACTION OFFICE:

EDO AUTHOR:

ROBERT RENNY CUSHING AFFILIATION:

NEW HAMPSHIRE ADDRESSEE:

CHAIRMAN JACKSON LETTER DATE:

Sep 3 97 FILE CODEt IDR 5 SEABROOK

SUBJECT:

ALLEGED SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AT THE SEABROOK NUCLEAR PLANT ACTION:

Signature of Chairinal:

DISTRIBUTION:

CHAIRMAN, RF SPECIAL HANDLING: SECY TO ACK CONSTITUENT:

NOTES:

A1EB6bERNiETaEftI72~

DATE DUE:

Sep 22 97 SIGNATURE:

DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION:

EDO -- G970642

, a 6[

$ tate of picfu Jintupsljire llOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONCORD September 3,1997 Shirley Jackson, Chair U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0111

Dear Chairwoman Jackson:

As a New llampshire State Representative I write to bring to your attention information I have received of alleged security deficiencies at the Seabrook Nuclear Plant that are a potential threat to the health and safety of residents of the New llampshire seacoast.

Two weeks ago the people of the state of New llampshire were shocked when Carl Drega, a 62 year old flow millwright, went on a bloody murder spree in the town of Colebrook.

Drega's rampage took the lives of two state troopers,,,.dge, and a newspaper editor and wounded several other law enforcernent officers before he was killed in a police shootout. The killings by Carl Drega will cause grief to New llampshire citizens for a long, long time, in the aflermath of the Drega bloodbath, the public leamed that he had a long history of violence and instability, including previously firing a gun at and threatening Judge Vickie llunnell, one of people he murdered in Colbrook. The public also was discomforted to leam that this disturbed man had been able to get past security to work at a number of atomic power plants, including Pilgrim and Vemon. Officials at those plants now publicly acknowledge that there was a problem with security and screening of employees that permitted a man who had threatened public ofricials with a gun being given clearance to enter and work in the secure portions of a nuclear facility, it is my understanding from reading news accounts that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now conducting a review of Drega's employment at the Pilgrim and Vemon plants to ascertain the extent of the security problems at those facilities, and will make recommeadations to the managers of those plants. to prevent any more Carl Drega's from getting security clearances.

While Drega's ability to gain employment inside the restricted access area of a nuclear plant was quite disturbing, citizens of the New IIampshire seacaast took some comfort when it i

was announced Drega had not been employed at Seabrook. In.i story by reporter Pat Grossman 1

F t, *

• f ','.

that appeared in the August 23,1997 edition of the Union I eader, Manin Murray, spokesman for Public Service Company of New llampshire, stated that Carl Drega never worked at the Seabrook Nuclear Plant an3 further, never worked at any nuclear plant operated by a Northeast Utilities Company.

My own personal sense of relief that a madman like Drega had not been able to work at Seabrook had a very shon half life. A confidential source has now informed me that the statement made by the omcial Seabrook spokesman that Carl Drega never worked at the Scabrook nuclear plant is a lie. This source told me that, contrary to the story that is being told to the public, Carl Drega worked at the Seabrook Atomic Plant both during the plants construction and since it has been placed in commercial operation. I was told that as recently as the next to the last Seabrook shutdown for refueling and maintenance, Carl Drega was employed on site. I was further told that Drega was known to plant security, having been embroiled in some controversy at the plant involving a camper that he brought onto Seabrook propeny.

As a seacoast resident and siate representative, I am very disturbed by the discrepancy between what Seabrook's operators publicly state and what my source informs me about Carl Drega's relationship with New llampshire's only operating atomic plant. I must say that I have every reason to believe my source, and, given the history of the Seabrook project, believe it is not unreasonable for anyone to be skeptical of reassurances by that plant's owners th,r, there was never a security problem because Carl Drega never worked at Seabrook. liwhat my source tells me is in fact the truth, then either the utility is engaged in a deliberate efTort to mislead omcials and members of the public and cover up Carl Drega's connections to Seabrook n, perhaps even more disturbing, Seabrook's security system is so flawed that in fact the utility does not know that a violent psychopath was able to pass its security measures and gain access to the inside of the generating plant. Whether the company is lying or incompetent, or both. the implications for and threat to the health and safety of the public are enormous.

I write now to formally request that you conduct a thorough independent investigation to determine if, when, and why Carl Drega worked at the Seabrook Nuclear Plant. I request the investigation address, at least, some of the following: If Carl Drega did work at Seabrook, how did he gain security clearance, how did he get past the psychological screening? If Seabrook's operators did not know Carl Drega worked there, why not? Who, and what systems, are responsible for a Carl Drega being able to gain entry to work at Seabrook? Was there a cover-up by Seabrook management of Carl Drega's employment at the plant? If so, who is responsible and what steps have been taken to prevent disinformation in the future? What work did Drega perform at Seabrook, and what steps have been taken to examine that work for possible sabotage? Was Drega involved in controversy with other employees and security while he worked at Seabrook? If so, did Seabrook Station inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the State of New ilampshire and other nuclear plant operators of Drega's agitation? Did Carl Drega work at other NU nuclear plants? What is being done in the aflermath of Drega's murder spree to improve screening of employees at Seabrook and other NU operated nuclear plants?

We all painfully recognize the possible consequences of a deranged individual inside a nuclear power plant. Perhaps from the Colebrook tragedy, we can take steps to minimize the 2

I

,\\..

\\

\\

opponunity for a sick individual like Carl Drega to do greater harm, and make sure that never again will an individual chvged with firing shots at e.nd threatening public officials be welcomed inside Seabrook or any other nuclear power plant. It is my hope, and my expectation, that you will grant this request, conduct a thorough and timely investigation of Drega's Seabrook connection, and make the results known to me and members of the public.

Thank you very much for your attention to this request. I look forward to hearing from you.

i Sincere '

. Roben Renny Cushing State Representative, Rock 22 395 Winnacunnet Road llampton, Nil 03842 Copies to:

Governor Jeanne Shaheen i

Attorney General Phillip McLaughlin Nil Public Utilities Commission Deborah Schacter George Iverson SAPL C.10 6

~I 3

--,....,,,-,-,c..m.--,.

.,,._,-c.,_....y~,..

_.,w.e

,,. - ~.e._.

e.-

.,, -.,,... -