ML20198S499

Amend 196 to License NPF-6,modifying TS 3/4.10.3, Table 2.2-1,table 3.3-1,table 3.3-3,table 3.3-1,bases 2.2.1, Bases 3/4.3 & Bases 3/4.10.3 to Compensate for Limitation Associated with Use of Bistable

ML20198S499
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	12/31/1998
From:	Nolan M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20198S509	List: ML20198S499 ML20198S523
References
NPF-06-A-196 NUDOCS 9901110345
Download: ML20198S499 (18)

Text

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h UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR F.EGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000H001

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ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.

l DOCKET NO. 50-368 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 196 License No. NPF-6 l

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated September 17,1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's ruies and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

' The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, aqd the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

OMbe PDR

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2-2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 196, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

M. Christopher Nolan, Project Manger Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: December 31, 1998 i

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-6 DOCKET NO. 50 368 Revise the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE PAGES INSERT PAGES 2-5 2-5 2-6 26 B 2-3 B 2-3 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-18 3/4 3-18 3/4 10-3 3/4 10-3 B 3/4 3-1a B 3/4 3-1a B 3/4 3-1b

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f TABLE 2.2-1 i

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINT LIMITS FtINCTIONAL UNIT l

TRIP SETPOINT ALI4*%BLE VALUES 1.

Manual Reactor, Trip' Noti Applicable Not Applicable i

i 2.

Linear Power Level - High l

a.

Four Reactor Coolant Pumps s 110% of RATED THERMAL POWER S 110.712% of RATED THERMAL POWER I

Operatingi l

b.

Three Reactor Coolant Pumps

.{

Operating'

i c.

Two Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating - Same Loop t

j d.

Two Reactor Coolant Pumps l

jl Operating - Opposite Loops i

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3.

Logarithmic Power Level -

l High (1) i 5 0.75%

s 0.8194 l

l 4.

Pressurizer Pressure - High 5 2362 psia s 2370.887 psia f

I 5.

Pressurizer Pr asure - Low 21717.4 paia (2) 21686.3 psia (2) 6.

Containement Pressure - High s 18.3 psia 5 18.490 psim 7.

Steam Generatot Pressure - Low 2 712 psia (3) 2 599.6 psia (3) i 8.

Steam Generato Level - Low 2 23% (4) 2 22.1114 (4) i i

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• These values left blank pending NRC approval of safety analyses for operation with less than four reactor coolant pumps operating.

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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 2-5 Amendment No. 4,34,6,447,444, 449,196 i

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) l REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINT LIMITS l

l EtJNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALIZMABLE VALUES 90 Local Power Density - High s 21.0 kw/ft (5) s 21.0 kw/ft (5) 10.

DNBR - Low 2 1.25 (Sh 2 1.25 (5)

11. Steam Generator Level;- High 5 93.~1% (4) s 94.589% (4)

TABLE NOTATION (1) Trip may be manually bypassed chove 10-*% powers bypass shall be automatically removed before decreasing below 10'*% power. -

(2) Value may be decreased manually, to a minimum value of 100 psia, during a planned reduction in pressurizer pressure, provided the margin between the pressurizer pressure and this value is maintained at s 200 psis the setpoint shall be increased automatically as pressurizer pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached. Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be i

automatically removed before pressurizer pressure exceeds 500 psia.

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(3) Value may be decreased manually during a planned reduction in steam generator pressure provided the l

margin between the steam generator pressure.and this value is maintained at s 200 psis the setpoint shall be increased automatically as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is r

reached.

l (4)

% of the distance :between steam generator bpper and lower level instrument nozzles.

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1 (5) As stored within the Core Protection Calculator (CPC). Calculation of the trip setpoint includes

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measurement, calculational and processor uncertainties, and dynamic allowances. Trip may be manually l

bypassed below 10-*% powers bypass shall be automatically rer <ved before exceeding 10-86 power.

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l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 2-6 Awndment No. M,36,M,66,~19,196 I

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5AFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS t

l BASES To maintain the margins of safety assumed in the safety analyses, the calculations of the trip variables for the DNBR - Low and Local Power Density - High trips include the measurement, calculational and processor uncertainties and dynamic allowances as defined in CEN 305-P, " Functional Design Requirement for a Core Protection calculator," July 1985; CEN-304-P,

" Functional Design Requirements for a Control Element Assembly Calculator,"

July 1985; CEN-310-P, "CPC and Methodology Changes for the CPC Inqprovement l

Program," October 1985; and CEN-300-P, "CPC/CEAC Software Modifications for l

the CPC Improvement Program," August 1985.

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The operating bypasses associated with the notations of Table 2.2-1 are l

discussed in the bases for specifications 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1.

Manual Reactor Trip l g..

The Manual Reactor Trip is a redundant channel to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provides manual reactor trip capability.

l Linear Power Level - High The Linear Power Level - High trip provides reactor core protection against rapid reactivity excursions which might occur as the result of an ejected CEA.

This trip initiates a reactor trip at a linear power level of 5 110.712% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

i Logarithmic Power Level - High The Logarithmic Power Level - High trip is provided to protect the integrity of fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary in the event of an unplanned criticality from a shutdown condition. A reactor trip is initiated by the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip at a logarithmic power level of 5 0.819% unless this trip is manually bypassed by the operator. The. operator may manually bypass this trip when the logarithmic power level is above 10*84 powers this bypass is automatically removed before the logarithmic power level decreases below 10**t power.

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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 2-3 Amendment No. 34,44,%l96

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SAFTTY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING 5 B A RF.R Prannuriner Pressura-Nieh The Pressuriser Pressure-Eigh trip, in conjunction with the pressuriser safety valves and sein. steam safety valves, provides reactor coolant systes protection against overpressurisation la the event of loss of load without reactor trip. This trip's setpoint is at $2370.887 pois which is below the nominal lift setting (1500 pois) of the pressuriser safety valves and its operation avoids the undesirable operation of the pressuriser safety valves.

Frannuriner Fransura-Tm The Pressuriser Pressure-Low trip is provided to trip the reactor and to assist the Engineered Safety Features System in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident. Duringnormaloperation,thistrip'ssetpointissetat 21686.3 psia. This trip s setpoint say be manually decreased, to a I

sinimum value of 100 psia, as pressuriser pressure is reduced during plant shutdowns, provided the sargin between the pressuriser pressure and this trip's setpoint is maintained at $200 psi; this setpoint increases l

automatically as pressuriser pressure increases until the trip setpoint is reached.

Centainment Frannura-Nieh.

The Containment Pressure-High trip provides assurance that a reactor trip is initiated concurrently with a safety injection. The setpoint for this trip is identical to the safety injection setpoint.

Steam Generater Fransura-Tm The Steas Generator Pressure-Low trip provides protection against sa excessive rate of heat extraction from the steam generators and subsequent cooldown of the reactor coolant. The setpoint is sufficiently below the full load operating point of approximately 900 psia so as not to interfere

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with normal operation, but still high anotsh to provide the required protection in the event of excessively high steam flow. This trip's setpoint say be manually decreased as steam generator pressure is reduced during plant shutdowns provided the margin between the steam generator pressure and this trip;a setpoint is maintained at $200 psi; this setpoint increases autoestically as steam generator pressure increases until the trip setpoint is reached.

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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3 2-4 Amendment No. #,138 OCT 5 1992 l

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IAntf 3 3-1 frantinued)

RFACTOR PROTFETIVE InstanMFuTATIDE MINIMUM

-TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL IMRIT j

OF CHANNELS TO TRIP DPERABLE sennet ACTION l

10. DN8N - Low l

4 2(c)(d) 3

1. 2

'2.3 l

11. Steam Generator Level - High 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1.2 2.3 l

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12. Reactor Protection System l

l Logic i

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A. Matrix Logic l

6 1

3 1.2 1

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1 3

3*.4*.54 e

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8. Initiation logic 4

2 4

1.2 5

4 2

4 3*.4*.5*

8 1

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13. Reactor Trfp breakers 4(f) 2 4

1. 2 5'

4(f) 2 4

3*.4*.5*

8 14.CoreProtectIonCalculators 4

i 2(c)(d) 3

1. 2 2.3.7 l

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15. CEA Calculators 2

1 2(e)

1. 2 6.7 l

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ARKANSAS UNIT I 3/4 3-3 Amendment' No. 34. 434,159 l

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Crntinu'1d)

TABLE NOTATION

• With the protective syatem trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

L (a) Trip may be manually bypassed above 10t power; bypass shall be automatically removed before decreasing below 10'*4 power.

(b) Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed before pressurizer pressure exceeds 500 psia.

l (c) Trip may be manually bypassed below 10'84 power; bypass shall be automatically removed before exceeding 10-84 power.

During testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3, trip may be manually bypassed below 16 power; bypass shall be automatically removed before exceeding Il power.

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(d) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception t

3.10.3.

(e)

See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

(f)

Each channel shall be comprised of two trip breakers; actual trip logic shall be one-out-of-two taken twice.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and/or open the protective system trip breakers.

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1 ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 434,196

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i TABLE 3.3-3 teentinued)

I ENCINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATICIt SYSTD4 INSTatserTATION mwisans i TorAL ',m.

OcuerELS csuuseELs ArrLicAg A

' or cu JeseELS To TRIP _

OPERABLE 9toets AcTtOW FWIIcTicIIAL Ultt?

a t

1.

1859 or PeteER e.

4.15 kw Ihmegency sus

]I Wedervoltage (Lose i

!I, of Veitsgel

. 2/ Bus 1/tes 2/tes 1, 2, $ '

~ 9 l

l b.

As4 volt thw *gency l

ama sedervoltage (Degraded voltagel 1/aus 1/ sus 1/sme i, d, d 9

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IsemicencT PEEDIIRTER tEFAS) t a.

sensuel (Trip switches) 2 sets of 2 2 sets oI A 2setsof5 k, 2, 2, 4 9

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- per s/s per s/4 per s/s l

f b.

SS tevel and Pressure

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• IA/s) - new and AP (A/BI - Nigh 4/98 2/98

$/98 de24$,4 19,11 i

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38 tevel t'A/89 - Leer i

i ord No 3/8 Fressure -

l Ime, Trip (A/Bl.

4/SS 2/30 3/98 A, 2e 3, 4 19,11 l

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d. ; ESFAS topic 1.

pentrim togte s

1 2

1, 2, 2, 4 12 12.

Initiation Imgie 4

2 4

1,2,3,4 9

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Anstematie Actuation imple :

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. 2 1, 2, 2, 4 i 13 t

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AIUIRIssAs - tut? 2 3/4 3-13 MAY 21 ny/

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Cantinued)

TABLE NOTATION (a)

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when presserizer pressure is belcw 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed before pressurizer pressure exceeds 500 psia.

(b)

An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable C5AS logic.

(c)

Remote manual not provided for RAS. These are local manuals at each ESF auxiliary relay cabinet.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 9

-With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to j

OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 10 -With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the inoperable channel is bypassed for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the desirability of maintaining this channel in the bypassed condition shall be reviewed at the next regularly scheduled PSC meeting in accordance with the QA Manual Operations. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status prior to startup following the next COLD SEUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit runctional Unit Bypassed

l. Containment Pressure - NR Containment Pressure

.High. (RPS) _

Containment Pressure - High (ESFAS)

Containment Pressure - High-High (ESEAS)

2. Steam Generator 1 Pressure Steam Generator 1 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EFAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EFAS 2)

3. Steam Generator 2 Pressure Stean Generator 2 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EFAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EFAS 2) 1

4. Steam Gener'ator 1 Javel Steam Generator 1 Level - Low c._

-. _ _.-~ Steam Generator 1 Level ~ High i

Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

5. Steam Generator 2 Level Steam Generator 2 Level - Low Steam Generator 2 Level - High Steam Generator 2 AP (EFAS 2)

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. H 4,H 9,H 6, 196

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1 TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) i ENGINEERED SAFETT FEATURE AC118ATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES i

m sg 1

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP VALUE VALUES 4.

MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER ISO 1ATION (MS$5) 1 a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable.

1 b.

Stease Generator Pressure - Low k 112 psia (2) k $99.5 psia (2) t f.

5.

CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS)

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Manual (Trip settons)

Not Applicable Not applicable t

t b.

Contaisement Pressure - Nigh s 10.3 pela s 10.490 psia t

c.

Pressuriser Pressure - Low 2 1717.4 psia (1) k 1606.3 pele (1)

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RECIRCUIATION kRAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable

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t b.

Refueling Water Tank - Low l

54,400 1 2,370 gallons between 51,050 and 58,600 f

1 (equivalent to 6.0 A 0.54

. gallons (equivalent to j

I indicated level) between 5.1110 and 6.009%

indicat.ed level) l 7.

I455 OF POWER 4.16 kw energency sus Undervoltage t

a.

(Loss of Voltage) 3120 volts (4) 3120 volts (4) l b.

460 volt anergency Bus Undervoltage 423 1 2.0 volts 423 1 4.0 welts (Degraded Voltage) with an 8.0 1 0.5 with an 0.0 1 0.0 t

second time delay second tisme delay i

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AmanNsAS - oNrr 2 l

3/4 3-17

. W No. e4,4a*,4as,440,189 l

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE T.CTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES ALIDNABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP VALUE VALUES _

8.

DIERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable 1

b.

Steam Generator: (A&B) Level-Low 2 23% (3) 2 22.1119 (3) i i

c.

Steam GeneratoriAP-High (SG-A > SG-B)

$ 90 psi s 99.344 psi d.

Steam Generetor;AP-Righ (SG-B > SG-A) l s 90 psi s 99.344 psi 1

l e.

Steam Generator (A&B) Pressure - Low 2 712 psia (2) 2 699.6 paia (2) l k

i (1)

Value may be decreased manually, to a minimum of 2 100 psia, during a planned reduction in pressurizer pressure, provided the margin between the pressurizer pressure and this value is maintained at 5 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as pressurizer pressure is increased until the trip set-point is reached. Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed

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before pressurizer pressure exceeds 500 psia.

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(2)

Value may be decreased manually during a planned reduction in steam generator pressure, provided the margin between the steam generator pressure and this value is maintained at 5 200 pois the setpoint i

shall be increased automatically as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached.

(3) 8 of the distance between steam generator v.pper and lower level instrument nozzles.

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(4)

Inverse time relay set value, not a trip value. The zero voltage trip will occur in 0.75 i 0.075 seconds.

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I 3/4 3-18 Amendment No, e,34,45,449,196 l

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 k

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.10.3 The limitations of Specification 3.4.1.1 and noted requirements of Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-1 may be suspended during the performance of startup and l

PHYSICS TESTS, provided:

a.

The THERMAL ?OWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and b.

The reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE power level channels are set at 5 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

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APPLICABILITY: During startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

ACTION:

J With the THERMAL POWER > 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, imunediately trip the reactor.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be 5 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during startup knd PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each wide range logarithmic and power level neutron flux monitoring channel shall be subjected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to initiating startup or PHYSICS TESTS.

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i ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 10-3 Amendment No. 444,196

3/4.3 TNSTRUMENTATION RASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (EST)

ItJSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and Esr instrumentation systems and r,

bypasses ensure that 1) the associated EST action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is,.

maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems f.= required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent I

with the assumptions ~ used in the accident analyses.

I The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The period.ic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this espability. The triannual channel functional testing frequency is to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

1 The aessurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and EST action function associated with each channel is compJoted within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

The RPS and ESTAS response time tables have been relocated to the Safety Analysis Report (sAR). No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels i

with response times indicated as not applicable.

t Responte time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, ove c 6apping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests der castrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response tiue verification may be damenstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or ofinite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacament sensors with certified.

response times.

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ARxANsAs - UNIT 2 3 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. M,M,H4,109 W.it i ; m3

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BAST.S Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

Plant Protective Sysism (PPS) logic is designed for operation as s 2-out-of-3 logic, althouta pormally it is operated in a 2-out-of-4 mode.

The RPS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable relays and ugetream of the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers. The RPS Logic is divided into two parts, Nhtrix Logic, and Initiation Logic.

Failures of individual histables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

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The ESTAS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable relays and upstream of the subgroup relays. The ESTAS Logic is divided into three parts, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, and Actuation Logic.

Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

Matrix Logic refers to the matrix power supplies, trip channel bypass contacts, and interconnecting matrix wiring between bistable relay cards, up to, but not including the matrix relays. Matrix contacts on the bistable relay cards are excluded from the Matrix Logic definition since they are addressed as part of the measurement channel.

Initiation Logic consists of the trip path power source, matrix relays and their associated contacts, all interconnecting wiring, and the initiation relays (including contacts).

ESEAS Actuation Logic consists of all circuitry housed within the l

Auxiliary Relay Cabinets (ARCS) used to house the EST runction; excluding the subgroup relays, and interconnecting wiring to the

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initiation relay contacts mounted in the PPS cabinet.

For the purposes of this LCO, de-energization of up to three matrix l

power supplies due to a single failure, such as loss of a vital j

instrument bus, is to be treated as a single matrix channel failure,

__ l providing the affected matrix relays de-energize as designed to produce a half-trip. Although each of the six matrices within an ESEAS runction (e.g., SIAS, MSIS, CSAS, etc.) uses separate power stpp)iss, the matrices for the different ESEAS runctions share power supplies. Thus, failure of a matrix power supply may force entry into the Condition specified for each of the associated ESEAS Functional Units.

- The LCOs for the RPS and the ESEAS instrumentation systems require-the -- -

OPERABILITY of the bypass permissive removal channels. These LCOs require the automatic bypass removal feature of all four operating bypass channels to be OPERABLE for each of the RPS and ESEAS functions with an operating bypass in the MODES addressed in the specific LCO for each function. The operating bypasses required by these LCOs are the Pressurizer Pressure - Low, the Cec (DNBR - Low and LPD - High), and the Logarithmic Power Level - High trips.

All four automatic bypass removal channels must be OPERABLE to ensure that none of the four RPS and ESTAS channels are inadvertently bypassed. The automatic removal feature of the operating bypasses is required to be verified ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. us,196

d Sy "nc L:tt:: {t:d22;: 19, 1000

e g

3/403 INSTRUMENTATION a

BASES i

during surveillance testing and are not required to be verified during plant maneuvering.

t The bypass term in the RPS and ESFAS LCOs applies to the automatic operating bypass removal feature and not the PPS trip channel bypass feature.

If the bypass enable function is failed so as to prevent entering a bypass condition, operation may continue. In the case of the Logarithmic Power i

Level - High trip, the absence of a bypass will limit maximum power to below t '

the trip setpoint.

Tables 3.3-1 notation (a) and 2.2-1 notation (1) allow the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip to be manually bypassed when above 10"4 logarithmic 4

power to allow the reactor to be brought to power during a reactor startup.

4 The operating bypass is nanually initiated in all four logarithmic power

)

channels when the plant conditions do not warrant this trip protection and the operating bypass permissive has been enabled. The bistable design ensures

.j, that the CPC trips will be automatically enabled when tLa Logarithmic Power Level - High trip can be manually bypassed. The Logarithmic Power Level - High j

trip operating bypass is automatically removed before the logarithmic power j

level decreases below 3 0"4 power.

~

Tables 3.3-1 notation (c) and 2.2-1 notation (5) allow the CPC trips to be manually bypassed below 10",% logarithmic power. The operating bypass effectively removes the CPC trips from the RPS.

This allows closure of the reactor trip circuit breakers and thus enabling the CEA operation necessary for l

a plant startup. The operating bypass is manually initiated in all four CPC channels when the plant conditions do not warrant this trip protaction and the operating bypass permissive has been enabled. The bistable design ensures that 4

the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip will be automatically enabled when the CPC trips can be manually bypassed. The CPC operating bypass is automatically

{

removed before the logarithmic power level exceeds 10",% power.

}

The bistable for the operating bypasses for the CPC and Logarithmic Power Level - High trips is required to be set within the two decade range allowed by Table 3.3-1 notations (a) and (c) and Table 2.2-1 notations (1) and (5). These limits provide the bistable with the appropriate range to account for the

~~

bistable hysteresis and to provide margin for the applicable uncertainties.

Regardless of the actual bistable setpoint within the two decade band, the single bistable design ensures that either the CPC or the Logarithmic Power Level - High trips are available to provide reactor trip protection.

During testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3, the bistable setpoint for these operating bypasses is increased to automatically remove the CPCs from bypass before the logarithmic power level exceeds 16 power.

Tables 2.2-1 notation (2), 3.3-1 notation (b), 3.3-3 notation (a), and 3.3-4 notation (1) allow the Pressurizer Pressure - Low function to be manually bypassed below 400 psia when the operating bypass permissive has been enabled.

The margin between the pressurizer pressure and the setpoint is maintained 200 psia as pressurizer pressure is reduced during controlled plant cooldowns. This allows for controlled depressurization of the RCS while still y

maintaining an active trip setpoint until the trip is no longer needed to protect the plant.

Since che Pressurizer Pressure - Low bistable is shared with RPS, SIAS, and CCAS an inadvertent actuation of these systems due to low pressurizer pressure is prevented while bypassed. The Pressurizar Pressure - Low bypass is required to be automatically removed before RCS pressure exceeds 500 psia. The difference between the 400 psia allowance for the manua? bypass and 500 psia automatic bypass removal feature allows for the bistable hysteresis.

1 ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-lb Amendment No.196

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