ML20198R373

Forwards Open Items Associated w/AP600 SER Section 3.5.1, Missile Protection

ML20198R373
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	12/12/1997
From:	Joseph Sebrosky NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Liparulo N WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9801230293
Download: ML20198R373 (5)

Text

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December 12, 1997 Mr. Nicholas J. Liparuto, Mansger,

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Nuclear Safety and Re0ulstory Analysis Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Westinghouse Electric Corporation P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230

SUBJECT:

OPEN ITEMS ASSOCLATED WITH AP600 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT (SER)

SECTION 3.5.1

• MISSILE PROTECTION"

Dear Mr. Liparulo:

i, The Plant Systems Branch has provided the subject SER to the projects staff. However, the SER contained some open items. These open items have been extracted from the SER and can be found in the enclosure to this letter.

You have requested that portions of the information submitted in the June 1992, application for -

design certification be exempt from.nandatory public disclosure. While the staff has not completed its review of your request in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 2.790, that portion of the submitted information is being withheld from public disclosure pending the staff's

~i final determination. The staff concludes that these follow on questions do not contain those portions of the information for which exemption is sought. However, the staff will withhold this letter from public disclosure for 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to allow Westing.

' house the opportunity to verify the staff's conclusions. If, after that time, you do not request that all or portions of the information in the enclosures be withheld from public disclosure in accor-dance with 10 CFR 2,790, this letter will be placed in the Nuclear RegoIPtory Commission Public Document Room.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, you may contact me at (301) 415-1132.

Sincerely, original signed by:

Joseph M. Sebrosky, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 52 003

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ encl: See next page 3}f t

DISTRIBUTION:

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}L See next page DOCUMENT NAME: A:SPLB 351.RAI To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "C" r Copy without attachment / enclosure

• E" = Copy giochment/ enclosure "N" = No copy 4/4

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l Mr. Nicholas J. Lipatulo t

Docket No. 62 003 Westinghouse Electric Corporation AP600 l

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Mr. 8. A. McIntyre Ms. Cindy L Haag Advanood Plant Safety & Lloonsing Advanood Plant Safety & Lloonsing Westinghouse Electr6c Corporation Westinghouse Electric Corporation i

Energy Systems Business Unit P.O. Box 355 Energy Systems Business Unit I

Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 i

Pittsburgh, PA 15230 i

Enclosure to be distributed to the following addressees after the result of the proprietary evalul i

received from Westinghouse:

Mr. Russ Bell Ms. Lynn Connor Senior Project Manager, Programs DOC-Search Associates Nuclear Energy Institute Post ofree Box 34 5

1776 i Street, NW Cabin John, MD 20818 Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006 3708 Mr. Robert H. Suchhob I

Dr. Craig D. Sawyer, Manager GE Nuclear Energy 175 Curtner Avenue, MC 781 Advanced Reactor Programs San Jose, CA 95125 1

GE Nuclear Energy 1

175 Curtner Avenue, MC 754 Mr. Storting Franks San Jose, CA 95125; U.S. Department of Energy i

NE50-Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.

19901 Germantown Road l

Eckert seamans Cherin & Mellott Germantown, MD 20874 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer AP600 Certification Mr. Frank A. Ross '

NE 50 U.S. Department of Energy, NE 42 19901 Germantown Road office of LWR Safety and Technology Germantown, MD -20874 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD 20874 4

Mr. Ed Rodwell Manager PWR Design Certification '

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- Electric Power Research Institute 3412 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94303 i

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l Open Hems Associated SER Oection 3.5.1 ' Missile Protection

• 410.404F (from SER Section 3.5.1.1) i in response to Q410.208, Westinghouse stated that a reference to Section 7.4 for the safety.

related systems required for safe shutdown has been added in SSAR Section 3.5.1.1 The staff finds that the reference is not included in any subsection of SSAR Section 3.5. This is an Open ltem.

410.406F (from SER Section 3.8.1.1)

In response to RAI 410.313, Westinghouse stated that safety rollef valves in high energy systems use the boh bonnet design that will preclude missile generation. The piping and tubing that connect instrumentation such as pressure, level, and flow transmitters to the pressure boundary cf piping and components in high energy systems are designed with welded joints or compression fittings for the tubing. Throeded connections are not used to connect instrumentation to high energy systems or components. The quantity of high energy fluid in these instruments is limited and will not result in missile generation. The staff finds the response acceptable. Westinghouse committed to revise the sixth bullet and the ninth bullet of SSAR Sections 3.5.1.1.2.1 to address these concoms. This is an Open item.

410.406F (from SER Section 3.5.1.2)

In SSAR Section 3.5.1.2.1.1, Westinghouse listed the following potential sources of intemally-generated missiles:

Any failure of rotating parts of the reactor coolant pump.

Catastrophic failure of rotating equipment such as pumps, fans, and compressors leading to the generation of missiles.

Failure of the reactor vessel, steam generator, pressurizer, core makeup tanks, e

accumulators, reactor coolant pump castings, passive residual heat exchangers and piping leading to the generation of missiles.

Gross failure of a control rod drive mechanism housing sufficient to create a missile from a piece of the housing or to allow a control rod to be ejected rapidly from the core, Valves, valve stems, nuts and bolts, thermowells, and missiles originating in non-high-e energy fluid systems.

Westinghouse stated that the above potential missile sources are nJt considered credible because there is insufficient energy to produce a missile. However, Westinghouse should propde information on the kinetic energy of these potential missiles, such as maximum impact kine r snergy (ft Ib), weight of the object (Ib), and impact section (sq ft). These missiles can not be w edered non credible without justification. This was identified as RAI Q410.315.

Tbv e 'oro, Westinghouse's response to this RAI was inadequate. This is an Open item.

Enclosure

2 410.407F (from SER Section 3.8.1.2) in SSAR Section 3.5.1.2.1.4, Westinghouse states that falling objects heavy enough to ge a secondary missile are postulated as a result of movement of a heavy load or from a i

nonselsmically designed SSC during a seismic event. However, Westinghouse should iden the potential falling objects inside the containment. These falling objects are potential gravitational missiles, which may generate secondary missiles when they strike a high energ system. The intomal energy of the damaged high-energy components may generale secon missiles. Westinghouse should address this concem and reference SCAR Section g.1.5 concoming heavy loads and SSAR Section 3.7.3.13 concoming gravitation missiles, there should be a cross-reference between these sections and SSAR Section 3.5.1.2. This is an Open it 410.408F (from SER Section 3.8.1.4)

The missiles generated by natural phenomena that are of concem are those resulting from tomadoes. The tomado missile spectrum used by Westinghouse is Spectrum I as identified in SRP 3.5.1.4. The EPRI URD for Passive Plants states that the selection of tornad i

spectrum shall be in accordance with ANSI /ANS 2.3, " Standard for Estimating Tomado and Extreme Wind Characteristics at Nuclear Power Sites" and meets the intent of c criteria. However, Westinghouse did not explain the basis on which Spectrum Iis selected for the AP600 standard design and whether the Combined License applicants (COL) can select other missile spectra to represent any specific site and permit development of generic desig handle any offsite hazard it the specific plant site where other design basis natural phenomena could be espable of generating missiles. The SSAR should address these concems. This is an Open item.

410.409F (from SER section 3.5.1.4)

SSAR Section 3.3.2.1 provides the following design parameters for the Design Basis Tomado (DBT):

Maximum wind speed. 483 km/hr (300 mph) e Maximum rotational speed 386 km/hr (240 mph) e Maximum translational speed g7 km/hr (60 mph) e Radius of maximum rotational wind from center of DBT. 46 m (150 ft) e Atmospheric pressure drop 14 kPa (2 psi) e Mate of pressure change 8 kPa/sec (1.2 psl/sec) e These design parameters are selected based on the maximum wind speed of the east of the United States in ac:ordance with NUREG/CR-4664, " Tornado Climatology of the Contiguous United States," dated May 1,1988. However, Westinghouse did not provide guidance in the SSAR to an applicant referencing the AP600 standard design regarding e missile hazards if the plant site is not in the eastem United States. Westinghouse should also address the plant conformance with the guidance of RG 1,76, as it relates to the identification an acceptable design basis tomado. This is an Open item, 410.410F (from SER Section 3.5.2)

SRP 3.5.2 states that the SSCs required for safe shutdown of the reactor should be identified The identification of SSCs to be protected against extemally generated missiles is acceptab

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3 is in accordance with the requirements of GDC 2 and 4. However, SSAR Section 3.5.2 did no identify the SSCs requiring protection from extemally generated missiles and no references to other SSAR sections for this concem are provided. Westinghouse should list the systems and equipment that must be protected from missiles generated by natural phenomena or provide SSAR references that has addressed this concom. This was identified as RAI Q4 In response to this RAl, Westinghouse stated that the systems required for safe shutdown are protected from the effects of missiles. Thess, systems are identified in SSAR Section 7.4. The structural design requirements for the shield building and auxiliary building are outlined in SSAR Section 3.8.4. Openings through extemal walls are evaluated on a case by case basis to ensure that a missile passing through the opening would not prevent a safe shutdown of the plant and would not result in an offsite release exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 100. The Combined License applicant will evaluate site +pecific hazards for extemal events that may produce missiles more energetic than tomado missiles. The staff finds the above response acceptable Westinghouse committed to revise SSAR Section 3.5.2 to include this response. This is an Open item.

410.411F (from SER Section 3.5.2)

SRP 3.5.2 states that the SSCs to be protected from extemally generated missiles must meet the requirements of GDC 2 and 4 by meeting Regulatory Position C.2 of RG 1.13, " Spent Fue Facility Design Basis," Positions C.2 and C.3 of RG 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants," Position C.1 of RG 1.115, " Protection Apainst Low Trajectory Turbine Missiles," and Positions C.1, C.2, and C.3 of the Appendix to RG 1.117. "Tomado Design Classification."

Address the compliance of SSAR Section 3.5.2 with the above RG guidelines. This is an Op item.

410.112 F (from SER Sectiona 3.5.1.1, 3.5.1.2, 3.5.1.4, and 3.5.2)

During the DSER review of missile protection for the AP600 standard design, the staff req Westinghouse to incorporate the intent of the following RAI responses into the GSAR:

RAls 410.61, 410.54, 410.61, 410.62, 410.64, 410.67, 410.68, 410.6g, 410.73, 410.74, 410.75, 410.208,410.210,410.213,410.215,410.216,410.219,410123,410.224, and 410.227. This is an Open item.

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