ML20198Q753
| ML20198Q753 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1986 |
| From: | Corbin McNeil Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198Q757 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606090359 | |
| Download: ML20198Q753 (14) | |
Text
Puche Service Electnc and Gas Company C:rbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Pubhc Service Electnc and Gas Company P.0, Box 236, Hancocks Bndge N.' 08038 609 339-4800 Vice President-Nuctear June 4, 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Attention:
Ms. Elinor Adensam, Director Project Directorate 3 Division of BWR Licensing
Dear Ms. Adensam:
CONTAINMENT VENT / PURGE VALVE OPERATION HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 The Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are presently operable and sealed closed during operational conditions 1,
2 and 3 in accordance with the Hope Creek Technical Specifications.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) hereby requests approval to operate the HCGS drywell and suppression chamber purge system in accordance with the proposed revised technical specification (Enclosure 1) based upon the attached demonstration of valve qualification and operability (Enclosure 2). indicates that the proposed technical specification change does not involve a significant hazard.
The HCGS FSAR revisions (Enclosure 4) will be included in a future amendment to the HCGS FSAR.
No amendment to the present low-power license is being requested.
PSE&G requests that the proposed revised technical specification be approved when the full power operating license is issued for the Hope Creek Generating Station.
54X 3 b
.M I d
- Boo 8606090359 G60604 b
PDR ADOCK 05000354 P
POR pdm To c. Fe L83
T f
4 Director of Nuclear 2
6-4-86 Reactor Regulation J
4 If there are any questions regarding this submittal, do not hesitate to contact us.
j Sincerely, l
1 5
W 4
1 Enclosures (4)
Drawings (6)
C D.H. Wagner l
USNRC Licensing Project Manager i
R.W.
Borchardt USNRC Senior Resident Inspector 1
]
i 1
i i
l 4
I 4
i ENCLOSURE 1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4
DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.8 The 26-inch drywell purge supply and exhaust isolation valves and the 24-inch s'uppression chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valves, and theundy adminidra4u.
6-inch nitrogen supp)ly valve shall be OPERABLE and^' "^"
"^'M e
c.on4ro l. (ipseg.T @
gnwdne.d APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
IMSe9.T @
Yth 26-inch rywell p rge supp)p or e ust isolati valve, oveorthy}
a a.
24-i h suppr ssion ch er purg6 supply or exhaust lation v valve plen or not sealed cl d,* clo or seal fie 6-i ch nitr en supp'l valves (s) r othe ise isoljtie the p(netration yi in four ours or in
/.least T SHUT witpinthendxt12hoursandinCOL SHUTDOW withiny the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
p b.
With a drywell purge supply or exhaust isolation valve, or a suppression chamber purge supply or exhaust isolation valve or the nitrogen supply valve, with resilient material seals having a measured leakage rate exceed- -
ing the limit of Surveillance Requirement)( 4.6.1.8.% igd /er '.'.1.0.04' re-store the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />'or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within O
the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS pplyandexhaus'yisolatiorvalvear/ethe ]i and supplyydexhastisolatpnvalv Sach 261nch dryyn11 pur 4.6.1.p.1 7
24-ir)cn suppressipn chamber purge 6-irydhnitogenfupplyvTve,sha be veri ied to e sealed losed* t least 1
on per 1 days.
4.6.1.8.2 At/least o e per months o a STA EREDTESJBASISeachseales
/ closed 26-iphdrywe purge supply a exhau t isolation valve and 24-Mch supp/ession chamber urge s pply and xhaus isolatio valve, nd the inch nij,togen 6pply va ve, wi resilie t mate al seals shall b demons ated OPERABL y verif ing th the mea ured 1 akage ra is les than o equal to QSL,perpeneration hen pres urized to P, 48 psig.
the 26-inch drywell purgegMerd ej:=t-4.6.1.8./iAtleastonceper92 days,ialsealsshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbyl ice!: tier velee with resilient mater verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.05 L, per penetration when pressurized to P, 48.1 psig. Supply nad egbek isolah valves Aud Oe 2.4-inch Supression Chen'loe# fofgt. Sugplg uck exkue,t *l5ol&hion VAlVd S ducs Mte.
6-inch nMv o3en supply ~ VAIVe fxhauf valve,is n94. required Ao be sealey'
[*Ttyaf29-in ywel) pu,rge Injoard s
j O.;.
fing' perigds of fonta'inment presdureMntrol.J4ncp4 Tent line/ypasyvalv dur I closefd. d ay be' opened iVseries with the
/
/
HOPE CREEK 3/4 6-11
ENCLOSURE 1
([)TOPARAGRAPH3.6.1.8:
INSERT The drywell and suppression chamber purge system may be in operation with the supply and exhaust isolation valves in one supply line and one exhaust line open for prepurse cleanup or de-inerting.
For inerting, both the drywell and suppression chamber exhaust lines may be opened in
~
addition to the nitrogen supply line through valves GS-HV-4978, GS-HV-4956, and GS-HV-4958.
INSERT ([):
Action:
a.
With a drywell and/or suppression chamber purge supply 4
and/or exhaust isolation and/or nitrogen supply valve open, except as permitted above, close the valve (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
1
, - ~
-. ~
p TA8LE 3.6.3-1 (C:ntinued) 5 A
PRIMARY CONTAIPMENT ISOLATION VALVES k
MAXIMUM p
PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE FUNCTION AND NUpWER NUMBER (Seconds)
NOTE (S)
P&ID Outside:
Loop A: HV-9531A1 (G8-V048)
P8B 60 3
Loop B: Hy-9531A3 (GB-V070)
P38A 60 3
(b) Chilled Water from Drywell Coolers Isolation Valves M-87-1 Inside:
Loop A: HV-953182 (GB-V082)
P8A 60 3
Loop B: HV-9531B4 (G8-V084)
P388 60 3
Outside:
l R
Loop A: HV-9531A2 (G8-V046)
P8A 60 3
Loop B':
HV-9531A4 (GB-V071)
P388 60 3
1 N
- 11. Group 11 - Recirculation Pump System (a) Recirculation Pump Seal Water Isolation Valves M-43-1 Outside:
Loop A: HV-3800A (BF-V098)
P19 45 3
Loop 8: HV-38006 (BF-V099)
P20 45 3
- 12. Group 12 - Containment Atmosphere Control System (a) Drywell Purge Supply Isolation Valves M-57-1 Outside:
HV-4956 (GS-V009)
P22 45' 6 38 HV-4979 (GS-V021)
P22/220 M6 N8 g
n
{
(b) Drywell Purge Exhaust Isolation Valves M-57-1 Outside:
c=
HV-4951 (GS-V025)
P23 15 3
5 HV-4950 (GS-V026)
P23 E6 3, 8 g
HV-4952 (GS-V024)
P23 1& 5 3, 8 G
G O
k TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)
PRINARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 2,
MAXIMUM A
PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER NUMBER (Seconds)
NOTE (S)
P&ID (c) Suppression Chamber Purge Supply Isolation Valves M-57-1 1
Outside:
HV-4980 (GS-V020)
P22/P220 pf F 3, 8 HV-4958 (GS-V022)
P220 6
3, 8 i
(d) Suppression Chamber Purge Exhaust Isolation Valves M-57-1 Outside:
HV-4963 (GS-V076)
P219 15 3
HV-4962 (GS-V027)
P219 Ff F 3, 8 g
HV-4964 (GS'V028)
P219 pf F 3, 8 1
?
(e) Nitrogen Purge Isolation Valves M-57-1 5
Outside:
HV-4974 (GS-V053)
J7D/J202 45 3
HV-4978 (GS-V023)
P22/P220 pf F 3, 8
- 13. Group 13 - Hydrogen /0xygen (H2/02) Analyzer System (a) Drywell H2/02 Analyzer Inlet Isolation Valves M-57-1 l
Outside:
Loop A: HV-4955A (GS-V045)
J9E 45 3
~
HV-4983A (GS-V046)
J9E 45 3
i j
HV-4984A (GS-V048)
J10C 45 3
E
]
HV-5019A (GS-V047)
J10C 45 3
P I
E Outside:
c:
I Loop B:
HV-49558 (GS-V031)
J3B 45 3
l HV-4983B (GS-V032)
J3B 45 3
g i
HV-49848 (GS-V034)
J7D/J202 45 3
HV-50198 (GS-V033)
.J70 45 3
l
ENCLOSURE 1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This Ifmitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of j
the unit.
Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 48,1 psig in the event of a LOCA.
A visual 1
inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
l 3/4.6.1.6 DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on drywell and suppression chamber internal pressure ansure that the containment peak pressure of 48.1 psig does not exceed the design pressure of 62 psig during LOCA conditions or that the external i
pressure differential does not exceed the design maximum external pressure differential of 3 psid.
The limit of -0.5 to +1.5 psig for initial positive containment pressure will ifait the total pressure to 48.1 psig which is less than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analysis.
3/4.6.1.7 DRYWELL AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE J
The limitation on drywell average air temperature ensures that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 340*F during LOCA conditions and is consistent with the safety analysis.
The 135'F average temperature is conducive to normal and long term operation.
l 3/4.6.1.8 DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE SYSTEM l
Vo-lVd--
~ 3 w G inch n,ebwywi suppl 3 The-edbeeed.26-inch and ew4beeed-24-inch [drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valvesYare required to be de-1ed closed during i
. plant operationg 'n : three va'":: he.; ::t 5::- in:::tra' ' ~
' cle-h;;
~
u
- -<-4--
- '--- --i -
- g --._-- u h.--i, thal. " c[s's'Iv' ua5t.'sobadabi[
2._1__
- ~. n -
- T'io2ddurinbha'i/peratio l
e c
n ensur inadver/rovid matedals will not be rele' ed via e cont nment rge sy em.
To t
ently ene that t 26-inc and th 24-jnc valves annot b assurance / sealed ttye'y are losed i accor nce wit Standa Revie Plan 6.
4, wh h i
hclud mech ical de ces to eal or ock th valve osed, o preve powey l.
rom t ing s plied t the v ve oper or.
/
PrePr$e.- c. lea nuP 3 Pr*
- 5"* '
excep as recjaired Gr ineA3,lve.s are quaJ;&M do clo"-
. ce4rol, a.nct ck-ineA$. These.
va PosMion) Ach M*c Loch l
wMWa 5 seconds of
-the. onse4 oG a.
Cso Ge4,
.The rec,oVeneds c4 Bruch Teddca.e
" Con 4ashee**
Por g Dor'ing Morma PIawf Opea h "-
{
HOPE CREEK 8 3/4 6-2
ENCLOSURE 1 N
C CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE SYSTEM (Continued)
' Tile se of e drywell and suppr ssion cha ber purge lines for pressure ingexcepion,theinoard26-ipn valve on control s rest cted wit the foll hen used n conjuncti n with th 2-inch the dr ell pu e outlet ent line purg outlet nt line ypass val e since t 2-inch val es will c se during aL A or st am line eak acci nt and th efore the s te boundar dose delines f 10 CF art 100 ould not b exceeded i the event f an accid t ring pur ing ope tions.
addition ue to the li ited flow rate throug the
-inch b ass val e, the in oard 26-inc valve is a o capabl of closing nder these c ndition.
The de gn of the inch purge upply and xhaust iso tion valve meets e require ents of Bra ch Technica Position B 6-4,
)
" Con inment uraing D ing Normal lant Operat'ons".
/
Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops.
The 0.60 L leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the l$akage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetr,ations subject to Type B and C tests.
3/4.6.2.
DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS The specifications of this section ensure that the primary containment pressure will not exceed the design pressure of 62 psig during primary system blowdown from full operating pressure.
The suppression chamber water provides the heat sink for the reactor coolant system energy release following a postulated rupture of the system.
The suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during reactor coolant system blowdown from 1020 psig.
Since all of the gases in the drywell are purged into the suppression chamber air space during a loss of coolant accident, the pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, the suppressi'on chamber maximum internal design pressure.
The design volumq of the suppression chamber, water and air, was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be considered is discharged to the suppression chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression chamber.
Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in this specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is approximately 48.1 psig which is below the design pressure of 62 psig.
Maximum water volume of 3 results in a downcomer submergence of 3.33 ft and the minimum volume 122,000 ft 3 results in a submergence of approximately 3.0 ft.
The majority of 118,000 ft of the Bodega tests were run with a submerged length of four feet and with complete condensation. Thus, with respect to the downcomer submergence, this specification is adequate.
The maximum temperature at the end of the blowdown HOPE CREEK B 3/4 6-3
ENCLOSURE 2 VENT / PURGE VALVE QUALIFICATION AND OPERABILITY The enclosures to this submittal include the Hope Creek.:
FSAR and Technical Specification revisions that reflect the qualification and operability of the drywell and suppression chamber vent / purge valves within the Containment Atmosphere Control System (CACS) during plant operational conditions 1,
2, and 3.
These changes are a result of our analysis and evaluation of the effects of a LOCA during containment purging on the safety-related equipment outboard of the 24-inch and 26-inch containment vent / purge pipe connection from the drywell and pressure suppression chamber (torus).
In addition, our analysis evaluates the radiological dose rate impact at the site boundary and in the control room resulting from a LOCA during containment purging.
The containment vent / purge isolation valves were analyzed based on the short-term containment pressure response following a recirculation line break LOCA, Hope Creek FSAR Figure 6.2-3; maximum drywell peak pressure 48.1 psig (62.8 psia) with a blowdown mixture of steam-water-gas.
The maximum time for valve closure was limited to five seconds to assure that the purge valves would be closed before the onset of fuel failures following a LOCA and to limit the pressurization in the reactor building.
Our initial analysis indicated that the rapid pressurization of the drywell and torus due to a recirculation line break LOCA would have caused the rupture pressure limit of the Containment Prepurge Cleanup System (CPCS) ductwork to be exceeded and caused excessive pressurization of the Filtration, Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS) dampers, HD-9372A&C.
To offset this increase in pressurization, blow-out panels, set to open at a ductwork to room pressure differential of 1 psi, are being added upstream of the supply purge valves and downstream of the exhaust valves.
These panels will lower the pressure rise across the FRVS dampers, HD-9372A&C, to within acceptable limits and maintain the integrity of the CPCS ductwork.
The blowdown of the drywell/ torus fluid through these blow-out panels will pressurize the room in which the blowdown takes place and any connecting compartments.
(See Attachment 1 and enclosed drawings)
The analysis showed that during the purging and CPCS operations, the flow paths from the torus and drywell areas must be limited to a total of one supply line and one exhaust line from both areas to avoid over-pressurization.
ENCLOSURE 2 To protect the performance of the FRVS following a LOCA,.
the FRVS -isolation dampers that are currently activated -
by a 2-inch water gauge differential pressure between the torus compartment and the adjacent compartments, are being refitted with similar model pressure differential switches with a set point slightly greater than 1 psid.
The analysis showed that if a LOCA occurred and vented for 5 seconds, the maximum differential pressures in the torus compartment and connecting rooms, and in the FRVS rooms would reach 0.97 psi and 0.64 psi, respectively.
Therefore, FRVS performance is unaffected because these pressures will not close the isolation dampers.
Also, secondary containment is maintained because these pressures are below the 1.5 psi differential set pressure of the main torus compartment blow-out panels.
Hope Creek has evaluated the effects of the room pressurization discussed above on the ducts and equipment in the subject rooms and concludes that there will be no unacceptable effects on the integrity of the ducts or operability of equipment.
The effects on the FRVS filter units by the steam and nitrogen blowdown from the CPCS ducts during the 5 seconds of purge valve closure was evaluated.
At the time that the FRVS filter units start, the rooms where blowdown takes place are conservatively considered to reach 100% RH due to the steam release.
This will result in relative humidity at the FRVS filters of less than the design conditions.
Our evaluation also included the radiological dose assessment due to the LOCA mass blowdown through the CPCS duct blow-out panels.
Assuming that the releases are unfiltered from the drywell to the environment during the 5 second purge valve closure time, with the coolant concentrations based on data in FSAR Chapter 15 and using a calculated pre-existing iodine spiking factor, it is estimated that the resultant thyroid dose at the site boundary is 0.01 Rem.
The control room thyroid dose is estimated to be 1.0 x 10-5 Rem.
These doses are well below the 10CFR100 and GDC19 dose' criteria.
ENCLOSURE 2 The containment vent / purge isolation valves (See Attachment
- 2) were procured from the BIF Valve Company with Matryx air-actuators.
Even though these valves differ in size, they have been manufactured using similar materials, valve body styles and air-actuator models (See Enclosed Vendor Drawings).
To assure that the 26-inch and 24-inch valves close in less than 5 seconds, the tubing size was increased from 1/2-inch to 3/4-inch between the solenoid and the actuators' hydraulic cylinder, and the tubing was rerouted to decrease the number of fittings.
Based on the closure time documented in the Wyle Laboratories Test Report No.
47962-1 (Attachment 3) and Hope Creek's surveillance testing, all the containment vent / purge valves close in less than 5 seconds.
These safety-related, Class 2, non-NSSS active containment vent / purge valves (See FSAR Figure 6.2-29), meet the design criteria indicated in FSAR Section 3.9.3.2.7.2.
To demonstrate valve operability, the 26-inch valve was tested to the postulated recirculation line break LOCA condition at Wyle Laboratories as documented in Test Report No. 47962-1.
The 26-inch test specimen included a 26-inch BIF valve with a Greer Rotary Actuator, Model No. 45122-SR-80 and a 3/4-inch ASCO solenoid valve to control the actuator.
This test setup resembled the components used at Hope Creek.
The tubing design between the hydraulic actuator cylinder and solenoid was revised to resemble the Hope Creek plant modifications stated above.
Note that Matryx sold their product line of air-actuators to Greer Company.
As documented in Table I of the Wyle Report, the 26-inch valve assembly, subjected to saturated steam, closed against a differential pressure ranging from 57.7 psia to 131.7 psia in 3.92 seconds. is a graphical diagram comparing the recirculation line break LOCA pressure curve with the pressure output data obtained from the Wyle test.
In conclusion, the referenced test has demonstrated the conservatism in the design of the containment vent / purge valve assemblies at Hope Creek and thus demonstrates valve operability.
J
e ATTACHMENT I (SHEE.~T 1) z CPCS z
VENT PURGE N,,
TO ATMOS.
9 I1 FRVVRBVS
" HV-49'is EDtHAt/ST 2"
NY-4951 MAIN HEADER N
TORUS
-._ BLOW-OOT PAN EL g
HV-4950 f-
%QI
/
g- _ _
y HD-9372A HV-4952 i
HV-49'I9 l
DRYWELL I3 IN
/ p'l I
I -~-'---~~~~1
)
I I
FRVS/RBVS
[
l 1 HV-4956 l
SUPPLY U
I l
[
l PSI l
HEADER U
I I
L-~-
I y
x-If"'I
[12TYP.)l HV-4%1
--d I/H/l **~
g_ il w
4 HV 4%4 I
l l
HV-4356 HD-9372C 1 PSI TORUS I
a 6
l MN
[*
TORUS 1
C PD-9438H u - - - - - - - - - - - - - _
COMPARTMENT-__.-___________________l PD-9 43BG AMD CONNECTING RCOMS FRVS
=
=
- REClRC,
ATTACH MB.NT I
(SWEET 2) tor.05 CoR1 PAP-T MENT AMD CoMNecTING PcoMS W tTH B lowl-O UT PAN E.L LO CATI oMG
[j [
3 B LOW.
q%. 9o#
OUT 4
5 6
PANELS 4-i
, I '.'.,
E L.135' f
f
!I Y
E L.162' ~ m'
/ VMi-M'Mjd.....:.
l EL
..'-.m
\\,
\\
TsCS:P7
- E L.102*
l l
(GEM E 4A L.
LocArioMS i
oy Ly
-EL.102'
/
k
[
I TORUS
~
j NORTH N E L. 54' IJDT AM FSAR CHAtJ6ie.
ONLY RWCU VENTING COMPARTMENTS ARE SHOWN HOPE CREEK FOR CLARITY.
ENE R ATING STATION j jflW FETY $$YSIS REPpMT
@ - DV(TWORK. Blow-0UT PAMEL VLFRESSUM1TMPER$TKE i
NRANSIENT ANALYSISMO OR ChnElc ANDEWCy i
@ - %E FSAR. FIGOstE. 3 b - l~i BRE KSOUTSIDU'C MTAINME wira,a Tae. awao5so 594.
CHAM 6ELG FIGURE 3.644 AMENDMENT 7,08/94 l
l
i ATTACHMENT 2 CONTAINMENT VENT / PURGE ISOLATION VALVES VALVE TAG BlF VALVE MATRYX OPER.
VENDOR DWG.
ITEM N O.
SIZE MODEL NO.
No.
1 G5-HV-49 50 26" 45l12-SR 80 5
3 1.3 l-GS-HV-4952.
I-GS-HV-4956 l-GS-HV 49'19 y
V u
y ass sos a-l-Gs-HV-4978 6"
26051-SR 80 q
y y
y