ML20198L304
| ML20198L304 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198L287 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-7002-97-09, 70-7002-97-9, NUDOCS 9710240302 | |
| Download: ML20198L304 (11) | |
Text
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r U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Docket No:
70 7002 Cortificate No:
GDP 2 l
1 Report No:
70 7002/97009(DNMS)
Facility Operator:
United States Enrichment Corporation Facility Name:
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location:
3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Piketon, OH 45661 Dates:
September 11 13,1997 Inspectors:
T. Reidinger, Senior Fuel Facilities inspector -
R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst C. Blanchard, Fuel Facilities inspector J. Foster, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst Approved By:
P. L Hiland, Chief, Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety n
9710240302 971020 PDR ADOCK 07007002 C
PDR vn..
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Inspection Report 70 7002/97009(DNMS)
This inspection included evaluation of performance during the plant's exercise of the Emergency Plan by regionalinspectors.
Biennial Emeroency Prenaredness Exercise Overall performance during the 1997 Emergency Preparedness exercise demonstrated that the onsite Emergency Plan (EP) was adequate and that the certificatee's staff were capable of implementing the EP by correctly classifying scenario emergencier, notifying offsite agencies of the classified event, activating emergency facilities, providing protective action recommendations when warranted and taking accident mitigation actions, interfacility transfers of command and control of event response were orderly and timely.
The Plant Control Facility staff promptly responded to the liquid cylinder drop.
Notification and accountability were not conducted per the EP which resulted in two inspection followup items (IFI). (Section 1.1.b.1)
The lack of command and control by the incident Commander created confusior, in the command post which resulted in one IFl. (Section 1.1.b.2)
The computer support room staff in the emergency operations centor (EOC) compantly monitored and plotted plume release locations using actual meteorological data. The modeling software program adequacy was identified as an IFl. (Section 1.2.b.3)
The crisis manager (CM) performance in the EOC was strong.
(Section 1.2.bA)=
The performance of the technical support room staff in the EOC was good, strong technical recommendations were implemented in mitigating the accident.
(Section 1.2.b.5)
The delayed removal of the two material handlers and the Health Physic technicians was identified as an IFl. The actual safety of the two Fire Brigade team members due to heat stress and the safety of the " simulated" victim coupled with the lack of
-timely rescua assistance was identified as an IFl. In addition, the lack of effective contamination control was identified as an IFl. (Section 1.2.b.6)
The self assessment critiques were comprehensive snd essentially mirrored the NRC evaluation team's conclusions. (Section 1.2.b 7)
The scenario and exercise control was adequate. (Section 1.2.b.8) 2
Report Details 1.0 Ernergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation 1.1 Review of Exercise Obiectives and Scenario (82302. 88050)
The inspectors reviewed the 1997 exercise objectives and scenario and determined that they were acceptable. The scenario provided an appropriate framework to demonstrate the certificatee's staff capabilities to implement the EP. The scenario included a large uranium hexafluoride (UF.) release and several staff exposures.
1.2 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness 1.2.1 1997 Evaluated Biennial Emeroencv Preoaredness Exercise a.
Insoection Scone (82301. 08050)
On September 12,1997, the certificatee conducted a biennial exercise involving partial State participation and full county participation. The exercise was l
conducted to test major portions of the onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. The onsite emergency response organization and emergency response facilities were fully activated.
The inspectors evaluated performance of the emergency response personnelin the following areas.
Plant Control Facility (PCF)
Incident Commander (IC) and Command Post (CP)
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
EOC Technical Support Room and Computer Support Room Field Response Teams The inspectors assessed the certificatee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, and the overall im#ementation of the Emergency Plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post exercise critiques in each of these areas and the subsequent controller critique, to evaluate the self-assessment of exercise performance.
Emeroency Resoonse Facility Observations and Findinas b.1.
Plant Control Facility (PCF)
- The plant shift supervisor (PSS) received the initial accident report of the liquid cylinder drop and the release of uranium hexafluoride (UF,) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) via routine monitoring of onsite radio transmissions. In addition, the PSS was informed immediately via an onsite 911 call that a liquid UF, cylinder had been dropped in X-34.3 cylinder cos;ing area and was leaking. The inspectors noted that 3
the PSS im nediately made the appropriate site emergency radio broadcast of the release in progress. The PSS then reviewed the location of the cylinder on the central control center's (CCC) site area map and discussed pertinent westher information with the assistance plant shif t supervisor (APSS) and safety vfficer (SO) before going to the accident scene. The PSS then assumed the dual duties of Incident Commander (IC)/ Crisis Manager (CM) at the scene in accordance with the EP. (See Section B.2)
In the PCF emergency conditions were recognized and classified properly according to known information, in a timely manner, utilizing the emergency action level i
procedure, initial state and local notifications by the assistant PSS (APSS) were concise, but did not contain sufficient currently known information to adequately inform and utert the offsite authorities of the present quantity of UF released or e
any potential recommendations for offsite protective actions associated with the release. During offsite notifications, terminology was included in the initial notification message, i.e., the "343 complex," which was unfamiliar to offsite authorities.
The APSS in the PCF did not utilize the notification procedure, XP EP-EP1033.
Rev.1, dated November 3,1995. The procedure contained a checklist to be utilized for initial notifications as Appendix B, "Offsite Notification Checklist." Instead, the APSS utilized the exercise telephone list (not normally available) as a notification checklist. The exercise telephone list did not contain a telephone listing for the NRC headquarters operation center. Therefore, the NRC was not notified during the initial round of notifications performed in the PCF. The Alert was declared at 1526 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.80643e-4 months <br /> and the APSS announced at 1536 hours0.0178 days <br />0.427 hours <br />0.00254 weeks <br />5.84448e-4 months <br /> that offsite notifications were complete (except for the news media); however, the notification status board in the EOC indicated that the NRC was notified at 1607 hours0.0186 days <br />0.446 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.114635e-4 months <br />,41 minutes later. Plant wide accountability was promptly requested by the APSS but the accountability status reports were not accomplished by various onsite organizations within the time frame specified in the EP implementing procedure. The failure to complete the accountability report in a timely manner was identified as an Inspection Followup item (IFI) (70-7002/97009-01).
Documentation provided after the exercise, indicated that the individual listed as contacted on the notification form was the State Liaison Officer in Region 111, rather than the Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) in the operations center.
Interviews with plant staff confirmed that the EP training included the notification procedure and the use of the associated checklist, the notification information excluding site-specific jargon, the requirement to notify the HOO in the NRC operations center as soon as possible following notification of offsite authorities.
The failure to notify the NRC operation center in a timely manner was identified as an IFl (70-7002/97009-02).
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b.2 incident Command;r (lC) and Command Post (CP)
I The IC met the emergency response teams shortly af ter leaving the PCF, and a
- briefing was conducted regarding the approximate size and general direction of the HF plume. The IC appropriately established the Command Post (CP) location upwind of the release in progress. Shortly af ter this discussion, the IC declared the event an " Alert" and requested the activation of the EOC. Within two minutes of declaring the event an " Alert " the IC was informed that the cylinder had a
" catastrophic failure." The IC correctly reclassified the Alert as a " Site Area Emergency" and promptly communicated the change to the PCF.
Once the CP was established, the IC requested that the Field Team Coordinator (FTC) monitor the CP area for HF levels and radiological contamination. Shortly after the FTC informed the IC that minimum (above background) HF levels at the CP were detected, the CP was relocated approximately 150 yards west of the its initial location.
The FTC as directed by the IC, maintained an accurate and informative site status board. This status board addressed the following:
Boundary for contamination and HF restricted area Accountability and entry / exit time of emergency response staff that were in the hazard area Names, locations, and medical condition of victims Appropriate meteorologicalinformation The inspectors noted that the FTC demonstrated a thorough knowledge and understanding of his responsibilities in the EP.
The inspectors noted that the Security Protective Force (SPF) coordinated with the IC appropriately in preventing access past established roadblocks durir'g the release, in addition, the IC did not allow additional emergency response teams into the restricted area until appropriate backup emergency response teams were in place.
The Health Physics (HP) staff continuously monitored the CP for contamination.
The inspectors observed that the IC failed to take control of the decontamination area, staging area for emergency response staff, and monitoring areas which resulted in general confusion among the emergency response staff. On numerous occasions, the inspectors noted that the Fire Brigade (FB) and HP response activities were in conflict due to inadequate work areas at the CP Weak command and control functions by the sectional commanders were observed in their respective areas.
The inspectors noted that the IC appeared to be overwhelmed because he failed to delegate various field responsibilities to the sectional commanders. The IC rarely delegated tasks to the sectional commanders; Fire Chief, SPF Chief, HP manager, and FTC. The inspectors noted that the IC was often confused and distracted because he was in the process of receiving guidance from the EOC on the portable 5
phone, constant calls on the hand held radio, and verbal status reports from various sectional commanders. Specifically, the inspectors noted that FTC was relaying changes in HF levels when the IC was on the portable phone communicating with the EOC. As a result, the IC failed to hear the new information regarding HF levels until the FTC brought this issue to his attention again. The inspectors noted that the Response Safety Officer (RSO) and other sectional commanders f ailed to provide status updates to the IC until the IC asked them for recommendations or directed them to take specific actions. The failure of the IC to command and -
control the CP and delegate responsibilities to the sectional commanders in a timely manner was identified as an IFl(70 7002/97009 03).
b.3 EOC Comouter Suomort Room Computer Support Room staff generated HF plume maps using the ALOHA plume modeling program. Meteorological data was updated on a fif teen minute basis.
The computer operator promptly generated a new HF plume map when the meteorological data changed significantly. Wind direction and speed changed frequently, requiring the frequent generation of plume maps. The inspectors noted that the ALOHA program used a gaussian plume model rather than a segmented plume model. As a result, the program " anchored" the HF release to the release i
point, even after the cylinder release had halted. The program was unable to model the affects of wind speed and direction on the " detached" plume after the release was halted. Although the model was ineffective in tracking the actual plume release, no adverse effects were noted on the actual mitigation strategy. The evaluation of the Aloha plume release model for adequacy by the certificatee will be tracked as IFl (70 7002/97009 04),
b.4 Crisis Manaaement - Emeraency Ooerations Center (EOC)
Transfer..r command and control of emergency responsibilities from the IC/CM to the EOC's Crisis Manager (CM) was orderly and timely. The CM made a formal announcement that he had assumed command and control of the emergency response activities. The CM conducted periodic and effective briefings that kept EOC staff aware of current information on relevant, simulated chemical and radiological conditions and plant status. Emergency response managers in the EOC proficiently assisted the CM by utilizing appropriate procedures, including appropriate response checklists, EP and EPIP.
When scenario controllers advised the CM at 1828 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00302 weeks <br />6.95554e-4 months <br /> that the exercise could be terminated, the CM made the decision to continue the exercise for an additional 43 minutes to allow an adequate demonstration of the Recovery and Reentry procedures. Recovery planning was well demonstrated at the end of the exercise, utilizing the appropriate procedure. Short and long term planning and recovery operations were appropriately addressed. in addition, the inspectors observed that the recovery team identified various issues during the recovery phase for additional actions.
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Several press releases that were draf ted for transmittal to other f acilities were corrected by the CM when errors were identified, this ensured the accurate release of current plant status. During the emergency response, the CM adequately briefed the NRC Site Team Leader.
1 b.S EOC Technical Suncort Room (TSR)
The EOC TSR staff demonstrated effective communication and teamwork. The TSR Coordinator briefed the staff at frequent intervals. Procedures and checklists were effectively utilized.
The TSR staff used printed ALOHA plume maps to track the HF plume release locations. When meteorological conditions were changing rapidly, the printed maps did not reflect current information available at the ALOHA monitor in the EOC CSR.
As a result, the staff was not immediate aware of the change in plume location.
The inspectors were informed that the monitor capable of displaying the ALOHA model was currently on order. The TSR staff recognized that shif ting winds created the potential for the HF plume to involve the entire site, and that the EOC building could be impacted by the HF plume. Recommendations were made by the TSR staff to alert site personal and shut down heating, ventilating and air conditioning units in affected buildings.
The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) documents were appropriately utilized during technical reviews, As an example, it was identified that similar cylinders were undergoing heating at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion plant (PGDP). A simulated call to PGDP was made to alert them of the cylinder failure.
The EOC staff only had one " white board," i.e., status board, available which was used to provide status on personnelinjuries. As a result, no technicalissues were assigned to appropriate individuals and related resolutions were not tracked. The CM indicated that a " priority" status board would have appropriately focused f
attention on priority technicalissues. On several occasions, the inspectors observed that the EOC status boards contained information that was later determined to be incorrect by the CM, i.e., the status board indicated that a second plume was observed 40 minutes after ruptured cylinder had been "pa.ched." The inspectors were informed that it had been past practice to record on the status boards information monitored off the site radio network without independent verification. Discussions with the CM indicated that this practice and related procedures will be revised accordingly after review, b.6 Field Resoonse Teams The emergency response staff respondad rapidly to the accident scene in assisting the IC to set up the CP. The fire brigade (FB) and IC arrived within five minutes of the plant wide announcement declaring a plant emergency based on the ruptured liquid cylinder. A scenario controller at the CP properly declared one reentry field 7
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team member contaminated from the knee down af ter he stepped out of his environmental suit into a contaminated area near the CP.
A request was made to provide transport of two HP technicians who had been exposed to the HF release from the ruptured cylinder, it took 27 minutes fo' the FB team to respond to the request, in addition, the two material bandlers whu had been working during cylinder operations and involved in the plume were not located or attended to in a timely manner. The FB team responsible for locating the material handlers was dispatched more than one hour after the initial emergency announcement and approximately 41 minutes af ter the HP technicians were located. The delaycd removal of the two material handlers ano the HP technicians was identified as an IFl (70-7002r97009 05).
The inspectors identified a safety concern regarding the two FB team members who had to terminate their exercise participation due to heat stress af ter carrying the first material handler v;ctim almost 500 yards over a period of 17 minutes. After the FB team members made several requests for assistance, additional FB team members recognized that help was needed and they performed firema i carries of the first material handler the remaining 150 feet. Additionally, the actual safety of the " simulated" victim was compromised due to the heat stress condition of the FB team members inside the environmental suits. While transferring the second material handler from the back board to a gumey, only two FB members were available to perform the carry. The victim was not secured to the back board and it took extreme effort to move the victim without dropping him. The probability of dropping a victim was high. The IC and sectiona! commanders failed to l
immediately recognize these hazards. Timely assistance was not provided to the FB team members in moving the victims either by vehicle, or with additional FB team members dressed out in environmental suits. The actual safety of the two FB team members due to heat stress and the safety of the " simulated" victim coupled with the lack of timely rescue assistance was identified as an IFl (70 7002/97009-06).
Contamination control of returning field reentry teams was inadequate. Field team members were observed stepping with their stocking feet in a location where they had removed their environmental suits and other suits before them. Also, team members were observed using a broom handle to balance while removing the environmental suits. They started by holding the handle with the suit's rubber glove, then holding the same contaminated handle with the cloth glove liner, then using the same cloth glove liner to pull pant legs out of the environmental suit and potentially contaminating the pant legs.
A HP technician used a pancake probe to survey reentry team members. The pancake probe was dropped on the contaminated side of the decontamination area.
The pancake probe was then used to survey arriving environmental suited reentry team members. The potentially contaminated probe was not recognized by the HP technician, in addition, the inspectors observed that during surveys of reentry team members that the pancake probes were often dragged on the surface of the protective clothes being surveyed, probably contaminating the probes. The lack of effective contamination control was identified as a IFl (70-7002/97009 07).
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4 b.7 Whi_qqqn Critiques were held in each facility immediately following the exercise. Participants were actively oncouraged to identify positive and negative issues. A subsequent participant critique, held at the X 1000 building, produced few additional comments. A controller critique was conducted following the participant critiques.
'ssues of significance were entered onto problem report fo ms for entering into the corre.we action system. Plant staff critiques were considered highly effective.
b.8 Scenario an'd Exercise Control The ruptured cylinder mock up was effective. Use of smoke bombs and CO, fire extinguishers provided additional realism, and the signs provided additional information by indicating the duration and density of the HF plume.
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The inspectors determined that the scenario was adequate to test basic emergency j
capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. The scenario was challenging with respect to how rapidly plant conditions degraded to warrant a Sito j
Area Emergency declaration, i
c.
Conclusions j-The exercise was an adequate demonstration of the certificatee's capabilities to implement its emergency plans and procedures._ Event classifications were correct
' and timely. Offsite notifications were adequate. Transfers of command and control were appropriately coordinated with one exception. The IC did not effective _ly delegate responsibilities to the sectional commanders. Tht sctional commanders failed to take ownership of their emergency response activities. The lack of command and control of the CP hindered the timeliness and coordination of the emergen:y response activities. The seven IFis in aggregate, that identified multiple performance weaknesses in the emergency response organization, appear to be a result of inadequate EP training program. These IFis will remain open pending
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review of corrective actions.
p V. Manaoement Meetinas j
X1 Exit Meetino Summarv j
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the facility management on Saptember 13,1997. The facility staff acknowledged the findings presented.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Lockheed Martin Utility Services (LMUS)
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- D. I. Allen, General Manager
'J. B. Morgan, Enrichment Plant Manager i
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- R. W. Gaston, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager
'C. W. Sheward, Maintenance Manager
- R. D. McDermott, Operations Manager United States Enrichment Corooration
- L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on September 13,1997.
INSPECTION PROCEDU3ES USED IP 82301 Evaiuation of Exercises for power reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors IP 88050 Emergency Preparedness ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Qoened 70-7002/97009-01 IFI The failure to complete the accountability report in a tirr v
manner.
f 70-7002/97009-02 IFl The faliure to notify the NRC operation center in a timely manner.
70-7002/97009-03 IFl The failure of the IC to command and control the CP and delegate responsibilities to the sectional commanders in a timely manner.
70-7002/97009-04 IFl The evaluation of the Aloha plume release model for adequacy by the certificatee.
70-7002/97009-05 IFl The delayed removal of the two material handlers and the HP technicians by the emergency responders.
70-7002/97009-06 IFl The actual safety of the two FB team members due to heat stress and the safety of the " simulated" victim coupled with the lack of timely rescue assistance.
70-7002/97009-07 IFl The lack of etfective contamination control.
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOtiED, AND DISCUSSED (cont *di Closed None Discussed None Certification Issues Closed None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED i
i APSS Assistant Plant Superintendent CM Crisis Manager -
DNMS Division of Nuclear Material Safety EAL Emergency Action Level EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPIP Emergency Plan implementing procedure GDP Gaseous Diffusion Plant IC Incident Commander IFl-Inspection Followup item IP Inspection Procedure JPIC Joint Public Information Center.
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAG Protective Action Guideline PCF Plant Control Facility -
PSS Plant Shift Superintendent PWS Public Warning System RM Recovery Manager SAE Site Area Emergency SAR Safety Analysis Report -
-USEC United States Enrichment Corporation 11