ML20198K046

Discusses Insp on 851112-1227 & Forwards Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $50,000. Mitigation of Civil Penalty Inappropriate Despite Extensive Corrective Actions.Notice Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)

ML20198K046
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	05/20/1986
From:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Agosti F DETROIT EDISON CO.
References
EA-86-066, EA-86-66, NUDOCS 8606030300
Download: ML20198K046 (4)

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r: SIC"ATED ORIGINA MAY 2 01996 Certified By y _

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Docket No. 50-341 -

License No. NPF-33 EA 86-66 The Detroit Edison Company ATTN: Frank E. Agosti Vice President Nuclear Operations 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES

[NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-341/85047(DRSS)]

This refers to the special safeguards inspection conducted during the period November 12 through December 27, 1985 at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2, Newport, Michigan. The results of the inspection were discussed on January 17, 1986 during an enforcement conference between Mr. C. W. Heidel and others of the Detroit Edison staff and Mr. A. B. Davis and others of the NRC Region III staff.

The violations identified during this inspection resulted from the failure of l your management control system to assure adherence to the provisions of your l Commission approved physical security plan and related documents. The number l of problems identified reflect unacceptable levels of management performance l

ar.d programmatic weaknesses in several key areas of the security program.

f While sone of the violations may not be considered significant when viewed individually, the number of such violations makes it imperative that you increase your efforts for sufficient management involvement to assure activities are performed in accordance with established procedures and practices, i

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CERTIFIED MAIL /

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

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! The Detroit Edison Company 2 MAY 2 01986 The NRC is particularly concerned with violation No. 13 which relates to falsification of records by a member of the security guard force. The NRC views falsification of records which are required to be kept to be a serious concern. Such records are required to be kept to enable a licensee to adequately control the safety of its licensed activities. With regard to this part' cular instance, the NRC understands appropriate disciplinary action has bea' taken. Nonetheless, close licensee attention is needed to assure no re.urrence of this problem.

Te emphasize the importance the NRC places on effective management of the security program as well as the importarce of personnel maintaining accurate and complete records required by the se urity plan, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Inspection and Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars (550,000) for the violations described in the enclosed Notice. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1985), the violations described in the enclosed Notice have been classified as a Severity Level III problem. The base value of a civil penalty for a Severity Level III problem or violation is $50,000. The NRC Enforcement Policy allows for reduction of a civil penalty under certain circumstances. Consideration was given to reducing the civil penalty by fifty percent because of your extensive corrective actions which included: (1) increased audit commitments; (2) trend analysis commitments pertaining to access control violstions, maintenance support, and security reportable events; (3) an increased security surveillance program; (4) a detailed 100*. audit of all authorized access records; (5) accelerated activity on Engineering Design Projects pertaining to security systems; and (6) proposed long term corrective actions to address adverse trends, organizational responsibilities, and review and revision of security plans.

However, because of the pervasive nature of the violations and due to the multiple examples of violations in the area of access control, mitigation of the civil penalty is considered inappropriate.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. You should place all Safeguards Information as defined in 10 CFR 73.21 only in enclosures, so that your letter may be placed in the Public Document Room.

In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.

l Inclosure contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Upon separation This Page is Decontrolled E

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1 The Detroit Edison Company 3 NAY 2 01986 The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

Sincerely, Cf ID't::1 y b* Eae'c (,,,7,

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.f James G. Keppler Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties

2. Inspection Report No. 50-341/85047(DRSS)

(UNCLASSIFIED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION) cc w/ enclosures:

L. P. Bregni, Licensing Engineer P. A. Marquardt, Corporate Legal Department cc w/o enclosures:

See Attached Distribution l

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a The Detroit Edison Company 4 huY 2 01986 i

Distribution w/o enclosures:

PDR LPDR SECY CA l ACRS JTaylor, IE RVollmer, IE JKeppler, RIII*

JAxelrad, IE PRobinson, IE*

JLieberman, ELD Enforcement Coordinators RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV FIngram, PA

LCobb, IE VMiller, NMSS RBurnett, NMSS IE File IE/ES NMSS/SGPL NRR/DL/SSPB DCS Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission Harry H. Voigt, Esq.

Nuclear Facilities and Environmental Monitoring Section Monroe County Office of Civil Preparedness w/ Safeguards Information Enclosure Contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATIO Upon Separation This Page is Decontrolled

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-341/85047(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-33 Safeguards Group IV Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2200 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Inspection At: Plant Site and US NRC Region III Office Inspection Conducted: November 12-15; 19-20; December 9-13; and December 18-19, 1985 at site November 21 through December 6 and December 23-27, 1985 at NRC Region III Office Enforcement Conference Conducted: January 17, 1986 at NRC Region III Office Date of Previous Physical Security Inspection: September 30 through October 4, 1985 Type of Inspection: Reactive Physical Security Inspection Inspectors: 4 [ krod,,4 2[7/76 T. J 'deda Da'te '

Phys c 1 Security Inspector l

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. L. Pirtle e/n/es Date hysical Security Inspector i

) k- 3 l *l ib J. R. Kniceley Date l Physical Security Inspector l

Reviewed By: Q 8!#!86

p.R. Creed, Chief Date Safeguards Section Approved By

k qh W.' L. Axersod, Chief Date Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Enclosure contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

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o Inspection Summary Inspection on November 12 through December 27, 1985 (Report No. 50-341/85047(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: This team inspection was conducted to review the licensee's poor performance as indicated by several reportable events and adverse trends noted during the previous inspection and specifically included Management Effectiveness; Security Plan and Implementing Procedures; Security Program Audit; Records and Reports; Testing and Maintenance; Compensatory Measures; Access Control - Personnel; Personnel Training and Qualification - General Requirements; Safeguards Contingency Plan Implementation; and Physical Protection.of Safeguards Information. The inspection involved 248 inspection hours by three NRC inspectors and the Chief, Safeguards Section.

Results: Fourteen potential violations and one licensee identified violation were noted during the inspection effort, to include:

Compensatory Measures: Failure to implement required compensatory measures for a degraded vital area barrier (Section 10.b)

Compensatory Measures: Accessing a Vital area door without implementing required compensatory measures (Section 10.a)

Security Plan and Implementing Procedures: Failure to have a security procedure required by the Security Plan (Section 5)

Records and Reports: Failure to report two security events within time limits required by 10.CF8 73.71(c) (Section 8.b)

Records and Reports: Documentation of some vital area barrier checks was not accurate on three separate dates (Section 8.a)

Records and Reports: Some computerized record data required by the security plan could not be retrieved (Section 8.c)

Testing and Maintenance: Failure to conduct some analyses of alarm systems as required by the security plan (Section 9.a)

Testing and Maintenance: Preventive Maintenance did not meet procedural requirements in scope or effectiveness (Section 9.b)

Testing and Maintenance: Corrective maintenance program often failed to meet time criteria identified in the security plan (Section 9.c)

Access Control - Personnel: Corrective actions to address personnel access control violations have not been effective (Section 11.a)

! Access Control - Personnel: Some security badges were not deleted from l the access control system (Section 11.b) i Access Control - Personnel: On one occasion, security badges were not adequately controlled at a badge issue point (Section 11.c)

Security Force Training and Qualification: The training and certification l qualification time limits were exceeded for some security force members l (Section 12.a) Enclosure contains SA7EGUARDS INFORMAT!0tt l Upon separation this 2 page is Decontrolled'

Physical Protection for Safeguards Information: One document containing Safeguards Information was entered in a data processing system that did not meet security standards required by the licensee's procedures (Section 14)

Access Control - Personnel: Several personnel were granted unescorted access to the site without all screening requirements being completed.

This was identified and corrected by the licenses and no Notice of Violation was issued (Section 11.d)

The licensee's immediate corrective actions were considered adequate to resolve the inspectors' initial concerns for each of these matters. The above potential violations were considered symptomatic of a lack of adequate unified direction for the security program (Section 6). Long term corrective actions will be reviewed after receipt of the licensee's written response to the inspection report.

Additionally, an unresolved item pertaining to reporting certain security events will be sent to NRC, HQ for resolution (Section 4). Open items pertaining to implementation of the security compensatory measure program, the scope of Safeguards Contingency event drills / exercises and security force training were also noted (Sections 10.c, 12, and 13.a).

(Details: UNCLASSIFIED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION)

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