ML20198G908
| ML20198G908 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1986 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| ANPP-34498-EEVB, DER-85-41, NUDOCS 8601300009 | |
| Download: ML20198G908 (3) | |
Text
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P.O DOX $2034
- PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 ANPP-34498-EEVBJr PS-92.12 January 9,1986
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U. S. fuclear Regulatory Commission 4
Regica V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
Subject:
Interim Report - DER 85-41 A 50.55(e) Potentially Reportable Deficiency Relating To Burned Wire Insulation File: 86-019-026; D.4.33.2
Reference:
Telephone Conversation between R. C. Sorenson and T. P. Siegfried on December 9, 1985.
Dear Sir:
The NRC was notified of a potentially reportable deficiency in the ref-crenced telephone conversation. At that time, it was estimated that a determination of reportability would be made within thirty (30) days (January 8,1986).
Due to the extensive investigation and evaluation required, an Interim Report is attached.
It is now expected that this information will be finalized by January 22, 1986, at which time a complete report will be submitted.
Very truly y urs OW W
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President Project Director EEVB/TPS/ldf Attachment cc:
See Page Two 0601300009 860109 PDR ADOCK 05000529 g i S
PDR 1 -41 6
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n ANPM-34498-EEVBJr/TPS-92.12 January 9, 1986 Mr. D. F. Kirsch DER 85-41 Page Two cc:
Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 J. G. Ilaynes (4060)
D. B. Karner (4060)
W. E. Ide (4074)
D. B. Fasnacht (6330)
A. C. Rogers (4056)
L. A. Souza (6195)
T. D. Shriver (6085)
D. E. Fowler (6260)
C. N. Russo (6330)
J. R. Bynum (6125)
J. M. Allen (6130)
D. Canady (6345)
A. C. Gehr (4141)
C. A. liierzer (6330)
W. G. Bingham (6330)
R. W. Welcher (Bechtel/Norwalk)
- 11. D. Foster (6330)
D. R. llawkinson (6330)
R. P. Zimmerman (6241)
M. L. Clyde (6079)
B. T. Parker (6345)
J. Provasoli (4057)
D. N. Stover (4082)
J. D. Ilouchen (6291)
J. E. Kirby (6501)
Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339
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INTERIM REPORT - DER 85-41 POTENTIAL REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT PVNGS UNIT 2, 3 I.
Potential Problem During routine maintenance, it was observed that the field wiring for Valve IJ-SGB-UV-1136B had melted and burned insulation. This condition was documented on EER 85-SG-150.
A subsequent inspection of Valves 1J-SGB-UV-1135A, B and 1136A (under Work Request No. 126081) and Valve IJ-SGA-UV-138A (under Work Request No. 145922) found additional burned field wire insulation.
The field wires are part of the cable routed to these valves to provide solenoid coil power and valve position indication.
The cables are qualified in accordance with IEEE 383 for use inside containment and the cable insulation is rated for 90*C (194*F) conductor temperature. The vendor internal wires are rated 150*C.
The same condition as designed exists in Units 2 and 3.
The high temperature in the valve operator is the result of heat conduction from the connected valve which is subjected to high temperature process fluid. The damaged insulation is due to contact with hot metal parts within the valve operator.
The high temperature damage could result in premature failure of the cable insulation. This could lead to loss of control power to the valve and possibic incorrect valve position indication in the control room.
A survey to determine the extent of potential wire insulation damage was made of all other Q-Class Target Rock valves in each Unit.
II.
Approach To and Status Of Proposed Resolution ANPP is currently evaluating the results of the survey and evaluating the conditions for Reportability and Technical justification for Corrective Action. Valves JSCA-UV-134A and 138A are considered to be safety significant. liigh Temperature KAPTON insulated wire has been installed in Unit
- 1 valves.
III.
Projected Completion of Corrective Action and Submittal of the Final Report The complete evaluation and Final Report are forecast to be completed by January 22, 1986.
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