ML20198G510

Forwards List of Addl Info Needed for Review of PSAR Re Station Design

ML20198G510
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	02/06/1975
From:	Stello V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Deyoung R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-1313 NUDOCS 8605290635
Download: ML20198G510 (4)

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? 4 Qq ig y; UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULA10RY COMMisslON I,

20555 l' W ASHINGTON, D. C. s Docket No. STN 50-503/509 w,5 FG 6 Richard C. DeYoung, Jr.', Assistant Director for LWR's, Gro'up 1 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation PSAR SECOND-ROUND REVIEW: WPPSS 3 & 5,' DOCKET N0. STN 50-508/509 Plant flame: WPPSS-3 & 5 -

Licensing Stage: CP Docket No: STN 50-508/509 f

Responsible Branch & Project Manager: LWR l-3, P. D. O'Reilly Requested Completion Date: January 24, 1975 -

Technical Review Branch Involved: Reactor Systems Description of Request: Final Review Review Status: Second-Round Completed A review of tne WPPSS PSAR is being carried cut to assess the accept-ability of the station design. The NSSS is a Combustion Engineering standard two-loop PWR (CESSAR), with two reactor coolant pumps per loop. The "$tandard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (Rev.- 1)" dated October 1972 is being used as a guideline for the required infornation.

The attached list provides the additional information needed to continue our review. In addition, all of the unresolved items with respect to CESSAR also apply to this application.

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A Victor Stello, Dr., Assistant Director for Reactor Safety

' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

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. 214.0 Reactor Systems Branch 214.1 The system provided for normal shutdowfi cooling must (5.5.7- meet the requirenents of Criterion No. 34 of the General

& 9.2.10) Design Criteria. It must be capable of pdeforming the - j normal shutdoun cooling function from the control room with the system experienclng a single active failure of fluid components or any single active or passive failure of electrical components,. How does the applicant propose to show compliance? s 214.2 Paragraph 6.3.2.17 states that the; perator will restart (6.3) the low pressure safety, injection pumps approximately two hours- following LOCA. What are the consequences if the {

operator fails to accomplish this action?

. Paragraph 6.3.1.5.2 (a) indicates that discharge flow may have to be throttled during the recirculation mode to .

match available NPSH. Has this been determined? Describe the prc:cduro, including controls and monitoring instrumen- s tation. ,

t 214.3 .Your analysis of a steam cenerator tube. rupture (maximum (15.4.3 tleakage) indicates that power operation continees fel

_  ;, . ,816.3.18) app'roximatel'y 12 #inutes before a trip is initiat.e'd,bf s' low D!!B.R. -This resulted in leakabe of about 55000 pounds of reac' tor coolant to the secondary system, with subsequent.

-leakage to the environment via the steam dump valves if~~

, offsite power 16. not.available.

Is there a smaller , leak which could result in a greater ,

amcunt of primary-to-secondary coolant leakage pricr to' detection and subsequent shutdown? If so, what is. the s most adverse leakage rates and what are the consequences-

, , cw A .of the accident? -*

4 Please discuss the; monitoring methods and procedures which would lead to shutdown and assura complianc'e with proposed Technical Specification 16.3.18 ll-131 limits),

214.4 Page 16.3.11 Technical Specification requir(s sufficient (16.3.5) refueling' water tank (RWT) capacity to prevent e Recircu-lation Actuation Signal in less than 18 mhutes eith all ESF pumps operating at rated floss. This is'not con-sistent with sections 6.3.2.2.3 and 6.3.2.2.1 which in-;

dicat'e that suction from the RlU is to continue for a

minimum of 20 minutes before actuation of the recircdiation _

_ mode. .

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Please clarify and provide a summary tabulation of data

- to demonstrate that all of the criteria of Section 9.3.4.

5.2 (1) are satisfied. Include consideration of maximum and minimum pumps operation versus time to reach the recirculation actuation level and summarize the NPSH available versus required for all pumps in the recircula-tion mode.

- 214.5- Page 16.3-20 Technical Specification describes the basis (16.3.6.5) for detection of leaks from-the reactor coolant system.

The monitoring method is given for all items except item A.

Please describe-how the ate of makeup water required will be monitored. .What is.the maximum rate of uncontrolled leakage (e.g., steam generator tube leak) which could go undetected by this method? -

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