ML20198F607
| ML20198F607 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1974 |
| From: | Tedesco R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0963, CON-WNP-963 NUDOCS 8605290017 | |
| Download: ML20198F607 (11) | |
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bo cid r [, c f ER 2 2 1974 Docket 50-460 -
Voss A. Moore, Assistant Director for Light Water Rasetors, Group 2, L FIRST EDUND REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, AUZILIARY AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEMS BRANCH Plant Names Combustion Rngineering CESSAR Standard Safety Analysis (PSAR), NSSS, CENPD-78 Licensing Stage: CP Docket No. 50-460 '
Responsible Branch: LWR 2-3 Project Leader:
G. Rivenbark Requestad completion Date: March 22, 1974 The anclosed first round requests for additional information covers those portious of the Combustion Fngtneering Safety Analysis Report for which the Attrt11mry and Power Conversion Systems Branch has prissary responsi-bility. Some general comments on the improve:aent of the CESSAR have been included.
All questions on items not presently included in the standard format are identified by a double asterisk.
Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Containment Safety Directorate of Licensing
Enclosure:
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AUXILIARY AND PO'cTER CONVERSION SYSTEMS BRANCll FIRST ROUND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COMBUSTION ENGINEERING SYSTEM S0 - CESSAR STANDARD Docket No. 50-460 GENERAL NOTES 1.
A review of the various sections indicates that a better comprehension of the system (s) could be realized (especially for a standard format of this type) if the system (s) descrip-tion (s) was more closely tied in with the referenced diagram (s).
t In addition to what is presently included, a word description and the diagram (s) should take the reader step by step through the entire system (s). The addition of this information in the present format of CESSAR would facilitate better system under-standing and minimize'possible future questions.
2.
Clearly define interfaces (match points) between sequential diagrams.
3.
Maintain same line location and identifying flags from diagram to diagram. This would lead to a more direct use and application of the CESSAR by the reviewer and future applicants who reference CESSAR.
4.
Provide interface criteria for items furnished by Combustion Engineering that interface with structures or components furnished by others, i.e., interface between refueling machine, CEA change platform, spent fuel handling, new fuel elevation and new fuel storage crane.
5.
Several areas in CESSAR indicate "See Applicants SAR" or similar wording. It would be more meaningful and thus standard plant format would be more complete if Combustion Engineering would m.
Indicate what interface or other requirements exist in that area.
If they do end the requirements have been discussed under other sections indicate the sections where the information may be found or provide it in the particular section as it has been done in most cases.
If Combustion Engineering has no requirements or interface responsibility in the particular section so indicate.
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- 3.6 Protection Against Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping 1.
Provide the criteria and basis of design that will be used to preclude the consequences of postulated high and moderate energy piping system ruptures outside the primary containment (cnly those systems furnished by Combustion Engineering) from having an adverse effect on safety related structures, systems or components neces-sary for safe shutdown. Include in the discussion the results of a failure mode and effects analysis relating to systems required for safe shutdown to demonstrate that a current single active compon-ent failure will not produce an unsafe condition.
It is suggested that in preparing the above information you should follow the criteria set forth in !!r. J. O' Leary's letter dated July 12, 1973.
8.3 Onsite Youer Systems 1.
Section 8.3.1 states standby onsite power should be provided by two (2) or more independent standby generators. It is assumed this statement applies for each reactor unit. Clarify this area.
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9.0 Auxiliary Svstems
- 9.01 Provide a tabulation of all valves in the reactor pressure boundary and in other seismic Category I systems (within the scope of CESSAR) as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.29, e.g., safety valves, relief valves, stop valves, stop check valves, control valves whose operation is relied upon either to assure safe plant shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a transient or accident. The tabulation should identify the system in which it is installed, the type and size of valves, the actuation type (s), and the environmental design criteria to which the valves are qualified, as stated in the design specifications.
Where air operated valves are used and furnished with air accumulators provide the design criteria for the air accumulators, air supply system isolation valves and air supply piping from the isolation valves to the accumulator and from the accumulator to the air operated valve.
Also include the interval of time the accumulator will permit v'alve operation in the event of air supply failure.
9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling 1.
Section 9.1.2.4 recommends a cask handling crane of 125 tons.
If the responsibility of providing adequate cask crane handling capacity and fuel pool design lies with the applicant, then the crane recommended capacity and any reference to cask handling should be deleted from the CISSAR.
2.
Section 9.1.3.1.2 indicates that a seismic Category I makeup water source to the fuel pool is provided from the refueling water storage tank.
Is this makeup source used for both normal and emergency conditions?
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3.
Section 9.1.4.2.2 describes various fuel handling machines and other components which are also shown on Figure 9.1.4-1.
CESSAR does not contain a full complement of drawings of the items discussed in Section 9.1.4.2.2 and shown on Figure 9.1.4-1, provide those drawings that are lacking if they are part of the CESSAR scope and if not delete from the CESSAR.
4.
Provide a list (or tabulation) of all major tools and servicing cquipment necessary to perform. the various reactor vessel servicing and refueling functions and indicate whether each is designed to seismic Category I requirements or their storage locations are designed to these requirements.
5.
Provide the design criteria for each crane (or machine) provided by Combustion Engineering and the applicable codes and standards which will be.used in the design, fabrication, installation and testing of crancs, bridges, trolleys, hoists, cables (ropes), lif t-ing hooks, special handling fixtures and slings. Also include a description of the above devices if any have redundant features.
6.
Provide a description of the crane (or machine) control features provided by Combustion Engineering as part of CESSAR.
7.
Provide a description (including discussion of safety features) of each crane (or nachine), provided by Combustion Engineering.
and the degree of compliance with OSHA subpart N Materials Handling and storage of 29 CFR 1910, Section 1910.179. Identify, discuss and provide a basis for any exceptions and/or deviation taken.
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9.2-Water Systems 1.
Section 9.2.2.1 discusses interface requirements for the component cooling water system.
In addition to the data provided, include makeup requirements to the surge tank (s) under the following conditions and considering the criteria set forth in Mr. J. O' Leary's letter of July 12, 1973:
(a) Normal conditions.
(b) Normal shutdown.
(c) Accident condition (SSE, DBA, LOCA).
2.
The component cooling water system is shown on Figures 9.2.2-1 and 9.2.2-2.
Normal makeup supply to the system surge tank (s) is from the demineralized water storage tank. The CCWS is seismic Catego'ry I and is an engineered safeguard system required to function under all modes of operation..For this reason, the staff requires a Category I makeup source to the surge tank (s). The P and ID's should be modified to reflect this requirement.
3.
Verify that the component cooling water system and shutdown cooling water system pumps (RHR) and other safety related system ccaponents are physically located such that they will be unaffected by the maximum probable flood or the consequences of other natural phenomenon associated with their locations.
4.
Tables 9.2.2-3 and 9.2.7-3 indicate the failure mode and effects analyses for the component cooling water system and shutdown cooling water system (RllR). Revise these analyses to comply with the moderate energy line criteria set forth in Mr. J. O' Leary's letter dated July 12, 1973.
. 9.2.5 Ultimate IIcat Sink 1.
.Under section 9.2.5 delete sub-paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shown on page 9.2-29 which duplicate statements in Regulatory Guide 1.27.
Reference to the guide is sufficient.
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10.3. Main Steare System I
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Provide the maximum expected Icakage rate through the main steam I
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isolation valves when closed under the following conditions:
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(a) Steam line break downstream of the valve.
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(b) Steaunline break upstream of the valve.
(c) Reactor on hot standby.
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Section 10.3.1.1 discusses the location of the steam supply line j
to the auxiliary turbina driven feedwater pump. Figure 10.3-1 should j
be corrected to show these connections up to and including the first i
shutoff valve and their seismic classifications.
4 3.
Provide more details of the main steam isolation valves testing 1
program to assure fuactional performance under the worst loading conditions.
Provide an outliae of the inservice testing program.
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