ML20198F279
| ML20198F279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1998 |
| From: | John Miller UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE) |
| References | |
| 70-7001-97-07, 70-7001-97-7, EA-97-431, GDP-97-0215, GDP-97-215, NUDOCS 9801120033 | |
| Download: ML20198F279 (11) | |
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CJ h/t i j LSEC A Global Energy Company JAuts H. MILLER Dir. (301) 564-3309 WCE PRESIDENT, PRODUCTION Far (301) 571-8279 January 7,1998 i
Director, Ollice of Enforcement S!! RIAL: GDP 97 0215 United States Nuclear Regulatory Compilssion Washington, D.C. M555 0001 Paducah Gancous Diffusion Plant (PGDP)
Docket No. 70-7001 Reply to Notice of Violation (NOV) 70 7001/97007 09 (EA 97-431) 1he Nuclear Regulatory Conunission (NRC) letter dated December 8,1997, transmitted the subject NOV which was categorized as Severity 1.evel 111 and was the subject of a predecisional enforcement conference held on October 9,1997. This NOV concerned the United States Enrichment Corporation's. (USl!C) discovery of uncontrolled classified materials outside the Controlled Access Area. USEC's reply to this NOV is provided in Enclosure 1. Unless specifically noted, the corrective actions specified in each enclosure apply solely to PGDP. Additionally, as was noted at the predecisional enforcement conference, the events that led to this NOV were also reviewed for applicability at the Portsmouth site.
As directed by your December 8,1997 letter, Enclosure 2 is a check in the amount of
$55,000 in payment of the civil penalty associated with this violation.
There are no new commitments in this letter since the corrective actions in this submittal reflect those that USEC presented in the predecisional entbreement conference' and in USEC letter GDP 971032 dated September 23,1997, which provided NRC with the Classified hiatter Action Plan.
-f' 9001120033 990107 lllll
'See NRC letter dated November 3,1997, Patrick lliland to J.ll. hiiller, "NRC Predecisional Enforcement Conference Report."
6903 RmLledge Dris e, liethesda. htD 20817-1818 Telephone 301-564 3200 Fax 301464 3201 http://www.mec.com Oks ir, l.itermore. CA Paducah, KY lbmmouth. 01i Washington, DC
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Director, Omcc of Enforcement January 7,1998 ODP 97 0215. Page 2 If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact 11111 Sykes at (502)441-6796.
% cerely,Jl
,11. Miller Vice President. Production
Enclosures:
- 2) USEC Check No.14782 cc:
NitC Itegion til Administrator NitC Senior itesident inspector. PGDP Document Control Desk NitC Special Projects Ilranch
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liNCl.OSUltli 1 UNITl!D STATliS !!NitlCllMl!NT COltPORATION (USl!C) l Iti! PLY TO NOTICl! OF VIOLATlON (NOV) 70 7001/97007 09 i
itestatement of Violation 10 CFit 76.60(1) requires, in part, that the Corporation (certificatee) shall comply with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 95.
10 CFR 95.35(a) requires, in part, that no person subject to the regulations in this part may receive or may permit an individual to have access to matter revealing Confidential Restricted Data unless the individual has a "Q" or "L" access authori7ation.
Contrary to the above, USI!C permitted individuals who did not have either a "Q" or "L" necess authorization to have access to matter revealing Confidential Restricted Data, as evidenced by the
- following examples:
On August 13,1997, a drawing containing Confidential Restricted Data was identitled in the a.
engineering department, a location within the controlled access (fenced) area of the theility, which was not controlled to preclude access to individuals without either "Q" or "L" access authorization. The department was accessible to and routinely occupied by individuals who did not have either "Q" or "I." access authorization.
b.
On August 13,1997, drawings containing Confidential Restricted Data were identified in a trailer located outside the controlled access (fenced) area of the facility which were not controlled. The trailer was accessible to and routinely occupied by individuals who did not have either "Q" or "L" access authorization.
c.
On August 14,1997, a videotape containing Confidential Restricted Data was identified in a trailer located outside the controlled access (fenced) area of the facility which was not controlled. The trailer was accessible to and routinely occupied by :ndividuals who did not have either "Q" or "L" access authori7ation, d.
On September i I,1997, drawings containing Confidential Restricted Data were identified in a location outside the controlled access (fenced) area of the facility which were not controlled. The drawings were in the possession of an individual without either a "Q" or "L" access authori7ation.
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c.
On September 17,1997, a procedure containing Confidential Restricted Data was identified in a location outside the controlled acens (fenced) area of the facility which was not controlled. The procedure was in the possession of an individual without either a "Q" or "L" access authorization.
USEC RESPONSE I.
Introdudien At the predecisional enforcement conference, USEC provided NRC with a detailed chronology of events and actions taken that led up to this NOV. As was discussed at the predecisional enfbreement conference, the examples cited in this NOV weie self identified by USl!C and inunediately reported to NRC as part of our ongoing effort to locate ut ;ontrolled classified matter. USEC did acknowledge that there were missed opportunities to identify uncontrolled classified matter. USEC explained, however, that classified document control at PODP is a complex issue that involves not only existing program weaknesses, but also legacy issues which have made identification of chssified matter confusing.
Personnel awareness at both GDPs has been heightened regarding the identification of and control of classified matter. Consequently, USEC has continued to discover additional examples of uncontrolled classified matter which are being reported to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Part 95.2 As was noted in our letter to NRC dated September 23, 1997, USEC has initiated an action plan to identify uncontrolled classified matter and place it under proper control. As noted in the action plan, the NRC Senior Resident inspector, or his designee, has been intbrmed of the actions in progress or planned. Additional background material is provided in the supplement to this enclosure.
11.
Admission or Denial of Alleged Violatiort USEC does not contest the cited violation.
'As indicated in NRC letter dated October 28,1997, USEC was granted an exemption to the reponing requirements of 10 CFR 95.57(b). This temporary exemption permits USEC to provide written reports on a weekly basis to NRC for those 10 CFR 95.57(b) reportable events that occur within the CAA as a result of the classified matter review.
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1l1.
. Reasons for the Violation
- 1..
Inadequate identification of the extent of the pre-existing problems until August 12,1997, due in part to missed opportunities before NRC assumed regulatory oversight.
2.
In some instances, inadequate knowledge to recognize improperly classified documents and to properly classify newly generated documents.
3.
Controls relating to preventing uncleared perscnnel from gaining access to classified information were inadequate.
IV.
Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved The following corrective actions address those that were taken to address the immediate concem of uncontrolled classified matter:
1.
Classified material found outside the controlled access area (CAA) was immediately moved to inside the CAA and placed under proper control.
2.
Employees were notified that uncleared individuals were to be denied access to electronically generated documents as well as hard copies of process-related documents until these documents were reviewed for classification by an authorized derivative classifier (ADC).
3.
Plant bulletin issued reiterating procedural requirements for ADC reviews.
4.
Functional Organization Managers reviewed their responsibilities for document classification.
5.
A new procedure was developed (CP2-SS-SE105 )," Development of Security Plan for Uncleared Individuals") and implemented to provide additional controls to prevent uncleared individuals from gaining access to classified information.
6.
Upgraded ADC training program using CG-PGD 5," Joint NRC/ DOE Classification Guide."
7.
Sanitized at :as outside CAA where classified material was found.
8.
Initiated plant walkdown on a building-by-building basis t, locate improperly controlled classified information both inside and outside the CAA. Started: August 26,1997.
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9.
Performed special briefing for cleared PGDP personnel delineating what is ciassified anc that they are individually responsible for safeguarding classified material. This was completed by November 18,1997, and led to a significant increase in the number of findings of improperly classified or stored classified matter being self identified by newly trained personnel.
10.
Plant staff reviewed their files and reported to security any examples of potential compromises fbr further evaluation.
The ibiloning addresses the corrective actions that were taken to address the Reasons for the Violatiom A
identification ofpre-existing problems 1.
A walkdowrdverification plan to review procedures containing potentially classified material was developed. This plan identified those procedures needing ADC review.
2.
" Purge Campaign" activities were initiated on August 26,1997.
3.
Plans for review of nuclear safety engineering documents, engineering service order files, and problem rc. port and corrective action drc.a bases were developed and imp!cmented.
4.
Field monitoring by security management has been increased to ensure regulatory commitments related to control of classified information are met via strict procedural adherence.
IL Improving Plant StanKnowledge 1.
Special briefings were given to cleared PGDP personnel delineating what is classified. These briefings were completed by November 18,1997.
2.
Additional ADCs have been trained using CG-PGD-5, " Joint NRC/ DOE Classification Guide," as the standard.
3.
Management has stressed to all cleared PGDP personnel that they are individually responsible for the safeguarding of classified matter.
4.
Security training for personnel who handle classified infomtation and for custodians of classified safes was completed by Decembe: 31,1997.
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G Improving Controlsfor the Protection ofClassified Matter 1.
The classified matter protection procedure was revised to clarify instructions for protection of classified matter.
2.
'llie security education program was revised to provide for a briefing on sensitive technology / processes prior to issuance of" cleared" picture badges.
3.
'lhe security briefing requirements in the General limployee Training program were revised to stress the responsibilities of each cleared individual.
V.
Corrective Action to lle Taken to Avoid Further Violation 1.
An independent assessment will be performed on the effectiveness of the classified matter protection program by April 30,1998.
2.
As indicated in USl!C letter GDp 97-1032 dated Sep; ember 23,1997, the classified matter review is expected to be completed by June 30,1998.
VI.
Date of Full Comnliance With respect to the examples cited in this violation, compliance was achieved on September 17,1997, when the classified materials were brought under control. The actions to prevent recurrence (i.e, the classified matter purge canipaign) will be completed by June 30,1998. This action, as previously noted, has continued to discover additional examples of uncontrolled classilled matter which are being reported to NRC.
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Supplement to Enclosure 1 Additional llackground information Concerns with regard to the control of classified matter at PGDP became more focused in mid April 1997. These concems revealed themselves as an ever increasingly complex matter with the identification ofdocuments inside the Controlled Access Area (CAA) being handled in a manner which could have allowed their classified. ontent to be revealed to uncleared personnel. The two incidents involved were self identified by USEC and were later cited by NRC in Notice of Violation 97002 31. The actions developed and implemented in response to this violation were directed toward treating the classified matter control issues as being limited to the CAA based on the findings at the time. The chronology of events and actions taken were presented during the October 9,1997, predecisional enforcement conference between USEC and NRC.
It was not until August 12,1997, when the Site and Facilities Manager became aware of DOE correspondence from 1994 regarding declassification ofclassified documents, that the potential extent of the classification issues became apparent. The events outside the CAA over the next two days, which led to this violation, revealed the magnitude of the issues. These areas were reviewed for other potentially classified matter, and the classified matter was returned to the CAA and protected as required. Upon discovery of the full extent of the problem, PGDP initiated a process to capture, control, and protect this material. PGDP initiated a plan involving plant personnel to
" purge" USEC leased areas both inside and outside the CAA lbr the presence of improperly controlled classified material. The planning fbr the comprehensive walkdown was begun on August 15, and the pilot program was discussed with the Resident Inspectors on August 22,1997. At this time, USEC was attempting to assess the scope of the issue to assure appropriate resources were applied. On September 11,1997, a classification review of drawings with older classification markings Ibund during the pilot purge inside the CAA, made a reviewer concerned, since he was aware that similar drawings were possibly stored in other plant buildings. The investigation led to Document Control where it was confirmed that these drawings had been provided to a contracted company. Confirmation of this problem led to the change in fbcus to outside the CAA and the full scope of actions we are presently performing.
The action plan was fbrmally provided to NRC in a September 8,1997, letter supplementing USEC's response to inspection Report 97002. This action plan has served as the basis for the entire classified matter " purge" efibrt. It should be noted that not all documents at PGDP are being checked ihr classification. The action plan included exceptions to the review. A more simplified version of the action plan was developed as a guide for the " purge" reviewers and has been developed / modified as a living document that is revised to reflect / respond to changes needed as a result of findings during the purge. A core group ofindividuals was named as team members and they were provided Authorized Derivative Classifier Training as well as more specific training in the terminology of Gaseous Difrusion Technology. This team meets with appropriate management and the coordinators of the purge effort on a weekly basis to discuss issues / questions raised during the purge effort to assure consistency in the application of the guidance provided.
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_. To address ' he potential for dissemination of classified matter beyond the CAA, pODp t
- determined which vendor organizations provided senices, primarily engineering senices, to pODp.
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The site's record copy of the information provided to the vendor organization was reviewed using -
the action plan guidance as a basis.- If this review identified a classification issue, th'e vendor's files were reviewed and any suspect material was confiscated. This activity was begun aller the September 11,1997, event.
i The purge effbrt at each pODp facility is conducted either by the trained purge reviewer or a group provided by the facility owner with guidance from the' purge reviewer. 'Following documentation of completion of the facility review using the site's walkdown procedure, an l
independent sampling cross check is perfonned by another trairied purge reviewer. This cross check is done to validate the adequacy of the review. Based on the purge reviewer and purge coordinator's -
recommendation, the Site and Facilities Manager declares the facility purge complete. Once a
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. facility is declared complete, a reporting exemption for inside the CAA is no longer applicable and
-: normal event reporting will resume.
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.- A ENCLOSURE 2 USEC CilECK NO.14782 i