ML20198E773
| ML20198E773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1997 |
| From: | Cruse C BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9801090215 | |
| Download: ML20198E773 (47) | |
Text
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-y CH4H tT.8 II. CRLM llalumore Gas and Electnc Compan)
Vice Preddent Cahen Clins Nuclear Power Plant
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Nucl ar Energy 1650 Cahen CliHs Parkway g
Lu oy. Manland 20657 g
4 M, 495-445 5
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t January 6,1998 f
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washing:on, DC 20555 A'ITENTION:
Document Control Desk k
i SU3 JECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
(_
Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Report of Changes.lg,sts. and Exreriments - 10 CFR 50.59 I
I i
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), Baltimore C-as and Electric Company hereby submits a report
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containing brief descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments approved under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
Attachment (1) of this report includes 50.59 evaluations recorded approved between Januay 1,1997 and l
December 15,1997. Items in the report are sorted by 50.59 identification number.
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F Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
i Very truly yours,
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i CHC/EM7 /bjd
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Attachment:
(1)
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experimants
[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)]
I I
cc:
R. S. Fleishman, Esquire H. J. Miller, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire Resident inspector, NRC g
Director, Project Directorate 1-1, NRC R.1. McLean, DNR A. W. Dromerick, NRC J. H. Walter, PSC
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l b d b O d <j 9901090215 971215 q
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l 50.59s Statused G 62 in 1997
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DOCID 80-B437403-R01 CJMMARY:
TI!!S ACFIVTTY PROVIDES A NITROGEN BLANKET AND NITROGEN SPARGE LINE FOR 12 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (CST) TIE ADDITKW OF T1tESE MODIDCATIONS DO NOT AFFECT TIIE ABILITY OF 12 CST TO PROVIDE Tim REQLTRED VOLUME OF WATER TO BE AVAP ABLE FOR AFW SYSTEM OPERATION. TIIE SAFETY IUNCTION OF 12 CST IS NOT IMPACTED AND NO UNREVIEWED SF FTY QUESTIONS EXIST. GN MARGN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED N TIIE TECINICAL SPECIRCATIONS BASIS FOR REQUIRED WATER YOLLTIE IN 12 CST IS NOT REDUCED. TIESE MODIncATIONS ATRE PREVIOL%LY EVALUATED AND NSTAf I rn UNDER FCR 30-M. Tills SAFETY EVALUAT10N REVISION WAS PREPARED TO SLTPORTT11E"AS-FOUNTT CONDF110N OF T11E NON SAFETY REIATED NTFROGEN SUPPLY UNE TOTIIE 12 CST SPARGING CONNTCTION. NO PIIYSICALCIIANGES TO TifE PLANT WERE MADE. BUT THE REFERENCE TO TIIE NITROGEN SUPPLY IIOSE WAS REMOVED SINCE STANLFl.S STEEL TUBLNG liAS BEEN INSTAT I rn N ITS PIACE. T1 TIS CilANGE DOES N(YF Af7ECT TIIE INTENT NOR CONCLUSIONS OF TIE ORIGINAL SAFETY EVA!l1ATION.
89-I 017-096-R01 TO SUPPLY Tite INSTRUMENT AIR IIEADER IN TIE CONTAINMENT YIA TIE SALT WATER AIR COMPRESSOR SYSTEM. NORMAL 1Y PRESSURIZED BY NORMALINSTRUMENT AIR. T1E UNE-UP willCONSIST OF A SUPPLY VIA I IA 731 (NORMAL INSTRUMENT AIR TO DE AFW INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM). I Lt 723 (SW AIR COMPRESSOR SLTFLY TO AFW INSTRUMENT AIR) AND T1EN T11ROUGli 11A 727.TAPPIN9 IN DOWNSTREAM OF Tile CONTAINMENT AIR RECE!\\TR.
90-ILo38414-R00
SUMMARY
TifE EXISTING PASS. PROVIDED TO MEET Tile CRITERIA OF ITEM ILB3 OF NUREG-0737, REUED ON INUNE INSTRUMENTATION AS A PRIMARY METl!OD FOR ANALYZING TIE REACTOR COOLANT AND CONTAINMENT ATMOSPIIERE. Tills MET 110D llAS NOT PROVIDED ACCURATE RESULTS AND liAS OFTEN CAUSED Tl!E RESULTS TO BE OUTSIDE OF TIIE TOLERANCES RECOMMENDED IN ITT.M 1183 OF NURE04737. TIE MODIRED PASS REUES. EXCcFT FOR CONTAINMENT IIYDROGEN LEVEL INUNE ISNTRUMENTATION.
ON GRAB SAMIl.E ANALYSES FOR DOTil TifE REACTOR COOLANT AND CONTAINMENT ATMOSPilERE. TlilS SAMPUNO WILL UTILIZE TIIE EXISTING NSSS SAMPLE SINK; TIIUS.NO PIIYSICAL PIANT MODIHCATIONS ARE REQUIRED. ALSO.TIIE NRC IIAS CONCLUDED TIIAT TIIE MODIFIED PASS MEETS TIIE I I CRITERIA OF ITEM !L113 OF NUREG-C737 AND PROVIDES A VIABII MET 110D FOR DETERMINING POST ACCIDENT CIIEMISTRY AND ENVIRONMENTS N Tite PLANT.
TIIIS FCR IX)ES NOT CONSTITUTT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QLTSTiON (USQ, OR REQUIRE A CIIANGE TO TIIE TECIINICAL SPECIDCATIONS BASED ON TIE DISCL5SION CONTAINTD N TIIE 50.59 EVALUA110N.
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50.59s Statused C3 62 in 1997 DOCID 93-B4WISS-R00
SUMMARY
IN Ti!E EVENT OF A SEVERE HRE. Tile AOP-9 SERIES PROCEDL"RES DIRECT FIACENG TIIE PLANT IN A COLD SHLTDOWN CONDITION %TTIIIN 72 IlOURS AS REQUIRED BY 10CFR50 APPENDIX R. Ti!1S TYPICr_LY INWLVES STEAMING Tile STEAM GENIRATORS (SGS) DOWN TO A LEVEL OF 350 INCIES AND RAPIDLY REFHllNG TIIEM USLNG TIIE ALTHlARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM EACll SG REQUIRES A REHIl FLOW RATE OF 225 GPM FOR A TOTAL OF 450 GPM. T!!IS IS NORMAI1Y ACIHEVED BY USING THE E> TOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP' SIN 2 TIIE TURBC;E DRIVE PUMPS k'AY NOT BE CAPABLE OF DEIJVERING UIIS FIDW RATE AT LDW SG PRESSLTES. IlOWEVER,IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED TilAT A SEVERE HRE IN SEVERAL AREA SOF TIIE PLANT MAY CAUSE Ti!E IDSS OF BOTl! MOTOR DIRVDJ AFW PUMPS. THIS ACTI\\ TTY IS A CilANGE TO THE AOP-9 PROCEUDRES TO DIRECT AN ALTERNATE TEMPORARY METHOD OF SUPPLYING T11E REQUIRED MA)&UP FIDW RATE TO THE SGS FROM THE RRE PROTECTION WATER SLTFLY SYSTEM. TIIIS TEMPORARY CilANGE TO TIIE SYSTEM CONFIGURATION Will BE ACCOMPflSliED AT TIIE DISCIIARGE OF TiiE MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMPS BY ISOIATING UE APPROPRIATE (UNTT I OR 2) UNAVAILABLE PUMPS AITTOMATIC RECIRCUIATION(ARC)
VALVE, DRAINING IT. AND REMOVING IT FROM Ti!E SYSTESL IN TTS It\\CE E1LL BE INSTAI I Fn A HRE DEPARTMENT SIAMESE CONNECTION. TWO HRE IlOSES WI11TIIEN BE CONNECTED IN PARAILEL TO TIIE SIAMESE CONNECTION FROM TWO FIRE PRO TECTION WATER SLTPLY SYSTEM STANDP! PES INTIE TURBINE BUIIDING BASEMENT. IN TIIIS MANNER TIIE DIESEL DRIVEN FIRE PUMP (DFP) WILL TitEN BE L3ED TO SLTPLY T11E REQUIRED MAKE-UP FIDW RATE OF WATER FROM TIIE PRETREATED WATER STORAGETANK, THROUGli TIE TEMPORARY AfW CONNEC110N ON THE DISCllARGE OF Tile MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP,TO Ti!E SGS.
TIIIS ACTI\\ TTY DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION BECAUSE TliE TEMPORARY IJNE UP DIRECTED BY TIIE PROCEDURE CllANGE TAKES PLACE AFTER A SEVERE HRE WIIILE TIIE PIANT IS IN TIIE PROCESS OF SlitTITING D0%%
ADDITIONAL 1Y,Th2 MOTOR D2IVEN AFW PUMP %TIL liA%I ALREADY BEEN DISABLED BY TIE RRE, AND TIIE DFP WIL IIAVE ALREADY ACCOMPIlS1IED ITS FIRE SUPPRESSION FUNCTION AT TIIE TIME Ti!E PROCEDURE TAKES PIACE. BEFORE STARTING UP OR OPERATING AT POWER Tile ORIGNALCONFIGURATION OF TIIE AFW AND RRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS WI11 BE RE-ESTABIJS1tED. Tl!E DISCilARGE PRESSUIE OF Tile DFP IS SEVERAL HUNDRED POUNDS IISS TilAN THAT OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP. DIEREFORE, A FAILURE OF TIIE AFW PIPING AS A RESULTOFTHIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION IS NOT CONSIDERED CREDIBLI. THE ADDITION OF FIRE FIGHTING WATER TO TIIE STEAM GENERATORS, VIA THE AFW PUMP SUCi1ON. IIAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY l
REVIEWED (REFER TO LTSAR, SECTION 10.3.2K l
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50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOCID 944401417-R02 PROPOSED ACTI\\ TTY:
TUIS REVISION TO THE $039 DElrTES T11E INSTALLATION OF TIIE PtLSE RELAYS.
SE00046
SUMMARY
TIIIS ACTI\\ TTY CllANGES TIIE ' MASTER
- CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY (CEA) MOTION INIIIBIT(CMI) BYPASS BLTTON FROM A UGIITED PUSIIBUTTON TO AN LN UGHTED PUSIIBLTTON TYPE. LTSAR SECTION 7.4.23 STATES TIIAT THE CEA MOTION INIIIBTT BYPASS BLTTON MUST BE CONTINUATY DEPRESSED, AND IS II1UMINATED RED DURING CEA MOTION INI!1 BIT BYPASS OPERATION. IlO%TVER, SINCE TIIE BUTTON IS CONTINUALLY DEPRESSED, THE Il1UMNATION OF THE BUITON CANNOT BE SEEN. THIS SECTION Will BE CilANGED TO REMOVETIIE DESCRIPTION TilAT T11E PUSIIBLTTON IS ILLUMINATED. THE FUNCTION OF TIIE CMI BYPASS S%TTCil WI11 NOT BE AFFECTED BY Tl!!S ACTITTTY.
Tile CMI BYPASS SWITCII IIAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO ROD DROPS DURING CMI BYPASS OPERATION, PARTICLTARLY DURING ENTENDED CEA OPERAT10N %Tni CMI BYPASS. THIS flAS BEEN EXPERIENCED MOST NOTABLY DURING SURVEft1ANCE TEST PROCEDURE STP-029 WHEN TIIE OPERATOR BECOMES FATIGUED IIO! DING TIIE CMI BYPASS BUTTON.
TIIE OPERATOR MAY IIAVE A TENDENCY TO INTERMITTENTLY RF. LEASE THE BOTTON.111E RESL1 TING TRANSIENT ON T11E CONT 1tOL ELEMENT DRIVE MECIIANISM PROGRAMMER ILAS RESULTED IN A DROP OF THE SELECTED CEA. TIIE IIEAT GENERATED BY TIIE 111UMINAT10N OF TIIE PUSHBLTTON IS UNCOMFORTABE To TIIE OPERATOR AND CONTRIBUTES TO TIIIS PROBEAL NUMEROUS BARRIERS ENSURE TlIAT CMI CANNOT BE INADVERTENTLY BYPASSES. TIIE OPERATOR MUST CONTINUA 11Y IIOLD TIIE BYPASS SWITCH DEPRESSED TO BYPASS TIIE CMI INTERIDCK. TIIE BYPASSING OF CMIIS ANNLNCIATED N THE MAN CONTROL ROOM BY A CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATOR AS WELL AS 111UMNATION OF TIIE BYPASS SWITC)L IDGS ARE TAKEN ON TIIE ANNUNCIATOR PANE 15 T%1CE A SIIIIT.
ADDITIONAL 1Y,IF A CMI SIGNALIS PRESENT.TilIS IS ANNLNCIATED BY A SEPAlltTE
.NNUNCIATOR %TNTOW. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROIS REQUIRE Tite OPERATOR TO DISENGAGE THE BYPASS S%TTCII FOLIDWING BYPASS OPL*ATION. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AISO REQUIRE THE OPERATORS TO MAINTAN CEA POSITIONS RTT11N DESIN LIMIT 3. SINCE TIIESE BARRIERS ENSURE TIIATTHE CMI SIGNAL %T11 NOT B6 NADVERTENTLY BYPASSED. Tills ACTIVTTY DOES NOT CONSTTILTE AN UNREVIEWED S AFETY QUESTION.
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50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOCID SE0008i
SUMMARY
Tills MODIDCAGON ALTIIORIZES TifE REPIACEMENT OF TiiE BAW FILTER CARTRIDGES FOR TIIE Ci!EMICAL AND VOLl?dE CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) PURIFICATION HLTERS %TFII AN EQUIVAIINT HLTER MARTACTURED BY PALL CORP. TIE PA11 FILTERS WIDCII ARE ALT 11ARIZED FOR USE ARE RATED FROM 6 MICRON ABSOLUTE DOWN TO 0.1 MICRON ABSOLLTE. TIIE REPIACEMENT CARTRIDGES ARE SIMIIAR IN SIZE, %IIGitT. FORM.
HT AND IUNCTION TO TIIE BAW CARTRIDGE. Tile REASON FOR TitlS MODIDCATION IS TO AllDW T1lE USE OF TIE FINER HLTERS TO ACIIIEVE GREATER C11AN-LT EFDCIENCIES OF Ti!E RCS. TiiE PALL FILTERS ARE AVAllABLE IN FINER MICRON RATINGS TIIAN TIIF B&W RLTERS.11ENCE TIIE NEED FOR Tite C11ANGE.
Tills ACTITTTY RESULTS IN A CIIANGE TO T1E LT3AR TABII9-7. CURRENTLY,Ti!E FILTER RATING IS IJSTED AS 3 MICRON AND LARGER AT A99.3*= EFFICIENCY. TIIE NEW WORDING WILL Rt.FLECT T1?E USE OF VARIOUS HLTER RATINGS DEPENDING ON P1 ANT CONDITIONS. ALSO, A C1ARIFICATION TO TIE SAME TAB 111S ADDED TO INDICATE TilAT Tl!E STATED DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATUiE IS FOR Tl!E RLTER VESSEL ONLY.
TIE NEW RLTER MEDIA IS RATED FOR ISO DEGREES F VERSUS 250 DEGREES F FOR T1IE CURRENT MEDIA. 'DIIS RESULTS IN A CliANGE N TiiE OPERATING Pili 1DSOPl!Y OF LETDOWN TO PREVENT HLTER DEGRADATION IN TIE EVENT OF LETD0%W TEMPERAlURFS EXCEEDING Tl!EIR NORMAL RANGE t O D*GREES F TO I40 DEGREES F). T1Ils h*3DIF1 CATION REQUIRES OPERATING PROCEDURE REVISIONS.I' *NSURE TilAT LETDOWN BE lsotATED OR DIVERTED TO TifE WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM IF LETDOWN TEMPERATURE EXCEED
- 170 DEGREES F. ADDITIONAL 1Y, LETD0%N isotATION IS REQL1 RED IF TiiE TEMPERATURE REACl!ES 180 DEGREES F TO PROTECT TIIE WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM COMPONENTS. NORMAL OPERATION OF IITDOWN IS UNAFFECTED BY Tills MODIMCATION.
T~ REVISED HLTER DESIGN, AS WELL AS TIIE RESULTING OPERATIONAL CliANGES.
IIAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND DETERMINED TO NOT INVOLVE EITTIER f.N UNREVIE%TD SAFETY QUESTION OR A CIIANGE TO Tile TECl!NICAL SPECIRCATIONS.
SE00086 IMPLEMENTATION OFCONVOLUTION METIIODOIDGY,INCirDING TMLP AND AFD SETPOINT CIIANGES, FOR UNTT 2 CYCII 12.
SUMMARY
IN ORDER 1D MAINTAIN A ILIL FAILURE PERCENTAGE IISS TIIAN 1% FOR TiiE PRE-TRIP STEAM LINE REAK EVENT WTDIOUT EMP1 DYING TIE DNB CONVOLIJF10N MET 110DOIDGY, Page 4
50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOC ID.
. T11E PREVIOUS CALVERT CUFFS UNTT 2 CYCLE 10 AND LSTF 1 CYCE 12 F X( T AND F R T Cout UMITS (AND OT1ER ASSOCIATED Cout UMITS) % IRE REDUCED BELOW Tem 1.7 UMIT. THE USE OF DNB CONVOILTION METHODOLOGY FOR THE PRE-TRIP STEAM UNE BREAK ANALYSIS HAS NOW DEEN APPROVED BY TIIE NRC THEREFORE TIE UNIT I AND LSTT 2 FXY T. FRT, AND RE1ATED UMITS MAY NOW BE RESTORIII TIIIS ACTIVTY SUPPORTS RESTORLNG TIII FXY T AND FRT RE1ATED UM.TS AND T1E FOUDWING Cl!ANGES TO TIE ISSS FOR TIE AfD AN1) Tatif TRIPS:
-TIIE MOST NEGATIVE ASI AU.DWED BYTitE APD TRIP AT FUE POWER WAS CIIANGED FROM -0.18 ASIUTO -0.2 ASIU TO EN11ANCE TIE OPERATING MARON IN THE NEGATIVE ASI REGION. THIS MODIFICATION WAS SUPPORTED BY TIE UIR MARGN GAN ASSOCIATED %TTIITIIE IMPLI. MENTATION OPI1MIZED SHIM CUT BACKS AND ERBIUM N THE RELOADIUELr,ESIGN.
-TIIE Al f1JNC110N AND TIIE VALUE OF T1IE LAST TERM N Tile TM1.F PVAR TRIP EQUATION (CONSTANT Y) %7LL BE MODiffED AS FOIlD%1 Al 111NCTION (0.6. l.4k(0.2, I.0),
(0 6,13),(0.0, I 0),
(ASI, Al) BREAM'OINTS AND (0 6,1.2)
AND (0.6,1.1)
{
CONSTANT Y
- 10,682 PSI
- 10.393 PSI l
l THIS MODillCATION IS TO ACCOMMODATE ANALYTICAL MARGN FOR fLTURE RELDAD ANALYSES.
REVISION 0 OF 11tE SAFETY EVAUJATION ADDRESSED 11tESE CllANCES FOR UNTT 2 CYCLE II AND UNTT 1 CYCE 13. REVIS10N I TO TlIIS EVLUATION INCORPORA1T.S TIIESE CilANGES FOR UNIT 2 CYCLE 12. A REVIEW OF TL'E LS1T 2 CYCE II.
UNIT 2 CYCLE 12 ANT)UNTT I CYCE 13 SAFETY AND SETPOLYT ANALYSES WAS PERFORMED N THIS SAFETY EVALUATION. T11E FOLLOWING CRITERIA TOR THE SAFETY AND SETPOLVF ANALYSES REMAIN S/USFIED WITII T11E COtJt CIIANGES:
-T1IE WIR AND DNB S A F D L S AND11iE PEAK PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PRESSURE UMITS ARE Nof EXCEEDED FOR NORMALOPERATION EVENTS AAD ANTICIPATED OPERATIONALOCCURRENCES.
-TiiE OFFSITE DOSES AND PEAK PRLMARY AND SECONDARY PRESSUltE UMITS ARE NOT ENCEEITlD FOR POSTULATED ACCIDENTS.
BASED UPON Tite SAIITY AND SETPOINT ANALYSES RESULTS AN1) A T110 ROUGH EVALUATION l
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O 50.59s StatuSed at 62 in 1997 DOCID OF TIE QUESTIONS PERTAINLNG TO A NEGATIVE 50 59 F1NDNG IT WAS CONCLUDED TilAT TIE CHANGES TO TIIE COLR FOR CALVERT CIllTS UNIT 2 CYCLE 11,. LSTT 2 CYCLE 2, AND UNIT I CYCII 13 DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QGSTION.
SE00093
SUMMARY
Tills ACTISTTY RETIFI.S TIE GAITRONICS PL'BUC ADDRESS SYSTEM. TitIS SYSTEM ilAS BEEN REPIACED BY THE NORTIIERN TELECOM PUBUC ADDRESS SYSTEM THIS ACTIVITY WIII REQUIRE A REVISION TO DIE LT3AR TO REMOVE THE DESCRIPTION OF TIIE GAITRONICS SU1TM.
TIIE REMAINING COMMLWICAT10N SYSTEM. A COMBINATION OF TIIE NORTHERN TEMCOM SYSTEM, RADIO TEEPIIONE SYSTEM. MICROWAVE SYSTEM. AND TIIE SOUND PO41 RED PIIONE SYSTEM. IS A PROVEN, REDUNDANT AND RE!lABLE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.
VIIE REMAINING COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS MEET ANDOR EXCEED TIIE REQURIEMENTS OUY.lNEDIN SECT:ON 7 8 OF THE ORIGINAL LTSAR.
%TIllOUT TifE GAITRONICS SYSTEM. A FAILURE OF TliE NORT1ERN TELECOM PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM WOULD NOT RESULTIN A LOSS OF TIIE COMMUNICATION ABi1IFY OF T!!E PLANT. T11E RADIO 1TLEP110NE SYSTEM AND T1IE SOUND PO% IRED PIIONE ARE REDUNDANT TO T!!E NORT11ERN TELECOM SYSTEM. TIIE GATTRONICS SYSTEM CIRCLTTS DO NOT INTERTACE WITII AST OTIER PLANT EQUIPMENT; CONSEQUENTLY, RETIRING Tile GAITRONICS SYSTEM WILL NOT ATTECT T1E RESPONSE OF IMPORTANT TO SAFETY EQUIPMENT. THIS AC11VITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIERTD SAFETY QUESTION.
SE00ll3
SUMMARY
Ti!E LTSAR STATES TIIAT TIIE CON 11NUOUS OLTPUT RATING OF THE SBO DIESEL GENERATOR l$ *APPROXIMATELY 5000 K%-(LE,4963 KWE). ALTilOUGli T11E BASIC DESIGN OF TIIE SBO DIESEL GENERATOR IS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO TIIAT Of SA*ETY-RELACED SACM DIESEL GENERATOR DG t A. WIIICH IS RATED /' M KWE CONTINLOUS.
DIFFERENCES IN TIIE D'tSIGN OF THE COMBUSTION AIR INTA L F -TEM FOR THE 590 DIESELGENERATOR RESULTED IN DE-RATING TIE SDO DIESEL ut.NERATOR TO ADDRESS OPERATION OF TIIE DIESEL %TT11 T11E MAXIMUM COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE TEMPERATURE OF 120 DEGREES F. ALL OTIER DIESEL SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNTD TO SUPPORT A DIESEL RATING OF 5400 KWE. ADDED OPERATIONAJ HEA1BIIITY FOR TIIE SDO DIESEL GENERATOR IS DESIRED, SO RESTORING 11 E FUIlCONTINTOUS RATING OF THE DIESEL GENTRATOR. %TTl! SPECIFIC COMBUSTION AIR TEMPERATURE RESTRICTIONS IS BEING PROPOSED. THIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES TO USE TIIE 111.1COVI1NUOUS OUTPUT RATING OF 5400 KWE FOR THE ALTERNATI AC DIESEL GENERATOR (AKA SDO DIESEL GENERA 1DR
[DG0C] %1Til CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS. IF TtfE COMBUSTION AIR TEMPERA 1URES ATTHE Page6
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50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOCID TURBOCilARGER / INTERCOOLER ENIST3 EXCEEDS 167 DEGREES F + /- 2 DEGREES F (CORRESPONDING TO Tile COMBUSTION Aftt TEMPERATL1tE 5% Tittles' HIGH AIARM SETTOINTL THE D!ESEL GENERATOR PORTR OUTPUT WOULD BE REDUCED TO 4963 KHT.
TliE CURRENT REQLTRED AMOUNT OF FLTL TO SLTPORT OPERATION OF THE DrESEL GENERATOR IS BASED ON OPERATION OF TIE SBO DESEL GENERATOR AT 5400 KWE AND IS TifUS NOT AFFECTED BY T1115 ACT!YITY. BECAUSE TIIE ALTOMATICAll.Y SEAK'ENCED IDADS REQUIRED TO BE SUPPUED BY Tile SDO DESEL GENTRATOR DURING AN SBO EVENT AND SAFE Slit 7DOWN IDADS(REQUIRED FOR APPENDIX R EVENTS) ARE ESS TIIAN ITS MINIMUM DEslGN POWER OUTPtJT CAPACITY OF 490 K%T,THE SBO DESEL GENERATOR IS CAPABM OF PO%TRING TIIE REQUIRED IDADS. SINCE THE FUNCTM.H OF Tite DIESELIS NOT AfTECTED BY T1!!S ACTIVITY ANT) A PLANT PROCEDURE WIll GOVERN IT3 OPERATION UNDER HIGH COMBUSTION AIR TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS. T1115 ACTIVITY DOEA NOT INCREASE TIIE PROBABIIJTY OF CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MAUUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS. SINCE NO PIIYSICALCilANGE TO Tile DIESELIS BEING MADE BY T1115 ACTISTTY NO NEW FAT 11?RE MODES ARE CREATED BY T1IIS ACTISTTY. TITUS, NO NEW MAIJUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED BY TIIIS ACTTSTTY.
TifUS. Tills ACT1VITY DOES NOT CONSTTTLTE AN UNREVIEWED SA! TTY QUESTION-SE00116.Rev.I
SUMMARY
THE CllEMICAL AND VO11NE CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) W/ S DESIGNED %TFH OPERATM)NAL FEXIBIUTY AS INDICATED BY Tile FOUR
- MODES
- OF Of~ RATION DESCRIBED IN T1IE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (LTSAR) FIDW PATH FLEXIBIUTY WAS ALSO A PAL T OF PIANT DESIGN. BUT IS NOT DESCRIBED IN THE LTSAR. TIIIS SAFETY EVALUATION INVESTIGATED WHETIIER A CLARIFICAT10N OF TIIE ~ PROCEDURES
- DESCRIBED IN THE LTSAR INVOLVES AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY t<UESTION(USQ) TIIE CLARIFICATION REGARDS THE OPERAT10N OF THE CVCS WIIEN CHANGING THE BORON CONCENTRATION OF Tile REACFOR COOLANT.
THE LTSAR CURPENTLY DESCRIBES Tile INJEFT10N f1DW PATH FROM THE MAAE.UP SOLSCE TO TIIE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) VIA THE VotrME CONTROL TANK (VLT) i T1IE T11E CIIARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER. HOWEVER.TIIERE IS NO DISCUSSION OF Tite VALVE UNE UP TIIAT BYPASSES TIIE VCT AND PRO \\1 DES FOR M AKE-UP DIRECTLY TO Tl!E CIIARGING PUMP SUCTION IIEADER (* DIRECT FEED") " DIRECT FEED" PROVIDES MORE TIMELY REAC11\\TIY CONTROL
- FEEDBACK" SINCE IT INCREASES T1IE ClIANGE RATE r
OF TiiE RCS BORON CONCENTRATION. QUICKER FEEDBACK"IS ADVANTAGEOUS DURING CERTAIN PIANT CONDITIONS.
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50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOCID T1E PROBADIUTY OF OCCURRENCE OR TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MAIJL'NCTION OF EQLTPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAETY PREVIOUSLY EVAIDATED N Tite SAR 15 NOT INCREASED. TIIE POSSIIMUTY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MAUL'NCTION OF A DIITERENT TYPETIIAN ANT EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN TifE SAR IS NOT CREATED.
TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED INTHE BASIS FOR AST TECitNICAL SPECIFICATION 15 NOT L UCED. TIIEREFORE, NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS LNVOLVED.
SE00116, Rev. 2 SLTIMARY:
TIIE ClEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) WAS DESIGNEO %TTil OPERATIONAL FLEXIBIUTY AS INDICATED BY TIIE FOL1t
- MODES
- OF OPERATION DESCRIBED N TITE LTDATED FNAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (LTSAR). FIDW PATil FILMBIUTY WAS ALSO A PARTOF PLAN ~.)ESIGN,.BUT 15 NOT DESCRIBED N TIE LTSAR. TIUS SAFETY EVALUAT!ON NVEST1 GATED WHET 1ER A CLARIFICATION OF TIE TROCEDURES*
DESCRIBED IN THE LTSAR INVOLVES AN UNREVIE%ID SAFE 1Y QUESTION (USQ) TIIE CIARIFICATION REGARDS TIE OPERATION OF11E CVCS Wi!EN CHANGING TIE DORON CONCENT1 TAT 10N OF THE REACTOR COOIANT.
' TIIE LTSAR CURRENTLY DESCRIBES 11tE INJECTION FLOW PATH 11tOMTIIE MAkFAJP SOURCE TO TifE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) VIA Tile VOLUME CONTROLTANK (VCT) AND THE CIIARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER. HOWEVER.TIERE IS NO DISCUSSION OF THE VALVE LINEAJP TIIAT BYPASSES TIIE VCT AND PROVIDES FOR MAkE4JP DIRECTLY TO Tl!E CitARGING PUMP SUCTION !!EADER (* DIRECT FEED 4 " DIRECT FEED" PROVIDES MORE TIMELY REACT 1\\ TTY CONTROL" FEEDBACK
- FEEDBACK
- 13 ADVANTAGEOUS DURING CERTAIN PIANT CONDITIONS.
TifE PROBABIUTY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MAIJL'NCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVAIDATED IN T1IE SAR IS NOT INCREASED. TIIE POSSIB!UTY FOR AN ACCIDENTOR MAIJL'NCTIOS ")F A DIFFERENT TYPE 111AN ANY EVAIEAIT.D PREVIOUSLY N THE SAR IS NOT CREATED.
TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN111E BASIS FOR ANT TECHNICAL SPEGT1 CATIONS IS NOT REDUCED. THEREFORE, NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS INVOLVED.
SE00120
SUMMARY
TIIIS ALTT\\ TTY REPLACES TIE EXISTING SALTWATER SYSTEM AIR COMPRESS')RS (SWACS)
%TTil NEW IAF %R CAPACITY COMPRESSORS. TIIE REP 1ACEMENT SWACS ARE TANK MOUNTED RELt'ROCATING COMPRESSORS, AS ARE THE EXISTING COMPRESSORS BUT Will PROVIDE INCREASED CAPACFTY MARGN FOR SAFETY-REIATED AIR DEMANDS. THE NEW COMPRESSORS WIIL NOT CAUSE A C11ANGE IN THE WAY T11N.' TIE SALTWATER AIR Page 8
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' 50.595 Statused at 32 in 1997
- i s
LDOCID
~ SYSTEM FLHCFIONS. SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS SUPPORTED BY DIE SALTWATER AIR I
SYSIT.M %1LL CONTNUE TO FUNCTION N THE SAME MANNER. THERE B No CHANGE IN THE WAY DIESE SYSTEMS ACT TO MIT1 GATE ACCIDENTS, NOR ARE ANY FOSSIB1UTIES OF NEW MALILMS OR ACCIDENTS CREATED.
THIS CHANGES DOES NOT REPRESENT AN LNREVIE%TD SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL 4
SPECIFICATION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQLTRED.
SE00130
SUMMARY
THE PURPOSE OF TEMPORARY ALTERATION 2 95 0140 IS TO INSTAU. A FRFF7 F SEAL IN THE DISCHARGE MPING OF VCT RFI fr.F VALVE 2RVI15. THIS VALST IS BEING
' REPIACED DURING MODE 5,6 OR DEILTLED WHEN THE UN1T 2 CVCS 4111 BE TAGGED OLT OF SERVICE; HOWEVER.THE DISCHARGE PIPING IS N THE HTS, WHICH IS E
COMMON TO BOTH UNTTS CANNOT BE TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE.
I L
THE FREEZE SEAL HAS BEEN EVAIEATED AS EQUIVALENT TO A SYSTEM BOUNDARY
- I ISOIA110N VALVE. DESIGN REQL1REMENTS HA%T BEEN CONSIDERED,THAT ARE EQUIVALENT To SUCH A VALVE, AND WERE DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE FRFF7F SEAL #1LL HAVE NO DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE PIPING SYSTEM. IF
' )
UQUID STTROGEN SUPPLY TO THE FREEZE SEAL WERE 1 DST, INTEGRITY OF THE
- i FREEZE SEAL WILL BE MAINTAINED FUR AT LEAST I HOUR. DURING THIS TIME
-- A BUND FIANGE WOUID PE INSTAf I Fn ON THE REUEF VALVE OUILET PIPING.
t THEREFORE,IF THE FRFF7F SEAL INTEGRITY HTRE NOT RE-EST/. BUSHED.THE l
i BUND FLANGE WOULD PROVIDE PRESSURE BOUNDARY. ALL DESKN REQL1REMENTS i
OFTHE RC WPS MPING ARE MET,WPS PIPING IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED AND -
l' MEETS SEISMIC REQL1REMENTS. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENT 3, AND NO NEW MALEUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, 1111S ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTT1UTE A USQ.
i' SE00I32
SUMMARY
i.
1 THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A CHANGE TO THE LTSAR SECTION 143 BORON EtLtJ1104 EVENT. THE CHANGE NVOLVES A REANALYSIS OF THE BORON DIIETION EVENT AND A.
REWRITE OF SECTION 14.3 IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR A GREATER MAXIMUM CHARGING PUMP FIDW RATE, CONSIDER TEMPERATURE EFTECT ON DENSITY.USE ONI.Y THE ACTIVE RCS VOLUME, INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CHARGING PUMPS ASSUMED M OPERATEIN I
1 MODE 5 EVALUATE MODE 2 N SAME MANNER AS MODE 1, AND EUMINATETHE r
DESCRIPTKW OFTHE *TIMETO REACH CRI11CAUTY" FOR MODE 2. THE REANALYSIS -
[
RESULTS SHoW mar THERE IS SUmCIENr nME TO AUDW OPERATOR ACDON TO
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50.59s Statused C2 62 in 1997 DOC ID MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES BEFORE S11LTDOWN MARGIN IS LOST. THE MODIHCATION OF THE MODE 2 CASE METHOD WAS SUBMITTED. THE CHANGES DO NOT NVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFE 1Y QUESTION SINCE THE RESUI.TNG TIMETO IJOSE S!!LTDOWN MARGN IS ETTIIN ACCEPTABLE UMI13.
SE00148 THE DESIGN PROVIDED UNDER SUPP 1 IS UMITED TO TIIE REPLACEMENT OF THE L%TT I SRW HEAT EXC11 ANGERS. DETAIIID ENGINEERING FOR LS1T 2 WILL BE PROVIDED UNDER A IU1URE ENGINEERLNG PACKAGE. If0 WEVER.CONCEITUALLY11E MODIHCATIO: 3 DOTH UNTTS 41LL BE IDENTICAL ES19950114i PROVIDES TIE DESIGN TO REPIACE TifE SRW IIEAT EXCHANGEE, HTTTI NEW-PLATE AND FRAME EXCILANGERS HAVING INCREASED TIIERMAL PERIORMANCE CAPABIUTY TiiE SW AND SRW PIPING CONFIGURATION WIllBE MODIHED AS NECESSARY TO A11DW PROPER FITUp TO TIIE NEW COMPONENTS. A FIDW CONTROL SCIIEME TO TIIROTTI.E SW ITDW TO TIE IIEAT EXCIIANGERS AND N THE ASSOCIATED BYPASS UNES WH1 BE ADDED.
SW STRAINERS WITil AN WTOMATIC flUsitING ARRANGEMENT Will BE ADDED LTSTREAM OF EAcil HEAT EXCIIANGER. TIIE MAJORITY OF TIE PHYSICAL WORK ASSOCIATED WITil TIPS MODIRCATION IS RES1 RICTED TO TIIE SRW PUMP ROOM.
TIIERE ARE ANtalBER OF ACTIVE COMPONENTS ADDED BY TlIIS ACTIVF.~Y ANT) DUE TOTHE INCREASED COMPII.XITY AND A9DITIONAL CONTROL FEATURES INCORPORATED BY TIIIS MOD!f1 CATION,TIIE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS POTENTIALLY SUB.IECT TO MAIJUNCTION IS INCREASED INTRINSIC BENESTT ASSOCIATED HTT11TIIE NEW DESIGN IlOWEVER IS AN OVERAll LMPROVEMENT IN T1IE METIIOD OF PERH)RMINO THE FUNCTION OF Tile SW ANT)
SRW SYSTEMS. TIIE BENEITTS INTIIE NEW DESIGN ARE JUMMARIZED AS FOUJOWS:
INCREASE IN IIEAT DUTY AVAILABLE %TTH TIE PLATE EXCHANGERS.TIIERMAL MARGN IS INCREASED.
SYSTEM OPERATION AND TES11NG IS SIMPUFIED.
FTI.XIBluTY PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR TO SECURE ONT EXCHANGER AT A TIME FOR MAINTENANCE OR TO COMPENSATI IUR A COMPONTNT FAILL1tE TIIE AVAILABIUTY OF ITS EQUIPMEN1 IS INCREASED TIIE ADDITION OF SW STRAINERS REDUCES MACROFOUUNO ALTilOUGH TIIERE ARE INTRINSIC BENEHTS GANED BY THIS DESIGN, AS DISCUSSED ADOVE TIIE BENEFITS N 1TIEMSELVES CANNOT OITSET TIIE POSSIBIUTY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OF ANY ONE OF T1IE NUMEROUS ACTI\\T COMPONTNTS CREATED BY TIIIS AC11VFTY. TIIEREFORE.T1!E POSSIBIUTY OF FAH11tE OF ANY ONE OF THE NEW COMPONENTS LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ACTIVITY MAY CREATE THE POSSIBIUTY OF A MAIJUNCTION OF A TYPE DifTERENTTHAN THAT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED N TIIE SAR.
IUR THE ADOVE REASONS. T11E POSSIBIUTY OF A MAIJUNCTION OF A DIFFIRENT TYPE TilAN PREVIOUSLY EVALi'ATED IN THE SAR IS CREATED.
NOTE TIIAT T1IIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT REDUCE TIIE MARON OF SAFETY DEHNED N THE TECIINICAL SPECIRCATION BASES. IN FACT THE MARGN WillBE INCREASES BY Page 10
- o 50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOCID TI!!S ACTIVTTY DUE TO TIE NCREASE N TIIERMAL CAPACTTY OF THE DUAL EXCHANGER TRAN DESIGN AND TIE NCREASED AVAIIABUJIY OF Sk COMPONENTS (IIX, DO, CAC, ECCS COOERS).
SE00t$0, Rev. 0 SLMMARY:
TlIIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES DISABIlNG A PRIMARY SYSTEM RESISTANCE TEMPERATL"RE DETECTOR (RTD)INPLTTO THE REACTOR PROTECT 10N SYSTEM (RPS) TifE SYSTEM AVERAGES TIE TEMPERAlURE OFTHE II AND 12 HOT EG RTDS FOR FOUR DIFFERENT CHANNELS. THIS ACTI\\ TTY REMOVES ONE RTD FROM ONE OF THE CIIANNELS SO THAT THREE OF Ti!E CHANNELS WIll STIII HAVE A T IIOT AVERAGF (TWO INPLTS) AND ONE CHANNEL WILL HAVE A SINGE T llOT INPUT. TO ACCOMP11SH THIS, THE OLTFUT OF THE TEMPERATURETRANSMITTER INTO RPS ETLL BE DISABER THIS ACTITTTY WILL MAINTAN FOUR OPERABLE RPS CHANNEIS AND ONE OPERABE SUDCOOED MARGIN MONTTORS (SCMM).
TIIE IUNCTION OF RPS WILL BE UNAFFECTED BECAUSE TIIE TWO HOT EGS ARE AT APPROXIMATELY TIE SAME TEMPERATURE.TIIEREFORE SYMMI TRICAL EVENTS WILL BE DETECTED BY TIE SINGLE RTD.11 TERE ARE NO A>YMMETRICAL EVEN (S THAT RELY ON TllOTINPUTS TO TRIP T1IE REACTOR.
BASED ON TIE ADOVE EVAI UAT10N, THIS ACTINTTY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN.M.TIDENT OR MAIJLHCTION PREVIOUsLY EVALUATED IN TIE SAR,Nok DOES IT CI EATE A NTW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MALIUNCTION NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. THIS ACTITTTY DOES NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN TIE TECIINICAL SPECIFI-CATIONS,THEREFORE THIS ACTIVTTY 15 NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
SE00150.Rev.I
SUMMARY
TIIIS ACTIVIIT EVALUATES DISABIlNO A PRIMARY SYSTEM RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (RTD)INFLT TO T1E REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPSL T11E SYSTEM AVERAGES THE TEMPERATURE OF TIIE II AND 12 IIOT EG RTDS FOR FOUR DIFFERENT CHANNELS. THIS ACTIVTTY REMOVES ON RTD FROM ONE OF THE CHANNELS SO T1?AT THREE OF Tl!E CIIANNE13 WILL S111111 AVE AT IIOT AVERAGES (TWO INPUTS) AND ONE CIIANNEL WILL HAVE A SINGE T HOT. TO ACCOMPLISH TIIIS.THE OUTPUT OF TIIE TEMPERAlURE TRANSMTTTER INTO RPS WIll BE DISABED. THIS ACTITTTY WIII MANTAIN IUUR OPERABLE RPS CliANNELS ANTS TWO OPERABE SUEMX)OLED MARGIN MONTTORS (SCMM).
Page 11
50.59s Statused #3 62 in 1997 DOCID T11E It'NCT10N OF RPS 4111. BE UNAITECTED BECAUSE TIE TWO I!OT LEG!: ARE AT APPROXIMATELY TIIE S AME TEMPERA 1URE,TIERETORE SYMMETRICAL EVENTS %T11 BE DETECTED BY T11E SINGLE PTD. TID'RE ARE NO ASYMMETRICAL EVENTS THAT RELY ON TIlOT INPUTS TO T1tIPTHE REACTOIL BASED ON TiiE ABOVE EVALUATION,T1HS ACTnTTY DOES NOTINCREASE TIIE PROBABIUTY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALEUNCT10N PREVIOUSLY EV/ 8UATED IN T11E SAR, NOR DOES IT CREATE A NEW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MAIJUNCI?9N NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN TIIE SAR. T1HS ACTDTTY DOES NOT RESUI T IN A REDUCTION OF THE MARGIN OF SATETY IN THE TECHNICAL SPEC 111 CATIONS, TliEREFORE TIIIS ACTI\\ TTY IS NOT AN UNltEVIE%TD SAFETY Q'.ESTION.
SE00153
SUMMARY
THE SCOPE OF TIIIS ACTIVITY 15 TWO FotD. FIRST, ADDRESS THE USE OF A NEW BIOCIDE TO CONTROL FOUIJNG. SECOND. ABANDON UNUSED PORTIONS OF TIE Cli1DRINATION SYSTEM PIPINO.
TO MINIMIZE MARINE FOUUNO IN TIIE SW SYSTEM. FOR TIE PAST SEVERAL YEARS BETZ CIAMTROL IIAS BEEN USED VICE SOD!UM IIYPOCHIDRITE. THE USE OF CLAMTROL liAS BEEN CONTROI.1ED VIATlIE TEMPORARY ALTERATION PROCESS. TlHS ACTISTTY P20VIDES TIIE DESIGN TO ALIDW T1E PERMANENT USE OF CIAMTROL THIS S0.59 3AFETY EVAIDAT10N IS REQUIRED SINCE ALID%TNG TIIE USE OF CLAMTROL WILL ALTER TIIE DESCRIPT10N OF Tile CHIDRINATION S YSTEM AS STATED IN SECTIONS 1194 AND 9.S.23. OF THE LTSAIL T1tESE SECTIONS OF Tits LTSAR WIII.
BE UPDATED TO allow TifE 15E OF SODIUM ITYPOCIIIDRITE OR CIAMTRoi C1 AMTROLliAS BEEN USED FUR SEVERAL YEARS AS A BIOCIDE IN T11E SW SYSTEM. IT IS COMPATIBLE %TTH TifE VARIOL3 MATTJtlALS FOUND IN THE SW SYS1EM ANT ITS USE HAS NOT IIAD ANY ADVERSE AFFECTS ON ANY SW COMPONENT. Tite STORAGE IDCATION OF TIE CLAMTROL CONTAINERS IIAS BEEE EVALUATED ANT) WAS FOUND TO BE IN COMPUANCE %TTII T1IE DESIGN REtiQIREMENTS. A
- CONTROL ROOM CHEMICAL IIABTTABIUTY* EVALUATION OF CLAMTROLIN ACCORDANCE %TTH 10 Cfit 50 APPENDLX A ODC.19 CONCLUDED THAT CLAMTROL Wili NOT CONSTITUTE A TOXIC CONDITION OR FIRE IIAZARD TO THE CONTROL ROOM TOLIDWING A WORSE CASE ACCIDENT.
IURTIIERMORE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL AfTECTS OF T1E CIAMlltOLINJECTION HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY EVAIUATED. THE GUIDEUNES PROVIDED BY Tite DISCHARGE PERMIT (ISSUED BY TIIE STATE OF MARYtAND DEPARTMENT OF THE EN\\TRONNENT)IIAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE PIANT4 CIIEM"TRY PROCEDURES.
Page 12
o-50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOCID TIUS ACTIVTTY WI11 NOT DEGRADE TiiE REllASIUTY OR INCREASE THE CIIALIl%GES OF ANT ITS SSCS. TIIE PROPOSED ACTIMTY MEETS THE REQLTREMENTS OF THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND REGLTATIONS.
BASED ON TIIIS EVAIEATION,T!"IS ACTIVTTY DOES NOT CONSTTTUTE AN UNREVIE%TD SAFETY QUEST 10N AND THE MARGN OF SAFETY AS DEITNID IN Tile TECINICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.
SE00154 SL11 MARY:
THIS ACT1VITY INSTALLED A CONTAINMENT OUTAGE DOOR (COD':ON THE EXTERIOR OF EACli CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AT THE FQUIPMENT HATCl3 (EII) OPENING AS A SUBS 11TUTE FOR TIIE EQUIPMENT IIATCH DOOR (EXID) WIIEN SETTING CONTAINMENT CIDSURE DURING OLTAGE CONDIT'JNS. TIUS MODIFICATION AUDWS TIIE SUBSTITUTION OF AN OPCd Elf (USING TIIE COD AS T1IE CIDSt'RE DEVICE) FOR TIIE OPEN PERSONNEL AIRIJOCK(PAL)(CURRENTLY PERMITTED DURING CORE ALTERATIONS) AND SUPPORTS TIIE FUNCT10NAL EQL1VA11NCY OF Ti!E CDD FOR T HE EIID (WHERE1ECli SPECS SPECIFICALLY STATE END %TTil FOUR DOLTS AS Tite CLOSURE DEVICE). IN ADDTTION, T1ils MODIFICATION CONDUCTED A ONF TIME PNEL11ATIC PROOF TEST OF TIIE COD ATTACIIMENT t?'ING T1IE EXISTING EQUIPMENT IIATCH DOOR AS A TEST BOUNDARY, ADDED DESCR11710NS OFTilE COD TO LTSAR CIIAFTER 5.1 ADDED A DESCRIITION OF TIIE COD TO LTSAR SECTION 917; REVISED TIIE DESCRIPTION OF C1DSL1tE CONDITIONS IN LTSAR SECTION 1418 (FUEL HAND! LNG INCICENT),AND REVISED APP 1JCABLE LTSAR FIGURES TO Sif0W THE COD.
TIIIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONC 1EDED TilAT NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION EXISTED BECAUSE TIIE MODES 5 AND 6 EVENT CONDITIONS ARE MUCll LESS SE% IRE TIIAN Tite MODE I EVFSTS AND Tite EQUIPMENT LYTENDED FOR MODES 5 AND 6 USE (TIIE COD)
WAS DESIGNED USING TIIE CODE AIJ.OWABLES FOR DESIGN OF Tile CORRESIUNDINO MODE I EQUIPMENT (TIIE EIID), BUT AT TIIE APPROPRIATE CONDITION:l: EXPERIENCED DURING MODES 5 AND 6 CASUALTIE1 T1115 MODIFICATION IS CONSISTENT %TTH TifE PROGRAMMED EN11ANCEMENTS DISCUSSED IN GL 88-17.
SE00I$8,Rev.0
SUMMARY
TIIIS ACTIVI1Y WIllREPIACE TIIE UI AND U2 IJNEAR POWER RANGE NLM INSTRUMENTATION (PRNI) DRAWERS IN TIIE REACTOR PRUITCTIVE SYSTEM (RPS)
FOR CHANNELS A B, C, AND D %TTII NEW t.NALOG ELICTRONICS DRAWERS PROCURED THROUG1I SPFCII1 CATION SP 0797 REV 2 FROM GAMMA METRICS (GM) WIIILE TIIE NEW PRNI DRAWERS WILL FIT IN TIIE SAME 1DCATION AS TIIE EXISTN1 DRA#ERS,THE Page 13
-j 50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 '
DOCID wj DESIGN HAS BEEN MODIITED TO SIMPLIFY MAINTENANCE AND C.ALIBRATION, AND ENHANCE THE VISUAL APPEARANCE. THESE PRh1 DRA%TRS ARE SCHEDL1ED TO BE y-REPLACED WIHM AT 80%IR. HOWEVER. IF NECESSARY.THEY CAN BE REPLACED
- 1
. WHILETHE UNITI$ IN ANY MODE.
I mE DESMN BASES FOR HE EX?SBNO RPS PRNI DRAHHS,MATWERE ARE NO NEW BASED ON THE FACTS TilAT TIIE NEW RPS PRNI DRAWERS W!Il CONTINLI TO MEET
~
1 i
' ACCIDENTS OR MAIJUNCTIONS INTRODUCED BY TIIIS ACIT\\ TTY, AND THATTHE RPS PRS 1 DRARTRS ARE NEITHER AN INTI1ATOR OR MITIGATOR OF AN ACCIDENT,THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INTRODUCE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQL SE001)s,Rev. I -
SUMMARY
. TIIIS ACT1\\ TTY 4111 REPLACE THE71 AND U2 IJSTAR PO%TR RANGE STX1 EAR INSTRUMENTATION (PRNI) DRAHTRS IN THE REACTOR PROTECTITT SYSTEM (RPS)
FOR CHANNELS A, B,C AND D WITH NEW ANALDO EMCTRONICS DRA%T.RS PROCURED.
THROUGII SPECIFICATION SP 0797 REV.2 FROM OAMMA ME11t1CS (CM) WHILE THE NEW PRS 1 DRAWERS WIII fTT INTHE SAME LOCATIONS AS THE EXISTING DRAWERS, TIIE DESIGN HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO SIMPLIFY MAINTENANCE AND CAllBRAT10N.
AND ENHANCE TIIE VISUAL APPEARANCE. THESE PRNI DRA%TRS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED WIi!M AT PO%TR. HO%TVER. IF NECESSARY TItEY CAN BE REPIACED WHILE TIIE UNITIS IN ANY MODE.
BASED ON TIIE FACTS THAT TIIE NEW RPS PRNI DRA%TJtS WII1 CONTINUE TO MEET THE DESIGN BASES FOR THE EXISTING RPS PRh1 DRA% IRS.THATTHERE ARE No NEW
- ACCIDENTS OR MALILMNS INTRODUCED BY THIS ACITVTIY, AND THATHE RPS PRNI DRAWERS ARE NEITHER AN INITIATOR O2 MillOAIDR OF AN ACCIDENT,THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INTRODUCE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ)
[
l SE00161
SUMMARY
l TIIIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES TO INSTALL A BYPASS LINE ACROSS TIIE UP3TREAM SEAT OF I(2)MOV45I AND632.
THESE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES ARE TIIE SHUIDOWN C00I150 SYSTEM SUCTION IJNE ISOLATION VALVES. THE FUNCI1ON OF THE BYPASS IJNE IS TO PROVIDE A REllEF PATII FOR THE FLUID TRAPPED IN TIIE BONNET CAVITY THUS EllMINA11NO THE l{
l POTES"TIAL FOR PRESSURE IDCKING OFTIaESE VALVES..
t Page 14 -
e r
50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOC ID THIS 50 59 SAFETY EVAWATION IS NEEDED SLNCE TIE SAR 3 DESCRITTION OFTliE SDC 15 ALTERED BY TfDS MODIFICADON. SPECIFICAl1Y LTSAR F1GURES 5-1C, 6-1 AND 6-10 WILL BE REVISED TU DEP!CT TIE BYPASS UNE.
11fE S:ILTDOWN COO 11NG (SDC) SYSTEM IS USED TO REMOVE CORE DECAY HEAT AND R1 ACTOR COOLANT SENSIBM IIEAT DURING PLANT COO 1 DOWNS AND COLD SHtJIDOWNS.
T11E SYSTEM ALSO C0013 THE CONTAIN\\ LENT SPRAY WATEP DURLNG CONTANMENT SPRAY SYSTEM (CSS) OPERATION POST RECIRCLTATION ACTUATION SIGN AL(1LAS) AND MAINTALNS REFUEUNG TEMPERATURE DURING RERT11NG OPERATIONS. ADDITONA11Y.
THE HEAT EXCIIANGERS CAN BE USED TO PROVIDE ADDIDONAL SPENT FLT1 POOL COOUNG (SFPC) WHENT HE COMPUTE CORE IS REMOVED FROM TiiE REACTOR VESSEL AND TEMPORARILY STORED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL (SM TiiE SDC SYSTEM SUCTION IlNT HAS TWO HEADER ISOLATIONS VALVES. S1452 AND S1451. THESE VALVE.4 ARE MOTOR OPERATED CONTAINMENT 1SotATION VALVES. MOV 652 IS IDCATFD INSIDE CONTAINEMNT NEAR TifE ASSOCIATED RCS IlOT UG ANI)
MOV 651 IS IDCATED IN T11E AUXILLARY BUILDING LNSIDE THE PE'JETRATION ROOM.
BOTil VALVES ARE 12" GATE VALVES %TTil A SINGE DISC WlilCH IS WEDGED CIDSE.
BY THE MOTOR OPERAlY)R. BETWEEN TWO SEATS.
RFfENT INDUSTRY CONCERNS IIAS IDENTIFIED THESE VALVES AS BEING SUSCEPTIBM IUR PRESSURE LDCKING. PRESSURE 1DCKING CAN 00C01 %TIEN Tile *E FLEXIBLE GATE VALVES ARE CIDSED AND A IIIGIIER FRESSURE IT1'ID IS TRAPPED IN TIIE BONNET CAVITY AS COMPARED TO TI(E SYSTEM PRESSURE. ONE SCENARIO LEADING TO TilIS TYPE OF BINDINO OCCURS WHEN TifE VALVE IS CLDSED RTIll Tite SYSTEM PRESSURE AT HIGH PRESSURE FollO%TD BY A DECREASE IN THE SYSTEM PRESSURE. TIIE HIGifER PRESSURE II.UID TRAPPED IN THE BONNET WILL FORCE BOTH SIDES OF TIE DISC AGAINST THE SEATS. CAUSING Tite DISC SEAT FRICTION FORCES TO RESIST VALVE REOPENING. ANOTEHR EXAMPLE IS WHEN T1IE CLOSED GATE VALVE WIT 11 UQUID TRAPPED IN TIE BONNET CASTTY 15 SLTUECTED TO A TEMPERATURE INCREASE.
TliE BONNET FLUID WI11TRY TO EXPAND DUE TO TIE TEMPERAll'RE INCREASE. IF TiiE VALVE BONNET IS 1 EAK TIGiff.TlIE F11'ID CANNOT EXPAND So THE PRESSURE IN THE BONNET INCREASES. TIIE RESULTANT PRESSURIZATION OF TIIE BONNET CAVTTY MAY PREVENTTHE VALVE FYOM OPENING.
TlilS ACTIVIFv WIII NOT DEGRADE THE RELIABIllTY OR INCREASE T1[E CHALLENGES OF.ANY ITS SSCS. T1E PROPOSED ACTi\\ TTY MET TIIE REQUIREMENTS OF TIE DESIGN CODES. STANI)ARDS, AND REGULATIONS.
Page 15
's.
50.59s Statused c2 62 in 1997 -
i'
.DOCID BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, DOS ACTI\\TIY DOTS NOT CONSTITUTE AN LWREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTN AND THE MARON OF SAFETY AS DEFEED N THETECHNICAL
~
SPECIf1CADONSIS NOT REDUCED 5
- SE0cI63
SUMMARY
Tile PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO APPROVE ABANDONING ATHIEFTHAT WAS LOST IN THE I A FOST BECAUSE IT IS NOT A SAFETY CONCERN AND IT IS NOT l[
ECONOMICALTO RETRIEVEIT.
THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF TifE 1 A FOST IS TO STORE IUEL AND PROVIDE A SUCTION L FIJDW PATH TO THE TRANSFER PUMPS. LEAVING THE THIEF IN PLACE IS NOT A CONCERN BECAUSE THE THIEF Will NOT AfTECT THE INTEGRIlY OFDIE TANK OR IMPEDE DIE FIDW PATII TO THE FUEL OIL DAY TANT FOR THE 1 A DfESEL THE
. THIEF WAS SHOWN TO BE INERT IN THE fUELOfLTANK ENVIRONMENT. ALSO.THE TANK IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT DEBRIS AND SEDIMENT FROM ENTERING THE SUCTION PIPING SY SIDPLV1 THE FIDOR AWAY FROMTHE SUCTION IlNT AND IDCATING THE SUCTION 11NE 7.5" ABOVE THE ILDOR. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MAIJUNCTIONS OR AC,42 DENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE -
CREATED. THEREFORE.THIS N'T"Ta fY DOES NOT CONSTTTLTE A LM SE00164
SUMMARY
4 THIS ACIDITY CHANGES THE POSTT10N OF(1)2CV1581,(1)2CV1584,(1)2CV1589 (1)2CV1592 DURING SIAS FROM MODUIATING TO IUI1Y OPEN. BASED ON DIE ENGINEERLNG EVAllJAT10N PERFORMED N17.MIORARY AI TERATION
- 2960124. AND 1960201, SRW TEMPERATURE CAN BE MAINTAINED IN THE DESIGN IlMIT PROVIDED THE PRESCRIBED OPERATINO 11MITS ARIOBSERVED DURING THETIMEFRAME DIAT THIS TEMPGRARY ALTERATION IS EFFECTIVF-t SE00165
SUMMARY
THIS SAFTY EVAIDATION ADDRESSES THETEMPORARY CONDITION WHERE THE DIESEL AUXILIARIES FOR1TO DIESEL GENERATORS ARE FED FROM ONE MOTOR CONTROL CENITJt (MCC). WHILE DG 1B IS BEING TESTED, DO 2A WILL BE OPERABE AND AVAEIABE
.TO EMERGENCY BUS 21. THIS Will RESULT IN MCC 214R SUPPLYING BOTH DG IB AND DO 2A AUXIllARIES.
THIS IJNEUP IS CONSISTENT %7TH PLANT SEPARATION CRITERIA. AND SUFFICIENT MAR 9IN EXISTS IN THE ELECTRJCAL DISTRIBUFION SYSTEM TO AllDW FEEDENO OF BOTH THE DO IB AND DO 2A AUX 111 ARIES FROM MCC 2I4R. SAFETY RELATED Page 16
~.
50.59S Statused at 62 in 1997 DOCID PROTECTIVE DEVICES PROVIDED ON MCC 214R AND DISEL AUAIllARIES (INCEDING MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS) PROTECT TIE EQLTPMENT AGAINST E1ECTRICAL MAIJL%CTION IURTHERMORE,THE FEEDER BREAKER FROM DO IB TO EMERGENCY BUS 2I WIll BE ISOLATED %TTH DISCONNECT I 29 - 2406 A OPEN %1EN CONTROL IDGIC TESTING IS PERFORMED. THIS ElliISOIATE T1E DESEL FROM EMERGENCY BUS 21 DL1tLNG TTIIS TEMPORARY CON 11GURAT10N. TIEREFORE, TIE PRnBABIIJTY OF MAIJUNCTION IS NOT INCREASED.
SINCE EOLTPMENT USED TO MITIGATE MAIJLNCDON AND ACCIDENTS IS NOT ADVERSELY IMPACTED BY THIS ACTITTTY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRE %10USLY EVAWATED MAIJUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS IS NOT INCREASED. THIS ACTISTTY DOES NOT AFTECT EQUIPMENT ASSUMED TO BE ACCIDENTINITIATORS. NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTION 3
%TTil JTIER SSCS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY TIIIS ACTI\\ TTY TilAT COGD CAUSE A NEW MAIJUNCTION OR ACCIDENT. N ADDITION,TIIE DIESELGENTRATORS ARE MITIGAT*)RS OF PREVIOUSLY EVAWATED ACCIDENTS ANDCANNOT BECOME ACCIDENT IN!TIATORS. TIIUS. Tite POSSIBillTY 01 NEW MAIJUNCT10NS OR ACCIDENTS IS NOT CREATED BY TIIIS ACIT\\ TTY. TIE CONTROL 1JDGIC TESTING AND PilASING ARE REQUIRED TO RETL1tN TIE DIESEL GENERATOR TO SER\\1CE TWO EMERGUC DESEL GENERATORS 4111 BE AVAILABELTU SUPPORT UNTT 2 AND ONE DtESEL GENERATOR
%TIL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT UNIT 1 %11111 TECIIN1 CAL SPECIFICATIONS 31.1.1. IS ENTERED. DGB 1B %1LL BE RETURSTD TO S9VICE %TTII TIE ACTION STATEMENT OF TFr!{NICAL SPECIFICATlON 3.31.1 OR UNIT I %TIL SIILT DOWN. TIIUS.TIIE MARON OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSEDIN T11ETECIINICALSPECIF1 CAT 10N IS NOT REDUCED BY TlilS ACMTTY. TIEREFORE,TIIIS ACTitTTY DOES NOT CONSTTILTF AN UNREVE%TD SAFETY QUESTION.
SE00166
SUMMARY
TlHS ACTI\\ TTY MODIFIES Tite REACTOR COOIANT WASTE (RCW) PROCESSING SYSTEM AND TIE M.lSCEllANEOUS WASTE (MW) SYSTEM TO ADD A SECOND ISOIAT10N VALVE DOWNSTREAM OF ISOL ATION VALVE 0-RCW-259 C1;OSE TO TifE TEE WHERE THE RCW DISCllARGE IIEADER TIES INTO Tite MW DISCitARGE. TIIIS ACTIVITY ALSO PROPOSES TO ADD A DRAIN BETWEEN THESTW ISOIATION VALVE AND EXISTING CIIECK VALVE 0-RCW-343. N ADDITION, TIE ACT1VTTY INCLUDES AS-BUILT PIPING SEGMENT 3 AND THEIR SUPPORT 3 ASSOCIATED WITII TIIE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.
SINCE TIIE PROBAB113TY OF OCCURRENCE OF PREVIOUSLY EVAWATED MAIJUNCTIONS OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY AND PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENTS IS NOT INCREASED,TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVAWATED MAIJUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS ARE WT INCREASED. THE POTENTIAL FOR NEW MAIA JNCI1ONS AND ACCIDENT 3 IS NOT CREATED, ANT) TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN TIIE1TCHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED, TIUS ACMTTY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
Page 17
-o;.
S0.59s Statused at 62 in 1537.
DOCID -
-SE00164.-
' 532530 $9 SAFETY EVAIIIATION WAS APPROVED BY 10SRC ON APRIL 121993 AT METING 93 42. THE PIANT GENERAL MANAGER APPRO%ID THE 50 39 THE SAME DAY. HOWEVEst.THE SO 59 NEVER RL. IVED A 1DG NUMBER. THUS. WE ARE NOW T
. ASSIGNING IT A SE 100 NUMBER IN 1997 PRIOR TO SEND!NG IT TO OSSRC.(TAS)
?
. SE00170
SUMMARY
THE #21 SERVICE WATER HEAD TANK LEVEL IS CONTRO11ED BY THE CYCLING OF ~
2 CV IS79. DHS CONTRO. VALVE IS PROVIDED WIDI AN ISOLATION VALVE ON THE INLET SIDE (2 HV SRW 104) 'ND THE OUTIET SIDE (2 HV SRW 103) CURRENTLY 2 HV SRW 10415 LEAKINC BY TS SEAT AND REQUIRES OVERHALL THIS OVERHAl.U. '
Elli BE ACCOMP11SHED UNDL R MAINTENANCE ORDER 219 9 3 03 6 3 2. TO -
l MINIMIZE THE AITECT ON MAKL ~!P AVAILAB11JTY TO THE SRW HEAD TANIQi, DIE OVERIIAUL OF 2 HV SRW 104 WIll L2 COMPLETED IN TWO STAGES.THE VAL %I INTERNALS WILL BE REMOVED AND A BUND F1ANGE Will BE INSTAt t rn ON THE
' BONNET OF THE VALVE. F011DWING THE INSTALLATION OF THE BUND FIANGE ON TifE VALVE BONNET.THE PIPING RE BE RETURNTD TO SERVICE. ONCETHE VAL %T '
OVERHAUL IS COMP 1ETED, MAKE UP TO THE 21 SRW HEAD TANK IS TAAEN OLT OF SERVICE.1HE VALVE INTERNALS %111 BE REINSTA1 rn AND THE VALVE DECIARED OPERABLE.
TIIIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS GENERATED BECAUSE THE SAR DESCRIPTION OF THE SERVICE WATEP SYSTEM AS DEPICTED ON LTSAR F1GURE 9-27 IS TEMPORARILY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.
. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUIE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED IN 10 CFR 5039.
SE00171
SUMMARY
THIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES REPLACING DIE PRESSURE SHTKHES,INIMCATORS, AND TRANSMITTERS ON DIE MAIN STEAM ISOtATION Vf1VE(. MV) ACTUATOR. THE S%1TCHES PROVIDE AN AIARM IDCAl1Y ANDIN TEH C04ROL ROOM FOR HYDRAUIJC AND NITROGEN PRESSURE. DIE TRANSMITTERS AND INDICATORS PROVIDE PRESSURE INDICATION AT PANEL 1/ 2C161. AlliUNC110NS OF THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT l
Will E MAINTAINED BY THE REPIACEMENT INSTRLNENTS.
i 4
BASED ON THE ABOVE EVALUATION.TIIIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILFIY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MAIJUNCTION PREVIOUSLY l
EVALUATED IN TIM SAR.NOR DOES IT CREATE A NEW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR Page 18
- - ~.
s a
50.59s Statused O 62 in 1997 DOCID MAIJUNCTKW NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. T1113 AC'IT% TTY DOES NOT RESULT N A REDUCT10N OF THE MARON OF SAFETY IN TIIE TECHNICAL SPECTsCATIONS,11IEREFORE THIS ACTIVTTY IS NOT AN UNREVIEuTD SAFETY
- QUESTION, SE00172 Rev.I
SUMMARY
T1E NSTAllATION OF A FREEZE SEAL N Tite WASTE PROCESSING MPING HAS BEEN EVALUATED DESIGN REQUIREMENTS HAVE BFIN CONSIDERED AND WERE DETERMISTD TO BE ACCEPTABIA T11E FRFF7F SEAL WI1111 AVE NO DETPIETAL EFIT' TON TIE
}.
PIPING SYSTEM. IF UQL1D NITROGEN SUPPLY TO THE FRrF7F SEALWERE IDST.
INTEGRITY OF TIIE I 2FF7F SEAS %E BE MAINTAINED FOR ATIJAST 2 I!CUPA DURING T1(15 TIME, A B11ND f1ANGE WILL BE INSTAt i Fn ON TIIE REIIEF V"L%T OUTI ET PIPING THEkEFORE, IF TiiE F alEEZE SEAL INTEGRITY WERE LOST.Ti!E BilND FIANGE WOUI.D PROVIDE PRESSURE BOUN9ARY. AllDESIGN P.EQUIREMENTS OF TIIE RC WPS PIPING ARE MET, WPS PIPING IS ADEQUATELY SUP!URTED AND MEETS SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS.
TIIE GAGGING OF Tite WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RDJEI VALVES uTTH THE WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM PIPING IN T11E LINEUP DESCRIBED IN THE DESIGN EVA11'ATION PORTION OF TEMPORARY ALTERATION 2 97009 IS AllDHTD BY TIIE ORIGINAL j
CONSTRUCTLA CODE. EURTHERMORE, EVEN TIIOUGilTiiE RE13EF VALVES ARE NOT l
REQUIRE 17TO PROTECT TIIE TASIS FROM ABNORMAL CONDIT10NS SUC11 AS FIRES.
THIS WAS EVALUATED. Tl!E PRESSURE INCREASE IN TIIE WASTE GAS DECAY TANKS TIIAT REsCLTS FROM TIIE MAXIMUM THEORETICAL FIRE IN ROOM 207 / 205 RESUI.TS N A REDUCTION N Ti!E SAFETY FACTOR ON TIIE TANK FROM 4 TO 2.9. TIIIS l
{
REDUCTION IS ACCEPTABLE AND PROVIDES ASSURANCE TIIAT TANK FAILL1tE DUE TO OVERPRE%URIZATIGA %RLNOTOCCUR AS A RESULTOFTHIS ACTi% TTY.
TIIERE ARE NO CllANGES TO ANALYZED MAIJUNCTIONS OR ACCIDESTS, AND NO NEW MAIJUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED TTIEREFORE.TIIIS ACTIVITY DOES NOTCONSTTTUTE AUSQ.
SE00172. Rev.2 SUMM.GY:
TIIE INSTAMATION OF A TkEEZE SEAL N T11E WASTE PROCESSING PIPING HAS BEEN EVALUATED. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS IIAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND WERE DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABif THE FREEZE SEAL WIllHAVE NO DETRIMUTAL EFTECT ON Tile PIPING SYSTEM. IF UQUID NITROGEN SUPPLY TO T11E FRFFH SEAL WERE IDST.
INTEGRITY OF TIIE FREEZE SEAL Will BE MAINTAINED FOR AT LEAST 2 liOURS DURING TIIIS TIME, A BUND FIANGE WI'1 BE INSTAlu3 ON TIIE REUEF VALVE OUTLET PIPING. TIIEREFORE, IF TIIE FREEZE SEAL WTEWAITY WERE LOST. TIIE BilND FLANGE WOULD PROVIDE PRESSURE BOUNDA2Y. AllDESIGN REQUIREMENTS Page 19
. _ _...........,...,-i...
i..,,,,.. :,.... _.
...,,,.....,......g s
.e,..-
in 50.59S Statused C3 62 iri 1997 DOC ID -
OF TI!E RC WPS PIPING ARE MET, %TS PIPING IS ADEQUATELY SLTPORTED AND MEFTS SEISMIC REQLTREMENTL.
TIIE GAGGING OF TiiE WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RELIEF VALVES %1T:t TIE WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM PIPING IN THE UNEUP DETRIBED W THE DESIGN EVAIEATION PORTION OF TEMPORARY ALTERATION 2 97 009 IS ALLOWED BY THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION CODE. IURTilERMORE, EVEN THOUGH THE RELIEF VALVES ARE NOT REQUIRE DTO PROWTHE TANKS FROM ABNORMALCONIMTIONS SUCH AS FIRES, THIS WAS EVALUATED. TIIE PRESSURE INCREASE N THE WASTE GAS DECAY TANTS TilAT RESULTS FROM THE MAXIMUM T1IEORET1 CAL FTRE IN ROOM 207/ 208 RESL1TS N A REDUCTION IN THE SAFETY FACFOR ON THE TANK FROM 4 TO 2.9. THIS REDUCTION IS ACCEPTABII AND PROVIDES ASSURANCE THATTANK FAllIRE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION WIllNOTOCCUR AS A RESLLTOFTHIS ACTITTTY.
THERE ARE NO C11ANGES TO ANALYZED MAIJUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALEUNCTIONSOR ACCIDENTS ARECREATED TIIEREFORE THIS ACTIVI1T DOES NOTCONST11UTE AUSQ.
SE00172 Rev.O
SUMMARY
TIIE INSTALLATION OF A FREEZE SEAL IN TIE WASTE PROCESSING PIPING llAS BEEN EVALUATED. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS IIAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND WERE DETERMINTD 10 BE ACCEPTABLE. TiiE FR FF7F. SEAL 4TLL llAVE NO DETRIMENTAL EITECT ON THE PIPING SYSTEE IF UQLTD NTTROGEN SLTPLY TO THE FREEZE SEAL WERE LOST.
INTEGRITY OF T11E FREEZE SEAL RTLL BE MAINTAINED FOR AT LEAST 2 HOUlts.
DURING TIIIS TIME. A BUND FLANGE WILL DE INSTAI J Fn ON 111E REUEF VALVE OUTLET PIPING. TI!EREFORE,IF THE DEEZE SEAL INTEGRITY TERE IJOST. Tite BUND FLANGE WOUID PROVIDE PRESSURE BOUNDARY. ALLDESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF TIIE RC WPS PIPING ARE MET, WPS PIPING IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED AND MEETS SEISMIC REQUIREMENT 3.
TIIE GAGGING OF TIE WASTE GAS DECAY TANK REllEF VALVES WITH TIIE WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEN PIPING IN THE IlNEUP DESCRIBED IN THE DESIGN EVALUATION PORTION OF TEMPOR ARY ALTERATION 2 97 009 IS ALIDWE3 BY TIIE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION CODE. EURT1tERMORE, EVEN THOUGli TIIE REUEF VALVES ARE NOT P.EQUIRE DTO PROTECT THETANKS FROM ABNORMALCONDITIONS SLCH AS FIRES.
TrilS WAS EVAIEATED.11IE PRESSURE INCREASE IN TIE WASTE GAS DECAY TANKS TilAT RESL1TS FROM TIIE MAXIMUM TIIEORET1 CAL f1RE IN ROOM 207 / 208 RESULTS IN A REDUCTION IN TIIE SAFETY FACTOR ON THETAAK FROM 4 TO 2.9. TIIIS REDUCTION IS ACCEPTABLE AND PROVIDES ASSURANCE TilAT TANI FAIIERE DUETO OVERPRESSURIZATION WIIINOTOCCUR AS A RESULTOFT1 TIS ACTI\\ TIT.
Page 20 -
50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 DOC ID T1IERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MAIJUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS. AND NO NTW MALFUNCDONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE.T1113 ACTISTIY DOES NOTCONSTTTLTE AL3Q.
SE00173,Rev.1
SUMMARY
IIVAC DAMPER 0-PO-5343 HAS REEN DECIARED OLT OF SERVICF FOR FAIUNO STROKE TESTNO. IT MUST BE REMOVED FORM TIIE DUC SYSTEM TO BE REPAIRED. IT IS PART OF THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABE SPREADING ROOM COOUNO AND VENTILATION SYSTEM AND SUPPORTS TIIE CABE SPREADING ROOM IIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM. FIRE WATC!IES N THE CABE SPREADING ROOM HAVE BEEN ESTABUSIIED N ACCORDANCE ETI11 TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE. TO MAINTAN TIE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTIIATION SYSTEM.THE EQUIPMENT ROOM TilAT IIOUSES THE DAMPER 41LL BE SEAED TO ALIDW THE DUCT *ORK TO BE OPENED TO REMOVE THE DAMPER AND AGAN TO REINSTAU.,IT. 41 TILE MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED ON TIIE DAMPER. A *MAKEEP" PIECE 4111BE INSTAILED IN THE DUCT TO ESTABUSII TIIE IN1TGitITY OF TIIE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM. WITil T1IE SYSTEM INTEGRITY ASSURED T11E REQLTRED COOUNG FOR THE ROOMS W111 BE AVAILABLE. TIIIS AC~1VITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QLISTION SE00173.Rsv.0
SUMMARY
IIVAC DAMPER 0-PO-5343 H/.S BEEN DECIARED OUT OF SERV!CE FOR FAIUNO STROKE TESTING. IT MUST BE CEMOVED FORM TIIE DUCT SYSTEM TO BE REPAIRED. IT IS PAR ~ OF THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABE SPREADING ROOM COOUNO AND VENITIATION SYSTEM AND SUPPORTS TIIE CABLE SPREADING ROOM FIRE FROTECTION S1 STEM. MRE WATCHES IN THE CABE SPREADING ROOM HAVE BEEN E~TABUS11ED N ACCORDANCE %THI TECil SPEC ACTION STATEMENTS TUR TQL1PMENT OUT OF SERVICE '"U MAINTAN 1 TIE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM. DIE EQLTPMENT ROOM TilAT llOUSES THE DAMPER %Ti1 BE SEAED TO ALIDW T11E DULT WORK TO BE OPEITD TO REMOVE TIIE DAMPER AND AGAN TO REINSTALL IT. WHILE MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED ON THE DAMPER. A "MAKECP" PIECE %111 DE INSTAILED N TIIE DUCT TO ESTABUS11 T1!E INT 1 GRITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM. %TTH TIIE SYSTEM INTEGRITY ASSURED.TIIE RFQUTRED COOLING FOR THE ROOMS %111 BE AVAILABLE. THIS ACTI\\TIY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIE%TD SAFETY QUESTION SE00175
SUMMARY
TIIE REMOVAL OF TIIE UNTT 2 MotSTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER (MSR) ANT) MSR DRAN TANK II!GII LEVEL 1URBINE TRIP ALTERS TIIE UST OFTURBINT TRIPS PRO \\TDED IN Ti!E LTSAR SECTION 7.4.7.2 B AND FIGURE 8-12 SiiEET 2. TIIIS TRIP DOES NOT AfTECT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY NOR IS TI CREDITED N ANY ACCIDENTOR EVENT SCENARIOS.
Page 21
50.59s Statused at 62 hi 1997 DOCID TIIIS ACTIVI1Y DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIE%ID SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINID IN 10CFR50.$9. -
SE00176 Rev.1
SUMMARY
TIIIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNTT 2 CYCE 12.
MODIFICATIONS TO T1IE IL*EL ASSEMBLY AND TIIE REIDAD CORE DESIGN % IRE CONSIDERED. TIIE USE OF A SECOND IU11 BATCil OF ERBIUM FOR LSTT 2 AS A BURNABLE ABSORBER wad CX)NSIDERED. TiiE PRE-TRIP STEAM UNE BREAK EVE. T WAS N
EVALUATED USING NRC APPROVED DNB CONVOLUTION MET 1tODOLOGY TO PREDICT THE PERCENTAGE OF FUEL FAILURES. TIIE EVALUATION ASSUMED F R T AND F XT T LLMITS EQUAL TO I.70 AND RESULTED IN ILTL FAILL'RES LISE LIMITING THAN TilAT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. T11E CIIANGES ASSOCIATED %Tril F R T ANT) F XY T UMITS EQUALTO l.70 ARE IMPLEMENTED IN TIIE UNIT 2 CYCLE 12 COLR AND ARE VERD1ED TO BE APPUCABLE TO UNIT 2 CYCE 12. THE LSTT 2 CYCLE 12 SAFETY ANALYSES ACCOUNTED FOR ALL RELDAD CORE DUTERENCES. TifE RESULTS OF All ANALYSES OF RECORD CONSERVATIVELY APPLY TO *JNIT 2 CYCE 12. IT 15 CONCLLT)ED THAT OPERATION OF UNTT 2 CYCE 12 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIE%TD SAFETY QLTSDON.
SE60176. Rev. 2
SUMMARY
THIS SAFETY EVALUADON CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNTT 2 CYCLE 12.
MODTTICATIONS TO T11E FUEL ASSEMBLY AND TIIE RELDAD CORE DESIGN. TRE CONSIDERED. THE USE OF A SECOND ILT1 BATC11 OF ERBIUM FOR UNTT 2 # $ A BURNABLE ARSORBER W.'.S CONSIDERED. THE PRE-TRIP STEAM LINE BREA< EVENT WAS EVALUATED USING NRC APPROVED DNB CONVOLIJTION METIIODOLDGY TO PREDICT 11IE PERCENTAGE OF FUEL FAILURES. TIIE EVALUATION ASSUMED F R T AND F AY T UMITS EQUAL TO l.70 AND RESULTED IN ELTL FAT 111tES ESS UMITING TilAN TIL4T P9EV10USLY REPORTED. TiiE CIIANGES ASSOCIATED %TTil F R T AND FXY T UMITS EQUALTO 1,70 ARE IMPLEMENTED IN TIIE UNTT 2 CYCLE 12 COLR ANT) ARE VERDTED TO BE APPUCABE TO UNTT 2 CYCLE 12. T11E UNTT 2 CYCE 12 SAFETY ANALYSES ACCOUNTED FOR ALL RELOAD CORE DIITERENCES. T11E RESUI,13 OF AIL ANALYSES OF RECORD CONSERVATIVELY APPLY TO UNTT 2 CYCE 12. IT IS CONCLUDED TilAT OPERATION OF UNIT 2 CYCE 12 DOES NOT CUNSTITUTE AN UNREVIE%TD SAFE 1Y QUESTIOV.
SE00176 Rev.O SLM1ARY:
TIIIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNTT 2 CYCE 12.
MODIFICATIONS TO TIIE IUEL ASSEMBLY ANT) THE REIDAD CORE DESIGN WERE CONS!DERED. THE USE OF A SECOND ILT1 BATCH OF ERBIUM FOR UNTT 2 AS A Page 22
' 50.59s Statused at 62 in 1997 i
1i DOCID
..BURNABM ABSORBER WAS CONSIDERED. THE PRE-TRIP STEAM UNE BREAK EVENT WAS EVAWATED USNG NRC APPROVED DNB CON \\VLIJT10N METHODOLOGY TO PREDICTT*1E -
PERCENTAGE OF FLTL FA!WRES. THE EVAWATION ASSUMED F R T AND F XY T UMITS EQUALTO L70 AND RESLTTED N ILTL FM11tES LESS UMITLNG THAN THAT
- PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. TIIE CHANGES ASSOCIATED HTTH F R T AND F XY T UMITS a
EQUALTO l.70 ARE IMPEMENTED N THE UNTT 2 CYCLE 12 COut AND ARE %IRIFIED TO BE APFUCABLE TO LSTT 2 CYCLE 12. TIE UNIT 2 CYCLE 12 SAFETY ANALYSES ACCOUNTED FOR ALL REIDAD CORE DIITERENCES.. THE RESULTS OF AIL ANALYSES OF RECORD CONSERVATIVELY APPLY TO UNTT 2 CYCII 12. IT IS CONCWDED TilAT OPERADON OF L%TT 2 CYCII 12 DOES NOT CONTTITL7E AN L%1tE%1E%TD SAFETY QUESTION.
SE00179 Rev.1
SUMMARY
NRC GENERIC LETTER (GL) 96-06 IDENTIFIES A WATERHAMMER CONCERN N PIPING
)
INSIDE CONTAINMENT WIIICli CONTAINS STAGNANT WATER FOLLOWING A POSTULATED DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THE BALTI'K)RE GAS AND EUCTRIC COMPANTS ANALYSIS FOR THE CALVERT CUFFS NUCLEAR POWER FIANT, UNTT 2. SHOWS THAT IF A IDSS OF OfTSITE PO%T? (IDOP) OCCURS DURING ALOSS OFCOOLANT ACCIDENT (IDCAA POWER i
WOULD BE IDST TO BOTH TifE CAC FAN COOLERS AND THE SERVICE WATER (SRW)
PUMPS, WHICH SUPPLY WATER TO THE FAN COOLERS. THE VOIDS WOUID FORM, AS DESCRIBED N GL 96 06. WHEN THE SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZES BELOW THE LOCAL SA1L* RATION PRESSURE AS A RESL1 T OF STOPPING OFTim SRW PUMPS DURLNG THE ABOVE POSTULATED SCENARIO. OTON RESTARTOF THE SRW PUMPS %11EN IDADED ON Tile EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) THE VOIDS WOL1.D COUAPSE
'illEREBY CAUSLNG WATERilAMMER.
THE PROPOSED MODIFlCATION PROVIDES A MEANS TO PREVENT STEAM FORMATION IN THE SRW %TTHW THE CACS BY INSTALLING A NITROGEN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM N ORDER TO MAINTAN A MINIMUM NORMALOPERATING NTTROGEN PRESSURE OF 15 '
i PSIG IN THE IIEAD TANKS. TIIE OBJECTIVE IS TO INCREASE NORMAL SRW SYSTEM PRESSU21INTILTHE SRW PUMPS RESTART WHEN LOADED 9 THE EDOS FOUDWING TIC POSTL* LATED SCENARIO.
l THE PROPOSED MODIf1 CAT 10N WAS INCORPORATED INTO THE TRANSIENT CAC HEAT UP
{
ANALYSIS. THE RESULTS OF TIIE ANALYSIS SHOW THAT %TTH A 15 PS10 NT!1tOGEN PRESSURE IN T1IE SRW HEAD TANK, THE PUMPS WIII START A MINIMUM OF to SECONDS PRIOR TO THE START OF BOIUNO AND ESTABLISH THE SRW FLOW T11 ROUGH TIIE CACS. THUS, THIS MODIFICATION WIIL EUMINATE THE WATERHAMMER CONCERNS
]
%TTHIN THE CACS IDEN11FIED IN GENERIC ETTER 9646.
THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A USQ, SINCE IT INCREASES THE PROBABIU.T OF Page 23 n
~ -,..., - - -,
50.59s Statused c 62 in 1997 DOCID -
OCCURRENCE OF A MAIJUNCTION OF A DIITERENTTYPE TIIAN PREV 100$LY EVALUATED IN TIIE SAR. HOWEVER, SUCli A MALFUNCTION DOES NOT ALTER ANT ASSLNTDONS MADE N T1fE SAR OR CHANGE, DEGRADE, OR FRE\\ TNT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN THE SAR. TIIE ACCIDENT ANALYSES ASSLNES THAT THE SRW SYSTEM 15 OPERADE AND THAT THE CACS OPERATE ALTOMATICALLY FULLO%1NO AN ACCIDENT.
TifE PROPOSED MODIDCATION INCREASES THE RELIAB11TY OF T11ESE ASSLNTTIONS Bv PREVENTNG UNDESIRED LDADINGS WII1CH COL 1D DAMAGE THE CACS AND TIIEIR SRW ASSOCIATED PIPING (I E, DIE AVAIIABILITY OF TIIE CACS IS INCREASED)
DUE TO POTENTIAL WATERHAMMER CONCERNS %TUIN THE CACS IDENTIFIED IN GENERIC LETTER (GL)964.
SE00179, Rev. O SLNMARY:
NRC GENERIC LETTER (GL) 964 IDENTFIES A WATERilAMMER CONCERN N PIPING INSIDE CONTAINMENT Wil1CII CONTAINS STAGNANT WATER FO11DWING A POST'ILATED DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. Ti!E BALTL\\f0RE GAS AND EECTRIC COMPANY'S AsALYSIS FOR TIIE CALVERT C11FFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNTT 2. SIIOWS TilAT IF A LOSS OF OfTSITE POWER (IDOP) OCCURS DURING AIDSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (IDCA), POWER WOULD DE IDST TO BOTil THE CAC FAN COOERS AND TifE SERVICE WATER (SRW)
PUMPS. WIIICII SUPPLY WATER TO THE FAN COOERS. TIIE VOIDS WOULD FORM AS DESCRIBED IN GL 96. % %1IEN THE SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZES BELIPX T1fE IDCAL SATURADON PRESSURE AS A RESULT OF STOPPING OF TiiE SRW PLNPS DURING THE ABOVE POSTUIATED SCENARIO. LTON RESTART OF THE SRW PUMPS WHEN LOADED ON T!IE EMERGENCY DIESELGENERATORS (EDGS).THE VO!DS WOULD COLLAPSE TilEREDY CAUSING WATERHAMMER.
TifE PROPOSED MODIFICATION PROVIDES A MEANS TO PREVENT STEAll FORMATION IN TIIE SRW %TDilN THE CACS BY INSTALIlNO A NITROGEN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A MINIMLN NORMAL OPERATINO NTFROGEN PRESSURE OF I5 PSIG IN THE IIEAD TANKS, THE Of1IECTIVE IS TO INCREASE NORMAL SRW SYSTEM PRESSURE UNTIL TIIE SRW PUMPS RESTART %1IEN IDADED ON THE EDOS FOilis%1NO THE POSTU1ATED SCENARIO.
THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION WAS INCORPORATED INTO THE TRANSIENT CAC HEAT UP ANALYSIS. THE RESULT 3 OF TIIE ANALYTIS SIIOW TilAT %TDI A IS PSIG NTFROGEN PRESSURE IN 11(E SRW IIFAD TANK,11fE PtJMPS Will. START A MINLMUM OF to '
SECONDS PRIOR TO TIIE START OF BOIllNG AND ESTABLISH Tile SRW FIDW TIIROUGH TIIE CACS. TlIUS. Tills MODIFICATION %Til ELIMINATE THE WATERIIAMMER CONCERNS
%TDIIN TIIE CACS IDENTIFIED IN GENERIC ETTER 964.
TIIIS ACTI\\ TTY INVOLVES A USQ. SINCE IT INCREASES THE PROBABIIlTY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MAIJUNCTION OF A DIFTERENT TYPE TIIAN PREVIOUSLY EVA11JATED Page 24
50.59s Statused at 62 'n 1997
' DOC ID 8N THE SAR. HOWEVER, SUCH A MAIJUNCTION DOES NOT ALTER ANT ASStatFT10NS MADE N THE SAR OR CHANGE, DEGRADE.OR FREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED N T1E SAR_ TIIE ACCIDENT ANALYSES ASSUMES THAT THE SRW SYSTEM IS OPERABLE AND THATTHE CACS OPERATE AUTOMATICALLY FO!1DWING AN ACCIDENT.
TifE PROPOSED MODIHCATION INCREASES Tite REllABIUTY OF TIIESE ASSUMPTIONS BY PREVENTING UNDESIRED IDADINGS WlUCH COULD DAMAGE THE CACS AND THEIR SRW ASSOCIATED PIPING (LE, Tite AVAILABIUTY OF THE CACS IS INCREASED)
DUE TO POTENTIAL WATERHAMMER CONCERNS %TTHIN TIIE CACS IDENTIFIED N -
GENERIC LITTER (GL)964>6.
SE00179. Rev. 2 SL%IMARY:
NRC GENERIC LETTER (GL) 9646 IDENTIFIES A WA FERHAMMER CONCERN IN PIPING INSIDE CONTAWMENT WlHCII CONTAINS STAGNANT WATER FollDWING A POSTUIATED DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT.TIIE BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 3 ANALYSIS FOR ThE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER FLANT S110WS THAT IF A LDSS OF OFFSITE POWER (LDOP) OCCURS DURING A IDSS OF COOIANT ACCIDENT (LOCAL POWER WOULD BE LOST TO BOT!! THE CAC FAN COOIIRS AND THE SERVICE WATER (SRW) PL3tPS WHICII SUPPLY WATER TO TIIE WAN COOLIRS. THE VOIDS WOULD FOf31. AS DESCRIBED IN GL 9646 Wi1EN TIIE SYSTEM DEPRESSL111ZES BELOW TIIE LOCAL SATLTATION PRE 11'RE AS A RESUI.T OF STOPPINO OF TIIE SRW FUMPS DURING T1tE ABOVE POSTU1ATED SCENARK.. UPON RESTART OF THE SRW PUMPS Wl'E*J IDADED ON TIIE EMERGENCY DfESEL GENERATORS (EDGSA THE VOIIE WOUiD COLLAPSE THEREBY CAUSING WATERHAMMER.
TIIE PROPOSED MODIFICATION PROVIDES A ME/.NS TO PREVENT STEAM FORMX 10N IN Tile SRW %TDIIN DIE CACS BY NSTAllING A NTTROGEN PRF.SSURIZATION SYSTEM N ORDER TO MANTAN A NORMAL SRW NTTROGEN PRF'.SURE OF 16 +A I PSIG N THE HEAD TANKS. TIIE OBJECITVE IS TO INCRE.tSE NORMAL SRW SYSTEM PRESSURE TO MAINTAN SRW PRESSURE N THE AREA OF THE Cars AHOVE TIIE ITL1D SATURATION PRESSURE UNTILTIIE SRW PUMPS RESTART WIIEN IDADED ON THE EDGS FOLLOWING TIIE POSTUIATED SCENARIO.
THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION WAS LVORPORATED NTO THE TRANSIENT CAC IIEAT 07 ANALYSIS. Tl!E RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS SIIOW THAT HTHI A 15 PSIG NTFROGEN PRESSURE IN TIIE SRW HEAD TANK.TIIE PUMPS WILL START APPROXIMATELY 4.0 SECONDS PRIOR TO THE START OF D% NO AND ESTABLIS11 THE SRW FLOW T11 ROUGH THE CACS.
TIIUS.TII!h ',dODIf1 CATION Will. ELLMINATE TIIE WATERIIAMMER CONCERNS %TTIIN T1IE CACS IDENTIRED IN GENERIC LETTER 9%6.
TIIIS ACTISTTY INVOLVES A USQ, SINCE ITINTRODUCES TIIE POSSIBILITY OF A MAIJUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PPIVIOUSLY EVAIUATED N THE SAR.
IlOWEVER.THE FOilDWING DESIGN PRICAUTIONS ARE TAKEN TO PRECLUDE ANY Page 25
O 50.599 Statused C3 62 in 1997 DOCID V MJUNCTION.111E PROPOSED MOD!llCATION PROVIDES TR'O 100% REDUNDANT NITROGEN ACCUMUIATORS AND EACII ACCOMUIATOR IS D ' SIGNED TO MAINTAIN 16 M I PSIG NORMAL OPERATINO NITROGEN I*.ESSL1tE IN BOT 11 OL (IIE HEAD TANKS. TliE NITROGEN ACCLNUIATORS AND THE ASSOCIATED REUEF VALVES, PRESSURE CONTROL VALVES AND PIPING ARE SAFETY REIATED,SEISMICCNITOORY 1. ANNUNCIATION IS PROVIDED FOR Tite NITROGIN PRESSURE DURING NORMAL OPERATION. SIIOULD ONE PRESSURE REGULATOR FAIL OPEN,ITS DOWNSTREAM RElfr.S VALVE %1LL UFT %TTilOLT IMPACTING TIIE NTTROGEN SLTPLY 1D THE IIEAD TANKS FROM TIIE REIM.N9 ANT ACCUMUIATOR. SIIOULD A PRESSURE REGUIATOR FAIL SHLT,NTTROGEN SUPPLY FROM Tl!E REDUNDANT ACCUMULATok %11L STILL BE AVA11ABLE TO PRESSURIZE DOT 11 OF TIE IIEAD TANKS.
TIIE POSSIBIUTY OF THIS NEW MALEUNCIlON DOES NOT ALTER ANY ASSUMPTIONS MADE IN THE SAR OR CIIANGE, DEGRADE, O!t PREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN Tl!E SAR. Tile ACCIDENT ANALYSES ASSUMES THATTiiE SRW SYSTEM IS OPERABE AND TIIAT TIIE CACS OPERATE AUTOMATICA11Y FollD%1NO AN ACCIDENT. Tile PROPOSED MODIFICATION INCREASES T1IE REUABIUTY OF TifESE ASSUMPTIONS BY PRESTNTING LWDESIPED LOADINGS R1tICH COULD DAMAGE TIIE CACS AND TilEIR SRW ASSOCIATED P! PING (1 E.,Tl!E AVAHABILITY OF Tile CACS IS INCREASED) DUE TO POTENTIAL WATERJIAM?.!ER CONCERNS %TTHIN TIIE CACS IDENTIFIED IN GENERIC ETTER 96 06.
SE00130
SUMMARY
THIS SAETY EVALUATION (REVISION TO 5AITTY EVALUATION 95 0006) EXTENDS TiiE MAXIMUM ALIDWED CYCLE AVERAGE BURNT? TOR UNTT 2 CYCE II FROM 20.400 M%DMTU TO 21.500 MEDitTU.
Tl!E SAETY ANALYSES SUPPORT BOTII AN RCS EULK INET TEMPERAlURE COASTDowW AND A TIIERMAL POWER COASTDOWN. TIIE INLET TEMPERA 1URE MAY BE REDUCED TO l
537 DEGREES F. AS LDNG AS TIIE INIIT TEMPERATURE REMAINS GREAITR TilAN OR EQUAL TO 357 DEGREES F. TIIE TIIEhfAL POWER LEVEL SilALL BE ESS TIIAN OR EQUAL TO 100% BUT GREATER TIIAN OR EQUAL TO THE INET TEMPERATURE / POWER PROGRAM UMIT. TO OPERATE BEIDW 537 DEGREES F OR BEIDW 31 AND 1/4*4 POWER,THE PLANT MU T BE ON Tile INLET TEMPERATURE / POWER PROGRAM. Tl!E COASTDOWN MUST END WIIEN T18" C CE AVERAGE DURNUP REACifES TifE NEW UCENSED UMIT OF 21.500 MWD *.51v. EX1T.NDING TIIE UNIT 2 CYCLE II BURNUP UMIT Allo %T, FOR AIDNGER EOC COAS)D0%H.
Tif15 EXTENSION OF T1!E BURNUP UMIT IS REQUIRED BECAUSE A110F TIIE ANALYSES FOR CYCE 1I ASSUMED A MAXIMUM CYCE ENGTII OF 20.400 MWDMTU. TIIE ANTICIPATED END POINT OF CYCE 11 IS ESTIMATED TO BE GREATER THAN 20,400 Page 26
l 50.59s Statused d 62 in 1997 t
DOCID MWDMTU. TIIE 20,400 MWDMTU UMIT 15 NOT SLTF1 CENT DUE TO A IIIGIIER THAN ANTICIPATED CAPACITY FACTOR.
AllPIIYSICS DATA AND SAITTY ANALYSES CAlfCLATIONS % IRE REVIEWED FOR ANY IMPACT OF EXTENDING TIIE CYCLE II BURNUP UMIT. NO CIIANGES ARI REQUIRED TO SETPOINTS. TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS. CECOR OR BASSS UBRARIES. ETC.
THE PROPOSED ACIT% TTY DOES NOT INCREASE TIIE PROBABI1JIY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A MAULWCT10N OR ACCIDENT FREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. THE POSSIBIUTY OF A NEW MALit'NCTION OR ACCIDENT llAS NOT BEEN CREATT.D. AN1)NO C11ANGES ARE NECESSARY TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ANDOR ITS BASES. THEREFORE.
THE PROPOSED ACTT\\ TTY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ)
SE0018i
SUMMARY
CURRENTLY. EACH CAC INLET CONTROL VAINE (CV)IS AN 8* BLTTERFLY TYPE E1T11 AN AIR OPERATOR. THE CV 15 NORMAL 1Y OPEN %TTH TIIE OPERATOR VENTED Tt2 ATMOSPitERE VIA A THREE WAY SOLENOID VALVF_ UPON RECEIPT OF A SIAS,TifE SOLENotD VAL %T REDIRECTS THE FLOW INDICATING CONTROLLER OUTPOT TO THE CV OPERATOR WHICH SIIUTS TIIE VALVE TO A TifROTTLE POSITION CONT 2OllED BY EACH VALVE 5 ITDW CONTROLLER SETPOINT.
Tit!S ACTIVITY REPOS1TIONS THE VALVE TRAVEL !! MITER SO TilAT DURING SIAS ACTUATION THE VALVE 15 C1DSED AGAINST ATRAVEL UMITER (MEClif.N1 CAL STOP)
AND IIELD THERE BY A CLOSE SIGNAL FROM THE CON TltOLLER. T11E TIIROTTLE POSITION WILL BE DETERMINED BY PERFORMING AN ENGINEERINO TEST PROCEDURE.
THE TIIROTTLE POSITION WIII ENSURE 111AT THE MINIMUM REQ *.?IR*D fTDW TO T11E CACS DURING SIAS ACTUATION IS MAINTAINTD.
T1115 EVAIDATION DE a c.RMINES T11AT Tills ACTIVITY DOES NOT INTOL\\T A L5Q.
SE00184
SUMMARY
11 TIS ACTIVITY REVISED TIIE Uf5AR TO CLARIFY TilAT THE CONTAIN3fENT PL1tGE 7
SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN NEGATIVE PRESSURE IN TIIE CONTAINMENT.
ALTERNATIVE UNE-LTS. SUCH AS TIIE VENTILATION SYSTEM BEING SECL1tED, MAY INDUCE SOME NATURAL AIR CIRCULATION AROUND TIIE CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS MG., EQUIPMENT HATCIf, PALS).
VIDWING SOME RECIRCULATION AT THE CGNTAINMENT OPENINGS WILLNOT ATTECT TIIE CURRRENTLTSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SINCE THE ANALYSIS AutEADY CONSIDERS Page 27 L
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21 P1 ANT AIR AFTERCOOGR (THE NEW COMPRESSOR HAS ANINTEGRAL AFTERCOOLERE TIE FLNCTION OF THE PIANT AIR 0)MPRESSOR AND INTERACTIONS STTH OTHER SYSTEMS W111NOT BE AFTECTED BY TitIS ACTI TTY. T1E DESIGN BASIS OF THE PIANT AIR ANDINSTRLMENT AIR INMACE.SRW. AND PtANT ELECTRJCALSYSTEMS W!Il BE MAINTANED.SO ASSUMPT10N3 REGARDLNG ACCIDENTS AND MALFLM EVALUATED INT 1tE SAR REMAN VAIJD. THE P! ANT AIR SYSTEM 15 NOT REOGRID TO PERFORM AST SAfTTY FUNCTION. AND TIIE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE UtW AND DICTRICAL SYSTEMS W111NOT AlTECT THE PERIORMANCE OF ANT REQUIRED SAFETY FUNCTION. TIE DESIGN BASIS FOR THE P! ANT ELECTRICAL SYS1TMS WILL BE MANTAINED.SO ASSLMI"TIONS REGARDLNG ACCIDENTS AND MALEUNCTIONS EVALUATED IN TIIE SAR REMAN VAUD TitIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR RIIMIE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN Tim BASIS FOR ANTTECHNICALSPECIFICATION. NOCHANGESTOTIETEGINICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED 5000:04
SUMMARY
Tit!S ACTIV!1 Y AllhWS THE UFTING OF T1IE LEAD FROM THE PRESSURIZER LE%TL CONTROL SYSTEM THAT TRIPS THE BACK1"P CHARGING PtVP DURING ESTAS SURVEILLANCE TESTING IN MODE 5 UNDER STP O 4 AB THE IIAD IS BEING UFTED 50 THE CHARGING PUMP MAY BE RUN TO DUPUCATE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS DURING TESTING IJFTENG OF THE LEAD WIIlONLY OCCt* DURING MODE 5 TEST OPERATIONS AND ALL AFTECTED SYSTEMS WIll BE RETURNID 1U THEIR NORMAL CONDITION FIUOR TO PLANT STARTUP AND PO%TR OPERATION. tit!S ACTT% TTY WILNOT CAL 3E OR INCREASE THE PROBABUJIT OF ANT MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT.INCIIDENG AN LTOP SCENARIO. 50 THERE IS NO USQ INVOLVED. T1 TIS ACTIVITY AISO DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN ANT TECIINICAL SPECIF1 CAT 10N BASE SE00205 SLVMARY:
ALTilOUGH SERVICE WATER (SRW) CONTROL VALVES (I CV 1588.2 CV 1588 AND 2 CV I587) CURRENTLY fL'tJTLL THUR SAITTY-RE1ATED FUNCTIONAL REQLTREMEATS TO PROVIDE SUITICIENT SRW COOllNG TO DIESEL GENERATORS (DG1R DG2A AND DG2R RESPECT 1VELY).THDR FAIIERE IN THE FULL OPEN POSTTION UPON A LOSS OF INSTRtWEST AIR INCREASES TiiE SERVICE WATER COOUNG FLOW RATE TO THE DrESEL GENERATORS. IN ORDER TOOP1TMIZE SRWCOOUNG AVAIIABIUTYTOTHE CONTAINMENT AIR COOtIRS. OF PARTICUIAR CONCERN DURING PERIOD OF E1IVATED DAY WATER TEMPERTURE.THESE VALVES AND CONTROUIRS WIIA.3E SLTPtJED Page 32
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SEse213 5LMMARY:
1 DUR.ING THE SALTWATER (SW) 5YSTEM OLTAGE ICE THE LSTr i REftT11NG OLTAGE N 3
1998.THE SERVICE WATER (SRW) SYSTEM RE BE UNAVAILABLE TO PROVIDE C00UNG TO THE IB DG. THE DIESEL E. GLNE WILL BE M00tf1ED(ENGLNT UF-RATING) DL' RING N
4 THE OLTAGE AND WILL REQL' IRE TESTING TEMPROARY ALTERATION 197 Oct 8 M1u.
5 INSTALL A PORTABLE 000UNG TonTR LSTTTO PROVIDE ATEMPORAkY C00UNG V ATER 3
5UPPLY TO BE USED DURNG P05TM00tFICATION ENGNE TESTDG THE 1 B DIESEL t
GENERATOR WIll BE INOPERABEI FOR THE DURATION OF THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION
' THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION WI11 CONSIST M A C00UNG SYSTEM UTILIZDsG A TRAILER MOUNTED PORTABLE C00UNG TOWER. A PCMPTRAILER. AND A DIESEL GENERATOR SET PROVIDED BY RENTAL T00t3 COMPANT. THIS EQUIPMENT WILL BE LOCATED OLT5fDE THE IB EDG ROOM ON THE WEST ROADWAY.
1 i
THE TEMPORARY C00UNG SYSTEM PIPING CONSIST 5 OF UGHTWE3GHT MATERIAL 1L
[
i PRECAUTIONS ARE PRESCRIBED N TEMPORARY ALTERATION t 970011 TO MANAGE
[
THE ADOfT10NAL EQUIPMENT LOCATED N THE ROADWAY.THE INITIAL F1110F THE i
SYSTEM.AND THE 18AKE-L7 WATER (0.75 GPM) WII1 BE PRO 51DED BY THE f
i DEMINERAI17mWATERSYSTEM THISTEMPORARY ALTERATIONWR1BEINSTA Im f
FOR APPPON7MATELY 34 WEEKS (DEFENDtNG ON OLTAGE SCHEDULE) N SL7 PORT OF i
THE t998 LSTM REFLTUNG OLTAGE.
THIS SAFETY EVAll'ATION 15 REQLlRED SNCE THE METHOD M PnOVIDENG C00UNG TO THE 1B EDG 15 DifTERENT THAN THAT DESCRIBED N THE SAR. THE IB EDG IS
[
l INOPERABIIDURINGTHEPE1000THATTHISTEMPORARY ALTERAT10N15INSTA2 m
{
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY POWER SOURCES WIU.BE MET. AND THE TEMPORARY i
C00usG 5YSTEM HAS NO AFFECT ON ANT OTHER SSCS. THEREFORE.THE PROBABEUTY l
f M OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUE.NCES M AN ACCIDENT OR MAULW OF EQUIPMENT I
d IMPORTANT TO SAFE 1T PREVIOUSLY EVAtrATED N THE SAR 15 NOT INCREASEDL THE i
POSSIBtUTY FOR AN ACCIDENTOR MAULNCTION OF ADtFFERENTTYPETHAN ANT EVA!EA1ED PREVIOUSLY N THE SAR IS NOT CREAIID. AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY h
AS DEHNED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES 15 NOT REDLX'ED. THIS j
TEMPORARY ALTERATION DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE TOTHETECHNICAL SPECUlCATIONS AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AUSQ
[
[
SFM214
SUMMARY
[
THIS ACIDTIT I5 ISSUED TO CORRECTTHE ANSI CLASS RATING OFTHE FORY
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BtJDCK VALVES 1(2)MOV 403 & 405. CUlutENTLY THE LT5AR SPECIFIES THESE VALVES AS ASA CLASS 2500 UL THE CORRECT RATING FOR THE FORY BLOCK VALVES
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50.59s StatuSed C 62 in 1997 DOCID IS ANSI IS00 LB CLASS.
THIS $059 SAFETY EVALI!ADON IS NLTDED TO REVISE LTSAR TABII 4-17 TO CORRECTLY RE71ECT TIE BIDCK VALVES RATING AND Tite ASSOCIATED DESKN TEMPERATL"RE.
THE CORRECT RATLNG FOR TIIE BLOCK VADIS IS ANSI I$fM LA TitIS IS SL'F1URTED BY ALL AFFIJCABLE DE.tIGN RECOREDS SUCII AS TIE DESIGN S'ECIFICAT10N AND
\\TNDOR (VELAN)DOCUMENTATKyN. TICS VAL T RATING MEETSTHE SYSTEM DES 3GN REQUIREMENTS AND IS CONSISTENT %TTTITIE SYSTEM DESIGN CODES AND STANDARDS.
TitIS ACTIVITY WILLNOT DEGRADE THE REIJABIIJTY OR LNCREASE TIE CHAIJIN. GES OF ANY ITS SSCS. TIIE FROPOSED ACTT\\ TTY MEETS TIE REQLTREMENTS OF TIE DESIGN CODES. STAND ARDS AND REGCf.ADONS BASED ON TTHS EVALUATION.THIS ACT\\ TTY DOES NOT CONSTTTL7E AN L3REME%TD SAFETY QUESTIN AND TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINTD IN THE TECIINICAL SFECIFICATIONS IS NOT RETECED.
SE002I5 SLWARY:
tie EXISTING DKi1TAL FEEDWATER (DFW) SOFTWARE EXECLTES SIDH LY FOR A REAL, TIME SYSTEM.ONTHE ORDER OF 700 TO 900 MTr t itrrONDi. Tite DFW SYSTEM IS ALSO NOT SING 11 FAILURE FROOF EVEN THOUGH Tite CENTRAL PROCESSING 1;NTTS (CPUS) AND BACK FLANES ARE FM1Y REDUNDANT. SOME DfW FAILURE MODES. IF THEY WERE TO OCCtlt. WILL LIAD TU REACTOR TRIri THEREFORE.TitIS PROJECT IS PART OFT 1E REACTOR TRIP REDUCTION INTTIATIVE AND SYSTEM MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENT INITIATTVE. WIT 11 THE FollOWING COALS
. IMPROVE T1E CPU CYCLE TIME TO ACCOMMODATE MORE FUNCTION FOtNTS AND TO IMPROTI RESIUNSE TO FEEDWATER SYSTDI TRANSIENTS
. REMOVE SINGLE FOINTS OF FAILURE BETRTEN CFUS AND THEIR RACK FLANES TO A MAXIMUM FRACTICAL EXTENT.
ACCORDINGLY,TitIS MODIFICATION MAKES THE FollOWING CHANGES TO Tite DFW SYSTEM _
- l. UFGRADES THE CPUS TO A FASTER MODEL
- 2. RE-ENGINTER Tite SOFTWARE FROM BAS 1C TU T.C++".
- 3. ADD NEWIL5CT10N FOINTS IN Tite SYSTEM (IIARDWARE ANI) SOFTWARE).
Page 38
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o 50.595 StatuSed C 62 in 1997 doc to Srm220
SUMMARY
THM ACTf4 TTY IS A FACILITIES GRNGE Wi!1CH INTVOTS L%TALLATION OF A NEW iDADING DOCK AT WAREHOL3E 3 (OLTSIDE OF TIE PROTECT
- D AREA 1 INSTALLATION OF TTZ LDADING DOCK REQUTRES REMOVAL OF UNDERGROUND FIRE PROTECTION PIPING.
AS WEli AS ONE HRE HYDRANT (%TTH VALVE) N THE SAVE AREA, %TTH THE REMAINING PIPING B11ND HANGED TO PROVIDE THE SYSTDI PRESSURE BOUNTMRY.
RELOCATION OF A SECOND HYDRANT AND PIPING ARE ALSO REQUIRED THE P!P!NG EDRK W111USE PIPING AND fTTTINGS OF THE SAME SPECIFICATIONS AS TIE REST OF TIIE HRE PROTECTION SYSTT_M. DURING TiG CHANGES.THE WATER SUPPLY TO THE SPRINKLER SYSTDts IN WAREHOUSES I AND 2 WII.L BE OUT OF SERVICE. AND A RO51NG FIREWATCH Will BE PROYtDED DURING HT.EKENDS ANT) ESTNINGS (PERSON 3EL NORMA 11Y N TIE BUI1 DINGS DURING 4 EEK DAYS WIII PRO \\TDE ADEQUATE HRE WATGi COVERAGE)
TruS ORNGE HAS NO AmCT ON TifE RDtAINDER OF TiiE HRI PROTECTION SYSiT.M.
T1E FIRE HYDRANT BE"C REMOVED IS REDUNDANT TO T%u OT1IER HRE HYDRANTS IN TIE sAME ARIA.TitEREFORE FIRE SAFETY 15 NOT COMPROMISED BY THE OIANGE. IN ADDTTON THE NEW1DADING DOCK ATTIE WAREHOUSE HAS BEEN APPROPRIATELY RDTE%TD FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LMPACTS OTTER TilAN TIIE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM.
TIIERE ARE NO INSTAR 1 rn P! ANT COMPONENTS THAT ARE AFITCTED BY TIIIS OIANGE.
TifE GIANGE DOES NOT AfTECT T1E PROMIMTY OR CO% SEQUENCES OF A MALFLN OF PIANT SSCS, NOR DOES IT AFTECT THE PROBABI11TY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A PIANT ACCIDENT. TIIE GIANGE DOES NOT CREATE TIE POSSIBILITY FOR A NEW MALTUNCTION OR A NEW ACCDENT NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED BY THE SAR. THE CHANGE DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OFSAFETY FOR THETECHNICALSPECIRCA.
TIONS. Tit!S OIANGE DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIE%T9 SAFETY QUESTION.
SE00222
SUMMARY
I THIS ESP RTIL ADD A NOTE TO TliE SAR TO IDENTITY 1200 G1M AS A DESIGN FOINT.
TiiIS ET11 A1JDW THE TRAVEL STOP ON CONTROL VADT 1(2)CV-223 TO BE RESET
. TO AllDW THE CONTROL VALVE TO MAINTAN A MORE CONSTANTTEMPERATtTE ON T1E DISGIARGE F1DW ON THE IITDOWN SIDE OF THE t_N,.N HEAT EXCIIANGER %THE HIGHER RCS IITDOWN FID%1 THE STOP PREVENTS THE VALVE FRO *.I GOING FU110 PEN. THE (DNTROL VALVE IS CURRENTLY SET FOR IISS TilAN 1000 GPM. TICS SETI1NG WAS DETERMINED DURLNG AN ABNORMAL SYSTEM AUGNMENT %TUCH CREATES IDGH HEAD AND HIGII FIDW RATES T1!ROUGli THE HEAT GTHANGER. T1HS WAS DONE TO GUARD AGALNST EXCEEDING 1200 GPM WlilCil IS SHOWN ON TABIE 9-5 OF TIE LTSAR. TIIE FEOW OF I200 GPM 15 A DESIGN IUINT USED TO DESIGN THE HEAT ENC 11 ANGER AND THE COM10NENTCOO!JNG SYSTDL If0 WEVER.THE HEAT ENCHANGER CAN OPERATE SAFELY WIT 11 FEOWS UP TO I500 GPM. THE NORMAL FLOW IS CONSIDERABLY Li'SS THAN 1000 Page 41
-e 50.59s StatuSed at 62 in 1997 DOCIn GPM. TIE LNCREASE N IIDW ABOVE TIE CURRENT UMIT WIII AID OPERATIONT N MAINTANING A MORE CJNSTANT IITDOWN TEMPERATLRE "TCH W11.1 AID N REACIBTTY MANAGDdDT.
TIERE ARENOCHANGESTO ANALYZED MAIJLM~5OR ACCIDENTS ANT)NO NTW MAIJL3CT10NS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED TIEREFORE.THIS ACTnTTY DOES NOT CONSTTTLTE ALVJ SE00224 SLVMARY:
N AN EFTORT TO MNIMIZE THE IMPACT OF A DLAL HEADER SALTWATER SYSTEM OLTAGE DURING TIE UPCOMING UNTT I RERTI1NG AND MANTENANCE OLTAGE N THE SPRING OF 1995 TIE PROPOSED IMitEMENTATION W THE ABOVE TAS Elli PROVIDC A SOURCE OF COOUNG WATER TO TIE I I SFF COOLER. TIIE OFUECTIVE W TIE TAS ASSOCIATED %TTH T1IIS EVA1 EAT 10N IS TO ENSGE THAT AT LEAST TWO REUABt.E AND INDEPENDENT SYSTEMS WII.L BE AVAIIABLs TO COOL THE SPENT FLTL POOL TIESE TAS HAVE BEEN StXX~ESSitu.Y INSTAf f rn IN FRD10CS OLTAGES.
TO OBTAIN THIS OOAI. SPOOL PfECES WI11 BE INSTAf I rn %1DCH ALKW TIE 21 SRW IIEADER R1I1CH SUPPUES COOUNG TO Tite 11 SFP COOtIR AND JLMPERS R1LL BE NSTAI I rn 1D AUTOMATICA11Y ISOLATE SRW TO TIE II SFF COOLER W Tite UNIlKELY EVENT OF A UNIT 2 CSAS. THIS ENSURES TH AT SRW R1U BE CAPABLE OF COOUNG TIE UNTT 2 CONTANMENT HTTilN THE ORIGINAL DESKW BASES A130, TEMN)RARY ALTERATIONS ARE PROVIDED %TUCH allow TITE REMOVALOF TiiE CSAS SIGNALS FROM TIE VALVES TO PERMIT RESTORATION OF SFF COOUNG UPON IMP 11P'DTATION OF TIE TAS. TITE II Si? COOT 1NG SYSTEM Elli BE AVAftABLE AS AN INDEPENDENT COOLING EDOP. THIS IS ACCOMPUSHED RTTil NO IMPACT ON T1E UNTT 2 EST AS C5 AS REQUIREMENTS. IT SHOLID DE NO"ID THAT DURING THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF TIIE TAS. TIIE I2 SFFtX)OtIR. AS WE11 AS Tite SDC SYSTEM. Will BE AVAIIABII TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT FROM TIE STF.
A110F TIE EQUIPMENT INSTA f I Fn TO sui? ORT TIE TAS IS DESKNED TO BE EQUIVAtINTTO TifE PERMANENT EQUIMENT PROVIDENG SIMIIAR FUNCTIONS. SFP HEAT IDAD AND TEMPERATURE IDUTS ARE ESTABUSHED TO SUPPORTTPIS EVAIEATION.
BASED ON TIESE UMITS. TIE RESTORiTION OF SFP COOUNG CAN BE EASILY ACCOMPUSHED PRIOR TO Tile SFF REACHING ITS DESKW TEMPERATURE OF 155 DEGREES l
F R1TIKET JEOPARDIZING TIIE ABIUTY OF SRWTO COOLTHE CONTAINNENT AS ORIGINA11Y REQLTRED IN tie CONTAWMENT ANALYSES <
l Page 42 i
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50.595[Datused at 62 in 1997 DrKID TIEREFORE Tills EVALUATION CONCLLDES THATTHIS ACTI% TTY CAN BE PERFORMED SAFELY AND DOES NOT AFTECT ANY OF THE CCNTP TECHNICAL SPECD1 CAT 10N3 NOR DOES IT CONTTTILTE AN L3REVIERTD SAFETY QUEST 10%
SED 0229 St% MARY; THIS ACT7% TTY IS TIE INTTALLATION OF A ANPER AS DIRECTED N FOST N5TAllATION TESTS (ETPS)OF DESIGN CHANGE 3 IMPfJLMENTED VIA Es t99602056. TO SLTPORT CONTINL'ED BL4 AND 1E EDG OPERABIIITY TO THE AlTECTED BUS. Tite INTERLOCK BET % TIN THE OC DG (% BREAKER CUBICLE) TIE BREAAERS AND THE lE EDG J03 BREAKER CL'BICII) OLTFLT BREAKERS ML3T BE IsotATED. CYCLING OF TIE 005 06 BREAKER N THE W POSITION (CONTROL FLSCTIONS AVACABII BLT PRIMARY BU5 CONNECTIONS RTUtDRAWN FROM BU5)COU1D BIDCK CLOSING OF THE I E EDG OLTFLT BRES KER IF THE INTEP'DCK IS NOT ISotATED BETWEEN OPERABLE AND005 EQUIPMENT DC'RINO PERFORMAhCE OFTHE TEST FOR A SPECIf1C 06 BREAAER A A'MPER Will BE INSTAf I Fn N THE 06 CUBICLE IN PARAI f rf
%TTII THE ALNILIARY CONTACTS RTITCH Tite 03 BREAKERS MONTTOR TO DETERMNE IF THE OC DG Will BE 005 AND ISotATED FORM TIE PLANT SAFETY BL3SES RENVERING THE NTER10CK LNNECESSARY. INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OFMIE EMPER RTLL BE PROCEDt.ltA11Y CONTROLLED AND %IRITIED.TIIUS RETURNING FIANT CONFIGLltAT10N TO NORMAL UFON COMPLETION OF THE TEST PRIOR TO PLACING TIE 03 DG AND ITS ASJOCIATED E%'IPMENT BACK N SERVICF_
3.
SE00231
SUMMARY
TifE LTSAR AND TIE OFT 5tTE DOSE CALCt1AT10N MANUAL ODCV Mo%1DE VERML DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SAMP11 LOCATION 3 THAT %TRE ESTABIlstED FOR TiiE RADIOACTIVE EFTLL'ENT CONN PROGRAM TO COMPLY %TTil 10 CFR 50. 36A TIESE LOCATONS ARE DESCRIBED AS *NEAR* T1tE SITE BOUNDRY. A CHANGE TO Tite SfTE DOUNDARY AFTER Tite PROGRAM WA5 ESTABIlSHED EXTENDED THE DtSTANCE BET % TEN Tite SAMP111DCAT10NS N THE SOLTH SECTOR AND Tite SITE BOUNDARY.
TIE DESTANCE BETRTEN TITE SAMPLE IDCATIONS AND THE SOURCE. Tite PIANT REMAINS UNCHANGED. NOTES WILL BE ADDED TO THE LT5AR AND TO THE ODCM IDENTIITING TITE AfTECTED SAMPLE LOCATIONS. IT WILL BE NOTED TilATTHESE LOCATRN5 NOW PROVIDE MORE CONSERVATIVE DATA FOR THE CAlfLTAT10N3 OFTilE RADIOtJOGICAL EFTECTS ATTHE STTE DOUNDARY.
T!!13 ACTI% TTY DOES NOT CONSTTitTE AN LWRESOt.%ID SAFETY QUESTION Page 43
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