ML20198D133
| ML20198D133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1992 |
| From: | Joshua Wilson TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 92-04, 92-4, NUDOCS 9205180127 | |
| Download: ML20198D133 (4) | |
Text
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'U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Commission ATINt Document Control Desk
-Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Mattc,r of
)
Docket No. 50-328
' Tennessee-Valley Authority
)
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 92-04 The enclosed special report provides details concerning two fire barriers being nonfunctional for a period greater than the technical specification (TS) allowable seven-day timef rnne. This report is being made in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12.
If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Coop;c at (615) 843-8924.
Sincerely, SW
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L. Wilson i
1 Enclosure-r cc:
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 6, 1992 cc (Enclosure):
Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nucicar Reguintory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclesr Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Rosa Soddy-Daisy, Tenntssee 37379 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Staaet. NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 c
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Enclosure SEQUOYA9 NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
SPL;1AL REPORT 92-04 1.
SHIELD BUILDING PENETRATION MARK 72 Deatriplio1Luf.lYIEt on March 31,1992, at 0155 Eastern standard time (EST), with Unit 2 in Mode 6 for the Unit 2 Cycle 5 (U2CS) refueling outage, shield building penetration Mark 72 on Elevation 717 was breached to support steam generator (SG) maintenance activities. The SG maintenance activities required the penetration to be breached to route cables and hoses into containment from shot-peening equipment located outside of containment. The SG maintenance work was completed, and the fire barriers were returned to operable status on April 21, 1992, at 1510 Eastern daylight time (EDT).
Coust_of_CondLtion The fire barrier was not returned to functional status within the seven-day timeframe because the U205 pianned SG maintenance activities for shotpeening required approximately three to four weeks to complete. The hoses and cables necessary to accomplish the activity were routed from the auxiliary building into the annulus area through the Mark 72 penetration.
Correttivn_ Action In accordance with Limited Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable; a roving fire watch was inmediately established and was inaintained until the breach was removed end the fire barrier returned to operable status on April ;
1992.
II.
SHIELD BUILDING PENETRATION MARK 20 Deactiption_of lynnt on April 17, 1992, at 1540 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 for th-U2C5 refueling outage, shield building penetration Mark 20 on Elevation 720 was breached to support the containment integrated leak rate test (CILRT). The fire barrier was nonfunctional in excess of the seven days allowed by LC0 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).
This condition is being reported in accordance with SQN Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.12.a.
6
~
Cause_of_Candition The CILRT is required to 16 performed to demonstrate the continuing leak-tight integrity of Unit 2 reactor buildir.g primary
. containment. To accomplish the test during the U205 refueling outage, sensor lines were routed f rom the auxiliary building into the annulus area through the Mark 20 penetration.
Correclire Ac. tion In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and was maintained until the breach was removed and the fire barrier returned to operable status on April 30, 1992.
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