ML20198C845
| ML20198C845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1985 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| (RDC-130(85)), PY-CEI-OIE-0132, PY-CEI-OIE-132, RDC-130(85), NUDOCS 8511120197 | |
| Download: ML20198C845 (3) | |
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMIN ATING COMP ANY P.O. BOX 5000 - CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622 9800 - lLLUMINATING BLDG - 55 PUBLIC SQUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURFMY R. EDRMAN VICE PRESIDENT NUC U A R October 30, 1985 PY-CEI/OIE 0132 L Mr. James G. Keppler Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 RE:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis [RDC 130(85)]
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter serves as the final report Jursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) concerning the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP).
Mr. J. McCormick-Barger of your office was notified on February 22, 1985, by Mr. T. Boss of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that this problem was being evaluated per Deviation Analysis Report 226.
Our interim report was filed on March 22, 1985, and a letter was filed on May 16, 1985, to advise you of our progress.
Description of Deficiency As a part of CEI's continuing process of verification of the design for PNPP, and in light of additional guidance provided by the NRC, a review of the PNPP Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis was undertaken.
Due to the revised criteria that were utilized, this review resulted in the identification of circuits and equipment that were not previously included in the analysis.
In particular, it was identified that the analysis of the exist-ing arrangement for alternative shutdown outside the control room did not provide for protection of all of the circuits associated with support systems needed for shutdown systems to function.
As a result of the addition of these circuits to the scope of the analysis, some fire areas now require additional divisional separ-ation to ensure compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section IIIG.
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Y Mr. Jame G. Kapplor Octobar 30, 1985 PY-CEI/OIE 0132 L.
Analysis of Safety Implications It can be postulated that a fire in particular fire areas could cause damage to the identified circuits associated with safe shutdown support systems.
In this svent, the ability of the affected shutdown systems to perform their safety functions could ultimately be affected.
Corrective Action To resolve this deficiency, Engineering Change Notices (ECN's) were initiated to provide additional divisional separation of the circuits identified through the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Reanalysis.
Plant modifications required by these changes include equipment / circuit relocation, cablewrapping, and installation of radiant energy shields, automatic sprinklers, fire rated penetrations, and additional control room isolation measures.
Operating Instructions ONI-P54, " Fire (Unit 1)", and IOI-ll " Shutdown From Outside Control Room", were revised to reflect the changes made by the safe shutdown analysis.
Implementation of these changes will ensure compliance with 10CPR50, Appendix R, Section IIIG requirements.
Documentation of the corrective actions taken to correct this deficiency will be available for NRC review when the work is complete.
This is The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ec-yany's final report on this deficiency.
If you have any questions, please call.
sqt{,((f3-Murray R.
Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:sab cc:
Mr. J. A. Grobe USNRC, Site Office Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center, SEE-IN l
Institute of Nuclear Power 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339