ML20198C840

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Refers to Investigation Repts 1-96-19 & 1-96-28 Re Removal of Tri-Nuclear Filter from Millstone Unit 1 SFP on 980716 & Fire in Unit 1 Drywell on 960608.With Respect to Removal of Tri-Nuclear Filter,Nrc Concluded That Violation Occurred
ML20198C840
Person / Time
Site: Millstone 
Issue date: 12/14/1998
From: Miller H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Bowling M, Loftus P
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
References
EA-97-026, EA-97-26, EA-98-204, EA-98-205, NUDOCS 9812220194
Download: ML20198C840 (3)


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UNITED STATES

-4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

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475 ALLENDALE ROAD

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KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 December 14,1998 EA 97-026 ~

EA 98-204 EA 98-205 -

Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer, Technical Services g

c/o Patricia Loftus, Director - Regulatory g/

Affairs for Millstone Station f

[J Northeast Nuclear Energy Company '

D P.O. Box 128

' Waterford, Connecticut 06385

SUBJECT:

EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (Investigation Report Nos. 1-96-019 and 1-96-028)

Dear.Mr. Bowling:

This letter refers to investigations conducted at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, by the NRC's' Office of Investigations (01), concerning the removal of a Tri-Nuclear filter from the Millstone Unit 1 spent fuel pool on July 16,1996, and a fire in the Millstone Unit 1 drywell on June 8,1996.~ The results of the first investigation were discussed with you on May 6,

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1998. The results of the second investigation were discussed with Mr. Brothers of your staff on June 4,1998. During these telephone conversations, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) declined predecisional enforcement conferences (conferences) on these issues. In subsequent letters dated May 14,1998, and June 5,1998, we requested that you respond to four apparent violations that were identified as a result of the 01 investigations, and were

- being considered for escalated enforcement action. You responded in letters dated June 15, 1998, and July 10,1998.

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l With respect to the removal of the Tri-Nuclear filter from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, based on l

the results of the 01 investigation, the NRC has concluded that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. Specifically, the overhead crane was used to lift the entire Tri-Nuclear l.

filter skid from the spent fuel pool in a manner contrary to the instructions in a special procedure required to be followed in accordance with the TS. The NRC has concluded that the technician in charge of the job acted with careless disregard when he failed to thoroughly review the correct version of the procedure prior to performing work, even though he l

undarstood at that time his responsibility to perform the work in accordance with approved

\\, g procedures. Additionally, the project engineer, who observed the work being performed, took no action to assure the special procedure was followed which contributed to the willful violation of NRC requirements. The project engineer, who had written the latest revision to

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the special procedure, recognized or should have recognized that the work was not being l

performed in accordance with the procedure.

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9812220?94 981214 h

PDR AKCK 05000245

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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 2

With respect to the fire in the Unit 1 drywell, based on the results of the 01 investigation, the NRC has concluded that two violations of NRC requirements occurred. Regarding the first violation, you violated Technical Specification (TS) requirements in July 1996 when the running standby gas treatment system (SGTS) was secured, the reactor building was unisolated, and the normal reactor building ventilation system was operated in an attempt to 1

clear fire fighting chemicals from the drywell.

Since certain radiation monitors were

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inoperable, running the normal ventilation system was a violation of TS. The violation is considered willful in that both the Shift Manager, who directed the actions, and the Unit Director, who concurred with the actions, knew or should have known that the radiation j

monitors were inoperable and that operation of normal reactor building ventilation with the radiation monitors inoperable was a violation of TS. Nonetheless, the normal ventilation was operated and the TS requirements were violated. Regulatory relief was not obtained from the NRC prior to taking such action. The NRC also notes that the Unit Director, when assigned j

to the position, did not have the requisite senior reactor operator (SRO) level of training or experience specified by ANSl 18.1-1971, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel," which constitutes another violation of NRC requirements.

Although two of the three violations were willful, they were indicative of past performance weaknesses that resulted from ineffective leadership that tolerated performance to low

' standards, as you acknowledged in your June 15,1998 and July 10,1998 responses. Such ineffective leadership contributed to other problems that led to the shutdown of the Millstone units, as well as other viciations that resulted in the issuance of a $2.1 million civil penalty in December 1997.

These three violations were considered for escalated enforcement action; however, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion pursuant to Section Vil.B.6 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy, and not issue a formal Notice of Violation or Civil Penalties. The decision to exercise discretion was made considering: (1) the violations were based on practices that resulted from the ineffective leadership at the facility that existed prior to the shutdown of the Millstone Unit 1 facility and the NRC has taken significant enforcement action for the performance issues that led to the shutdown, including the issuance of the $2.1 million civil penalty; (2) the potential safety consequences of the violations were not significant; and (3) although the violations were willful, you have taken corrective actions to address the weaknesses in management oversight that led to the violations. Although the violations were identified by the NRC, discretion is appropriate because you have already taken corrective actions and further enforcement action is not necessary to achieve remedial results.

In our May 14,1998 letter, the NRC described another apparent violation involving potentially inaccurate and incomplete information that was provided to the NRC during the 01 investigation of the Tri-Nuclear filter event. After further consideration of the matter, the NRC l

has concluded that, although a lot of the information provided to the NRC during that investigation was inconsistent and sometimes contradictory, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, " Completeness and Accuracy of Information."

Nonetheless, in your response, although you indicated that you did not have adequate j

information to conclude that any individual provided incomplete or inaccurate information to the NRC, you indicated that you have taken actions to communicate and reinforce i

management expectationJ regarding providing complete and accurate information to the NRC.

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i Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 3

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in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). No response to this letter is required.

if you have any questions, please contact Mr. Jacque P. Durr at 610-337-5224.

Sincerely,

/

H ert J. Miller Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-245 Licence No. DPR-21 i

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i Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 4

cc:

B. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer - Nuclear Group M. Brothers, Vice President - Operations J. McElwain, Recovery Officer - Millstone Unit 1

'J. Streeter, Recovery Officer - Nuclear Oversight l

P. Hinnenkamp, Director - Unit 3 J. Price, Director - Unit 2 D. Amerine, Vice President - Human Services E. Harkness, Director, Unit 1 Operations J. Althouse, Manager - Nuclear Training Assessment Group F. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services J. Cantrell, Director - Nuclear Training (CT)

S. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation L. Cuoco, Esquire J. Egan, Esquire V. Juliano, Waterford Library i

J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control i

i S. Comley, We The People 1

State of Connecticut SLO Designee D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)

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R. Bassilakis, CAN J. Block, Attorney, CAN S. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)

Representative T. Concannon E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC l

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Northeest Nuclear Energy Company 5

Distribution:

Region i Docket Room (with sp_DY of concurrences)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC FILE CENTER, NRR (with Oriainal concurrencas)

. Millstone inspection Directorate Secretarial File, Region l NRC Resident inspector OE (2)

H. Miller, Regional Administrator, RI L. Nicholson, DRS B. Jones, PIMB/ DISP W. Lanning, Deputy Director of Inspections, RI D. Screnci, PAO B. Letts, 01, RI K. Monroe, 01, RI D. Holody, ORA D. Vito, ORA J. Durr, Rt R. Urban, RI T. Walker, ORA B. Fewell, ORA

. N. Blumberg, R1 Distribution: <VIA E-MAIL >:

J. Andersen, PM, NRR <JWA>

M. Callahan, OCA <MSC>

R. Correia, NRR <RPC>

W. Dean, Project Directorate, NRR <WMD>

B. McCabe, OEDO < BCM>

S. Dombek, PM, NRR <SXD>

E. Imbro, NRR < EXI>

1 D. Mcdonald, PM, NRR _< DGM1 >

D. Screnci, PAO < DPS>

Inspection Program Branch <lPAS>

J. Lieberman, OE <0EMAIL>

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