ML20197J968

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Discusses 850425 Proposed Changes to Tech Specs for Excluding Certain Containment Isolation Valves from Routine Surveillance.Changes Would Not Create Increased Possibility of Violating Primary Containment Integrity
ML20197J968
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 07/09/1985
From: Houston R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Novak T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0803, CON-WNP-803 TAC-57546, NUDOCS 8507170074
Download: ML20197J968 (2)


Text

. , , ,

  • JJL ft 9 Y MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing, DL FROM: R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety, DSI

SUBJECT:

OR ACTION: WNP-2 PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUDING CERTAIN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FROM ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE (TAC #57546)

Plant Name: Washington Public Power Supply System (WNP-2)

Docket No.: 50-397 Region: V Responsible Branch: LE#2 Project Manager: J. Bradfute Due Date: July 14, 1985 Review Status: Complete By a letter dated April 25, 1985, the Washington Public Power Supply System

' proposed certain changes to the Surveillance Requirement of Section 4.6.1.1 of the Technical Specification for WNP-2.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.b states, in part, that all containment penetrations that are required to be closed during accident conditions and are not capable of being closed by automatic isolation valves shall be demonstrated closed once per 31 days. Excluded from this-31 day routine surveillance requirement are the containment penetrations that are located inside the inerted containment which are equipped with blind flanges, deactivated automatic valves, or closed valves. For these penetrations, the provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.b states that the surveillance be performed during each Cold Shut Condition.

In its April 25, 1985 letter, the licensee has requested to extend the exclusion from the 31-day surveillance requirement to closed valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves located in areas that are administratively controlled. This request was made to avoid unnecessary personnel hazards from high radiation levels and/or very high temperatures.

Based on our review of the licensee submittal, we find that the proposed change '

would not create an increased possibility of violating primary containment ,

integrity.

CONTACT: F. Eltawila, CSB X-29488 507170 g Q % 97 g )

- PoA i y . _ _ _

C Osv'

, .- k T. Novak -~

425 We, therefore, reconinend that the proposed change be approved provided that the "etc." on the fourth line of the proposed "**" footnote be deleted.

Since the efforts of this activity were minimal, we are not providing a SALP input.

Originm1 missed W

a. myne9eusten

. R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Integration cc: R. Bernero H. Thompson W. Butler J. Bradfute DISTRIBUTION DocRet- File- ,

CSB R/F FEltawila, R/F JKudrick RHouston "0FFI'CIAL RECORD COPY"

_, 3 n. t y-DSI:CSBri-U

' DSIfCSP, DSI:AD:RS FEltawila:jf JKu'drick RHoust'on 07/.;/85 07/rg/85

. 07/s./85 4