ML20197H708
| ML20197H708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1984 |
| From: | Woolever E DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2NRC-4-079, 2NRC-4-79, NUDOCS 8406190153 | |
| Download: ML20197H708 (5) | |
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s 2NRC-4-079 (412)787 - 5141 Telecopy Nuclear Construction Division June 13, 1984 Robinson Plaza, Building 2 Suite 210 Pittsburgh, PA 15205 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch 3 Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Outstanding Issue Gentlemen:
This letter fo rward s responses to the iseues listed be l_ ow.
The following items are attached: :
Response to Outstanding Issue 68 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draf t Safety Evaluation Report.
At tachment 2: Respons e to Outstanding Issue 71 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draf t Safety Evaluation Report.
DLC understands that the responses to URC staff questions E451.4 and E451.5 sufficiently addressed the concerns raised by outstanding issues 117 and 118.
Therefore, no further in fo rmat ion will be submit t ed on these issues.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By E.(/J. Woolever Vice President KAT/wjs Attachments Ms. M. Ley, Project Manager (w/a) cc:
-Mr. M. Lacitra, Project Manager (w/a)
Mr. G. Walton, Resident Inspector (w/a)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS
/ g DAY OF Offw 1984.
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Notary Public g
8406190153 840613
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PDR ADOCK 05000412 ANITA ELAINE REITER, NOTARY PUBUC E
PDR ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLEGHENY COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20, lo06 I I
Unit;d Stetso Nucichir Regulctory Conuniesion
. Mr. Garrgs W. Knighten, Chief P
Page 2
_o COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )
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SS:
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY
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On this
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day of m
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, before me,
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a Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, pe rsonally appeared E. J. Woolever, who being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and'. file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.
i nA Notary Public ANITA ELAINE REITER, NOTARY PUBUC ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLEGHENY COUNTf MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20,1988
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4 ATTACHMENT 1 Response to. Outstanding Issue 68 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draf t Safety Evaluation Report Draft SER Section 7.4.2.1:
Remote Shutdo.
' ability (excerpt)
FSAR.' Sec t ion 7.4'.1.3 ' s t ates that the design basis for control room evacuation ldoes not consider a single failur e.
The staff finds the applicant's design basis for remote shutdown capability unaccept able.
The 'staf f requires that the applicant clarify the design criteria for remote shutdown and addres s the isolation, separation, qualification, and trans fer/ override _ provisions of the remote shutdown equipment in Section 7.4 of the FSAR. This is an open item.
Response
Section 7.4.1.3 will be clarified in the next anendment to indicate that the design criteria for control room evacuation ' includes the single failure criterion and coincident loss of of fsite power.
Power sources for all Class IE control circuitry of pumps and valves are powered from the same power source as that used in the main control room.
Separation of redundant train-related and non-1E circuits is maintained by barriers or appropriate air space. All control equipment (other than indicators) which is part of a Class 1E circuit meet the requirements of IEEE-Standard-344-1975, " Seismic. Qualification of Class 1E Equipment,"
and IEEE-Standard-323-1974, " Qualifying Class 1E Equipment. Transfer of control to the shutdown _ panel is accomplished by trans fer pushbuttons and switches on the shutdown panel. _ Transfer separates all control from the control ' room.
Reset (override) ' is accomplished by hand reset
.tranrfer relays'_at the local relay panel.
7-ATTACHMENT 2 Response to Outstanding Issue 71 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report g_
Draft SER'Section 7.5.2.4:
Bypass and Inoperable Status Panel FSAR Section 1.8 states that the design follows the guidance of Regula-tory Guide 1.47.
The staff has audited some of the design drawings that contain information on the bypass and inoperable status panel. However, there is little information in the FSAR to describe the system.
The staff requests that the applicant provide the descriptive information in FSAR Section 7.5 to demonstrate conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.47.
This is an open item.
Response
Desc ript ive information similar to the following will be added to FSAR Section 7.5.5 in the next amendment.
The - des ign philosophy for bypassed and inoperable status complies with Regulatory Guide 1.47 as described below:
a.
A bypass indicator is provided for each prot ect ion system.
" Bypass" includes any deliberate action which renders a protec-tion system inoperable.
b.
The indicator is at the system level with separate inc:icators for each train, c.
The indicator is operated automatically only by act ions which meet all these criteria:
- The action is deliberate. (Component failure may be indicated by component failure indicators but should not operate the system bypass indicator.)
- The action is expect ed to occur more of ten than once a year.
ye ar" criterion is interpreted This "more often than once a liberally.
If an accessible, permanently installed electrical control device will bypass a safety system, it is assumed that the device will be used more than once a year.
(Devices within the containment are not accessible.)
- The ac t ion is expected when the prot ect ion system must be operab le.
(Bypass of source range flux trip during normal power operation would not, for example, be indicated on the system bypass indicator.
It may be indicated on a channel or component status indicator.)
- The act ion renders the system inoperable, not merely poten-tially inoperable.
(If, for example, redundant, par allel, 100 percent valves are provided for the discharge line of a spray pump, the system bypass indicator would not be actuated by the L.
r closing ' of. only one of those valves.
Valve closing may be
! indicated on a component status indicator.)
s
- Jose deliberate action has taken ' place in the protection system or a necessary supporting system. (For example, if the cooling water inlet valve for a recirculation spray heat exchanger is deliberately closed, the system. bypass indicator for the recirdulation spray system would be operated.)
l d.. he_ bypass indicators are separate from other plant indicators and grouped in a logical fashion.
=e.
.A capability is.-provided to operate each bypass indicator manually.
This ;lets the ' operator provide bypass indication for tan event that renders a safety system inoperable but does not y
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. automatically operate the sytem bypass' indicator.
f.
There is not any ' capability to-defeat an automatic operation of la bypass indicator. (Although, audible alarms'may be silenced.)
-g.
The bypass indicators are accompanied'by audible alarm.
h.
The -indication system is mechanically. and electrically isolated
-from the : safety ~ system to avoid degradation of the safety system..No fault in the indicator system can impair the ability of f the safety system to peform its safety-related function.
The.
_- bypass ~ indicators are not ; considered. safety-related; i.e.,. they
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need not ' be designed to safety ' system - criteria such as IEEE
. Standard 279-1971'.
'i. The operator.is sable to dertermine why a system level bypass is
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\\ indicated by accessing the plant computer..
j.
Service water system inoperative ' and diesel-generator inopera-tive indicators are provided. These support systems are unique,
- and important enough to warrant bypass' indicators.
k.
The-system design meets-the -recommendations of ICBS-21 as follows:
- Each safety system has a Train A (orange) and Train B (purple) bypass indicator.
The indicators are grouped. together by train on the main control - board.
Support systems have white bypass indicators and are arranged together with the as so ci-ated train of bypass indicators.
' ' Means by. which the operator can cancel erroneous bypassed indications are not provided.
- The bypass indication system does not perform. functions.essen-i,
. tial ; to safety.
No operator.. action is required based solely on the bypass indication.
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The indication system has no effect.on plant safety systems.
- The bypass indicating.and annunciating function can be tested during normal plant operation.
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