ML20197G497

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 93 & 74 to Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69,respectively
ML20197G497
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/31/1984
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20197G495 List:
References
NUDOCS 8406150277
Download: ML20197G497 (3)


Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING Af!ENDMENT NOS. 93 AND 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-53 AND DPR-69 BALTIM0RE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318 Introduction By application dated September 20, 1983, as supplemented by letter dated January 18, 1984, Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) requested changes to the Calvert Cliffs Technical Specifications (TS) for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2.

The proposed changes to the TS would revise the provisions in the Technical Specifications (TS) relating to the operability of the air recirculation and cooling units. The proposed revision to TS 3.6.2.2, " Containment Cooling System," would allow consideration of the operability status of the contain-ment spray systen in detemining remedial action should elements of the air recirculation and cooling units become inoperable.

Discussion and Evaluation At the present time, Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification 3.6.2.2, " Containment Cooling System," requires two groups of containment air recirculation and cooling (ARC) units to be operable with two units to each group.

Should one ARC unit become. inoperable, the unit must be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the plant nust be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The proposed change to TS 3.6.2.2 would allow less restrictive remedial actions to be taken if an ARC unit or units is inoperable. The proposed reredia.1 actions would be as follows:

a.

With one group of required contairment air recirculation and cooling units inoperable and both containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable group of air recirculation and cooling units to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT _ SHUTDOWN within 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.

h.

With three reouired containment air recirculation and cooling units inoperable and both containment spray systens OPERABLE, restore at least one required air recirculation and cooling unit to OPERARLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Pestore both above required groups of containment air recirculation-and cooling units to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

0406150277 840531 PDR ADOCK 05000317 l

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. With one group of required containment air recirculation and cooling i

c.

units inoperable and one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable containment spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Restore the inoperable group of containment air recirculation and cooling units to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 are each equipped with four 33% capacity ARC units and two 50% capacity containment spray trains for a total of 233% of the capacity required for post-LOCA containment cooling.

The Calvert Cliffs Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) recognizes that the ARC units and con-tainment spray trains are mutually supportive with regard to post-LOCA con-tainment heat removal. The FSAR states that:

The containment air recirculation and ccoling system is independent of the safety injection and containment spray systems.

It is sized such that, following a LOCA, three of the four containment air recirculation units limit the containment pressure to less than the containment design pressure even if the containment spray system does not operate.

The redundant nature of the ARC and containment spray systems is recognized by the most recent NRC guidance on TS for Combustion Engineering facilities (CESTS), NUREG-0212, Rev. 2, " Standard Technical Sepcifications for Combustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactors,." Fall 1980. The CESTS represents the model for the proposed change to Calvert Cliffs TS 3.6.2.2.

In this regard, the proposed TS are more conservative than the CESTS in that the proposed TS allows the operable containment cooling capability to be reduced to 117% of required capacity. The CESTS allows the operable containment cooling capabi-lity to be reduced to 100% of required capacity. The proposed TS require that an adequate level of containment cooling' capability be maintained and thus the proposed TS are acceptable.

Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluert types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is in-significant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared ~in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and, safety'of the public.

will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner,-and (2)'such

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activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the. issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the comon defense i

and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date:

May 31, 1984 i

Principal Contributor:

D. Jaffe d

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