ML20197G073

Reviews Util 831104 Submittal Re Justification for Interim Operation.Operation W/O Qualified Equipment Identified in Interim Operation Items JIO-S-1,JIO-S-4 & JIO-S-7 Does Not Represent Undue Risk to Health & Safety of Public

ML20197G073
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	11/22/1983
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Knight J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0686, CON-WNP-686 NUDOCS 8312020394
Download: ML20197G073 (2)

Text

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4JNITED STATES Distribution

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e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Docket File ASB Rdg. File Q.g .[

ASB Members o, LRubenstein

'NOV : 2 1983 MEMOhNDUM FOR: J. p. Knight, Assistant Director for Components and

. Structures Engineering, Division of Engineering

• FROM: L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Flant Systems, Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 - INTERIM OPERATION

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JUSTIFICATION DOCKET NO.'.50-397 He have reviewed the interim operation justifications for WNP-2, as provided by the ' utility's submittal dated November 4.1983 and provided to the Auxiliary Systems Branch by your memorandum dated November T7,1983, for those components which are part of systems for which the Auxiliary Systems Branch has primary responsibility. There are three items for which the applicant is seeking approval for interim operation that are in the Auxiliary Systems Branch's area of review as identified below. It is our understanding from discussions with your staff that this interim justification is applicable tc either the second refueling or Maren 1985, whichever comes first, Justification numbered JIO-S-1 is concerned with the seismic. qualification of continuous rolling type roughing filters (WMA-FL-53A and E38) for the critical switchgear air handling units (WMA-AH-53A and 53B)'. These air handling units serve the critical switchgear room, battery and battery .

charging rooms, electrical equipment rooms and the reactor protection system .

rooms. The probability of a safe shutdown earthquake event, during the interim operation period is low. However, if a safe shutdown earthquake were to occur, the failure of the filter would result either in no rough filtration of the air or an eventually clogged filter. The failure of the filter media by local yielding in the filter media support grid would not result in any short term performance degradation of the air handlers. .

Assuming failure of the mechanism to roll the filter, the filter will slowly become clogged and the serviced plant areas would have a gradually rising ambient temperature. The applicant stated that even with a clogged filter,  !

the air handlers will provide sufficient cooling to maintain the compartment temperatures within their design temperature range. Although the air flow would be reduced, the air residence time at the cooling coil would be longer and therefore the air outlet temperature would be lower. The reduced air flow at a lower temperature is expected to maintain the temperature in the safety-related compartments below the maximum design temperature.

The qualification testing and analysis for various components of the scram discharge codification package will be complete prior to fuel load although the final acceptable documentation will not be available until 1984 (interim operati'on justification number JIO-S-4). The safe operation of WNp-2 will not be jeopardized by not havi_ng acceptable documentation.

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Contact:

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J. Ridgely, X29566

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Interim operation justification number JIO-S-7 concerns the seismic qualifica-tion of the four spray pond level monitors SW-LTD-1 A, -18, -lC, and -10. The-installation of the level monitors is not consistent with the configuration used in the seismic analysis. A design modification is being implemented to bring the field installation into conformance with the con #iguration whica has been analyzed. These monitors provide operator information concerning the water level within the ponds initiate operation of the nonsafety-related makeup water system and cannot reduce the quantity of water in the ponds.

Thus any failure mode of these monitors will not hava an adverse affect upon the 30 day water supply and therefore will not af sericly affect safe shutdown.

Should makeup water be desired within the 30 days, t 9 makeup water system can be manually operated.

Based on cur review, we conclude that the Washincr.n Public Power Supply System has demonstrated that the operation of WNF.2 without the qualified equipment as identified in the interim operation itens JIO-S-1, -4, and -7, does not represent an undue risk to the health and safety of the public for an interim period of operation.

Or16nal signed by L. S. Rubenouin L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration cc: R. Mattson

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