ML20197F034
| ML20197F034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/30/1986 |
| From: | Senseney R NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-1160, NUDOCS 8605150384 | |
| Download: ML20197F034 (34) | |
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NUREG-1160 International Cooperation During Radiological Emergencies NRC Program Guidance for the Provision of Technical Advice to Foreign Counterpart Organizations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of International Programs R. Senseney p= nauq b'.
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NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in N RC publications will be available from one of the following sources:
- 1. The NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20555
- 2. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Post Office Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082
- 3. The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, it is not intended to be exhaustive.
Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Docu-ment Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation notices; Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers;and applicant and licensee documents and correspondence.
The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the GPO Sales Program: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceedings, and NRC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission issuances.
Documents available from the National Technical Information Service include NUREG series reports and technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all open literature items, such as books, journal and periodical articles, and transactions. Federal Register notices, federal and state legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.
Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non-NRC conference proceedings are available for purchase from the organization sponsoring the publication cited.
Single copies of NRC draft reports are available free, to the extent of supply, upon written request to the Division of Technical Information and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission, Washington, DC 20555.
Copies of industry codes and standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are maintained at the NRC Library, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, and are available there for reference use by the public. Codes and standards are usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the originating organization or, if they are American National Standards, from the American National Standards Institute,1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018.
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NUREG-1160 International Cooperation During Radiological Emergencies NRC Program Guidance for the Provision of Technical Advice to Foreign Counterpart Organizations MInuscript Completed: April 1986 D:te Published: April 1986 R. senseney International Cooperation Assistant Directorata Office of international Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20666
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ABSTRACT This report defines the scope, application, and limits of the technical cooperation the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) would provide, upon request, to a foreign regulatory agency in a nuclear emergency.
It outlines the basis for such cooperation, offers a model written agreement, and describes recent cases of NRC assistance.
It also identifies non-NRC sources of emergency advisory assistance available to foreign organizations.
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CONTENTS Paoe ABSTRACT............................
iii PREFACE.............................
vii INTRODUCTION..........................
1 SECTION I ROLE OF NRC........................
2 NRC ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE.................
2 GENERAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS............
3 Other Domestic Activities...............
3 Communication and Information Transfer........
4 PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING AND GENERAL PROCEDURES..
5 a
Public Statements...................
5 Facilities, Privileges and Immunities.........
5 Settl ement of Disputes................
6 Liability.......................
6 Cost Reimbursement..................
6 SECTION II BASIC ARRANGEMENT.....................
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SECTION III i
4 PAST ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES.................
9 Mexico........................
9 Korea and Taiwan...................
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GENERAL COMMENT
S......................
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Communication and Periodic Testing..........
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Page OTHER SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE................
11 IAEA.........................
11 Other Bilateral and Regional Cooperation.......
11 Proximity.......................
12 Supplier Relationships................
12 Safety Authority Relationships............
12 CONCLUSION...........................
13 REFERENCES...........................
15 APPENDIX A - CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GENERAL EMERGENCIES..............
17 APPENDIX B - EVENT NOTIFICATION.................
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PREFACE The report has been compiled with the assistance of the personnel of the Incident Response and Development Branch, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement, USNRC. Contributions from the following persons are acknowledged:
K. F. Perkins B. H. Weiss E. D. Weinstein.
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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION DURING RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES NRC PROGRAM GUIDANCE FOR THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL AD'< ICE TO FOREIGN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS l
INTRODUCTION In the event of a nuclear accident or a radiological emergenc another country, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC)y in may be requested by the foreign authorities to share special expertise or capabilities it may have in dealing with the problem. Such a request might originate in any country, but the most substantive cases could involve countries which in recent years have initiated nuclear power programs using U.S.-supplied technology.
Recognizing the value of addressing certain policy and practical questions with respect to bilateral emergency assistance prior to an actual emergency, the NRC staff has outlined, in this document, program guidance on the level of assistance which NRC might be in a position to provide to a foreign safety organization. This guidance includes a model agreement of the type already concluded between NRC and two foreign regulatory agencies and which is recommended to any counterpart agency which might require imediate NRC advice during an emergency at a.
U.S.-supplied reactor.
In this regard,' it is noted that NRC's twenty or so general bilateral regulatory infonnation exchange Arrangements, as well as NRC's active participation in nuclear safety assistance programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), anticipate that NRC would, within available resources and statutory limitations, attempt to respond favorably to foreign requests for emergency advice or coopera-tion. However, the matter of coordinated and effective comunication, between NRC and a foreign regulatory agency during a power reactor accident or other complex event, requires pre-planning and a clear-understanding of mutual roles and limitations. This document serves to discuss such planning elements.* It is intended to be useful to NRC~
staff and foreign nuclear safety officials regardless of the degree of formal cooperation which may exist between their respective agencies.
1 The purpose of Section I of this report is to outline the scope, l
applicability, and limitations of NRC emerg(;ncy assistance.. A basic agreement is outlined in Section II of this report to serve as the model for formalizing a cooperative relationship during an emergency situation.
Some examples of past assistance activities, general coments, and other snurces of secondary emergency assistance which are available to national safety authorities are identified in Section III.
This effort utilized earlier work by international groups of experts in the field of emergency preparedness and response (Ref.1).
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SECTION I ROLE OF NRC The NRC's role in assisting a foreign agency deal with a power reactor accident or other radiological emergency (Ref. 2) will be essentially a monitoring and advisory role utilizing the infonnation which is trans-mitted in English to the NRC Operations Center. The source of the infonnation should ideally be the competent regulatory / safety authority of the other country.
In some countries this responsibility may be delegated to a national analytical or safety research authority or may also involve a direct infonnational link with the involved utility organizations to enable rapid infonnation access. NRC's advice or technical assessment, however, would be provided to the relevant govern-ment authority-
- er directly to the utility. The role of the NRC will be consistent w;e,;. the monitoring and advisory aspects of its domestic statutory responsibilities and ibe NRC Incident Response Plan as defined in the NRC Manual Chapter 0502 (Ref. 3) and will recognize the limita-i tions which time and distance may impose during the early phases of an event.
In addition, acceptance of the NRC opinions, judgments, and 3
suggestions will be entirely at the discretion of the regulatory / safety authority which has entered into this agreement with the NRC.
NRC ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE Upon official notification that a reactor emergency or other radiological accident is in progress, the NRC will follow its established procedures *, as generally defined in NUREG-0845, Agency Procedures for the NRC Incident Response, (Ref. 4) or as those procedures may be revised in the future.
In general, it is recognized that assistance options during the early stages of an emergency i
situation will be limited to actions which can be taken by NRC staff members, acting within the U.S. at NRC headquarters. The type of NRC.
responses which may be agreed to at this stage may include, but will not necessarily be limited to, the following:
l 1.
Review available infonnation provided by the competent regulatory / safety authority, its contractors and the local utility organization.
2.
Reconsnend to the off1cial safety authority, or its designated representative, protective actions for protection of the public health and safety.
NUREG-0845 contains general agency procedures. Detailed l
procedures, which include calling lists and other communications specificity, are in the NRC headquarters and regional supplements.
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3.
To the extent that it is practical, provide 'the official safety authority with an evaluation of the incident and develop timely projections of the likely course of an incident.*
After sufficient time has passed to gain infonnation on conditions at the site, the competent safety authority may want to expand the level or type of advice and assistance from that being provided, as described above. Consistent with its established procedures and available i
resources, the NRC will attempt to respond to requests for technical.
i advice which are commensurate with the level of the emergency situation I
in that country. To accomplish this, a pre-designated, senior official i
of the safety authority receiving this assistance shall confer by telephone or other means with a senior NRC official at the NRC l
Operations Center, and they shall discuss and agree on additional assistance measures. The additional cooperation will begin as soon.as i
agreed to by these officials and will be confirmed by telegram or other means as soon as practicable. These additional measures may include, but will not necessarily be limited to, the following:
T 1.
Upon request by the official safety authority,-and if warranted by available information on the accident situation which NRC receives, NRC will assemble a team of experts which may be dispatched to the requesting country to govide technical advice on safety problems and protective actions associated with the radiological emergency.
1 2.
Upon request by the official s6fety authority, and if warranted by available information on the accident situation which NRC receives, NRC will consider providing the capabilities that it has for q
responding to emergencies and may request assistance from other U.S.
Federal agencies that have additional capabilities.
3.
Recomend protective actions,for protection of the public and, to the extent practical, predift incident consequences 'and plant status changes.
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GENERAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS l
Other Domestic Activities NRC emergency assistance of the scope and type outlined in this report is meant to supplement and not replace domestic expertise and emergency preparedness and response activities in the country regbesting assis-i tance. As indicated above, time and distance place major limitations on the type and content of assistance which NRC can provide, particularly during the early phases of an event.
In addition, the technical evalua-2 tions which NRC would be in a pnsition to perform at any point during the emergency are limited to the. information and data which are provided 1
to the NRC Operations Center.
For these reasons the national safety j
authorities must rely primarily on domestic sources of analysis and i
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- It should be noted that this is a very difficult task for the NRC to accomplish, even for U.S. facilities, given the speed with which certain events can progress.
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safety evaluation.
If these are not already available in their own organization, they must develop working arrangements with other indigenous emergency organizations (such as national civil defense or police organizations) for effective emergency response. Additionally, site-specific emergency plans need to be developed and tested in coop-eration with the local utilities.
In those countries where emergency preparedness and response activities are still being developed, the NRC, in close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
might work with the official safety authority to assist in the estab-lishment of a framework for effective emergency preparedness and response and assist the IAEA and the official safety authority in evaluating the effectiveness of that system. This could be accomplished primarily through NRC's participation in Safety Missions such as IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (0SART) and on an individual basis through the IAEA.
In any case, findings are delivered in the form of IAEA guidance and suggestions and not in the form of an " order" or " requirement." See additional infonnation on this aspect of international cooperation in Section III of this report.
Cc munication and Information Transfer 4
All comunications with the NRC Operations Center must be in English.
Comunications during emergency situations may be conducted over the telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, depending upon the comunication means available to the official safety authority at its headquarters domestic emergency center or the accident site. The mechanism of comunication should be established and tested on a periodic basis.
Plant-specific documents, written in English, which the NRC would need to have on hand at the Operations Center would include, but not be restricted to, the following:
1.
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) on all facilities to be covered under this program.
2.
Maps giving the plant's location relative to environmental monitoring points population centers emergency planning zones (EPZs) population distributions by distance and direction special facilities, i.e., schools, hospitals, prisons, etc.
3.
Emergency procedures established by the official safety authority fcr response to emergency situations. This should include statements describing the emergency conditions (i.e., Alerts, Site Area Emergencies, and General Emergencies) for which the safety authority has established plans.
4.
Emergency plan for all facilities to be covered under this program.
5.
Emergency transportation infonnation; nearest airport, etc.
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PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING AND GENERAL PROCEDURES NRC and U.S. licensees currently employ,the protective action l
decision-making criteria outlined in Appendix A.
The official safety authority is encouraged to examine its domestic criteria to determine the extent to which its criteria, and emergency planning procedures in general, conflict with U.S. criteria; procedures;and practices. Although uniformity is not a prerequisite for cooperation ~ during radiological emergencies, the case-by-case differences-- practiced by each individual country need to be fully discussed and well understood to minimize confusion during an actual emergency. Working closely with the IAEA is one method for the development of an integrated plan for emergency preparedness and response which, to e large degree, would be compatible with the system employed in the U.S.
As both parties to the agreement revise their individual procedures, they should endeavor to keep the other party fully informed of all changes which may have an impact on their interaction during an emergency.
Public Statements In the course of the assistance activity, the content of any NRC public statements or reports would, to the extent practic'al, be coordinated in advance with the country receiving the assistance.
Infomation provided in confidence by the official safety authority in connection with the assistance (such as commercial, proprietary, diplomatic, or physical protection infomation) would be protected by the NRC, its personnel or representatives acting on its behalf to the maximum extent possible.
This provision would not, however, preclude the NRC from using the infomation as the basis for regulatory activities in the U.S.
In addition, the NRC must cceply with U.S. information laws such as the Freedom of Information Act.
Facilities, Privileges and Immunities The official safety authority and other local organizations involved in activities related to this program would provide, to the extent of their i
capabilities, any facilities and services necessary for the proper and effective administration of ~ assistance'by the NRC. The recipient country's organizations would ensure the protection and security of personnel of the NRC or representatives acting on its behalf, as well as of their documents and o#ficial and personal property.
The official safety authority and other indigenous authorities would be expected to facilitate 'the entry (free of duty,' taxation or seizure) and movement within the recipient country of property brought to that country by the NRC, its personnel or representatives acting on its behalf, for the purposes of the emergency assistance. The official safety authority and other indigenous authorities would be expected to pemit and facilitate the re-export of such property duty free and, to the extent that they are able to do so, arrange for the requisite decontamination of recoverable equipment before its re-export.
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Settlement of Disputes In the event of a dispute between two or more parties concerning any of the matters dealt with in the execution of this cooperation, the parties would agree to consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by any other amicable means. Any dispute which could not be settled in this manner could be submitted to arbitration for a decision.
Liability The NRC, its personnel, and representatives acting on its behalf would not be held liable for damage or injury to or loss of life of any person, damage to or loss of any personal property, or damage to the environment, where caused by the nuclear accident or radiological emergency, or by any actions taken in rendering assistance that has been requested, except in respect to liability of individuals having caused damage by willful misconduct or gross negligence.
The official safety organization would assume all responsibility for defending against claims that might be brought by third parties against the NRC, its personnel, and representatives acting on its behalf and would hold the NRC and its representatives harmless in the case of any claim or liability in connection with the nuclear accident, the radiological emergency or the assistance.
The official safety authority would not make any admission on behalf of the NRC or comit the NRC to any obligations or courses of actions with regard to any claim without the express written permission of the NRC.
Cost Reimbursement Unless agreed othenvise in the future on a case-by-case basis, the government of the recipient country would.be expected to reimburse the NRC, its personnel, and representatives acting on its behalf for the costs incurred for the services rendered in connection with the assis-tance, including personnel subsistence, travel and transport, communications, insurance (including insurance of personnel and property of the U.S., the NRC, and its representatives), equipment, materials or facilities provided, or the use'thereof, and other documented expenses.
General overhead and daily operating expenses of the NRC Operations Center would not be included, although reimbursement of additional expenses incurred as a result of the assistance activity, including overtime salaries of the NRC personnel and salaries of contractor personnel engaged specifically for the assistance activity, may be considered.
SECTION II BASIC ARRANGEMENT The following is an example of a basic arrangement which could be incorporated into an existing bilateral arrangement between the NRC and 6
k the official safety authority for the provision of assistance during radiological emergencies as outlined above:
I.A.
Cooperation in Radiological Emergencies In the case of a significant nuclear incident or radiological accident in (the requesting country) involving a U.S.-supplied nuclear power plant, other U.S.-supplied nuclear technology, or other general radiological emergencies (such as transportation or industrial accidents) which pose a threat to public health and safety, the U.S.N.R.C. agrees, within the limits of its legislative authority and available resource::, to render assistance at the request of the (official safety authority).
Examples of the types of assistance, the extent of which will be determined by the U.S.N.R.C. and the (official safety authority) on a case-by-case basis, could include but would not necessarily be restricted to the following:
i a.
Establishing and maintaining a channel of I
comunication between the (official safety authority) and the U.S.N.R.C. to monitor the severity of the incident and to provide technical advice to the (official safety authority).
b.
Organizing and maintaining teams of experts, working in U.S.N.R.C. Headquarters and in other U.S. loca-tions as required, to give technical advice on the safety problems attendant to the emergency.
c.
Sending U.S.N.R.C., and other U.S. technical experts, including experts in offsite protective measures, to (the requesting country) during emergency situations.
It is understood by both parties that all assistance rendered, unless otherwise agreed, shall be at the expense of the party requesting the assistance.
To activate this emergency assistance
- the following procedures would apply:
(1) A designated representative of the (official safety authority) will comunicate directly with the U.S.N.R.C. Headquarters Operations Officer at the U.S.N.R.C. Operations Center for the purpose of supplying initial information on the incident. A
- In situations requiring technical advice, but not of an emergency nature, requests for assistance will be made within the channel of comunication between the U.S.N.R.C. and the (official safety authority) Arrangement administrators.
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l line of comunication will be established and maintained by the (official safety authority).
(2) The U.S.N.R.C. Operations Center will follow its established procedures for collecting and assessing status infomation and monitoring the progress of l
the emergency, using this established communications l
link.
(3) Continuing infomation (in English) will be provided from (the requesting country) to the United States, preferably from the site of the incident.
(4) As soon as practical and after the initial consultation, the Headquarters Operations Officer and the (official safety authority) designee will arrange for conference conversations between a pre-designated official of the safety authority of (the requesting country) or his designated represen-tative, a senior NRC official representing U.S.N.R.C.,
and appropriate technical experts in which assistance measures will be discussed and plans for initiating assistance programs agreed upon.
(5) Cooperative action will begin as soon as this verbal agreement is reached. This plan of cooperative action will be confirmed by telegraph or facsimile as soon as practicable.
(6) The U.S.N.R.C., or its representatives, will not be held liable for personal injury or property damage which may result from infomation or assistance it provides, or fails to provide, in the course of civil nuclear emergencies. As with other informa-tion furnished under this Arrangement, each side is fully responsible for what use it makes of any infomation it receives.
(7) The (official safety authority) will send copies of final safety analysis reports and other documentation describing (the requesting country's) nuclear power plants and approved emergency procedures to U.S.N.R.C.
These documents will be kept current by updates and revisions' supplied by the'(official s'fety authority) and filed by the U.S.N.R.C.
These will be kept by U.S.N.R.C. for use in interpretation and analysis of information received during emergency and other assistance actions.
(8) ihis cooperative arrangement shall be supplemented in (the requesting country) by finalized plans for interaction with the other appropriate national civil defense and local governmental organizations which may be called upon to provide assistance I
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during emergencies involving commercial nuclear facilities and other radiological emergencies which may pose a threat to public health and safety.
I.B.
Additional Safety Advice To the extent that the documents, training, and other assistance provided by the U.S.N.R.C, as described in previous sections of this Arrangement, are not adequate to meet the (official safety authority's) needs for technical advice, the parties will consult on the best means for fulfilling such needs.
SECTION III PAST ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES Mexico NUREG-1103, Contaminated Mexican Steel Incident, outlines the most recent instance where the NRC offered to assist a counterpart safety authority in the evaluation, assessment and corrective actions in response to an incident which posed a radiological hazard to the public health and safety.
The event did not involve a U.S.-supplied nuclear facility but did involve U.S.-origin radioactive materials which had been removed from protective encasement, sold as scrap metal and even-tually incorporated into construction materials and other consumer products. The radiological hazard was not limited to the country in which this event occurred as many of the items, which were then manufac-tured with the contaminated steel, were bound for' export. The bilateral Arrangement between the NRC and the Mexican National Nuclear Safety and Safeguards Connission, which was the principal Mexican respondent to the accident, did not explicitly contain provisions for cooperation during l
nuclear emergencies at the time of the event. Under the arrangement, l
the NRC did give advice and exchange status information during the incident which was beneficial to both sides. A special agreement on emergency cooperation would have prescribed an established channel of emergency communication, which would have facilitated the Mexican authority's ability to contact the appropriate officials within the NRC and might have facilitated the NRC's reaction to the initial event, forea and Taiwan The NRC Arrangements with the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology and the Taiwan Atomic Energy Council (through the American Institute in Taiwan) each include a provision for NRC, upon request, to supply an agreed-to level of assistance in the event of an emergcacy situation at one of those countries' U.S.-supplied nuclear facilities.
Emergency plans and other plant-specific information for the facilities to be covered.under these agreements are in the process of being provided to NRC and will be stored at its Operations Center.
In the case of Korea, a great deal of written infonnation has been exchanged and successful tests of communication systems have been conducted.
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GENERAL COMENTS Connunication and Periodic Testing As indicated in Section I and again in the assistance activity cited above, connunications between the NRC Operations Center and the official safety authority in the country requesting assistance may be conducted utilizing a variety of mechanisms (telephone, telex, facsimile, etc.),
which may or may not be dedicated expressly for use during emergency situations. Connunication mechanisms, use of redundant or complementary systems, use of tele-conferencing, and systems dedication will usually be determined according to the resources available to the official safety authority. These are considerations beyond the scope of NRC as long as the systems are compatible with those employed at the NRC Operations Center and the connunication itself is in English.
Experience has shown that periodic testing (perhaps on a quarterly basis) of the connunication links between the NRC Operations Center and the official safety authority is beneficial for the following reasons:
It serves as a good test to ensure that basic, non-emergency contact is possible and, by extension, emergency contact as well.
It tests each organization's ability to make contact during non-routine work hours.
Weak points can be uncovered and addressed.
Each side becomes familiar with speaking and working with the other during non-emergency situations, making it easier to work with the other during an actual emergency.
Questions to which the individual making the contact should be prepared to respond during a communication check could include:
the plant name and/or the location of the caller name and affiliation of caller and callback number the licensee name and callback number reactor system status, including:
- power level
- pressure
- temperature Utilizing the connunication link during an event of relatively low significance, where no assistance is actually being requested and neither the involved utility nor the official safety authority expects the situation to develop into anything serious can also be beneficial for the following reasons:
It serves not only as a test of connunication capabilities but also of the ability to exchange data and ideas on a real time basis.
It builds confidence in the working relationship between the official-safety authority and the NRC.
Should the situation develop into a serious event, the NRC Operations Center would already have been alerted to the initial events, thus minimizing the amount of " historical" information which would need to be conveyed to the NRC.
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l During an actual event, even one of relatively low significance, the individual making the contact should be prepared to supply NRC with the information identified on the " Event Notification" form.
(See AppendixB.) Basically, the individual would need to be prepared to respond to the following:
the plant name and/or location of the event the licensee name the nature of the event the event classification the plant status: power level, pressure, temperature, etc.
whether the incident consequences have stabilized, improved, or are worsening whether there was any offsite release of radioactive material
- which government agencies are responding OTHER SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE IAEA On April 7,1981, the IAEA issued Circular Letter SC/651-3 (Ref. 5) in which the Agency extended an offer to assist member states in the development and implementation of emergency preparedness and response I
activities. This is an important mechanism through which national safety authorities can obtain advice and technical assistance to aid in their development and evaluation of domestic emergency preparedness and response capabilities, regardless of the origin of the nuclear system being utilized. For its part, NRC has found that working through the Agency's Divisions of Nuclear Safety and Technical Cooperation has been an effective way for the NRC to supply experts to other countries while minimizing the extent to which it needs to be concerned with the long-term or follow up activities required for the effective development of the recipient country's response program. Recipient countries have 3
likewise benefitted not only from the confidential expert advice which l
the Agency can provide but also because their utilization of the Agency i
is normally less costly, in terms of financial resources, than the same level of assistance on a bilateral basis.
Other Bilateral and Regional Cooperation IAEA INFCIRC/310, " Guidelines for Mutual Emergency Assistance Arrangements in Connection with a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency," is the culmination of efforts by several groups of experts which, during 1982 and 1983, wrestled with the legal, technical, politi-cal and practical problems associated with the development of bilateral and multilateral assistance relationships during emergency situations involving nuclear technology and other radiological hazards. NRC has utilized this document in the development of its program in this area.
Safety authorities may wish to use this document in their pursuit of similar agreements with safety authorities in other countries, either for reasons of proximity, technological or political compatibility, or by virtue of a supplier relationship.
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Proximity Although telephone and facsimile systems enable rapid communications and provide an effective mechanism for gathering technical experts together to address a comon problem, they are less effective.when attempting to transfer large amounts of technical data on a real-time basis. A combination of the use of facsimiles concurrent with telephone communi-cation increases comunication flow, minimizes language and distance barriers, and is particularly effective for cooperative activities during the early phases of an event, during events which might progress slowly, or for events of relatively minor significance.
There are practical limitations to the usefulness of these systems for rapidly degrading or changing situations, or instances where. ongoing advice and assistance are deemed to be needed near or at the site of the.
emergency.
In these instances the proximity of the cooperating partners becomes a significant factor.
If it takes a day or.more for cooperating.
partners to physically come together due to travel constraints,. the ~
event itself could well have, by then, run its course or gone beyond the point where the cooperative assistance would have any value. The official safety authority should look to nearby sources for technical emergency cooperation to fulfill assistance requirements which may be needed on a near-tenn basis (rapidly) on or near the site of-the emergency.
Supplier Relationships In addition, the vendor (NSSS-supplier) should be approached to detennine, in advance, what level of assistance can be expected from them in the event of an emergency. Vendor-to-utility emergency comu-nications and assistance can be a particularly effective addition to an overall program for external advice and assistance.
Engineering judg--
ments are the ultimate basis for recommendations which external organizations, such as the NRC or vendors, will provide to its counter-part or partners in the event of an emergency. The vendor has the advantage of being able to base its engineering judgments on the design.
testing, and other engineering aspects more closely related to the plant in question, although its recomendations may be influenced by consider-ations of ' damage limitation" to the plant system as a primary consideration. NRC's assessments cannot be as plant-specific, lacking the joint-history which the vendor shares with the utility regarding the reactor system which it provided.
Safety Authority Relationships The safety authority in the country which supplied the reactor system could be looked to as a source of technical advice during emergency or
.off-normal situations. Like NRC, it is doubtful that'other safety authorities have direct experience in operating the reactors it licenses for. export. The safety authority's expertise is derived from the extensive license review which it conducts on domestic reactors. Any advice or assistance is, therefore, limited in both scope and content.
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Identification of reference plants (facilities which are similar in size, system, component, design, etc., but which may be located in different countries) facilitates the dialogue between cooperating partners and provides a standard reference on which to base their discussions.
CONCLUSION NRC is willing to provide, upon request, technical advice to safety and regulatory authorities in other countries to help them deal with emergency situations. The NRC assistance would be expected to be especially useful to less-experienced foreign regulatory agencies when reacting to a complex problem involving U.S. technology or some other unusual situation where NRC expertise could be applied. However, NRC's efforts to provide advice, and those of any other outside organization, can only be expected to supplement domestic efforts. Outside organiza-tions cannot be expected to replace effectively local analytical and protective action decision-making expertise. Advance planning and periodic testing of communication systems minimize the impact of the physical distance between cooperative partners and the time that would otherwise be necessary to organize a cooperative effort of this type.
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l REFERENCES
^
1.
International Atomic Energy Agency, " Guidelines for Mutual Emergency Assistance Arrangements in Connection with a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency," IAEA Report INFCIRC/310, January 1984.
Available from the International Atomic Energy Agency, P. O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria.
2.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, " Contaminated Mexican Steel Incident - Importation of Steel Into the United States That Had Been Inadvertently Contaminated With Cobalt-60 as a Result of Scrapping of a Teletherapy Unit," USNRC Report NUREG-1103, January 1985.
3.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, " Manual Chapter 0502, NRC Incident Response Plan," USNRC Report, February 14, 1983.
4.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, " Agency Procedures for the NRC Incident Response Plan - Final Report," USNRC Report NUREG-0845, February 1983.
5.
Letter from S. Eklund, International Atomic Energy Agency,
Subject:
SC/651-3 Circ., dated April 7, 1981. Available from the International Atomic Energy Agency, P. O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria.
i 15
APPENDIX A
-SSINS No.: 6835 IN 83-28 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 May 4, 1983 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-28:
CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GENERAL EMERGENCIES Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information notice is provided to bring to the attention of licensees certain requirements contained in the emergency planning rule.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities. No written response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
In many cases, it has been found that licensees have not fully understood one aspect of the protective action decisionmaking guidance regarding prnvisions for making of fsite. recommendations based on precursors of a release (i.e., core and containment status).
The Federal guidance on the protective actions to be recommended to offsite l
officials for general emergencies is addressed in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Energency Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."
Figure 1 shows these guidelines.
The licensee's emergency plan and emergency procedures are required to contain site-specific protective action reconnendation guidelines compatible with those shown in Figure 1.
These guidelines must include predetermined measurable /
l observable emergency action levels used to assess the status ~ of core and containment conditions on which the licensee will reconnend offsite protective actions for consideration by offsite offices.
These guidelines should be prepared af ter consideration of site-specific factors and any changes must be reviewed with offsite officials.
8303040031 17
IN 83-28 May 4, 1983 Page 2 of 2 No written response to this information notice is required. Compliance with the requirements of the Comission's regulations will be evaluated as part of the annual emergency preparedness inspections.
If you need additional infor-mation regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or this office.
Edwar
. Jordan, Director Divi n of Emergency Preparedness an Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical
Contact:
T. McKenna, IE 301-492-7612
Attachment:
1.
Flow Chart (Figure 1) 18
IN 83-28 May 4 e 1983 Page 1 of 1 FIGURE 1 FLOW CHART FOR GENERAL EMERGENCY OFFSITE PROTECTIVE DECISIONS rh. fonowing cosas won ne seees on e,eeeiermaes ense,vense instivment.oen.no piant si tue eneicarere IE ALsl conteense en the emergency pean and that have been recewee by effsete officiele However, reopene ble ettsete offscsels must decise en the fossabelery ofimplemenung the profechve ecnone at the ame of the accament.
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19 1
i
APPENDIX B SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-78 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF. INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 September 23, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-78: EVENT NOTIFICATION Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP).
Purposes:
This notice is being issued to revise guidance to power reactor licensees regarding specific event notification information that should be provided to the NRC Operations Center when reporting events in accordance with i
This guidance supercedes that provided in IN 83-34 dated May 26, 1983. Suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
Significant events reported to the NRC Operations Center receive prompt evaluation by NRC technical staff at headquarters and regional offices.
To assist in obtaining adequate information for evaluation, the worksheet has been revis,ed for the Operations Officers manning the NRC Operations Center.
The event notification worksheet has been provided for your information as an attachraent to this information notice. We recognize that this list is not all inclusive, nor are all of its items applicable to each event. Rather, it lists
)
certain key items on the basis of past experience that are required for most notifications.
The checklist is intended to provide the licensee with the type of information that should be provided to the NRC Operations Center when reporting events.
It is suggested that copies of the worksheet be made available to employees responsible for reporting, event related information to the NRC to replace copies of the worksheet provided in IN 83-34.
To prevent misunderstandings and reduce callbacks by the Operations Officer as a result of incomplete information, the description should provide sufficient detail for the Operations Officer to understand the event, including all system interactions.
The NRC welcomes any recommendations for improvements to the event reporting j
process.
4 21
IE 85-78 September 23, 1985 l
Page 2 of 2 i
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the NRC Headquarters incident response contacts listed in this notice.
a Jordan, Director Divisi of Emergency Preparedness and gineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contacts: Don Marksberry, IE (301) 492-4156 Ray Priebe, IE (301) 492-4333
Attachment:
1.
Event Notification Worksheet 22
IN 85-78 I r 8 *=maa sensavour - ~ser l
EVENT NOTIFICATION WomasMttT September 23. 1985 menareme canres Pace 1 of 2
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apte Only Jf T.S. eeceeded or actual contamination ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR REACTOR COO 1 ANT or STEAM GENERATOR TURE 11AFS SUDDEN OR LDNC TERM DtvtLDPMENT T START Dart e START T!nt s LEAR RAtt a
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG-ll60 stE s%$7muCT,045 Om twa agvinst 2 TaTLt ANo sustaTLE J LE AVE BLANE International Cooperation During Radiological Emergencies:
NRC Program idance for the Provision of Technical I
Advice to Fo ign Counterpart Organizations
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Office of International P rams U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co ssion Washington, DC 20555 10 SPON50ReNG ORGApel2 ATION mawa aNo wa Li%G aoopts acwee ze Co.,,
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Office of International Programs
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 12 Sup*LEwtstam, motes Prepared in cooperation with the Divisi of Emer cy Preparedness and Engineering Response, Office of Inspection and Enfor ment, U C.
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g This report defines the scope, application a mits of the technical cooperation the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) would ovide, upon request, to a foreign regulatory agency in a nuclear emergency.
It lines the basis for such coopera-tion, offers a model written agreement, and sc 'bes recent cases of NRC assistance.
It also identifies non-NRC sou es o mergency advisory assistance available to foreign organizations.
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Agreements; Bilateral Agreements; operation; Foreign Policy; IAEA; International Cooperation; Interna onal Relations; Radiation Accidents; Unlimited R: actor Accidents
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