ML20197D782
| ML20197D782 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002555 |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1978 |
| From: | Nosenzo L STATE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812050318 | |
| Download: ML20197D782 (21) | |
Text
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C SWEDEN
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XSNM-1112 ment No. I DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~ h$$$
was%ntton. D.C.
20s20 BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS
^
November 20, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES R.
SHEA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Enclosed is an Executive' Branch analysis covering a request for amendment of a license for the export of low-enriched uranium in the form of uranium dioxide to the Federal Republic of Germany for fabrication into fuel assemblies and shipment to Sweden.
In accordance with P.L.95-242, the analysis explicitly addresses how the requirements of Section 126 a. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act are met, including the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 128, as well as certain additional factors, en-visaged by Section 126 a. (1).
The Executive Branch, on the basis of its review of this case, has concluded that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and P.L.95-242'have been met and that the proposed exports would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States.
Moreover, both Sweden and the Community have adhered to the provisions of their Agreements for Cooperation with the United States.
Therefore, the Executive Branch recommends issuance of the proposed license.
,ctue /
A20 Louis V.
losen o Deputy Assiatpattt ecretary S
U.S. HRC Enclosure As stated 978 N0y 20 PM i 27 EXPORT /lMPORT AND INTERHAT'l SFGRDS 78120503/6
s XSNM-lll2 Amendment No. 1 Country:
Sweden Transaction:
The export of 1,130 kilograms of U-235 contained in 43,340 kilograms of uranium in the form of uranium dioxide enriched to a maximum of 2.90 percent U-235 Applicant:
EXXON Nuclear Company Inc.
Date of Application:
June 20, 1978 Purpose of Export This low enriched uranium in the form of sintered uranium dioxide pellets will be shipped to EXXON Nuclear GmbH, Lingen, West Germany for fabrication into fuel as-semblies, if not done by EXXON at its Richland Washington facility.
EXXON requests these alternative authorizations in order to provide flexibility for the assembly of the necessary fuel material for the Oskarshamn I reactor lo-cated at Oskarshamn, Sweden.
The total amount of low-enriched uranium requested exceeds the loading requirements by some ten percent to allow for possible production losses.
Shipments of the material are scheduled to begin in late 1978.
The Oskarshamn I is a boiling water reactor with a net power output of 450 megawatts electric.
It began reg-ular power operation in February 1972 and is owned and operated by Oskarshamnverkets Kraftgrupp AB.
j Mr Vance H Hudgins Division of International Security Affairs US Erda i
Washington, D.C.
20545 i f c
-lj
Dear Er Hudgins,
~
'1 I wish to refer to our letter of May 11 1977, regarding
,l an application (S-6 6) from Exxon Nuclear Company, Richland,
-l icense to export in 1978 565,000 Washington, for a in 21,670 kg U and in 1979 565,000 g in 21,670 kg U (g 255 U enrich-ment to a mari=um of 2 90 %) to Oskarshamnsverkets Kraft-grupp A3, Stockholm, Sweden. The assemblies are intended to be charged into the Oskarshamn I reactor located at Oskars-hamn, Sweden and irradiated for a period of at least four years.
I am now able to inform you that the above mentioned material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the US - Swedish agree =ent of cooperation regarding civil uses of atomic energy. Oskarshamnsverkets Kraftgrupp A3 is autho-rized to receive and possess the material.
Sincerely yours, I,
%. e. ed\\
s 7
HansFyr6nwall j
Secretary of Embassy n -tr <
.r e r nm-m e nn-m uy
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1 DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION'OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES May 23, 1977 MG/mc 8
Mr. Vance H. Hudgins l
Assistant Director for Politico-l Military Security Affairs Division of International Security Affairs E.R.D.A.
Washington, D.C. 20545
Subject:
XSNM#1113 - S#659 - Exxo5 Nuclear Company -Inc.
5 Application dated March 8, 1977 for West Germany
Dear Mr. Hudgins:
alication, We. certify that the material mentioned in this ap3,720 Kg namely 1,240,000 g of U-235 (max.) contained in 3 of U (max. ) in 1978 and 1,317,000 g of U-2 35 (max. ) contained in 41,140 Kg of U (max.).in 1979 and the transfer of this material will be subject to all terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation.
Further we certify that Exxon Nuclear GmbH, Lingen, West Germany, or Fabbricazioni Nucleari, Bosco Marengo, Italy, as intermediate consignees, and Rheinish-Westfa11sches Elektrizitatswerk, Essen, Wert Germany, as ultimate consignee, are authorized by EURATOM to receive and possess this material pursuant to the aforementioned Agreement for Cooperation.
Sincerely yours, hv F. SPAAK Head of Delegation b
cc: Mr. William Moffit, State Department Ms. Janice Dunn, NRC f
4
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DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUFIOPEAN COMMUNITIES July 29, 1977 JM/mc Mr. Vance H. Hudgins Assist, ant Director for Politico-g Military Security Affairs Division of International Security Affairs E.R.D.A.-
Washington, D.C. 30545 lication dated
Subject:
Exxon Nuclear Company Inc., app #1112 - S#658 March 2, 1977 for Sweden.
XSNM 4
Dear Mr. Hudgins:
This is with refererne of the above mentioned application.
-l We certify that the material mentioned in this application, 2
namely, in the course of 1978, 21,670 Kg of U containing
~565,000 g of U-235, and in the course of 1979, 21,670 Kg of U containing 565,000 g. of U-235, and the transfer of this material will be subject to all terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation.
Further we certify that Exxon Nuclear GmbH, Lingen, West Germany, as intermediate consignee, is authorized by EURATOM to receive and possess this material pursuant to the aforementioned Agreement for Cooperation.
The above material will be used by Exxon Nuclear either:
j
- 1) to fabricate the fuel assemblies at its Richland, Washington plant for shipment to Osi:arshamn; or
- 2) to fabricate 110% of the UOp fuel pellets for the fuel assemblies for shipment to hxon Nuclear GmbH in Lingen, West Germany where the fuel assemblies will be fabricated for shipment to Oskarshamn.
In the latter case, Exxon Nuclear will import the 10% excess UO back 2
3 to the U.S. for recovery.
After fabrication, the fuel assemblies will be exported to Sweden subject to U.S. authorization.
Sincerely yours,
/ 42chzg l
F. SPAAK l
Head of Delegation l
2100 M Sneet NW Suite 707 Washington DC 20037 / telephone, (202) 672 8350 t teiet 89 539 EUACOM
8 EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSIS 1.
Applicable Agreement for Cooperation The material covered by the export license applica-tion is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Sweden as amended.
This fact has been confirmed by letter from the Embassy of Sweden, a copy of which follows the description of the transaction.
The Agreement, as amended, entered into force on September 15, 1966.
Sweden has adhered to all provisions of this agree-ment with the United States.
The intermediate transfer of uranium to the Federal Republic of Germany for the manufacture of fuel elements is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), as amended.
This was confirmed in a letter from the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities, a copy of which is enclosed.
The European Atomic Energy Community has adhered to all provisions of this agreement with the United States.
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2.
Extent to Which Export Criteria Are Met l
A.
Section 127 Criteria As provided in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, the following criteria govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:
Criterion (1)
"IAEA safeguards as required by Article IITI of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the appli-cable Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof."
Sweden is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
A safeguard agreement between Sweden and the IAEA pursuant to the NPT entered into force on May 6, 1975 and under that agreement safeguards are being applied.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that cri-terion (1) is met with respect to Swaden.
The Federal Repubic of Germany, the six other non-nuclear weapons state members of the European Community and the United Kingdom are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Each of those seven states (Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands) thus undertook the obligation in Article III(1) of the NPT to accept safeguards of the IAEA on all nuclear material in all of its peaceful nuclear activities and to enter into an agreement with IAEA to that effect.
As permitted by Article III(4) of the NPT, those seven states elected to join in concluding a single agreement with l
the IAEA (INFCIRC/193).
Since they had already assigned to the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) the responsi-bility and authority to apply safeguards within their terri-tories (rather than each state establishing and maintaining a national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material), EURATOM is also a party to that agreement.
The agreement, after approval by the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the European Community and ratification by each of the seven states, entered into force on February 21, 1977.
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4 As in the case of all safeguards agreements between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states pursuant to Article III(I) of the NPT, the agreement with EURATOM and its seven non-nuclear-weapon member states includes provision for the com-pletion by the parties of " Subsidiary Arrangements", setting forth in detail the manner in which the safeguards procedures called for in the agreement are to be carried out.
In prac-tice, the Subsidiary Arrangements consist of a general part and, for each of the facilities and locations in which IAEA safeguards are to be applied to nuclear material pursuant to the agreement, individual " Facility Attachments".
The agreement calls for the parties to make every effort to achieve the entry into force of the " Subsidiary Arrange-ments" within 90 days of the entry into force of the agree-ment proper.
Extension of that period requires agreement among all the parties.
During the period since February 21, 1977, the parties have been negotiating the Subsidiary Arrangements, including Facility Attachments for the 205 facilities and locations which curren:ly come within the purview of the agreement.
The general part of the Subsidiary Arrangements has been com-pleted and is in effect.
As of September 15, 1978, approxi-mately 145 of the Facility Attachments have entered into force and serve as the basis for IAEA safeguards activities at such facilities.
About 15 othe'rs had been agreed at the negotiating level and the remainder were under active dis-cussion.
The parties have agreed to several extensions of the period for completion of the Subsidiary Arrangements, in accordance with the agreement.
The latest such extension runs until February 20, 1979.
The EURATOM /IAEA agreement provides, as does every safe-guards agreement with the IAEA pursuant to Article III(l) of the NPT, the right to the IAEA to apply in all non-nuclear weapon states party to such an agreement, the procedures laid down in the agreement, including inspections, as soon as the agreement enters into force, even if the Subsidiary Arrange-ments are not in force.
The agreements do not impose on the IAEA any limications of access, or frequency, of these in-spections prior to completion of Facility Attachments (see e.g.:
Articles 71 and 76 of the agreement with EURATOM and its member non-nuclear weapon states, INFCIRC/193).
The IAEA has, since the entry into force of the EURATOM /IAEA agree-ment, increasingly exercised this right to apply procedures and inspections.
The Agency's general cpproach is to carry out such in-spections so as to achieve tt.e same verification goals which
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B they would aim for normally under a Facility Attachment.
j For example, frequency of vi sits would be related to timeli-ness goals.
The Agency does, of course, have manpower limi-tations in this regard, and generally places greater emphasis on facilities involving sensitive material.
In some facili-ties surveillance equipment is employed prior to completion of Facility Attachments, while in other cases inspector pres-ence must be relied upon.
In non-nuclear weapon member states of EURATOM, all facilities with the exception of a few research reactors (LEU-fueled or low power) and other re-search installations have been inspected by IAEA.
In summary, it is clear that each of the non-nuclear weapons state members of EURATOM is a party to the NPT, has fulfilled its obligation under Article III(l) of the NPT, and has an agreement in force with the IAEA in accordance with Article III(4) of that treaty under which the IAEA has clear rights, which are being exercised, to apply safe-guards in all relevant facilities.
Therefore it is the Executive Branch view that cri-terion (1) is met.
Prior to the coming into force of the IAEA's agree-j ment with EURATOM and its member non-nuclear weapon states l
and the implementation by IAEA of that agreement, the US continued to export enriched uranium and other items to the non-nuclear weapon member states of EURATOM, notwith-standing the obligation undertaken by the US in Article III(2) of the NPT to do so only if the source or special fissionable processed used or produced shall be subject to IAEA safeguards.
The United States did so on the basis of a " rule of reason", which took into account the circum-stance that those states were NPT signatories and were conducting negotiations with IAEA of a safeguards agree-ment in accordance with Article III(l) of the NPT.
The ap-plication of EURATOM's safeguards within the territories of those states was also taken into account.
More recently, the entry into force of the IAEA/ EURATOM safeguards agree-ment, the progressive completion of facility attachments, and the increasing application of ad hoc IAEA inspections as the Agency made resources available to implement the verification agreement, combined with the continued ap-plication of EURATOM safeguards in all facilities, allowed the Executive Branch to adopt the view that the equivalent of criterion (1) was met.
We would note that the EURATOM safeguards system, be-cause of its continuing accountancy and materials control function for the EURATOM Community countries, will remain l
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i one of the factors relevant to the judgment of the Execu-tive Branch, under Section 126(a)(1), that a proposed ex-port to one of these states will not be inimical to the common defense and security.
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9 Criterion (2)
"No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for re-search on or development of any nuclear explosive device."
As non'-nuclear-weapons stato (NNWS) parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), both Sweden and the FRG have pledged not to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.
These pledges apply to any material, facil-ities and sensitive nuclear technology previously exported to either Sweden or the FRG by the US and subject to the US-Swedish and U.S.-EURATOM Agueements for Cooperation and to special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
Since these pledges will apply to the proposed export and to any special nuclear material produced through its use, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (2) is met with respect to Sweden and the FRG.
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Criterion (3)
" Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or pro-duced through the use thereof.
Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the applicable regulations."
It is the judgment of the Executive Branch that each mem-ber state of the Community has established physical security measures which, as a minimum, meet those recommended in the IAEA's INFCIRC/25/Rev.1, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material".
In addition, Sweden and all states in the Community (except Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg) also are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and, as such, have agreed to levels of protection consistent with INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, to be ensured with respect to nuclear materials and equipment and facilities containing these materials, which are detailed in transmission of the Nuclear Suppliers guidelines to the IAEA.
On September 15, 1978, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the following written generic physical security protection assurance to the U.S.
Embassy in Stockholm:
"The Ministry is pleased to confirm that the level of physical protection maintained in Sweden fulfills the criteria set forth in IAEA INFCIRC/225/ Revision 1.
This means that nuclear material within Sweden received from the U.S. and with respect to nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such material and facilities is, and will be, covered as a minimum by a level of protection that well corresponds to that set forth in the said document.
This also applies to material already in Sweden."
As reported to the Commission by Department of State letter dated October 26, 1978, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on October 17, 1978 provided the follow-ing generic assurance in the form of an Aide Memoire to the q
U.S.
Embassy at Bonn:
"The Federal Government confirms it will -- as in the past -- protect all deliveries of nuclear materials and installations supplied by the United States as well as all materials which are utilized or produced in connection with j
the exploitation of these materials or installations by physical safeguarding standards at least equalling those published in IAEA INFCIRC 254.
This physical safeguarding will be carried out pursuant to the London guidelines."
As the levels of protection called for in the Supplier Guidelines were derived directly from INFCIRC/225/ Revision 1 and were specifically designed to achieve levels of pro-tection consistent with the physical protection measures in INFCIRC/225/ Revision 1, it is the judgment of the Executive Branch that.this assurance meets the requirements set forth by the Commission under 10 CFR Section 110.43, established pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.
Therefore it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is met.
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Criterion (4)
"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.
In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such re-transfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive.such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section."
Article IX A.(3) of the U.S.-Sweden Agreement for Co-operation, as amended, provides that:
"No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of Sweden or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement will be trans-ferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Sweden except as the Commission may agree to such a transfer to another nation or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commission, the 1
transfer of the material is within the scope of an Agree-ment for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or groups of nations."
Article VII Bis E.
of the Agreement provides that "Special nuclear material produced through the use of mate-rial transferred to the Government of Sweden or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to Agreement, may be transferred to any other nation or group of nations, pro-vided that such nation or group of nations has an appropriate j
agreement for cooperation with the United States of America or guarantees that the use of such special nuclear material for peaceful purposes under safeguards acceptable to the Parties."
f There is a possible ambiguity in this language relating i
to a transfer to a nation or international organization, in that it does not explicitly stipulate whether the U.S.
or i
the other party is responsible for making the determination j
whether an " appropriate" Agreement for Cooperation exists.
(This is more than a pro forma finding that an agreement i
exists, since the word " appropriate" conveys the intent that the contemplated transfer is fully within the scope of the agreement.)
J However, it should be noted that the only way in which 1
special nuclear material covered by this article could become 1
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available for such transfer is through Swedish re-processing of spent fuel which had resulted from the irradiation in Sweden of U.S.-supplied source or special j
nuclear material.
So long as the produced material remains in the spent fuel it is not separable from the US-suppliud material, which is subject to the pro-visions of Article IX A.
(3).
Sweden presently has no s
indigenous reprocessing capacity nor is any planned.
?urthermore, should a Swedish reprocessing facility be built in the future, any reprocessing of U.S.-origin source or special nuclear material would be subject to U.S.
approval under Article VII Bis C.
of the Agree-ment and an unambigous U.S.
approval right over re-l transfer of recovered generated material could be ob-j tained at that time should Sweden desire to reprocess spent fuel of U.S.
origin and the U.S.
were otherwise prepared to make the determination required in that article.
It is the Executive Branch view that Article IX A.
j (3) gives the U.S.
a clear right of approval over re-transfers of exported materials or facilities, while Article VII Bis E.,
taken in conjunction with Article VII Bis C.,
gives the U.S.
an equivalent right with 1
respect to produced special nuclear material; therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (4) is met with respect to Sweden.
Article XI(2) of the November 8, 1958 Joint Program Ag re emen t, as amended, which is incorporated in the Ad-ditional Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, by Article V of the latter Agreement, provides that no material (including equipment and devices) may be trans-ferred beyond the control of the EURATOM Community, un-less the United States agrees.
Article 1 bis D of the Additional Agreement for Co-operation, as amended, provides that special nuclear material produced through the use of US-supplied material may be exported to any nation outside the Community or to a group of nations, provided that such nation or group of nations has an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation with the United States or guarantees the peaceful use of the produced material under safeguards acceptable to the Com-munity and the United States.
The European Community's interpretation of this language--as set out in an April 15 letter to the Department of State from Fernand Spaak, Head of the Delegation of the Community of the European Communities--is that the European Community Supply Agency prior to any proposed transfer will consult with the
United States to find out whether, in the view of the U.S.,
the proposed recipient of such produced special nu-clear material has an Agreement for Cooperation with the United States which is " appropriate".
During discussions with representatives of the Com-munity held in Washington on November 1, 1978, the Euro-pean Community confirmed that material subject to Article 1 bis D could not be transferred outside of the Community unless the U.S.
agreed that the recipient countries or group of nations had an appropriate Agreement for Coopera-tion with the U.S or safeguards acceptable to both parties.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that, with regard to the proposed export and special nuclear material produced through its use, criterion (4) is me t.
- With respect to transfers within the Community, it should be noted that the use of the words " group of nations" in criterion (4) makes clear that no retransfer consent right is required within a group of nations under this criteria.
With respect to this provision, the Senate report states:
"It should be noted that under the US-EURATOM Agreements, the US does have a right of prior approval on retransfers of certain material outside of the EURATOM Community.
It should also be noted that paragraph 4 does not require prior approval with respect to trans-fers within the EURATOM Community, con-sistent with US policy of treating that Community as a (single) entity."
The Congressional intent not to require US consent rights for transfers within the Community is also cluar in Section 123 a.(5) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, since it re-quires that the US seek a guarantee "by the cooperating party" (which in this case is EURATOM as a whole).
It should be noted that since the US-EURATOM Agreements for Cooperation were authorized in accordance with Section 124 of the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission may continue to issue export licenses until March 10, 1980 pursuant to the authority in the first proviso in Section 126a(2), even if criterion (4) were not met.
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t Criterion (5) i t
"No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel elements con-taining such material removed from a reactor shall be al-tered in form.or' content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or altera-
{
tion."
i Article VII Bis C.
of the U.S.-Sweden Agreement for Co-operation provides that:
"When any special nuclear material received from the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement requires reprocessing, or any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement are to be removed from a reactor and are to be altered in form or content, such re-processing or alteration shall be performed in facilities acceptable to both Parties upon a joint determination of the Parties that the provisions of Article X may be effectively applied."
As no joint determination under Article VII Bis C.
can be made without the agreement of the United States, and since the facilities to be used must be acceptable to the U.S.
as one of the Parties, it is the judgment of the Executive Branch that criterion (5) is met with respect to Sweden.
EURATOM is expressly exempted from Criterion (5) by virtue of Section 126 (a)2 of the Act for a period of two years from March 10, 1978, since the Department of State notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 20, 1978, that EURATOM has agreed to negotiations with the United States as called for in 4ection 404 (a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of.978.
However, this exemption in no way derogates from tne rights wnich the United States has under the US-EURATOM Agreements for Cooperation.
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Criterion (6)
"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nu-clear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any'such exported sensitive nuclear technology."
The proposed export does not involve the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology.
Criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.
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B.
Section 128 Criterion Section 128 a. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following additional criterion:
"As a condition of con-tinued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are main-tained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state'at the time of the export."
It should be noted that this criterion only applies to license applications under which the first export would not take place until after March 10, 1980 or pursuant to an ap-plication submitted after September 10, 1979.
h'e anticipate that the recommended export (s) will be initiated prior to March 10, 1980.
In any case, Sweden and the FRG are Parties to the NPT and, thus, have agreed to accept IAEA safeguards with respect to all their peaceful nuclear activities.
All peaceful nuclear activities of both countries are currently subject to IAEA or EURATOM safeguards.
Therefore it is the Executive Branch view that this criterion is met.
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3.
Additional Factors A.
Safeguards Implementation The IAEA Secretariat has noted in its Special Safe-guards Implementation Report that with regard to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, while some deficiencies exist in the system, no diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material was detected in any of the 45 states in which inspections were carried out.
Although recognizing the need to. correct existing deficiencies in safeguards in-plementation, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat's report is not valid.
In the light of this and other factors associated with the proposed export, the Executive Branch believes the framework of com-mitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpose of this export.
B.
Special Non-Proliferation and Other Foreign Policy Considerations None.
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9 4.
Inimicality Judgment Based on review of the proposed export it is the judg-ment of the Executive Branch that the proposed export will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and that the license should be issued.
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