ML20197D404
| ML20197D404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1986 |
| From: | Mark Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Conway R GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605140260 | |
| Download: ML20197D404 (2) | |
Text
_-
.j MAY 0 81986 1
Docket Nos.: 50-424 50-425 Mr. Richard Conway Vice President and Project Director Georgia Power Company Box 299A, Route 2 Waynesboro, GA 30830
Dear Mr. Conway:
I
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SER CONFIRMATORY ITEM 22, "0PERATOR ACTION IN EVENT OF A SMALL-BREAX LOCA" Georgia Power Company responded to confirmatory item 22 regarding operator action in event of a small-break LOCA by letter dated December 9,1985. The NRC staff reviewed this response and discussed its concern with your staff in a January 2,1986, telephone conference call. Because we have not yet received a further response from Georgia Power Company on this issue, we feel it is appropriate to document the outstanding questions which are contained in the enclosure. This issue must be resolved prior to licensing of Vogtle Unit 1.
If there are any questions, contact me at (301) 492-7357, 5
Melanie A. Miller, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate #4 l
Division of PWR Licensing-A
Enclosure:
DISTRIBUTION:
As stated Docket File NRC-PDR cc:
W. Jensen Local PDR R. Lobel PD#4 R/F BJYoungblood 0 ELD EJordan BGrimes JPartlow MMiller i
MDuncan ACRS(10) d
- lr MBJYoungblood 5/i
/86 5/j/86 8605140260 860508 PDR ADOCK 05000424 E
ENCLOSURE Request for Additional Information CI #22, Operator action in event of SBLOCA The staff SER (NUREG-1137) dated June 1985 contained the following description of confimatory item 22.
"The applicant needs to provide confimatory information through plant-specific calculations that the operator can mitigate the consequences of the limiting small-break LOCA in mode 3 with the ECCS locked out (per operator procedures and Technical Specification requirements). Operator failure to respond to specific alarms should be addressed in the applicant's submittal as part of the single failure analysis. The applicant should address the maximum time available to the operator to mitigate the event and provide assurances that the operator will respond before that time.
.... timely operator action for a very small LOCA during startup and shutdown should be verified." Some of the requested infomation was provided by the applicant in a letter of December 9,1985. We require the following additional information.
1.
The operator is required to manually initiate safety injection (SI) for small-break LOCAs two inches in diameter and smaller if automatic SI is defeated below 1900 psia. Describe operator procedures and training which will ensure that the required action will be initiated in a timely manner.
2.
Provide plant-specific small-break L(TA analyses below 1000 psig when the accumulators are isolated and belov: 350*F when the safety injection pumps are isolated. Describe and justify any operator action to restore accumulators or SI pumps by comparison to procedures.
3.
Appendices 8 and C to the December 9,1985, letter stated that for
" postulated LOCA at cooldown condition of 1000 psig, previous calculations show that the clad does not heat up beyond its initial temperature during blowdown." Provide an available reference for these calculations.
4.
Appendixes B and C, which provide LOCA analyses from different initial conditions, result in the same calculated temperatures.
Please verify that this is coincidence and not editorial error.
.