ML20197A745
| ML20197A745 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1986 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605120378 | |
| Download: ML20197A745 (3) | |
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April 22, 1986
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' Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30302
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-369, 50-370
Reference:
RII:REW NRC/OIE Inspection Report 50-369/85-45, 50-370/85-46
Dear Dr. Grace:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, please find attached a response to violation which was identified in the above referenced Inspection Report.
Very truly yours, M
__ ^
Hal B. Tucker JBD/jgm Attachment xc:
Mr. W.T. Orders Senior NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station 860S120378 860422 PDR ADOCK 05000369 O
PDR fO[
g DUKE POWER COMPANY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION RESPONSE TO VIOLATION IN INSPECTION REPORT 50-369/85-45 AND 50-370/85-46
. Violation 50-369/85-45-01, Severity Level IV Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that current written. approved procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978 which include recovery from Reactor Trip.
Station Directive 3.1.10 requires that malfunctions or failures in equipment or components subject to Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation requirements be evaluated and corrected as required prior to restart.
It further requires in Enclosure 4.1 that a review of safety. systems be performed to identify other than expected performance, and also that abnormal behavior be evaluated and resolved prior to restart.
Contrary to the above, the post trip review preceding Unit I reactor startup of November 2, 1985, was deficient in that it did not evaluate and resolve the abnormal response noted on Pressurizer Heater Bank A.
Response
1.
Admission or denial of the alleged violation:
Duke Power denies the alleged violation.
2..
Reasons for the alleged violation (if admitted):
Duke Power Company submits the following explanation for denying the alleged violation:
Technical Specification 3.4.3 requires that two pressurizer heater groups be operable with a minimum capacity of 150 KW each in modes 1, 2, and 3.
Following the Unit I reactor trip on November 2, 1985, Pressurizer Heater Group A alarmed indicating a " Loss of One Heater Bank".
The alarm cleared r
approximately 1.5 minutes into the transient and did not re-alarm during i
the remainder of the transient nor during the subsequent startup.
l j.
Pressurizer Heater Group A could not have been operating with a capacity of
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less than 150 KW without actuating the " Loss of One Heater Bank" alarm.
However, actuation of the alarm does not mean capacity has been reduced to this level. The alarm is designed to actuate long before the heater group capacity is reduced to 150 KW.
Duke Power Company agrees that additional follow-up on the Pressurizer Heater Group A alarm should have been pursued after startup. However, no further evaluation of the alarm was considered necessary prior to unit l
startup as the alarm was not actuated. No anomalous behavior of Heater Group A was observed and there was no question that the available pressurizer heater capacity far exceeded the minimum required for operability as defined by Technical Specification 3.4.3.
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' 3.
Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:
While Duke Power Company denies the alleged violation, the following steps have been taken:
Operation of the pressurizer heaters and associated alarms has been covered with those personnel performing post-trip reviews.
A change has been made to the procedure, " Transient / Reactor Trip Investigation" instructing the post trip review personnel to specifically check the pressurizer heater alarm points following each transient and/or reactor trip.
Post trip review personnel have been instructed to issue work requests and follow-up on any anomalous pressurizer heater response.
4.
Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations:
No additional steps are considered necessary.
5.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
McGuire Nuclear Station is presently in full compliance.
L