ML20196L213

Provides Comments Re Draft Evaluation Rept for Plant 860403 Emergency Exercise.No Concerns Observed Which Could Adversely Impact Public Health & Safety

ML20196L213
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	05/13/1986
From:	Gordan C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Asher J Federal Emergency Management Agency
References
NUDOCS 8807070296
Download: ML20196L213 (4)

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. MAY 131986

~ MEMORANDUM FOR: James Asher, Chairman, Regional Assistance Committee Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region III THRU: Terry L. Harpster. Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section.

Energency Preparedness and Radiological Protection. Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards FROM: Craig Z. Gordon, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Emergency Preparedness Section, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT FOR APRIL 3, 1986 LIMERICK GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY EXERCISE Per your request of May 2,1986, we have reviewed the subject draft and offer the following comments:

1. We agree with the "Explanation of Inadequacies" (p. 76) in that no areas requiring corrective action or improvement are described in the report which could adversely affect public health and safety. We believe this to be true if each deficiency is evaluated either on an individual basis or collectively. Also, the exercise sunnary section at the beginning of the report provides an overview of observations made at each State and local facility, but no determir,ation is made regarding overall performance. Although we recognize that such determination is reserved to your headquarters staff, we believe it prudent to indicate in the beginning of the report that no concerns were observed which could adversely impact public health and safety.

2. Other comments specific to those areas assigned to me, are annotated on pages xxi, 4 and 113 (enclosed).

If you have any questions regarding our review, please contact us.

. (M m88 Craig Z. Gordon go. Emergency Preparedness Specialist

Enclosure:

As stated

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l 88 R. Bellamy, NRC SC W. Adams, D0T gg B. Belanger, EPA J ,,

o3c2 B. Conley, USDA

0) M F. Gill, PHS l

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RI:DRSS Rl: 1 Gordon r ,

5/%/86 6 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY SW

, EXERCISE SCERARIO Unit One is operating at 85 percent power. At 1530, a fire is detected in the turbine enclosure along the west wall in the area of the condensate transfer, refueling water and condensate transfer jockey pumps. Offsit?

assistance is required due to the severity of the fire. An tinusual Event is declared. g g Condensate pumps trip as a resul f loss of power which results in the tripping of the feedwater pumps. The reactor vessel water level begins to decrease with a reactor scran occurring. The turbine trips, stop valves close and stean bypass valves open fully. The reactor vessel pressure M

begins pressure Drywell to . increase after isolation and tenperature beginoftothe rise.mainAnstean Alert is isolation declaredvalves.

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(csed +hr kk At 1730 the control room is notified that a contaminated injury has occurred ad @ n in the radwaste enclosure. At 1830, the casing on a reactor recirculation pump breaks, causing reactor vessel level and pressure to drop with a sharp increase in drywell pressure and temperature. A Site Emergency is declared b o.rtwlfof I

With the loss of all low pressure injection, the vessel level falls con M mar Pras+

rapidly. At 1850, the control room receives an indication that the drywellWhc Jkn to p purge valve has backed off the fully closed position; drywell radiation levels are increasing. At 1920, releases from the north stack begin to

increase, resulting fren leakage through the purge line. Along with partial I opening of the motor-operated purge valve, the air-operated purge line valve l has developed a leak past the seat. By 2000, drywell radiation levels I

continue to increase, with increased releases through the north stack, / _

! General Emergency is declared, - -

o. core, spnq pwp b apsird and b$4s b I4eci vahr inh Tr3*,l{ fa on M By 2050.hthe reactbr vessel.-icycl h stedj. Drywell temperature and aft todicOc *E pressure are reduced ( Releases to the atmosphere are stopped at 2200 when eldaqco the purge valve is closed.

The simulated events, radiation readings, and emergency classification levels (sumarized above) provided by the Limerick Generating Station

) triggered offsite exercise actions. Because of Pennsylvania's policy of P instituting protective actions, when necessary, within the entire plume EP2, based upon a recommendation by the utility, and after an assessment by the l Bureau of Radiation Protection and consultation with the Pennsylvania L Emergency Management Agency, the Governor directed an evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ. The various State, county, municipal, school, and private organizations utilized their respective plans and procedurec to produce a coordinated and timely emergency response, r

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iN Mt. DEA den it @WM b t k W rfdc W h e 04er $Hude-gjjg,j Energency Operations Facility pg (negg ggp g, g Activation and staffing of the EOF were adequate demonstrated. The State h M-nf Pennsylvania was represented at the E0F and echnical Support Center (TSC) by staf f from the BRP who arrived at 1815. State personnel had access to the utility work area, including plant paraneters, naps, and status boards. Suf ficient space, equipnent, and displays were available at the EOF to support energency operations and functions by State personnel. The comunication system included 2 individual dedicated telephone lines linking the TSC, E0F, and BRP (Harrisburg). One phone is used to coordinate technical and engin'- y J.ta while the other is used to transnit radiological data 0 '::aated infomation which BRP uses to perforn offsite dose assessment. Sone of the data is transmitted directly fron utility radiological assessnent personnel in the EOF to BRP.

The public infomation and runor control functions are coordinated locally at the utility's media center and through PE?tA at the State level. Although the dose assessnent function is not perforned by BRD staff at the EOF,

1. hgchanges in plant status, ar 1.ransnitted to theradiation Stateti areleases, t n t'c- rn.and meteorologicalforinformation Recomendations yB ro ective measures were coordinated and d'iscussed between the BRP 9pide representative and key utility representatives prior to transnittal to the State E0C. Protective action reenmendations were observed to be accurate po. and timely.

Energency Operations Facility Inadequacies /Recomendations See Sumary of inadequacies.

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AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT ,

' Reference ,

Actual Proj'd

NUREG-0654 Cncrectinn Date Date Part II Recommendation

5. Er. cept for those activities required by plan to be completed following each escalation of energency classification, activity at many of the municipal EOCs wat very slow. It is recommended that future exercises provide for the incorporation of controller-inserted situations to maintain a high level of staff response and scenario reality.

Emergency Operations Facility

6. Utility representatives were required to delay the scenario in order to provide additional time for offsite authorities and local emergency response personnel to demonstrate necessary obj ectives. Future scenarios should allow events a to be coordinated with offsite response timesso R #

that all emergency personnel (includirig all levels of utility. State and local responders) are able to exercise a smooth transition between each energency classification, i

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